SYNOPSIS  MACV-SOG, or Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, was a joint service unconventional warfare task force engaged in highly classified operations throughout Southeast Asia. The 5th Special Forces channeled personnel into MACV-SOG (though it was not a Special Forces group) through Special Operations Augmentation (SOA), which provided their "cover" while under secret orders to MACV-SOG. These teams performed deep penetration missions of strategic reconnaissance and interdiction that were called, depending on the location and time frame, "Shining Brass," "Daniel Boone," "Salem House" or "Prairie Fire" missions.

During 1968 and early 1969, CCS had been inserting 6-man reconnaissance patrols into the Fish Hook border area between South Vietnam and Cambodia. The hard reality was due to the intense enemy presence continuously operating in the region, if a patrol could be inserted and stay on the ground undetected for three days, it was very lucky. Many teams were discovered within 30 minutes of insertion and forced to be extracted under fire shortly thereafter. Another major factor faced by reconnaissance teams, including the Hatchet Force, was locating an unguarded landing zone (LZ). Locating one large enough for a single helicopter insertion was one thing, however, finding an unguarded LZ large enough to accommodate four helicopters was quite another.

To shift the balance of power and disrupt the NVA's influence in the region, a direct attack on the North Vietnamese headquarters for operations in South Vietnam known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) was developed by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The headquarters bunker complex was located just a mile inside Cambodia in the Fish Hook area; approximately 14 miles southeast of Memot, Cambodia; 20 miles southeast of Quan Loi and 28 miles northeast of Tay Ninh, South Vietnam.

After receiving his mission days before the Hatchet Force was to be inserted, Lt. Col. Earl Trabue, Commander of Command and Control South, informed OP-35, MACV-SOG in his opinion their plan to attack the COSVN complex was not viable. The plan included the Hatchet Force snatching NVA prisoners as well as reporting on the effects of a B-52 Arc Light air strike against the COSVN complex that was also going to be used to cover the team's insertion. Lt. Col. Trabue fully understood the complexities of the mission and believed it to be too dangerous to insert only an augmented platoon and should be cancelled. Further, he believed the B-52 Arc Light air strike would not stun the enemy as projected.

The size of the Hatchet Force was limited as only 9 US Army Huey helicopters assigned to the 195th Assault Helicopter Company were available for the 10 minute, 20-mile flight from Quan Loi Airfield, MACV-SOG's southern launch site, to the target - 4 Huey transport insertion helicopters supported by 4 Huey gunships and 1 Huey command and control aircraft for directing the overall mission. Because of the flight configuration, only one platoon-sized force could be assigned to this mission.

On 24 April 1969, Capt. William H. O'Rourke, Jr., company commander and ground mission commander; Capt. Paul D. Cahill, assistant ground commander; 1st Lt. Gregory M. Harrigan and 1st Lt. Walter L. Marcantel, then SFC Jerry M. "Mad Dog" Shriver, Hatchet Force exploitation platoon leader; Sgt. Earnest C. Jamison, team medic; and their Montagnard soldiers comprised the augmented Hatchet Force that was to be inserted into Cambodia by helicopter 1½ miles north of the Vietnamese/Cambodian border.

All US Army helicopters were under the operational control of the air commander in the command and control helicopter. The only other air asset assigned to this mission was an Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC) who was to call for and coordinate fixed wing air assets should their participation be necessary.

Shortly before takeoff at dawn, SFC Shriver boarded the first helicopter. As the aircraft lifted off the ground for the flight, the B-52s were to be making final preparations for their bomb run against COSVN. At the same time the helicopters prepared to takeoff, the Huey carrying Capt. O'Rourke and 5 team members developed mechanical problems and was forced to abort the mission. Because of this, Capt. Cahill, the assistant ground commander, took over the responsibilities of ground commander for the remainder of the mission.

The original plan was for the helicopters to insert the team as the air strike's dust settled. Unfortunately, when the helicopters arrived at the designated coordinates, it was the wrong location. The aircraft flew around for 30 to 45 minutes searching for signs of dry bomb craters, which would mark the correct site. When the pilots finally found three dry ones, the helicopters descended in-trail toward them and landed. After the members of the Hatchet Force leaped off, the helicopters' pulled up and away from the landing zone (LZ) for their return flight to Quan Loi.

As soon as the landing force was on the ground, the men took cover in one of two craters located side by side and roughly 30 to 50 yards from the bunker complex. Immediately after discharging their passengers, the helicopters pulled up and away from the LZ. They had reached an altitude of only 20 feet above the ground when the NVA opened fire from concrete bunkers and entrenched positions with a withering barrage of gunfire wounding or killing those men who had not reached the safety of the craters.

From his position in the western-most bomb crater, Jerry Shriver radioed other team members stating that a machine gun bunker to his left front had his men pinned down and asked if anyone could fire at it to relieve the pressure. Capt. Cahill, 1st Lt. Marcantel and Sgt. Ernest C. Jamison, who had taken cover in the center crater, reported they were also pinned down and unable to help. The air commander notified the Hatchet Force that he was bringing in the gunships for air support. Immediately he directed all gunships to use their mini-guns and rockets to attack the NVA positions. Further, to make sure no short rounds or bombs hit our troops, all attack passes were made along the bunker line, not head on into it. As the aircraft made their attack passes, one of the door gunners noted that the bunkers were made of concrete.

From his vantage point overhead, Maj. Benjamin T. Kapp, Jr., the southern launch site's senior launch officer who was also in the command and control aircraft as coordinator to assist Lt. Col. Trabue should the situation necessitate it, observed the battle site. From his vantage point, Maj. Kapp could see the platoon members in the bomb craters. According to one report, he witnessed North Vietnamese machine guns firing into the bodies of the men lying in front of the enemy positions. These machine guns also covered the open ground covered in ankle-high brown grass with grazing fire effectively trapping the members of the exploitation platoon.

Approximately 10 to 15 minutes into the raging battle, Capt. Cahill heard SFC Shriver transmit over his radio that he and five Montagnard soldiers were going to enter the tree line on the west edge of the LZ in an effort to flank an enemy position. Paul Cahill observed the 6 men as they broke from the crater and ran across the 30 yards of open ground between the crater and the treeline. As the men raced through the low grass toward the trees, Jerry Shriver maintained radio contact with the command and control aircraft and Capt. Cahill continued to monitor their progress.

