SYNOPSIS  MACV-SOG, or Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, was a joint service unconventional warfare task force engaged in highly classified operations throughout Southeast Asia. The 5th Special Forces channeled personnel into MACV-SOG (though it was not a Special Forces group) through Special Operations Augmentation (SOA), which provided their "cover" while under secret orders to MACV-SOG. These teams performed deep penetration missions of strategic reconnaissance and interdiction that were called, depending on the location and time frame, "Shining Brass," "Daniel Boone," "Salem House" or "Prairie Fire" missions.

During 1968 and early 1969, CCS had been inserting 6-man reconnaissance patrols into the Fish Hook border area between South Vietnam and Cambodia. The hard reality was due to the intense enemy presence continuously operating in the region, if a patrol could be inserted and stay on the ground undetected for three days, it was very lucky. Many teams were discovered within 30 minutes of insertion and forced to be extracted under fire shortly thereafter. Another major factor faced by reconnaissance teams, including the Hatchet Force, was locating an unguarded landing zone (LZ). Locating one large enough for a single helicopter insertion was one thing, however, finding an unguarded LZ large enough to accommodate four helicopters was quite another.

To shift the balance of power and disrupt the NVA's influence in the region, a direct attack on the North Vietnamese headquarters for operations in South Vietnam known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) was developed by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The headquarters bunker complex was located just a mile inside Cambodia in the Fish Hook area; approximately 14 miles southeast of Memot, Cambodia; 20 miles southeast of Quan Loi and 28 miles northeast of Tay Ninh, South Vietnam.

After receiving his mission days before the Hatchet Force was to be inserted, Lt. Col. Earl Trabue, Commander of Command and Control South, informed OP-35, MACV-SOG in his opinion their plan to attack the COSVN complex was not viable. The plan included the Hatchet Force snatching NVA prisoners as well as reporting on the effects of a B-52 Arc Light air strike against the COSVN complex that was also going to be used to cover the team's insertion. Lt. Col. Trabue fully understood the complexities of the mission and believed it to be too dangerous to insert only an augmented platoon and should be cancelled. Further, he believed the B-52 Arc Light air strike would not stun the enemy as projected.

The size of the Hatchet Force was limited as only 9 US Army Huey helicopters assigned to the 195th Assault Helicopter Company were available for the 10 minute, 20-mile flight from Quan Loi Airfield, MACV-SOG's southern launch site, to the target - 4 Huey transport insertion helicopters supported by 4 Huey gunships and 1 Huey command and control aircraft for directing the overall mission. Because of the flight configuration, only one platoon-sized force could be assigned to this mission.

On 24 April 1969, Capt. William H. O'Rourke, Jr., company commander and ground mission commander; Capt. Paul D. Cahill, assistant ground commander; 1st Lt. Gregory M. Harrigan and 1st Lt. Walter L. Marcantel, then SFC Jerry M. "Mad Dog" Shriver, Hatchet Force exploitation platoon leader; Sgt. Earnest C. Jamison, team medic; and their Montagnard soldiers comprised the augmented Hatchet Force that was to be inserted into Cambodia by helicopter 1½ miles north of the Vietnamese/Cambodian border.

All US Army helicopters were under the operational control of the air commander in the command and control helicopter. The only other air asset assigned to this mission was an Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC) who was to call for and coordinate fixed wing air assets should their participation be necessary.

Shortly before takeoff at dawn, SFC Shriver boarded the first helicopter. As the aircraft lifted off the ground for the flight, the B-52s were to be making final preparations for their bomb run against COSVN. At the same time the helicopters prepared to takeoff, the Huey carrying Capt. O'Rourke and 5 team members developed mechanical problems and was forced to abort the mission. Because of this, Capt. Cahill, the assistant ground commander, took over the responsibilities of ground commander for the remainder of the mission.

The original plan was for the helicopters to insert the team as the air strike's dust settled. Unfortunately, when the helicopters arrived at the designated coordinates, it was the wrong location. The aircraft flew around for 30 to 45 minutes searching for signs of dry bomb craters, which would mark the correct site. When the pilots finally found three dry ones, the helicopters descended in-trail toward them and landed. After the members of the Hatchet Force leaped off, the helicopters' pulled up and away from the landing zone (LZ) for their return flight to Quan Loi.

As soon as the landing force was on the ground, the men took cover in one of two craters located side by side and roughly 30 to 50 yards from the bunker complex. Immediately after discharging their passengers, the helicopters pulled up and away from the LZ. They had reached an altitude of only 20 feet above the ground when the NVA opened fire from concrete bunkers and entrenched positions with a withering barrage of gunfire wounding or killing those men who had not reached the safety of the craters.

From his position in the western-most bomb crater, Jerry Shriver radioed other team members stating that a machine gun bunker to his left front had his men pinned down and asked if anyone could fire at it to relieve the pressure. Capt. Cahill, 1st Lt. Marcantel and Sgt. Ernest C. Jamison, who had taken cover in the center crater, reported they were also pinned down and unable to help. The air commander notified the Hatchet Force that he was bringing in the gunships for air support. Immediately he directed all gunships to use their mini-guns and rockets to attack the NVA positions. Further, to make sure no short rounds or bombs hit our troops, all attack passes were made along the bunker line, not head on into it. As the aircraft made their attack passes, one of the door gunners noted that the bunkers were made of concrete.

From his vantage point overhead, Maj. Benjamin T. Kapp, Jr., the southern launch site's senior launch officer who was also in the command and control aircraft as coordinator to assist Lt. Col. Trabue should the situation necessitate it, observed the battle site. From his vantage point, Maj. Kapp could see the platoon members in the bomb craters. According to one report, he witnessed North Vietnamese machine guns firing into the bodies of the men lying in front of the enemy positions. These machine guns also covered the open ground covered in ankle-high brown grass with grazing fire effectively trapping the members of the exploitation platoon.

