Who Were the Tay Ninh PRU?
Bài của: Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.
On my second day, in a rela tively informal gathering, I would meet many of the mem bers of the 92-man Tay Ninh PRU that I would command and advise. I would find them to be brave and experienced troops. Some had military experience with the Cao Dai Army (a local militia that fought the Viet Minh), the South Vietnamese Airborne Division, or the Civil ian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), which had been com manded by US Special Forces. Most of the PRU’s troops were members of the Cao Dai religion, but a few were Roman Catholic, and even two or three ethnic Cambodians were assigned. All of them had a deep hatred for the Viet Cong, primarily because of atrocities committed against them and their families. Religion and family played large parts in their lives. The Tay Ninh PRU was divided into five 18-man teams (each team was broken further into three squads), one for each of the four districts in Tay Ninh Province and one for Tay Ninh City. The headquarters of the Tay Ninh PRU, which was collocated with the Tay Ninh City team, consisted of just two individuals, the commander and his opera tions officer. The commander of the city team also served as the Tay Ninh PRU’s deputy com mander. The PRU was armed with M16 rifles, M60 machine guns, 45-cal iber automatic pistols, and M79 grenade launchers; however, individuals also had a variety of other weapons they had acquired from disparate sources. The units also possessed PRC-25 radios, 7 by-50 binoculars, medical kits, 4 by-4 Toyota ¾-ton trucks, and Honda motorcycles. In garrison at their district headquarters, the men wore civilian clothes; in the field they wore tiger-stripe camouflage uniforms or black pajamas. The units’ US advisers were similarly outfitted and armed. In my first assessment of the Tay Ninh PRU’s operational capabili ties, I found that the teams func tioned well in most situations, but they lacked fire discipline. That is, the teams did not maneuver well under fire, and they were not proficient in calling for and adjusting supporting arms, generally artillery fire. Thus, the units did not perform well when they and the enemy met by chance or when the enemy was prepared for them. In part, this was a product of their training, which was unsystematic and erratic. Most PRU members were highly experienced combat veterans, who had survived many years in elite combat units before coming to the PRU, but a few had received only rudimentary field training or had served in noncombat units. At the national level, training took place from time to time at a camp near Vung Tau on the shore of the South China Sea; but at the local level, US commanders and advisers led training when operational lulls permitted. As a result, training was uneven and so was performance. The PRU’s strong suits lay in its intimate and complete knowl edge of the people and terrain of Tay Ninh Province. This knowl edge was central to their success in mounting operations against local VCI cadre and in compen sating for training shortcomings. This knowledge of the province led to a great ability to develop accurate intelligence on the VCI and to plan methodically. The members of the PRU also were masters in camouflage, conceal ment, and night movement. As a result they tended to rely heavily on surprise and ambush to achieve decisive results.
Sources of Intelligence
Thanks to the introduction of systems associated with CORDS, the Tay Ninh PRU in theory had a wide array of intelligence sources available to it. Every thing from local agent reports to national-level intelligence could in theory be funneled to them via the system of District Intelli gence and Operations Coordina tion Centers (DIOCCs). US military district advisers could channel operational leads to dis trict PRU units for exploitation. At the provincial level, the same organizational structure existed for coordination; however, at that level, the US PRU adviser filled the role US military advisers played at the district level. In practice, however, few opera tional leads were shared with the PRU for a host of reasons. Petty jealousies between the Vietnam ese National Police, the Vietnam ese Special Branch Police, and district chiefs often prevented the transmission of good operational leads to the PRU. This same problem existed on the American side, where US mili tary commanders and civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the Vietnamese for fear of compromise. Sadly, US civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the PRU even when they were specif ically directed to do so by the US Embassy in Saigon—and many of them even refused to share their intelligence with other US agen cies for fear of others getting a share of the credit. In theory, the DIOCC system should have worked well in developing operational leads, and on occasion it did. By and large, however, it did not function prop erly in Tay Ninh Province because of personal intransi gence and bureaucratic in-fight ing. The sources that were uniformly inaccurate were the agent reports developed by US military intelligence units. During the 10 months that I served as the PRU adviser, not a single agent report received by the PRU from the US military proved to be of value. Most agents were paid for their information in a piecework fash ion, and this led to the manufac ture of a large volume of worthless reports. Vietnamese National Police agent reports were equally worthless to the Tay Ninh PRU, and in some cases, dangerously inaccurate. National-level intelli gence sources were accurate but often did not pertain to VCI activities, so they were of little value to the PRU in rooting out the VCI in the province. Of moderate importance and value to the PRU were reports from the interrogation of prison ers by the Vietnamese Police Special Branch