As he watched, Paul Cahill saw SFC Shriver being struck by several rounds of automatic weapons fire at the treeline and fall to the ground. At the same time, radio contact between Jerry Shriver and the command aircraft was severed in mid-sentence. During the remainder of the mission several attempts were made to reestablish radio contact with the exploitation platoon leader, however, all attempts failed. Later Paul Cahill reported he believed "Jerry Shriver was dead when he hit the ground."

Also early in the fierce fighting, Sgt. Jamison left the protection of the crater to retrieve one of the wounded Montagnards. The team medic reached the soldier, but was immediately struck by a burst of machine gun fire that killed him instantly. Later in the heat of battle, Capt. Cahill lifted his head above the crater rim to evaluate the situation and was struck in the mouth by an AK-47 round that deflected upward into his right eye. This resulted in his total blindness for the next 30 minutes and the permanent loss of his right eye.

At the same time the Hatchet Force was engaged in vicious combat, several other teams were conducting reconnaissance operations from CCS's northern launch site located at Ban Me Thuot. When it became apparent that the gunships on hand did not have the necessary firepower to adequately suppress the NVA enough to evacuate the survivors, those teams from the northern launch site already on the ground were ordered to find secure positions to remain in until further notice. When the teams acknowledged they were in safe locations, the gunships assigned for their protection were sent south to rescue the Hatchet Force. Those helicopters, whose aircrews were assigned to the US Air Force's 20th Special Operations Squadron, arrived at the COSVN battle site approximately an hour and a half later.

After the contingent of gunships grew from 4 to 8, 1st Lt. Harrigan requested all gunships to press their attack with rockets and mini-guns. The increased airpower was successful in stemming the NVA ground fire, but not in halting it. After the enemy's ground fire was suppressed, Greg Harrigan reported that over half his platoon was dead or wounded, and then continued to direct the aerial attacks for another 45 minutes before being mortally wounded himself.

Meanwhile, to bolster and support the Hatchet Force already on the ground, a reconnaissance team comprised of two Americans and four Montagnards was inserted into a third bomb crater located roughly 80 yards east of the other two craters and only 10 yards west of the nearest grove of trees. Their mission was to attempt to flank the NVA bunker line in order to drop grenades into the bunkers' firing slits or rear entrances. However, after being safely inserted into the crater, the recon team reported they were also pinned down by heavy and accurate automatic weapons fire and could not move.

All the while, the 8 gunships continued to rotate between the area of operation and the mission’s launch site to rearm/refuel and drop a continuous barrage of mini-gun and rocket fire on the entrenched enemy positions.  Some time later in the day, 2 US Army Cobra gunships, call sign “Blue Max,” arrived onsite to add their firepower to that already being laid down by the Huey gunships.  The Cobras were assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA), Quang Loi, South Vietnam.  When it became apparent to Lt. Col. Trabue that the 10 helicopters still did not have the necessary firepower, he radioed the FAC asking him to arrange for Air Force strike aircraft to assist in the operation.  Shortly thereafter, the FAC notified the overall mission commander that “jet aircraft were not available to support this operation.”

Undeterred, Earl Trabue sent his request through the launch site's communication center to CCS Headquarters and then on to OPS 35, MACV-SOG. The end result was that a flight of US Air Force jet fighters arrived on station roughly 45 minutes later. After the fighters made several attack passes with bombs, rockets and machine gun fire, the survivors on the ground reported there was still too much enemy ground fire for an evacuation attempt to be made.

Weighing all the options and weapons available to him, Lt. Col. Trabue made the decision to use napalm against the NVA bunkers in an attempt to break the communists' grip on his beleaguered men. Once the decision was made, Lt. Col. Trabue requested the strike aircraft to make their napalm run along the line of concrete bunkers instead of over the heads of the Hatchet Force. After two napalm sorties, the Americans on the ground reported a sizable decrease in enemy activity and that it was now safe for them to be evacuated.

Immediately after the last napalm strike and after some 8 hours of brutal combat, all four recovery helicopters were able to dash in to extract the ground team. Three aircraft evacuated the Hatchet Force from their two craters and one recovered the recon team from the third. The battle site was ringed by clumps of trees with only two major openings in them, one approximately 20 yards wide on the northeast corner of the LZ and the other roughly 50 yards wide on the eastern end of the south side of the battle site near the eastern-most crater. Three of the pilots' made their approach from east to west. The pilots knew that because the treeline to the west was so close to the craters that they could not clear them with a heavy load, they swung their aircraft around so the tailboom's were pointing west in preparation for departing to the east. The forth helicopter entered the LZ through the gap in the trees at the northeast corner, set down close to the last crater and also departed through the east-southeastern gap in the trees.

As the aircraft lifted off, several crewmen in one of the helicopters saw movement in the center bomb crater. The helicopter again set down near the crater and 1st Lt. Daniel Hall raced over to it to recover the survivors. On his first trip 1st Lt. Hall recovered the team's badly wounded radio operator. On his second trip, and with the NVA firing at him and the waiting helicopter, he successfully dragged the body of 1st Lt. Harrigan to the aircraft. Once 1st Lt. Hall was safely back on board, the Huey rapidly pulled up and away from the battle site under fire.

Of the 18 men inserted for the mission and the 6 later inserted in support of the Hatchet Force, only the members of the recon team were recovered uninjured. Of the original 18 members of the Hatchet Force, 10 were wounded and safely evacuated. Greg Harrigan's remains were recovered, Ernest Jamison was reported as Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered, and Jerry Shriver, along with his 5 Montagnards, was reported as Missing in Action.

After the exploitation platoon was decimated, other Special Forces personnel assigned to Command and Control North were listening to a North Vietnamese propaganda broadcast made by "Hanoi Hanna" when they heard her boast that "Mad Dog Shriver had been captured" by NVA forces. A second broadcast aired by Hanoi Hanna some time after the first stated that "they had Shriver's ears," which was a euphemism for Jerry Shriver being dead and the NVA having his body. The first broadcast was later substantiated by a US military intelligence report declassified in 1993 that acknowledged "Vietnamese voices were later heard (which) stated that one American was in the process of being captured."