Approximately 10 to 15 minutes into the raging battle, Capt. Cahill heard SFC Shriver transmit over his radio that he and five Montagnard soldiers were going to enter the tree line on the west edge of the LZ in an effort to flank an enemy position. Paul Cahill observed the 6 men as they broke from the crater and ran across the 30 yards of open ground between the crater and the treeline. As the men raced through the low grass toward the trees, Jerry Shriver maintained radio contact with the command and control aircraft and Capt. Cahill continued to monitor their progress.

As he watched, Paul Cahill saw SFC Shriver being struck by several rounds of automatic weapons fire at the treeline and fall to the ground. At the same time, radio contact between Jerry Shriver and the command aircraft was severed in mid-sentence. During the remainder of the mission several attempts were made to reestablish radio contact with the exploitation platoon leader, however, all attempts failed. Later Paul Cahill reported he believed "Jerry Shriver was dead when he hit the ground."

Also early in the fierce fighting, Sgt. Jamison left the protection of the crater to retrieve one of the wounded Montagnards. The team medic reached the soldier, but was immediately struck by a burst of machine gun fire that killed him instantly. Later in the heat of battle, Capt. Cahill lifted his head above the crater rim to evaluate the situation and was struck in the mouth by an AK-47 round that deflected upward into his right eye. This resulted in his total blindness for the next 30 minutes and the permanent loss of his right eye.

At the same time the Hatchet Force was engaged in vicious combat, several other teams were conducting reconnaissance operations from CCS's northern launch site located at Ban Me Thuot. When it became apparent that the gunships on hand did not have the necessary firepower to adequately suppress the NVA enough to evacuate the survivors, those teams from the northern launch site already on the ground were ordered to find secure positions to remain in until further notice. When the teams acknowledged they were in safe locations, the gunships assigned for their protection were sent south to rescue the Hatchet Force. Those helicopters, whose aircrews were assigned to the US Air Force's 20th Special Operations Squadron, arrived at the COSVN battle site approximately an hour and a half later.

After the contingent of gunships grew from 4 to 8, 1st Lt. Harrigan requested all gunships to press their attack with rockets and mini-guns. The increased airpower was successful in stemming the NVA ground fire, but not in halting it. After the enemy's ground fire was suppressed, Greg Harrigan reported that over half his platoon was dead or wounded, and then continued to direct the aerial attacks for another 45 minutes before being mortally wounded himself.

Meanwhile, to bolster and support the Hatchet Force already on the ground, a reconnaissance team comprised of two Americans and four Montagnards was inserted into a third bomb crater located roughly 80 yards east of the other two craters and only 10 yards west of the nearest grove of trees. Their mission was to attempt to flank the NVA bunker line in order to drop grenades into the bunkers' firing slits or rear entrances. However, after being safely inserted into the crater, the recon team reported they were also pinned down by heavy and accurate automatic weapons fire and could not move.

All the while, the 8 gunships continued to rotate between the area of operation and the mission’s launch site to rearm/refuel and drop a continuous barrage of mini-gun and rocket fire on the entrenched enemy positions.  Some time later in the day, 2 US Army Cobra gunships, call sign “Blue Max,” arrived onsite to add their firepower to that already being laid down by the Huey gunships.  The Cobras were assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA), Quang Loi, South Vietnam.  When it became apparent to Lt. Col. Trabue that the 10 helicopters still did not have the necessary firepower, he radioed the FAC asking him to arrange for Air Force strike aircraft to assist in the operation.  Shortly thereafter, the FAC notified the overall mission commander that “jet aircraft were not available to support this operation.”

Undeterred, Earl Trabue sent his request through the launch site's communication center to CCS Headquarters and then on to OPS 35, MACV-SOG. The end result was that a flight of US Air Force jet fighters arrived on station roughly 45 minutes later. After the fighters made several attack passes with bombs, rockets and machine gun fire, the survivors on the ground reported there was still too much enemy ground fire for an evacuation attempt to be made.

Weighing all the options and weapons available to him, Lt. Col. Trabue made the decision to use napalm against the NVA bunkers in an attempt to break the communists' grip on his beleaguered men. Once the decision was made, Lt. Col. Trabue requested the strike aircraft to make their napalm run along the line of concrete bunkers instead of over the heads of the Hatchet Force. After two napalm sorties, the Americans on the ground reported a sizable decrease in enemy activity and that it was now safe for them to be evacuated.

Immediately after the last napalm strike and after some 8 hours of brutal combat, all four recovery helicopters were able to dash in to extract the ground team. Three aircraft evacuated the Hatchet Force from their two craters and one recovered the recon team from the third. The battle site was ringed by clumps of trees with only two major openings in them, one approximately 20 yards wide on the northeast corner of the LZ and the other roughly 50 yards wide on the eastern end of the south side of the battle site near the eastern-most crater. Three of the pilots' made their approach from east to west. The pilots knew that because the treeline to the west was so close to the craters that they could not clear them with a heavy load, they swung their aircraft around so the tailboom's were pointing west in preparation for departing to the east. The forth helicopter entered the LZ through the gap in the trees at the northeast corner, set down close to the last crater and also departed through the east-southeastern gap in the trees.

As the aircraft lifted off, several crewmen in one of the helicopters saw movement in the center bomb crater. The helicopter again set down near the crater and 1st Lt. Daniel Hall raced over to it to recover the survivors. On his first trip 1st Lt. Hall recovered the team's badly wounded radio operator. On his second trip, and with the NVA firing at him and the waiting helicopter, he successfully dragged the body of 1st Lt. Harrigan to the aircraft. Once 1st Lt. Hall was safely back on board, the Huey rapidly pulled up and away from the battle site under fire.

Of the 18 men inserted for the mission and the 6 later inserted in support of the Hatchet Force, only the members of the recon team were recovered uninjured. Of the original 18 members of the Hatchet Force, 10 were wounded and safely evacuated. Greg Harrigan's remains were recovered, Ernest Jamison was reported as Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered, and Jerry Shriver, along with his 5 Montagnards, was reported as Missing in Action.

