FNAOM-ACTDM

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November 10, 1951

Beginning of the Battle of Hoa Binh (Indochina War).

"Operation Tulip is the preparatory phase for Operation Lotus, which is the operation on Hoa Binh. Operation Tulip aimed to occupy the Cho Ben gap: it was a covering operation. Tulipe was launched on 10 November, and Operation Lotus began on the evening of the 13th with the opening of the motorised column. Hoa Binh was occupied by the paratroopers (1st, 2nd and 7th Colonial Parachute Battalions) on November 14, who were joined in the afternoon by the first elements of the ground formations. Moreover, the Muong country is not caught in a pincer movement. Hoa Binh was an abscess of fixation, a center of resistance whose purpose was to attract the Viet battle corps. With more or less happy results. French losses were underestimated: 436 killed + 458 missing (many of whom died) and 1,360 wounded. This is a low estimate." CDT Yvan Cadeau

The Battle of Hoa Binh

10 November 1951 – 25 February 1952 · Operations Tulip, Lotus and Rainbow

In the autumn of 1951, de Lattre broke Giap's five offensives around the delta (Vinh Yen, Mao Khé, le Day, Nghia Lo). Pressured by Paris and Washington to regain the initiative, he needed an offensive victory before the vote on the Indochinese budget in December, which also justified American aid. The choice fell on Hoa Binh, the capital of the Muong country evacuated in 1950, 70 km from Hanoi: the crossroads of the RC 6 and the Black River, on the corridor linking the Viet Bac to Thanh Hoa, the industrial centre of the Vietminh.

The strategic objectives are threefold:

• cutting the north-south communication axis of the Vietminh;

• to force Giap to fight on terrain favourable to French firepower;

• wear out your battle body.

The decision was reportedly inspired by the 2nd office of Squadron Leader Boussarie (of the Marine Artillery) and by Colonel Vanuxem. General Salan designed and executed the manoeuvre. The Tulip and Lotus operations were launched.

Tulip (November 10, 1951). The paratrooper legionnaires seized the Cho Ben gap, which blocked the southern flank of the operation. Commando 23, from the 6th RIC (Lieutenant Rusconi), took part in Tulipe as well as in Lotus.

Lotus (14 November 1951). The operation involved twenty-six units: two motorized groups advanced through RC 6 and the Black River, while three parachute battalions were dropped directly on Hoa Binh. These were the 1st, 2nd and 7th BPC, colonial parachute battalions. The 2nd BEP (Raffalli) also took part in the investment. The Vietminh, surprised, hardly resisted: by 15 November, the whole of Muong country was occupied.

• Hoa Binh Resistance Center: 5 battalions and an artillery group, extended by staggered strongpoints along the two supply axes.

• About fifteen battalions stationed in Muong country: Roux (2/13 DBLE) and Vaillant (3/13 DBLE) battalions, Colonel de Castries' GM 1, Muong infantrymen.

• Withdrawal of RC 6: 11 battalions mobilized.

• Evacuation of February 1952: more than 20,000 to 22,000 men brought back to the delta.

The colonial infantry provided both the airborne spearhead (the BPC) and the leader of the decisive phase: Colonel Gilles, (St Cyrian, former member of the 24th RTS and the RCCC) head of the 1st demi-brigade of colonial parachute commandos.

In December, the 308 and 312 divisions gained a foothold on either side of the Black River, 20 km north of Hoa Binh. On 22 December, an ambush sank an LCM and three speedboats in twelve minutes: the waterway was abandoned. Giap then focused his efforts on RC 6, reinforced by Division 304.

During the night of 7 to 8 January 1952, the Xom Phéo post, held by the 2/13th DBLE, repelled the assault of a reinforced regiment: nearly 800 Vietminh dead, against a dozen killed and forty French wounded. Colonel Gilles then reopened the road in five weeks, according to his formula: "Bait the Viet by holding out your little finger [...] give him a good blow on the head with the other hand. »

Hoa Binh was the first entrenched camp of the war: airstrip, fire planes, barbed wire networks, fortified strongpoints. Its weakness lies in its dependence on two vulnerable land and river routes, whose defence absorbs the mobile reserves.

Salan drew the lesson at Na San (October 1952): an air-land base resupplied exclusively by air, intended to wear down the enemy "as in the battle of Hoa Binh", but without logistical axes to hold. The concept was taken up again at the Plain of Jars and then at Dien Bien Phu.

Giap took advantage of the disappearance of the mobile reserves to infiltrate battalions into the delta. Salan, who considered that the operation was taking too many resources from the CEFEO, decided to withdraw on 5 February: Operation Arc-en-ciel (Colonel Gilles, Lieutenant-Colonel Ducournau (St Cyrian, former member of the Corps d'Afrique), 22-25 February 1952) was a model of stalling, carried out with few losses.

• On the tactical level: the three Vietminh divisions lost a third of their manpower and remained unavailable for seven months.

• Strategically: The war map does not change. The CEFEO proved unable to hold the ground out of the delta, and public opinion perceived the abandonment as a sign of powerlessness.

#AAMTDM - Denis D.