In June 1969, SFC Jerry Shriver's comrades at Command and Control South, commemorated his life and the unparalleled level of esteem to which they held him by hanging his prized Chinese smoking jacket in a prominent place of honor in the camp's club. The following inscription was displayed underneath the silk smoking jacket:

In Memory of Sergeant First Class Jerry M. Shriver

Missing in Action 24 April 1969

The above is by no means meant as a vulgar display. It is meant as a humble tribute to a man who was a legend among the members of CCS. A tribute to an individual who was one of the most courageous men ever to wear the Green Beret. SFC Jerry M. Shriver spent 3 ½ continuous years in Vietnam. During his tour he volunteered for almost every hazardous, classified project run by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Due to the classification of the missions in which he participated, we are unable to give him the recognition he deserves. Those who knew him can attest that he personally killed over 100 enemy and the information that he obtained caused the death of thousands more. His accomplishments were so well known that Radio Hanoi nicknamed him "MAD DOG" and offered a reward of $10,000.00 for his death or capture.

Below is a list of the personal decorations he received:

                                                                    2 Silver Stars
                                                                    3 Army Commendation Medals for Valor
                                                                    1 Soldier's medal 1 Air Medal
                                                                    7 Bronze Stars for Valor
                                                                    1 Purple Heart

At 0615 hours on 24 April 1969, SFC Jerry M. Shriver boarded a helicopter in Quan Loi for a mission that he stated the night before he would not return. The last words he was known to speak as he turned to board the helicopter were, "Take care of my boy," referring to Klaus, his German Shepard that he left behind. Klaus, the smoking jacket displayed above and a little over one dollar in MPC constituted most of his personal possessions.

SFC Shriver spoke Radhe fluently and had a deep concern for the Montagnards. He spent the majority of his pay buying food and clothing for the families of the Montagnard members of his platoon.

The smoking jacket is a biographical summary of the life and feelings of SFC Jerry M. Shriver. It not only reflects the hate he had for the enemy, but the love and dedication to duty that he had for his country. The embroidered Ogdaa means "One Good Deal After Another." A deeper interpretation is a meaning every volunteer understands, "IF you're a man, you've got the guts, and you want to fight with the best - Volunteer."

The accomplishments, courage and the attitude of SFC Jerry M. Shriver will long serve as an inspiration to those who wear the Green Beret. This jacket will remain here as a reminder that such a man did live and that he should not be forgotten ……. "One Good Deal After Another."

On 12 June 1970, a team from Graves Registration was inserted into the COSVN battle site to search the area for the 2 missing Special Forces Sergeants. They recovered human remains that were later identified as belonging to Ernest Jamison and 1 of the missing Montagnards. However, they found no trace of Jerry Shriver, the other 4 missing Montagnards or their equipment anywhere in or around the battle site.

For every insertion like this one that was detected and stopped, dozens of others safely slipped past NVA lines to strike a wide range of targets and collect vital information. The number of MACV-SOG missions conducted with Special Forces reconnaissance teams into Laos and Cambodia was 452 in 1969. It was the most sustained American campaign of raiding, sabotage and intelligence-gathering waged on foreign soil in US military history. MACV-SOG's teams earned a global reputation as one of the most combat effective deep-penetration forces ever raised.

If Jerry Shriver died in this savage battle, he has a right to have his remains returned to his family, friends and country. However, if he survived, he most certainly was captured and his fate, like that of other Americans who remain unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, could be quite different. Either way there is no question the Vietnamese could return him or his remains any time they had the desire to do so.

Since the end of the Vietnam War well over 21,000 reports of American prisoners, missing and otherwise unaccounted for have been received by our government. Many of these reports document LIVE American Prisoners of War remaining captive throughout Southeast Asia TODAY.

Military men in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were called upon to fly and fight in many dangerous circumstances, and they were prepared to be wounded, killed or captured. It probably never occurred to them that they could be abandoned by the country they so proudly served.

At the time he became Missing in Action, Jerry Shriver had less than three weeks left on his third tour of duty in Vietnam.

also see "Mad Dog Shriver"

 1970

On 21 March 1970, just 3 days after Prince Schanouk was removed by the parliament and Lon Nol was installed as the Prime Minister, then 1st Lt. Jerry L. Pool, team leader; SSgt. John A. Boronsky, assistant team leader; Sgt. Gary A. Harned, radio operator; and 5 Montagnard Commandos, comprised "Reconnaissance Team (RT) Pennsylvania," which was inserted by helicopter into Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. The team's mission was to determine the size and movements of the NVA force that was seizing control over the province as well as the suspected NVA movements in neighboring provinces.

Within an hour of being inserted, RT Pennsylvania had been located by highly trained NVA Counter-Recon Hunter teams who were aggressively following them. Moving in a southwesterly direction away from their insertion point, the team fought through heavy jungle and the steep mountain terrain at an exhausting pace. Each time the team stopped, the pursuing NVA would catch up with them and a brief firefight would ensue. During these encounters, the NVA pushed the team deeper into the mountains to avoid capture.

The first night RT Pennsylvania managed to set up a small encampment and gain some much needed rest. However, by first light the team was moving again, this time with the NVA even closer than before, and frequently seemingly right behind them. By nightfall of the second day, 1st Lt. Pool and his team were on a constant dodge and ambush routine with a large force of pursuing NVA. All the team's efforts to evade the NVA failed. Finally at a point when the team reached a state of nearly total exhaustion, the communists incorporated dogs into their search effort.

On the morning of 24 March 1970, the members of RT Pennsylvania were losing ground fast. Jerry Pool radioed for an emergency Prairie Fire Extraction. His team had gone as far as they could and needed to either abort the rest of the mission or face death or capture. Under the circumstances, they could not evade much longer. After relaying their dire situation, the team resumed its evasive tactics up the side of the next mountain.

The Forward Air Controller (FAC) Air Force Capt. Melvin Irvin, pilot; and MSgt. Charles Septer, observer; call sign "Covey," flew over RT Pennsylvania's position. MSgt. Septer was in constant radio contact with the Americans on the ground. 1st Lt. Pool reported they had been "running and ambushing all morning, but their pursuers were right behind them." Charles Septer knew he had to get relief for the team or they were not going to make it. He called for close air support and soon a flight of A1-E Skyraiders, referred to as "Spads" when functioning as attack aircraft, arrived on the scene. With the protective air cover dropping CBU (cluster bomb units) and napalm around the team, they were able to place some distance between themselves and the advancing enemy.