After the exploitation platoon was decimated, other Special Forces personnel assigned to Command and Control North were listening to a North Vietnamese propaganda broadcast made by "Hanoi Hanna" when they heard her boast that "Mad Dog Shriver had been captured" by NVA forces. A second broadcast aired by Hanoi Hanna some time after the first stated that "they had Shriver's ears," which was a euphemism for Jerry Shriver being dead and the NVA having his body. The first broadcast was later substantiated by a US military intelligence report declassified in 1993 that acknowledged "Vietnamese voices were later heard (which) stated that one American was in the process of being captured."

In June 1969, SFC Jerry Shriver's comrades at Command and Control South, commemorated his life and the unparalleled level of esteem to which they held him by hanging his prized Chinese smoking jacket in a prominent place of honor in the camp's club. The following inscription was displayed underneath the silk smoking jacket:

In Memory of Sergeant First Class Jerry M. Shriver

Missing in Action 24 April 1969

The above is by no means meant as a vulgar display. It is meant as a humble tribute to a man who was a legend among the members of CCS. A tribute to an individual who was one of the most courageous men ever to wear the Green Beret. SFC Jerry M. Shriver spent 3 ½ continuous years in Vietnam. During his tour he volunteered for almost every hazardous, classified project run by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Due to the classification of the missions in which he participated, we are unable to give him the recognition he deserves. Those who knew him can attest that he personally killed over 100 enemy and the information that he obtained caused the death of thousands more. His accomplishments were so well known that Radio Hanoi nicknamed him "MAD DOG" and offered a reward of $10,000.00 for his death or capture.

Below is a list of the personal decorations he received:

                                                                    2 Silver Stars
                                                                    3 Army Commendation Medals for Valor
                                                                    1 Soldier's medal 1 Air Medal
                                                                    7 Bronze Stars for Valor
                                                                    1 Purple Heart

At 0615 hours on 24 April 1969, SFC Jerry M. Shriver boarded a helicopter in Quan Loi for a mission that he stated the night before he would not return. The last words he was known to speak as he turned to board the helicopter were, "Take care of my boy," referring to Klaus, his German Shepard that he left behind. Klaus, the smoking jacket displayed above and a little over one dollar in MPC constituted most of his personal possessions.

SFC Shriver spoke Radhe fluently and had a deep concern for the Montagnards. He spent the majority of his pay buying food and clothing for the families of the Montagnard members of his platoon.

The smoking jacket is a biographical summary of the life and feelings of SFC Jerry M. Shriver. It not only reflects the hate he had for the enemy, but the love and dedication to duty that he had for his country. The embroidered Ogdaa means "One Good Deal After Another." A deeper interpretation is a meaning every volunteer understands, "IF you're a man, you've got the guts, and you want to fight with the best - Volunteer."

The accomplishments, courage and the attitude of SFC Jerry M. Shriver will long serve as an inspiration to those who wear the Green Beret. This jacket will remain here as a reminder that such a man did live and that he should not be forgotten ……. "One Good Deal After Another."

On 12 June 1970, a team from Graves Registration was inserted into the COSVN battle site to search the area for the 2 missing Special Forces Sergeants. They recovered human remains that were later identified as belonging to Ernest Jamison and 1 of the missing Montagnards. However, they found no trace of Jerry Shriver, the other 4 missing Montagnards or their equipment anywhere in or around the battle site.

For every insertion like this one that was detected and stopped, dozens of others safely slipped past NVA lines to strike a wide range of targets and collect vital information. The number of MACV-SOG missions conducted with Special Forces reconnaissance teams into Laos and Cambodia was 452 in 1969. It was the most sustained American campaign of raiding, sabotage and intelligence-gathering waged on foreign soil in US military history. MACV-SOG's teams earned a global reputation as one of the most combat effective deep-penetration forces ever raised.

If Jerry Shriver died in this savage battle, he has a right to have his remains returned to his family, friends and country. However, if he survived, he most certainly was captured and his fate, like that of other Americans who remain unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, could be quite different. Either way there is no question the Vietnamese could return him or his remains any time they had the desire to do so.

Since the end of the Vietnam War well over 21,000 reports of American prisoners, missing and otherwise unaccounted for have been received by our government. Many of these reports document LIVE American Prisoners of War remaining captive throughout Southeast Asia TODAY.

Military men in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were called upon to fly and fight in many dangerous circumstances, and they were prepared to be wounded, killed or captured. It probably never occurred to them that they could be abandoned by the country they so proudly served.

At the time he became Missing in Action, Jerry Shriver had less than three weeks left on his third tour of duty in Vietnam.

also see "Mad Dog Shriver"

 1970

On 21 March 1970, just 3 days after Prince Schanouk was removed by the parliament and Lon Nol was installed as the Prime Minister, then 1st Lt. Jerry L. Pool, team leader; SSgt. John A. Boronsky, assistant team leader; Sgt. Gary A. Harned, radio operator; and 5 Montagnard Commandos, comprised "Reconnaissance Team (RT) Pennsylvania," which was inserted by helicopter into Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. The team's mission was to determine the size and movements of the NVA force that was seizing control over the province as well as the suspected NVA movements in neighboring provinces.

Within an hour of being inserted, RT Pennsylvania had been located by highly trained NVA Counter-Recon Hunter teams who were aggressively following them. Moving in a southwesterly direction away from their insertion point, the team fought through heavy jungle and the steep mountain terrain at an exhausting pace. Each time the team stopped, the pursuing NVA would catch up with them and a brief firefight would ensue. During these encounters, the NVA pushed the team deeper into the mountains to avoid capture.

The first night RT Pennsylvania managed to set up a small encampment and gain some much needed rest. However, by first light the team was moving again, this time with the NVA even closer than before, and frequently seemingly right behind them. By nightfall of the second day, 1st Lt. Pool and his team were on a constant dodge and ambush routine with a large force of pursuing NVA. All the team's efforts to evade the NVA failed. Finally at a point when the team reached a state of nearly total exhaustion, the communists incorporated dogs into their search effort.

On the morning of 24 March 1970, the members of RT Pennsylvania were losing ground fast. Jerry Pool radioed for an emergency Prairie Fire Extraction. His team had gone as far as they could and needed to either abort the rest of the mission or face death or capture. Under the circumstances, they could not evade much longer. After relaying their dire situation, the team resumed its evasive tactics up the side of the next mountain.

The Forward Air Controller (FAC) Air Force Capt. Melvin Irvin, pilot; and MSgt. Charles Septer, observer; call sign "Covey," flew over RT Pennsylvania's position. MSgt. Septer was in constant radio contact with the Americans on the ground. 1st Lt. Pool reported they had been "running and ambushing all morning, but their pursuers were right behind them." Charles Septer knew he had to get relief for the team or they were not going to make it. He called for close air support and soon a flight of A1-E Skyraiders, referred to as "Spads" when functioning as attack aircraft, arrived on the scene. With the protective air cover dropping CBU (cluster bomb units) and napalm around the team, they were able to place some distance between themselves and the advancing enemy.

The napalm slowed down the NVA, but it also started numerous fires in the dense growth of the jungle, these fires soon became as much of a threat as the advancing NVA. Jerry Pool reported that now both the fires and NVA were closing in on them. As the Spads worked overhead, Charles Septer devised an extraction plan. He radioed instructions to the team leader directing the team to move to the nearest available extraction LZ that was southwest of their position, near the bottom of a narrow valley with steep canyon walls. 1st Lt. Pool acknowledged the transmission and again emphasized the NVA were closing in and they were going to need more aerial coverage. At roughly 1130 hours, MSgt. Septer called Dak To for additional close air support.

Capt. Michael D. "Mike" O'Donnell, aircraft commander; then WO1 John C. "Hippie" Hosken, pilot; SP4 Rudy M. Becerra, crew chief; and SP4 Berman Ganoe, door gunner; comprised the crew of a UH1H helicopter (serial #68-15262), call sign "Red 3," in a flight of 4 Huey and 4 Cobra gunships conducting the emergency extraction mission for the RT Pennsylvania. All 8 of the helicopters were assigned to the 170th Aviation Company, 17th Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade.

WO1 James E. Lake, who flew the aircraft that originally inserted RT Pennsylvania, and veteran pilot/former Green Beret Johnny Kemper, flew Red Lead, the flight leader for the Hueys. WO1 Hosken, while shy and retiring, received his nickname from the little round glasses he wore. SP4 Berman and SP4 Ganoe were both veterans of many clandestine missions "over the fence" into the politically denied areas of Laos and Cambodia. Capt. O'Donnell was Red platoon leader, but flew Red Three because while senior in rank, he was junior in experience, so he flew in the wingman position rather than lead. This was because on many MACV-SOG missions, experience equated to survival for the aircrews and teams alike.

After an approximately 20-minute flight, the four Cobras and two slicks arrived at the team's location. The Spads still circled in the sky above. Below them, the Covey Rider pointed out RT Pennsylvania's location to the gun team, and then gave coordinating references to the enemy positions based on the reports from 1st Lt. Pool. Immediately, the lead Cobra dove down to fire rockets along with its 40mm cannons and miniguns into NVA positions around RT Pennsylvania. The other gunship and the two Hueys orbited 1500 feet above the site, waiting for the team to reach the extraction LZ. The first Cobra soon expended its rockets and ammunition. The gunship withdrew from the area and flew to Dak To to rearm and refuel. On the ground, the situation facing RT Pennsylvania was deteriorating. Jerry Pool reported that they were back in contact with the enemy. They were moving as fast as possible, but the NVA were right behind them. To reach the LZ from their position, the team had to descend to the valley floor before moving southwest some distance.

In the sky above, WO1 Lake noted that he had a bit more than one hour of fuel remaining. Considering Pennsylvania's progress, he judged that it would reach the extraction LZ at about the time the two Hueys would be forced to return for fuel. He instructed Capt. O'Donnell to remain on station as long as possible to provide air cover for the team on the ground while he returned to Dak To to rearm, refuel and collect the other two Hueys for the extraction. Racing back to Dak To, James Lake and Johnny Kemper discussed the best way to perform what was sure to be a red-hot extraction. Landing in Dak To, WO1 Lake briefed the other two aircrews on their situation. Not only was RT Pennsylvania in desperate need of extraction, but by the time they could return, Capt. O'Donnell and the other Cobras would need to refuel. Time was critical.

Approximately 45 minutes later, WO1 Lake and the other two Hueys were enroute back to the LZ. WO1 William H. Stepp and WO1 Alan Hoffman were the pilots of the two Hueys. Neither pilot had extensive experience and WO1 Hoffman was also new to Vietnam. Because of this, neither of them totally appreciated the situation until they were airborne and had crossed into Laos. The reality set in as the flight raced westward. The aircrews monitored the radio transmissions between the FAC and 1st Lt. Pool as the team's situation continued to deteriorate even further.

Those 45 minutes had been harrowing ones for RT Pennsylvania. In continuous contact with the enemy, they were running through the dense jungle toward the LZ. The extraction birds were now ten minutes away. As the team stumbled down a steep slope towards the valley floor, Jerry Pool fell injuring his ankle. He reported that the enemy was right behind them, the fires were closing in, and he could not move further. He asked MSgt. Septer where the extraction birds were. Charles Septer replied they were on their way. 1st Lt. Pool looked up to the sky and saw Mike O'Donnell's Huey orbiting the LZ, he desperately radioed, "You ain't got no balls at all if you don't come down and get us right now!"