The napalm slowed down the NVA, but it also started numerous fires in the dense growth of the jungle, these fires soon became as much of a threat as the advancing NVA. Jerry Pool reported that now both the fires and NVA were closing in on them. As the Spads worked overhead, Charles Septer devised an extraction plan. He radioed instructions to the team leader directing the team to move to the nearest available extraction LZ that was southwest of their position, near the bottom of a narrow valley with steep canyon walls. 1st Lt. Pool acknowledged the transmission and again emphasized the NVA were closing in and they were going to need more aerial coverage. At roughly 1130 hours, MSgt. Septer called Dak To for additional close air support.

Capt. Michael D. "Mike" O'Donnell, aircraft commander; then WO1 John C. "Hippie" Hosken, pilot; SP4 Rudy M. Becerra, crew chief; and SP4 Berman Ganoe, door gunner; comprised the crew of a UH1H helicopter (serial #68-15262), call sign "Red 3," in a flight of 4 Huey and 4 Cobra gunships conducting the emergency extraction mission for the RT Pennsylvania. All 8 of the helicopters were assigned to the 170th Aviation Company, 17th Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade.

WO1 James E. Lake, who flew the aircraft that originally inserted RT Pennsylvania, and veteran pilot/former Green Beret Johnny Kemper, flew Red Lead, the flight leader for the Hueys. WO1 Hosken, while shy and retiring, received his nickname from the little round glasses he wore. SP4 Berman and SP4 Ganoe were both veterans of many clandestine missions "over the fence" into the politically denied areas of Laos and Cambodia. Capt. O'Donnell was Red platoon leader, but flew Red Three because while senior in rank, he was junior in experience, so he flew in the wingman position rather than lead. This was because on many MACV-SOG missions, experience equated to survival for the aircrews and teams alike.

After an approximately 20-minute flight, the four Cobras and two slicks arrived at the team's location. The Spads still circled in the sky above. Below them, the Covey Rider pointed out RT Pennsylvania's location to the gun team, and then gave coordinating references to the enemy positions based on the reports from 1st Lt. Pool. Immediately, the lead Cobra dove down to fire rockets along with its 40mm cannons and miniguns into NVA positions around RT Pennsylvania. The other gunship and the two Hueys orbited 1500 feet above the site, waiting for the team to reach the extraction LZ. The first Cobra soon expended its rockets and ammunition. The gunship withdrew from the area and flew to Dak To to rearm and refuel. On the ground, the situation facing RT Pennsylvania was deteriorating. Jerry Pool reported that they were back in contact with the enemy. They were moving as fast as possible, but the NVA were right behind them. To reach the LZ from their position, the team had to descend to the valley floor before moving southwest some distance.

In the sky above, WO1 Lake noted that he had a bit more than one hour of fuel remaining. Considering Pennsylvania's progress, he judged that it would reach the extraction LZ at about the time the two Hueys would be forced to return for fuel. He instructed Capt. O'Donnell to remain on station as long as possible to provide air cover for the team on the ground while he returned to Dak To to rearm, refuel and collect the other two Hueys for the extraction. Racing back to Dak To, James Lake and Johnny Kemper discussed the best way to perform what was sure to be a red-hot extraction. Landing in Dak To, WO1 Lake briefed the other two aircrews on their situation. Not only was RT Pennsylvania in desperate need of extraction, but by the time they could return, Capt. O'Donnell and the other Cobras would need to refuel. Time was critical.

Approximately 45 minutes later, WO1 Lake and the other two Hueys were enroute back to the LZ. WO1 William H. Stepp and WO1 Alan Hoffman were the pilots of the two Hueys. Neither pilot had extensive experience and WO1 Hoffman was also new to Vietnam. Because of this, neither of them totally appreciated the situation until they were airborne and had crossed into Laos. The reality set in as the flight raced westward. The aircrews monitored the radio transmissions between the FAC and 1st Lt. Pool as the team's situation continued to deteriorate even further.

Those 45 minutes had been harrowing ones for RT Pennsylvania. In continuous contact with the enemy, they were running through the dense jungle toward the LZ. The extraction birds were now ten minutes away. As the team stumbled down a steep slope towards the valley floor, Jerry Pool fell injuring his ankle. He reported that the enemy was right behind them, the fires were closing in, and he could not move further. He asked MSgt. Septer where the extraction birds were. Charles Septer replied they were on their way. 1st Lt. Pool looked up to the sky and saw Mike O'Donnell's Huey orbiting the LZ, he desperately radioed, "You ain't got no balls at all if you don't come down and get us right now!"

The aircrews supporting MACV-SOG operations had a creed they lived by: "You take them in - you get them out!" Without hesitation, Mike O'Donnell told Charles Septer that he would make the extraction alone. James Lake heard the transmission and told Capt. O'Donnell the rest of the extraction force was minutes away and to wait for them to arrive. Mike O'Donnell's reply was simple, the men on the ground didn't have a few minutes and he was going in. Followed by a Cobra gunship, Capt. O'Donnell dropped down between the canyon walls, slowed and hovered over RT Pennsylvania. He waited at a hover while the team scrambled through the dense undergrowth toward his aircraft. As the minutes ticked by, James Lake and the others arrived overhead. After roughly four minutes on the ground - an eternity under the circumstances - Mike O'Donnell started to pull up and away from the LZ. Slowly gathering speed, he climbed skyward. At an altitude of approximately 200 feet above the ground he reported, "I've got all eight, I'm coming out." The other aircrews heaved a collective sigh of relief. Suddenly and without warning, Mike O'Donnell's helicopter exploded in flames. Raining parts as its momentum carried it forward; the Huey continued some three hundred meters beyond the point of contact before it crashed in the jungle.