The aircrews supporting MACV-SOG operations had a creed they lived by: "You take them in - you get them out!" Without hesitation, Mike O'Donnell told Charles Septer that he would make the extraction alone. James Lake heard the transmission and told Capt. O'Donnell the rest of the extraction force was minutes away and to wait for them to arrive. Mike O'Donnell's reply was simple, the men on the ground didn't have a few minutes and he was going in. Followed by a Cobra gunship, Capt. O'Donnell dropped down between the canyon walls, slowed and hovered over RT Pennsylvania. He waited at a hover while the team scrambled through the dense undergrowth toward his aircraft. As the minutes ticked by, James Lake and the others arrived overhead. After roughly four minutes on the ground - an eternity under the circumstances - Mike O'Donnell started to pull up and away from the LZ. Slowly gathering speed, he climbed skyward. At an altitude of approximately 200 feet above the ground he reported, "I've got all eight, I'm coming out." The other aircrews heaved a collective sigh of relief. Suddenly and without warning, Mike O'Donnell's helicopter exploded in flames. Raining parts as its momentum carried it forward; the Huey continued some three hundred meters beyond the point of contact before it crashed in the jungle.

After a moment of stunned disbelief, the first voice over the radio was that of Cobra pilot Capt. Michael Jimison who was following Mike O'Donnell's Huey down the valley. He said, "I didn't see a piece bigger than my head." Capt. Jimison stated that he would move in for a closer look at the crash site. Making a wide, high-speed orbit of the site, the two Cobras flew back to the head of the valley, and began a run down the valley at a speed of close to 200 knots. Suddenly, the canyon walls lit up with muzzle flashes and tracer rounds. From the northern wall of the canyon, WO1 Lake watched a white streak flash behind the lead Cobra exploding against the far wall of the canyon. At the end of the pass, Capt. Jimison reported that he could see nothing in the heavy jungle of the valley floor except smoke and fire. Suddenly, a red flash of light followed by a column of dense black smoke rose from the crash site. Fires began to burn furiously in the jungle in and around it. James Lake decided to make a closer investigation of the crash site. He ordered the other helicopters to remain in high orbit while he descended through the veil of smoke toward the crash site. As he approached the valley, he watched thousands of tracer rounds begin their seemingly lazy looking arcs from the jungle on the canyon walls to flash by all sides of his aircraft.

The crash site was located at the bottom of a valley with steep walls that was populated by hundreds of NVA soldiers who were pouring out small arms and automatic weapons fire. From their position on the walls of the canyon, the NVA could shoot down at any aircraft attempting to fly through the valley near the burning wreckage. There was nowhere to land and hovering was certain death. James Lake and Johnny Kemper agreed there was nowhere to go, and nothing left they could do. From what they saw on the pass through, with what lay below them in smoke and fire, neither man believed that any person could have survived the explosion aboard the Huey or the 200 foot fall that followed it. WO1 Lake made a max power climb-out from the valley, and reluctantly turned away and ordered the flight to return to Dak To. At the time the immediate search effort was terminated, Mike O'Donnell, John Hoskins, Rudy Becerra, Berman Ganoe, Jerry Pool, John Boronski and Gary Harned plus the indigenous team members were immediately listed Missing in Action. Due to the area of loss being deep within enemy held territory, no further search and rescue/recovery operation was possible.

The Huey's wreckage was also located approximately 3 miles southeast of the Cambodian/Lao border, 15 miles west of the Cambodian/South Vietnamese, 23 miles southwest of the tri-border junction to Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam and 35 miles west-southwest of Dak To, South Vietnam.

On 16 November 1993, during JFA 94-2C, a joint team under the auspices of the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting (JTFFA) traveled to Cambodia to investigate this loss incident. The team landed by helicopter on the top of the small hill about 500 meters south of the valley in which the Huey's wreckage was located. As the team moved to the crash site through the dense jungle and rugged terrain, it took them 2 ½ hours to travel the distance of only one-kilometer. The team searched the area, but found no evidence of a crash site.

On 18 January 1994, another JTFFA te

 This article is about the operation during the Iran Hostage Crisis. For the operation during the Iraq War, see Operation Eagle Claw XI.

"Operation Rice Bowl" redirects here and is not to be confused with the Catholic Relief Services program to end hunger and poverty.

Operation Eagle Claw
Part of the Iran hostage crisis
Overview of the wreckage at the Desert One landing field in Iran
Location	Near Tabas, South Khorasan, Iran 33°04′23″N 55°53′33″E
Commanded by	President Jimmy Carter Maj. Gen. James B. Vaught (US Army) Col. James H. Kyle (USAF) Lt. Col. Edward R. Seiffert (USMC) Col. Charles A. Beckwith (US Army) Howard Philips Hart (CIA)
Target	Embassy of the United States, Tehran
Date	24–25 April 1980
Executed by	United States Army  Delta Force  US Army Rangers  United States Army Special Forces  Central Intelligence Agency  Special Activities Division Logistical support:  United States Air Force  United States Marine Corps  United States Navy
Outcome	Mission failed 1 helicopter and 1 transport aircraft destroyed 5 helicopters abandoned/captured
Casualties	8 US servicemen killed & 4 injured 1 Iranian civilian (alleged by Iranian Army) killed

v t e Iran hostage crisis

Wikimedia | © OpenStreetMap

60km
37miles

Desert One

   

Desert 1 location in central Iran

Operation Eagle Claw (Persian: عملیات پنجه عقاب) was a failed U.S. Department of Defense attempt to rescue 52 embassy staff held captive by Revolutionary Iran on 24 April 1980. It was ordered by US President Jimmy Carter after the staff were seized at the Embassy of the United States, Tehran. The operation, one of Delta Force's first, encountered many obstacles and failures and was subsequently aborted.^[1] Eight helicopters were sent to the first staging area called Desert One, but only five arrived in operational condition.^[2] One had encountered hydraulic problems, another was caught in a sand storm, and the third showed signs of a cracked rotor blade. During the operational planning, it was decided that the mission would be aborted if fewer than six helicopters remained operational upon arrival at the Desert One site, despite only four being absolutely necessary.^[2] In a move that is still discussed in military circles, the field commanders advised President Carter to abort the mission, which he did.^[3]