After a moment of stunned disbelief, the first voice over the radio was that of Cobra pilot Capt. Michael Jimison who was following Mike O'Donnell's Huey down the valley. He said, "I didn't see a piece bigger than my head." Capt. Jimison stated that he would move in for a closer look at the crash site. Making a wide, high-speed orbit of the site, the two Cobras flew back to the head of the valley, and began a run down the valley at a speed of close to 200 knots. Suddenly, the canyon walls lit up with muzzle flashes and tracer rounds. From the northern wall of the canyon, WO1 Lake watched a white streak flash behind the lead Cobra exploding against the far wall of the canyon. At the end of the pass, Capt. Jimison reported that he could see nothing in the heavy jungle of the valley floor except smoke and fire. Suddenly, a red flash of light followed by a column of dense black smoke rose from the crash site. Fires began to burn furiously in the jungle in and around it. James Lake decided to make a closer investigation of the crash site. He ordered the other helicopters to remain in high orbit while he descended through the veil of smoke toward the crash site. As he approached the valley, he watched thousands of tracer rounds begin their seemingly lazy looking arcs from the jungle on the canyon walls to flash by all sides of his aircraft.

The crash site was located at the bottom of a valley with steep walls that was populated by hundreds of NVA soldiers who were pouring out small arms and automatic weapons fire. From their position on the walls of the canyon, the NVA could shoot down at any aircraft attempting to fly through the valley near the burning wreckage. There was nowhere to land and hovering was certain death. James Lake and Johnny Kemper agreed there was nowhere to go, and nothing left they could do. From what they saw on the pass through, with what lay below them in smoke and fire, neither man believed that any person could have survived the explosion aboard the Huey or the 200 foot fall that followed it. WO1 Lake made a max power climb-out from the valley, and reluctantly turned away and ordered the flight to return to Dak To. At the time the immediate search effort was terminated, Mike O'Donnell, John Hoskins, Rudy Becerra, Berman Ganoe, Jerry Pool, John Boronski and Gary Harned plus the indigenous team members were immediately listed Missing in Action. Due to the area of loss being deep within enemy held territory, no further search and rescue/recovery operation was possible.

The Huey's wreckage was also located approximately 3 miles southeast of the Cambodian/Lao border, 15 miles west of the Cambodian/South Vietnamese, 23 miles southwest of the tri-border junction to Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam and 35 miles west-southwest of Dak To, South Vietnam.

On 16 November 1993, during JFA 94-2C, a joint team under the auspices of the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting (JTFFA) traveled to Cambodia to investigate this loss incident. The team landed by helicopter on the top of the small hill about 500 meters south of the valley in which the Huey's wreckage was located. As the team moved to the crash site through the dense jungle and rugged terrain, it took them 2 ½ hours to travel the distance of only one-kilometer. The team searched the area, but found no evidence of a crash site.

On 18 January 1994, another JTFFA te

‘S.O.G.’ của John L. Plaster, do Vũ đình Hiếu chuyển ngữ.

Ngồi đằng sau chiếc máy bay quan-sát, Wilcorek để-ý đường 19 nơi hướng đông bắc lãnh thổ Cambodia. Con đường này rộng đủ cho hai xe chạy, bụi bay lên mù-mịt chứng tỏ có đoàn xe đang di chuyển ở dưới, khu vực xung quanh không có làng mạc hay dấu hiệu nào của dân cư. Trong tháng Mười năm 1965, nơi thung-lũng Ia-Drang, sư-đoàn 1 Không-Kỵ Hoa-Kỳ mất 304 quân, khi chạm súng với hai trung đoàn chính-quy Bắc Việt, di chuyển và nhận tiếp tế từ bên Miên qua.

Năm 1966, đường 19 được bí mật nối liền với đường 110 và 96 trên đất Lào, điều này cho biết hệ thống đường mòn Hồ-Chí-Minh không dừng lại ở Lào và tiếp tục đi về hướng nam qua đất Cambodia. Cuối năm 1966, các toán biệt-kích thường xuyên phát giác đoàn quân xa của địch chuyển quân qua Miên. Đầu năm 1967, tướng Westmoreland cùng đô-đốc Grant Sharp tư lệnh Lực-Lương Thái-Bình-Dương, yêu cầu giới chức thẩm quyền ở Washington D.C. cho phép biệt-kích thuộc đơn vị SOG xâm nhập, dò-thám lãnh thổ Cambodia. Tháng Năm 1967, Đoàn Nghiên-Cứu Quan-Sát (SOG) được ưng thuận tổ chức hành-quân Daniel Boon, vượt biên qua Miên.

Chính quyền Sihanouk có nhiều liên hệ mật thiết với giới lãnh đạo Hà-Nội, các toán biệt-kích xâm nhập qua đất Cambodia phải dấu thật kín để bộ Ngoại-Giao Hoa-Kỳ có thể chối cãi dễ dàng. Các toán bìệt-kích chỉ có nhiệm vụ lấy tin tức tình báo chiến lược, không được tấn công, phá hoại, phục kích hoặc gài mìn bẫy. Họ được dặn dò thêm, cẩn thận nhầm lẫn lính Cambode và lính cộng-sản Bắc Việt, cả hai đều mặc quân phục xanh, trang bị AK-47. Trực thăng võ trang là hỏa lực duy nhất yểm trợ cho các toán biệt-kích hoạt-động bên Miên trong trường hợp khẩn cấp.

Lúc ban đầu, hành quân Daniel Boon chú trọng vào khu vực rừng núi rậm rạp tây bắc Cambodia, ráp-ranh với cao nguyên trung phần thuộc lãnh thổ Quân-Khu II / VNCH. Chuyến đầu tiên êm-xuôi, chuyến thứ hai xâm nhập ngày 15 tháng Sáu năm 1967. Trung Sĩ Nhất Lowell Stevens làm trưởng toán biệt-kích tuyên bố như sau ‘Đó là ngày dài nhất trong đời tôi’. Được một chiếc H-34 không phù hiệu Kingbee thuộc phi-đoàn 219 KL/VNCH đưa vào vùng xâm nhập nơi một sườn núi trong đất Lào khoảng 100 thước. Trưởng toán (One Zero) Stevens, toán phó Trung-Sĩ Roland Nuqui và bốn biệt-kích Nùng chạy ra khỏi bãi đáp cỏ tranh bị cháy, biến mất vào trong cánh rừng núi rậm rạp theo sau là những tiếng gọi nhau ơi-ới cùng tiếng súng bắn báo động. Họ đã bị địch phát giác.