As the US forces prepared to withdraw from Desert One, one of the remaining helicopters crashed into a transport aircraft that contained both servicemen and jet fuel. The resulting fire destroyed both aircraft and killed eight servicemen.^[2] In the context of the Iranian Revolution, Iran's new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, stated that the mission had been stopped by an act of God ("angels of God") who had foiled the US mission in order to protect Iran and its new Islamist government. In turn, Carter blamed his loss in the 1980 US presidential election mainly on his failure to secure the release of the hostages. The American hostages were released the day of Ronald Reagan's inauguration.^[4]

Motivation for military intervention

[edit]

Main article: Iran hostage crisis

On 4 November 1979, fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were taken hostage in the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, by a group of Iranian college students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, avid supporters of the Iranian Revolution.^[5][6] American President Jimmy Carter called the hostage-taking an act of "blackmail" and the hostages "victims of terrorism and anarchy".^[7] but in Iran it was widely seen as an act against the US and its influence in Iran, including its perceived attempts to undermine the Iranian Revolution and its longstanding support of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was overthrown in 1979.^[8]

The crisis had reached a climax after diplomatic negotiations failed to secure the release of the hostages. Facing elections and with little to show from negotiations, the Carter government ordered the State Department to sever diplomatic relations with Iran on 7 April 1980.^[9] Cyrus Vance, the United States Secretary of State, had argued against a push by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski for a military solution to the crisis.^[10] Vance left Washington on Thursday 10 April for a long weekend vacation in Florida.^[10] The following day, Friday 11 April, Brzezinski held a newly scheduled meeting of the National Security Council where he insisted that it was time to "lance the boil",^[11] and Carter said it was "time for us to bring our hostages home".^[12] During this Security Council meeting of 11 April Carter confirmed that he had authorized the mission.^{[10][11][Note 1]} He also continued to entertain the planning for a concurrent punitive air-strike, but this was finally rejected on 23 April, one day before the start of the mission,^[11] which was code-named Operation Eagle Claw.^[13]

Operation Eagle Claw occurred amid a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Iran and its western neighbor Iraq, including frequent border skirmishes, calls by Khomeini for Iraqi Shi'ites to revolt against the ruling Ba'ath Party, and allegations of Iraqi support for Arab and Kurdish separatists in Iran. According to an 11 April 1980 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis, "Evidence indicates that Iraq had probably planned to initiate a major military move against Iran with the aim of toppling the Khomeini regime" and had "sought to engage the Kuwaitis to act as intermediary in obtaining United States approval and support for Iraqi military action against Iran". Carter, who wrote in his diary on 10 April that "The Iranian terrorists are making all kinds of crazy threats to kill the American hostages if they are invaded by Iraq—whom they identify as an American puppet," may have been influenced by such reports to approve a rescue mission prior to the outbreak of a possible Iran–Iraq War.^[14]

Planning and preparation

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A pair of RH-53Ds aboard USS Nimitz

Planning for a possible rescue mission began on 6 November, two days after the hostages were taken.^[15] Army Major General James B. Vaught was appointed as Joint Task Force commander and was to be forward-based at Wadi Kena in Egypt, reporting directly to the President. In turn, he had two field commanders: USAF Colonel James H. Kyle as the field commander for aviation and US Army Colonel Charlie Beckwith as ground forces field commander.^[16] In planning the operation, some of the maps the US used were tourist maps.^[17]

The plan was designed so all four main services of the Department of Defense would have a part: Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marine Corps. It was planned that helicopters and C-130 aircraft, following different routes, would rendezvous on a salt flat (code-named Desert One) 200 miles (320 km) southeast of Tehran. Here the helicopters would refuel from the C-130s and pick up the combat troops who had flown in on the C-130 transports. The helicopters would then transport the troops to a mountain location (Desert Two) closer to Tehran, from which the rescue raid would be launched into the city the following night.^[13] The operation was further to be supported by an in-country CIA team.^[18] On completion of the raid, hostages were to be taken to a captured Tehran airport from where they were to be flown to Egypt.^[13]

On 31 March, anticipating the need for military action, a US Air Force Combat Controller, Major John T. Carney Jr., was flown in a Twin Otter to Desert One by covert CIA operatives Jim Rhyne and Claude "Bud" McBroom for a clandestine survey of the proposed landing areas for the helicopters and C-130s. Carney installed remotely operated infrared lights and an IR strobe to outline a landing pattern for the pilots.^{[Note 2]} He also took soil samples to determine the load-bearing properties of the desert surface. At the time of the survey, the salt-flat floor was hard-packed sand, but in the ensuing three weeks an ankle-deep layer of powdery sand had been deposited by sandstorms.^[19][21]

The Tehran CIA Special Activities Division in-country paramilitary team, led by retired US Army Special Forces officer Richard J. Meadows, had two assignments: to obtain information about the hostages and the embassy grounds^{[Note 3]} and to transport the rescue team from Desert Two to the embassy grounds in pre-staged vehicles.^[18] Desert One was in the South Khorasan Province, in the Dasht-e Lut desert near Tabas (33°04′23″N 55°53′33″E); Desert Two was located 50 miles (80 km) short of Tehran at 35°14′N 52°09′E. A small advanced force infiltrated Tehran and secured a warehouse where five Ford trucks and two Mazda vans with facade compartments that would conceal the assaulters as they went through Iranian checkpoints were kept.

Assault teams

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Planned and actual routes for Operation Eagle Claw

The ground forces consisted of 93 Delta soldiers to assault the embassy and a 13-man special forces assault team from Detachment "A" Berlin Brigade to assault the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where three further hostages were being held.^[23] A third group of 12 Rangers were to act as the roadblock team at the Desert One landing area. Rangers were also tasked with taking and holding the Manzariyeh Air Base near Tehran to be used to escape from Iran. In addition, the CIA had prepared an in-country team of 15 Iranian and American Persian-speakers, most of whom would act as truck drivers.^[24]

Ingress

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The complex plan required that on the first night, three USAF EC-130s (Call signs: Republic 4, 5, and 6), carrying the logistical supplies, and three MC-130E Combat Talons (Call signs: Dragon 1, 2, and 3), carrying Delta Force and Ranger troops (132 assault and security troops in total),^[25] would depart Masirah, off the coast of Oman, for Desert One, a flight of over 1,000 miles (1,600 km). They would be refueled by Air Force KC-135 tankers en route. Desert One would be secured by a protection force, and once secured, a refueling area would be established for the helicopters with approximately 6,000 US gallons (23,000 L) of jet fuel being made available from collapsible fuel bladders carried in the C-130s.^[26]

Eight United States Navy (USN) RH-53D Sea Stallion (Call signs: Bluebeard 1 – 8)^[27] helicopters were positioned aboard USS Nimitz, 60 miles (100 km) off the coast of Iran.^[28] The helicopters would fly 600 miles (1,000 km) to Desert One, refuel, load up the Delta Force and part of the Ranger teams, then fly 260 miles (420 km) further to Desert Two. As it would be close to morning, the helicopters and ground forces would hide during the day at Desert Two. The rescue operation would take place the second night.^[24]

Rescue raid

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A-7Es aboard Coral Sea with special identification stripes added specifically for Operation Eagle Claw

First, CIA officers who were already inside Iran would bring trucks they had sourced to Desert Two. Together, the CIA officers and ground forces would then drive from Desert Two into Tehran. This team would assault the embassy and Foreign Affairs building, eliminate the guards, and rescue the hostages, with air support from Air Force AC-130 gunships flying from Desert One. The hostages and rescue team would then rendezvous with the helicopters from Desert Two at the nearby Amjadieh Stadium, where the hostages and rescue teams would board the helicopters.^[29]

Egress

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In parallel to the rescue, an Army Ranger company would capture the abandoned Manzariyeh Air Base,^[30] (34°58′58″N 50°48′20″E) about 60 miles (100 km) southwest of Tehran, to allow two C-141 Starlifters^[31] to arrive from Saudi Arabia. The helicopters would bring all parties from the stadium to the Manzariyeh airbase, and the C-141s would fly them to an airbase in Egypt. The eight helicopters would be destroyed before departure.

Protection and support

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Protection for the operation was to be provided by Carrier Air Wing Eight (CVW-8) operating from Nimitz and CVW-14 operating from USS Coral Sea. For this operation, the aircraft bore special invasion stripe identification on their right wings. This was necessary to distinguish support aircraft from Iranian F-14 and F-4 aircraft purchased by Iran from the US in the time of the Shah. CVW-14 Marine F-4Ns were marked with a red (VMFA-323) or yellow (VMFA-531) stripe enclosed by two black stripes while CVW-14 attack aircraft (A-7s and A-6s) had an orange stripe enclosed by two black stripes.^[32][33]

The mission

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Repainted Bluebeard RH-53D helicopters in sand camouflage and without markings aboard USS Nimitz

Only the delivery of the soldiers, equipment and fuel by the C-130 aircraft went according to plan.^[34] MC-130 Dragon 1 landed at Desert One at 22:47 local time. The landing was made under blacked-out conditions using the improvised infrared landing light system installed by Carney on the airstrip, visible only through night vision goggles. The heavily loaded Dragon 1 required four passes to determine that there were no obstructions on the airstrip^{[Note 4]} and to align with the runway. Dragon 1 off-loaded the road-watch teams in Jeeps and a USAF Combat Control Team (CCT)^[35] to establish a parallel landing zone north of the dirt road and to set out TACAN beacons to guide in the helicopters.

Soon after the first crews landed and began securing Desert One, a civilian Iranian bus with a driver and 43 passengers was stopped while traveling on the road, which now served as the runway for the aircraft. The bus was forced to halt by the Rangers and the passengers were detained aboard Republic 3.^{[36][Note 5]} Minutes after the bus had been stopped, the Rangers in the road-watch team observed a fuel tanker truck, ignoring their orders to halt, bearing down on them.^[37] The truck, apparently smuggling fuel, was blown up by the Army Ranger roadblock team using a shoulder-fired rocket as it tried to escape the site. The truck's passenger was killed, but the driver managed to escape in an accompanying pickup truck. As the tanker truck was thought to be engaged in clandestine smuggling, the driver was not considered to pose a security threat to the mission.^[38] The resulting fire illuminated the nighttime landscape for many miles around, and provided a visual guide to Desert One for the disoriented incoming helicopters.

Two hours into the flight, RH-53D Bluebeard 6 made an emergency landing in the desert when a sensor indicated a cracked rotor blade.^{[Note 6]} Its crew was picked up by Bluebeard 8 and the aircraft was abandoned in the desert.^[39] The remaining helicopters ran into an unexpected weather phenomenon known as a haboob^[40] (an enormous, nearly opaque cloud of fine dust). Bluebeard 5 flew into the haboob, but abandoned the mission and returned to the Nimitz when electrical problems disabled flight instruments and flying without visual references proved impossible. The remaining six helicopters reached Desert One, 50 to 90 minutes behind schedule. Bluebeard 2 arrived last at Desert One at 01:00 with a malfunctioning secondary hydraulic system, leaving only one hydraulic system to control the aircraft.^[34]

With only five fully serviceable helicopters now remaining to transport the men and equipment to Desert Two (minimum of six aircraft was the planned mission's abort threshold), the various commanders reached a stalemate. Senior helicopter pilot Seiffert refused to use unsafe Bluebeard 2 on the mission, while Beckwith (field commander for ground forces) refused to consider reducing his trained rescue team's size. Kyle (the field aviation commander), therefore, recommended to Vaught that the mission be aborted. The recommendation was passed on by satellite radio to the President. After two and a half hours on the ground, the presidential abort confirmation was received.^[41]