Nhiệm vụ của toán biệt kích này là tìm kiếm hai con đường mòn, trạm đóng quân, vị trí đặt súng đại bác của pháo binh CSBV trong vòng năm ngày. Họ đã bị lộ khi xâm nhập, bây giờ chỉ cầu an, quân Bắc Việt đang bủa lưới bao vây toán biệt-kích. Đặt khẩu tiểu liên Thụy Sĩ K xuống đất, Stevens báo cáo ‘Bọn Bê-Bối (lính Bắv Việt) đang bao vây tụi tôi. Yếu cầu triệt xuất ngay tức khắc’.

Rủi cho toán biệt-kích, viên sĩ quan SOG ngồi ghế sau chiếc máy bay quan sát điều-không (FAC) không có kinh nghiệm về chiến tranh ngoại lệ, tưởng rằng Stevens nói hoảng, nên không ra lệnh cho chiếc Kingbee quay trở lại bốc toán biệt-kích. Viên sĩ-quan này đòi hỏi phải có bằng chứng áp-lực của địch. Ngồi trong bụi, toán trưởng biệt-kích cùng toán viên có thể nghe tiếng sĩ-quan Bắc Việt ra lệnh cho binh-sĩ của họ di chuyển lên đỉnh núi nơi toán biệt kích đang lẩn trốn.

Đúng ra, Stevens cùng toán viên của anh ta thuộc hành-quân Omega (Project Omega), trên giấy tờ họ là quân nhân trong Liên-Đoàn 5 LLĐB/HK. Đơn vị này tổ chức hành quân Omega do B-50/LLĐB gánh chịu và hành-quân Sigma do B-56 đảm trách. Hai hành quân, này nhiệm vụ xâm nhập vùng địch kiểm soát trong miền Nam Việt-Nam. Các sĩ quan cao cấp trong LĐ 5/LLĐB muốn dành nhiệm vụ qua Miên, cuối cùng bộ tư-lệnh Quân-Viện giao cả hai hành quân Omega, Sigma cho đơn vị SOG điều khiển.

Phải thúc giục nhiều lần, cuối cùng viên sĩ quan trên ghế sau chiếc FAC đưa vào bốn chiếc trực thăng võ trang (Huey gunship) bắn yểm trợ cho trực thăng H-34 vào bốc toán biệt-kích ra. Vì sườn núi có độ dốc cao, chiếc H-34 đem theo một quân nhân Hoa-Kỳ Thượng-Sĩ Ben Snowden, phụ giúp việc lôi các quân nhân biệt-kích lên máy bay. Khi Stevens nâng người dẫn đạo Nùng lên cho Snowden, địch quân bắn xối xả vào chiếc máy bay, chiếc Kingbee lắc lư nhưng vẫn đem các biệt kích ra khỏi vùng đang bị hỏa lực địch đàn áp.

Trúng 68 viên đạn, hỏng máy chiếc H-34 rớt xuống đất. Từ nơi trú ẩn, Stevens nhìn lên sườn núi thấy một cái hang, bên trong là khẩu đại liên, địch đã ngưng bắn sau khi chiếc máy bay rớt. Chiếc FAC gọi thêm khu trục thả bom làm thành màn lửa che cho toán biệt kích. Một chiếc Kingbee khác đáp xuống rước toán biệt-kích. Khi chiếc bày bốc kên cao khoảng 30 bộ, khẩu đại liên trong hang lại khai hỏa, bắn đứt đuôi chiếc trực thăng. Chiếc Kingbee quay vòng vòng trên trời rồi rớt xuống, phát hỏa. Tất cả biệt-kích cùng với phi hành đoàn chạy thoát ra ngoài, chạy lên một ngọn đồi khác lẩn trốn. Chỉ còn chiếc Kingbee duy nhất trên trời, nhưng chiếc này phải quay về đổ thêm xăng.

Kể cả nhân viên phi hành đoàn, tất cả chín người, chỉ có viên xạ thủ đại liên trên chiếc H-34 bị thương nặng. Từ trên đồi, họ theo dõi các khu trục A-1 Skyraider thả bom Napalm, rồi một chiếc trúng đạn rớt. Các biệt kích quân nín thở nhìn chiếc dù bị gió thổi dạt về hướng có quân Bắc Việt. Sau đó đoàn trực thăng khác xuất hiện, chiếc Kingbee còn lại xuống đón tất cả về Dakto an toàn. Stevens cùng toán biệt-kích Nùng ra khỏi máy bay, họ kiệt sức. Trong một chiếc poncho có xác Thượng Sĩ Snowden, ông ta lãnh chín viên trong số 68 viên bắn trúng chiếc Kingbee thứ nhất. Để đặt danh dự cho người quân nhân đầu tiên hy sinh trong hành quân Daniel Boon, văn phòng làm việc trong căn cứ ở Kontum được đặt tên la Snowden Hall.

Trong vòng vài tháng, các toán biệt kích trong hành quân Daniel Boon đem về nhiều tin tức về hệ thống đường mòn, điện thoại, căn cứ và kho tiếp vận của địch. Phiá nam vùng tam biên, dưới tỉnh Pleiku VNCH, là một khu vực hiểm trở, rừng núi rậm rạp. Quân đội Bắc Việt xây dựng một căn cứ rất rộng lớn. Quân Bắc Việt và Việt-Cộng tập trung trong khu vực này từ ba đến bốn sư-đoàn. Trong khu vực Lưỡi-Câu gần Lộc-Ninh, địch quân đặt bộ chỉ huy tối cao của Mặt-Trận Giải-Phóng Miền Nam (Trung Ương Cục Miền Nam hay Cục R).

Hầu hết các chuyến xâm nhập qua Miên, nhắm vào khu vực Lưỡi Câu và vùng Tam-Biên. Mùa Thu năm 1967, quân đội Hoa-Kỳ thiệt hại nhiều nhất trong trận Dakto, gần khu vực hoạt động của đơn vị SOG. Trong khi lữ-đoàn 173 Nhẩy-Dù Hoa-Kỳ đánh từng thước đất lên đồi 875 tây nam Dakto. Vài toán biệt-kích SOG xâm nhập về hướng tây 5 dặm trên đất Cambodia để yểm trợ cho lữ-đoàn 173 (Đơn vị này chưa chắc đã biết các hoạt động của SOG). Một toán do trưởng toán Stevens lãnh đạo, toán phó là Trung Sĩ Nhất Ken ‘Shoebox’ Carpenter, lội bộ qua đất Miên từ Nam Lào tìm con đường tiếp vận bí mật mà quân Bắc Việt dùng để tiếp tế cho các đơn vị đang chiến đãu trên đồi 875 và để biết địch sẽ tăng viện thêm quân hay rút lui. Toán biệt-kích này lục soát hai ngày, đến trưa ngày thứ ba họ khám phá ra con đường được trồng cây giả và rải lá nguỵ trang. Toán biệt kích bố tri và chờ xem...