Collision and fire

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Plan sketch of Desert One

Fuel consumption calculations showed that the extra 90 minutes idling on the ground waiting for the abort confirmation order had made fuel critical for one of the EC-130s. When it became clear that only six helicopters would arrive at Desert One, Kyle had authorized the EC-130s to transfer 1,000 US gallons (3,800 L) from the bladders to their own main fuel tanks, but Republic 4 had already expended all of its bladder fuel refueling three of the helicopters and had none to transfer. To make it to the air tanker refueling track without running out of fuel, it had to leave immediately and was already loaded with part of the Delta team. In addition, RH-53D Bluebeard 4 needed additional fuel, requiring it to be moved to the opposite side of the road.^[42]

To accomplish both actions, Bluebeard 3 piloted by Maj. James Schaefer^[43] had to be moved from directly behind the EC-130. The aircraft could not be moved by ground taxi and had to be moved by hover taxi (flying a short distance at low speed and altitude).^{[44][Note 7]} A Combat Controller attempted to direct the maneuvre from in front of the aircraft but was blasted by desert sand churned up by the rotor. The Controller attempted to back away, which led Bluebeard 3's pilot to mistakenly perceive that his craft was drifting backward (engulfed in a dust cloud, the pilot only had the Controller as a point of reference) and thus attempted to "correct" this situation by applying forward stick to maintain the same distance from the rearward moving marshaller. The RH-53D struck the EC-130's vertical stabilizer with its main rotor and crashed into the EC-130's wing root.^[45]

In the ensuing explosion and fire, eight servicemen died: five of the fourteen USAF aircrew in the EC-130, and three of the five USMC aircrew in the RH-53D, with only the helicopter's pilot and co-pilot (both badly burned) surviving.^{[Note 8]} After the crash, it was decided to abandon the helicopters. During the frantic evacuation to the EC-130s by the helicopter crews, unsuccessful attempts were made to retrieve their classified mission documents and destroy the aircraft. The helicopter crews boarded the EC-130s. Five RH-53D aircraft were left behind at Desert One mostly intact, some damaged by shrapnel. They could not be destroyed because they were loaded with ammunition and any fire or explosion would have endangered the EC-130s.^[46]

The EC-130s carried the remaining forces back to the intermediate airfield at Masirah Island, where two C-141 medical evacuation aircraft from the staging base at Wadi Abu Shihat, Egypt,^{[Note 9]} picked up the injured personnel, helicopter crews, Rangers, and Delta Force members, and returned to Wadi Kena. The injured were then transported to Landstuhl Army Regional Medical Center in Germany. The following day, after learning about the events at Desert One from the local Iranian news, the Tehran CIA team quietly left Iran, with the Iranians unaware of their presence.^[47]

Aftermath

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Wreckage of one of the destroyed Bluebeard helicopters with an abandoned RH-53D behind

The White House announced the failed rescue operation at 01:00 a.m. the following day (25 April 1980).^[48] Iranian Army investigators found eight bodies (eight Americans) and also alleged to have found the body of an Iranian civilian. However, it has been acknowledged that the fuel tank driver near the landing site who refused to stop, and whose tanker truck exploded after being hit by an anti-tank round, managed to leap from his vehicle and escape in a nearby pickup truck which was following;^[49][50][51] it was reported that the gas tank truck and a bus with 44 civilians were the vehicles which were stopped at the opposite ends of the dirt road near the Desert One landing site when the C-130 aircraft landed.^[49][51] Nine caskets were made, with Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali alleging that nine Americans were killed.^[52] The American bodies, which were acknowledged to have been numbered at eight,^[52] were returned to the United States on 6 May 1980,^[52] and buried at various locations across the country. The 44 Iranian civilians taken prisoner on the bus were released and subsequently gave eyewitness accounts of the operation.^[38]

Casualties

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The eight Americans who died included three Marines and five Air Force personnel. On 25 April 1980, Major General Robert M. Bond read a message from President Jimmy Carter at a memorial service commemorating them in Niceville, Florida.^[53][54] A memorial honoring them was erected in the Arlington National Cemetery and Carter attended a memorial service there with the families on 9 May.^[55] Three of the servicemen who died – Maj. Richard Bakke, Maj. Harold Lewis Jr., and Sgt. Joel Mayo – were buried in the Arlington National Cemetery in a grave marked by a common headstone, located about 25 feet from the group memorial.^[56] In addition, five servicemen were injured, One from Valdosta, Georgia (Capt. Lynn McIntosh), including USMC Majors Jim Schaefer, pilot, and Les Petty, co-pilot.^[57]

After the termination of the operation and the abandonment of equipment by the infiltration team, the Iranians became aware of the landings as well as the subsequent accident and fire. Mohammad Montazer al-Qaim, Commander of the Yazd Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) went to the scene to investigate reports from locals. At the same time, without knowing of the investigation activities of the IRGC, the Iranian Air Force conducted two observation flights over the incident area. During the first flight, two F-14s flew over the abandoned US equipment and the flight requested permission to fire on the equipment. This was refused by the Iranian command. The next day, Iranian Air Force F-4 fighter jets patrolling the area thought that the American helicopters were about to fly and they fired at the remaining American equipment with direct order from Abolhassan Banisadr (Iran's president at the time) killing Mohammad Montazer al-Qaim.^[58]

Political consequences

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President Carter continued to attempt to secure the hostages' release before his presidency's end. On 20 January 1981, minutes after Carter's term ended, the 52 US captives held in Iran were released, ending the 444-day Iran hostage crisis.^[59] US Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, believing that the operation would not work and would only endanger the lives of the hostages, opted to resign, regardless of whether the mission was successful or not. His resignation was confirmed several days later.^[60]

Ruhollah Khomeini condemned Jimmy Carter,^[61] and in a speech after the incident, credited God with protecting Iran.^[62][63] He said:

"Who crushed Mr. Carter's helicopters? We did? The sands did! They were God's agents. Wind is God's agent ... These sands are agents of God. They can try again!"^[64]

The embassy hostages were subsequently scattered across Iran to preclude any second rescue attempt and were released on 20 January 1981, minutes after Ronald Reagan had taken the oath of office, after winning the 1980 election over Carter.^[65]