Trời vừa chập tối, quân biệt kích bắt đầu nghe tiếng động cơ xe Molotova. Khoảng 10 giờ đêm, từng toán dân công xuất hiện như những bóng ma, lặng lẽ dọn đường cho xe đi. Con đường nhỏ đủ cho chiếc xe vận tải chạy qua. Nửa giờ sau, đoàn xe vận tải chạy qua đem theo đồ tiếp liệu, lương thực tiếp tế cho đơn vị đang đánh trên đồi 875. Địch không tăng viện thêm quân vào chiến trường. Khoảng 4 giờ sáng đoàn xe trở lại đem theo xác quân Bắc Việt tử trận. Trước khi trời sáng, đoàn quân ma xuất hiện, trồng lại cây, một vài dân công đi sau đeo túi lớn, rải những lá cây trên mặt đường che dấu bánh xe.

Mùa Thu năm 1967, và đầu năm 1968, SOG xử dụng quân của Liên-Đoàn 5 LLĐB/HK, hành quân Omega và Sigma cho hành quân Daniel Boon. Các toán biệt-kích đóng tại Ban-Mê-Thuột xâm nhập qua Miên. Các toán khác đóng trên Kontum đảm trách những mục tiêu vùng Nam Lào. Bộ chỉ huy ngoài Đà-Nẵng với các căn hành quân tiền phương ở Phú-Bài, Khe-Sanh và Kontum trở thành bộ chỉ-huy Bắc (CCN), các toán biệt-kích có tên tiểu bang hoặc rắn như Anaconda, California. Ban-Mê-Thuột trở nên bộ chỉ-huy Nam (CCS) các toán biệt kích có tên dụng cụ như Saw (Cưa), Hammer (Búa).

Đầu năm, ngày 29 tháng Giêng năm 1968, đơn vị SOG lãnh tổn thất mất tích đầu tiên bên Miên. Trung-Sĩ Nhất Charlie White, còn ba ngày nữa hết hạn kỳ phục vụ ở Việt-Nam, xâm nhập vào khu vực đông bắc Cambodia, chạm súng với địch, chạy đến một khoảng đất trống để trực thăng có thể dùng dây câu lên. White to con như cầu thủ chơi Football, 6 feet 4, 280 pounds. Khi trực thăng kéo anh ta lên cao khoảng 25 feet, White rớt xuống đất. Trong lúc địch đang truy kích và vì trời tối, nên phải đợi đến sáng hôm sau, đơn vị SOG mới tổ chức tìm kiếm.

Toán cấp cứu Bright Light gồm Trung-Sĩ Nhất Zabitosky và Dallas Longstreath III nhẩy xuống khu vực bãi đáp nơi bốc toán biệt kích hôm qua. Họ tìm thấy dấu vết quân Bắc Việt dàn hàng ngang lục xoát tiến lên đồi, rối tụ lại tại một điểm có cây bị gẫy, có lẽ nơi Trung-Sĩ White rớt. Không thấy có vết máu, trong vùng có nhiều dấu chân địch, và còn đơn vị Bắc Việt, toán biệt-kích Bright Light phải quay về. Bộ Quốc Phòng Hoa-Kỳ coi như Trung-Sĩ White tử trận. Trung Sĩ Zabitosky, người đi tìm, tin rằng White bị bắt, Hà-Nội trả lời không biết gì về chuyện đó.

Một trường hợp mất tích khác xẩy ra bên Miên, Trung-Úy Harry Kroske Jr. được biết rõ. Kroske rất nổi tiếng, làm trưởng toán biệt-kích Hammer trên Ban-Mê-Thuột. Toán Hammer gồm hai LLĐB/HK và bốn biệt kích Nùng lãnh nhiệm vụ dò thám khu vực Lưỡi-Câu, nơi tình nghi có căn cứ lớn quân-đội Bắc-Việt và Cục ‘R’. Sau vài ngày thực tập, toán biệt-kích phát xuất từ căn cứ hành quân tiền-phương Bù-Đốp xâm nhập vào buổi chiều.

Bãi đáp chỉ có cỏ tranh, trống trải, toán biệt kích di chuyển thật nhanh đến một cánh rừng cách đó khoảng 1/4 dặm. Vào đến bià rừng, Trung-Úy Kroske ra lệnh cho Stockdale gọi máy liên lạc trong khi anh ta cùng người hướng đạo Nùng đi sâu vào trong quan sát một con đường lớn mà họ trông thấy từ trên trực thăng khi đáp.

Stockdale báo cáo xong, tiếng trực thăng bao vùng bay về căn cứ. Còn nửa tiếng nữa, mặt trời lặn và toán biệt kích sẽ tìm điểm đóng quân đêm an toàn. Bỗng dưng, một tràng đạn AK sé tan bầu im lặng (cả biệt-kích lẫn địch quân đều xử dụng AK), rồi một tràng nữa rồi súng đạn nổ vang dội, cách Stockdale khoảng 50 feet, nơi Kroske cùng người khinh binh đi thăm dò. Stockdale vội vã gom toán biệt kích còn lại sẵn sàng ứng chiến, rồi người lính Nùng chạy trở lui báo cáo ‘Lieutenant fini! Trung-úy chết rồi!’. Stockdale bất chấp nguy hiểm chạy lên tìm Kroske. Anh ta vừa di chuyển vài bước, súng AK nổ tiếp, đạn cầy trên mặt đất văng đất buộc Stockdale phải năm xuống, mấy người lính Nùng phát hoảng bỏ chạy.

Sau này Stockdale biết rằng, Kroske đi đụng ba người lính Bắc Việt, anh ta nổ súng trước trúng hai địch quân, tên thứ ba bắn trả lại trúng Kroske hai viên vào bụng, một vào ngực. Chàng chạy trở lui, chui vào một góc rừng nằm im khoảng năm tiếng đồng hồ, đến nửa đêm. Quân Bắc Việt đi lùng khắp nơi suốt đêm, tìm không ra người lính biệt-kích Hoa-Kỳ.

Trong khi đó cách Ban-Mê-Thuột 80 dặm, một đơn vị độc nhất thuộc Không-Lực Hoa-Kỳ, Phi-Đoàn 20 Hành-Quân Đặc-Biệt gửi sáu chiếc trực thăng Huey đi cứu Stockdale. Trực thăng thuộc phi-đoàn này không sơn phù hiệu KL/HK, chỉ sơn hình con ong nên có biệt danh ‘Green Hornets’. Đơn vị cấp cứu mất gần ba tiếng đồng hồ đánh đuổi địch quân mới thả dây cấp cứu xuống câu Stockdale ra khỏi vùng nguy hiểm. Trung-Úy Kroske mất tích, không thâu hồi được xác. Stockdale trở thành trưởng toán Hammer, anh làm trưởng toán gần hai năm và rất nổi tiếng trong bộ chỉ huy Nam (CCS).

Trong phi-đoàn Green Hornets, Thiếu-Úy Flemming rất nổi về tài thả những toán biệt-kích của SOG, Trong một phi vụ bay có Thiếu-Tá Paul McClellan thả toán biệt-kích Chisel nơi mục tiêu Tango-51 Toán biệt kích xuống bãi đáp an-toàn, di chuyển đến một giòng sông rộng làm nhiệm vụ thám thính sự di chuyển của địch trên sông. Chiếc trực thăng Green Hornets bay về trại LLĐB Đức-Cơ gần biên giới, nơi phát xuất của toán biệt-kích. Họ sẽ ăn trưa, lấy thêm xăng, rồi buổi chiều bay về hướng nam thả toán biệt-kích khác vào đất Miên.

Trong khi đó toán Chisel đã bố trí xong, trong một bụi cây gần bờ sông để quan sát. Toán này do Trung-Sĩ Ancil ‘Sonny’ Franks làm trưởng toán đã gần một năm, toán phó là Trung-Sĩ Charles Hughes và ba biệt-kích người Thượng. Họ đem theo Đại-Úy Randolph Harrison, cấp chỉ huy mới của đại-đội thám-kích. Ông ta đi theo để biết đàn em mình làm ăn ra sao.

Trong khi mọi người làm thêm ngụy trang chỗ ẩn núp, Hughes đang kéo cần antenna lên để liên lạc thì địch tấn công toán Chisel. Trung Sĩ Hughes cố gắng gọi cầu cứu nhưng không ai trả lời. Trưởng toán Franks biết bị kẹt nơi bờ sông, hết chỗ chạy. Toán biệt-kích cố gắng cầm cự tại vị trí, trong lúc quân Bắc Việt kéo đến càng đông. Hughes tiếp tục liên lạc cầu cứu, phi đoàn năm chiếc Green Hornets đã bay xa 30 dặm, không chiếc nào nghe được tiếng cầu cứu của Hughes.

May thay trên vùng lúc đó có máy bay FAC do Thiếu-Tá TQLC/HK Charles Anonsen lái, ông này bắt được tần số của toán Chisel và bay về hướng toán đang bị vây để nghe rõ hơn và gọi hợp đoàn Green Hornets quay trở lại. Thêm một trở ngại nữa là các trực thăng đã gần hết xăng, chỉ còn đủ nhào xuống một chuyén bốc toán biệt kích. Hai chiếc gunship cố gắng đẩy lùi quân Bắc Việt ra xa để chiếc khác xuống bốc. Không dè địch có thêm đại-liên phòng không 12 ly 7 bắn rớt một chiếc, nhưng đáp được nơi an toàn, chiếc thứ hai xuống cứu phi hành đoàn và bay thẳng về Đức Cơ vì gần hết xăng.

Toán Chisel bị đẩy lui dần về bờ sông, thêm một trực thăng phải bay về vì hết xăng, còn lại hai chiếc trên vùng, chiếc thả viễn thám do Flemming lái và chiếc gunship do Thiếu-Tá Leonard Gonzales lái. Chiếc gunship nhào xuống bắn đại liên và rocket xung quanh toán biệt-kích bị trúng đạn bốc khói. Flemming đã gần hết xăng chỉ còn cách nhào xuống bốc toán biệt kích hoặc quay về. Được FAC hướng dẫn, Thiêú-Úy Flemming nhào xuống, cùng lúc quân Bắc Việt khai hỏa dữ dội, không biệt kích quân nào ngóc lên được để chạy ra trực thăng. Rồi quân Bắc Việt xung phong, Flemming nghe tiếng báo động trên máy truyền tin ‘Tụi nó vô được rồi! Vô được rồi! Chạy đi, chạy đi!’. Thiếu-Úy Flemming kéo cần lái. Chiếc trực thăng rời bờ sông bay lên trời xanh.

Huy Hiệu Long Mã Kingbee Phi Đòan 219 / KQ/QLVNCH

H-34 / S-58 Choctaw

TRỰC THĂNG VẬN TẢI / ĐA DỤNG

Sikorsky Aircraft (Mỹ)

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Phi hành đoàn : 02 + 16 lính

Dài : 17,28 m

Đường kính cánh quạt : 17,07 m

Cao : 4,85 m

Trọng lượng không tải : 3.583 kg

Tối đa khi cất cánh : 6.350 kg

Động cơ : 01 động cơ Wright R-1820-84 có sức đẩy 1.525 ngựa.

Tốc độ : 198 km/giờ

Cao độ : 2.900 m

Tầm hoạt động : 293 km

Bay lần đầu : 08/3/1954

Số lượng sản xuất : 1.821 chiếc

Quốc gia sử dụng : Argentina, Úc, Bỉ, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Đài Loan, Costa Rica, Pháp, Đức, Haiti, Indonesia, Ý, Israel, Nhật, Katanga, Lào, Hà Lan, Nicaragua, Philippines, Peru, Nam Việt Nam, Tây Ban Nha, Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ, Thái Lan, Mỹ, Uruguay.