at the Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC). Many of the prisoners held at the PIC provided accurate and timely information on VCI personalities and activities. When this infor mation was shared with the PRU, which was rare, the results were usually highly successful. Of particular value were the many VC who rallied to the South Vietnamese government as part of the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) Program. These Hoi Chanhs (returnees) were screened after they surrendered to the South Vietnamese govern ment and then interrogated at the PIC, where they often volun teered to guide PRU teams into highly contested areas to cap ture VCI. Hoi Chanhs were usu ally far more reliable than other prisoners, although many VC guerrillas and North Vietnam Army (NVA) soldiers also pro vided useful information on VCI targets. Another source of intelligence that was often productive, but time consuming to exploit and difficult to process, was the vast store of data collected by Census Grievance teams during 1963–64. These teams conducted inter views in conjunction with a national census at that time. Their interviews led to the devel opment of maps of the province’s districts and villages that were color-coded to illustrate degrees of loyalty to the South Vietnam ese government. Green-colored houses were deemed loyal; yel low meant neutral; and red indi cated VC sympathy. In addition, these maps would often contain the names of fam ily members who were VCI mem bers or sympathetic to the communists. This storehouse of data was kept at the CIA villa in Tay Ninh City and reviewed peri odically by the US adviser for operational leads. In most cases, the information was dated or dif ficult to exploit because of the inaccessibility or the death or capture of the communist sympa thizer, but in some notable cases important mid-level VCI cadre were arrested or killed as a result of information on the Cen sus Grievance maps. Had these maps been digitized and the information contained in a readily accessible database, the time taken to absorb their infor mation probably would have been greatly reduced and many more operational leads developed. By far, the most prolific source of intelligence for the PRU was the PRU’s own intelligence system. The Tay Ninh PRU was forced to develop its own source of opera tional leads because of the afore mentioned reluctance of other agencies to share information on VCI targets. As natives of Tay Ninh Province the PRU mem bers had lived and worked in the province for most, if not all, of their lives. They were part of the fabric of the provincial society, and their families engaged in all kinds of commerce throughout the province. Through family contacts, PRU members developed an extensive intelligence system that success fully gathered accurate informa tion on the VCI at the hamlet and village level to map VCI activities. In many cases, the PRU members knew personally the VCI cadre they were hunt ing; indeed, many had known them since childhood. They knew the families of the VCI and the details of their personal lives. In some cases, the Tay Ninh PRU was actually successful in infil trating the VCI. This intimate knowledge of the VCI led to many highly accurate operational leads and the elimi nation of several important VCI cadres during my tour there. While I was the US adviser to the Tay Ninh PRU, approximately two-thirds of the VCI the PRU captured or killed were uncov ered by the intelligence devel oped by the PRU’s organic system. Operational Relationships While the PRU program was a national organization under CORDS on the American side and the Ministry of Interior on the Vietnamese side, it was much more a provincial “action arm.” By that I mean the operational direction and authority for any PRU came from the Vietnamese province chief, who was the only official who could sign an arrest order or operational order for the PRU. Thus, as the US PRU adviser in Tay Ninh, I could coordinate with Vietnamese and American mili tary units and plan operations, but I could not authorize them. To conduct any operation by the Tay Ninh PRU against a VCI tar get, I had to submit a written request for a signed authoriza tion from the province chief. Since the province chief and his key subordinates and US advis ers met almost daily, this requirement never really was an impediment to successful use of the PRU. Down the line, at the district level, Vietnamese dis trict chiefs could not use the PRU teams located there on missions without the approval of both the US PRU adviser and the prov ince chief. Even so, because the district coordination centers, the DIOCCs, were set up to rapidly process such operational requests, I saw no meaningful delays in approving PRU opera
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tions at the district level while I was there.
The Impact of the Changing Role of American Participation
I arrived at a time of shifting arrangements. Installed as a “commander” of the PRU in Sep tember, I became an “advisor after November 1969. Until then, “command” rested with the US military officers and senior noncommissioned officers assigned to the PRUs. This arrangement changed after November because General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, had become con cerned about perceived abuses in the Phoenix program and the effect allegations of abuse were having on support of the war in the United States. That month, he issued an order that changed the status of US military men assigned to the PRU from “commander” to “adviser.” He also stipulated that no American was to accompany PRU teams on operations in the field. This he did to avoid the possibility that US personnel might involve themselves in actions that could be construed as violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I was not privy to the rationale of Abrams or his staff in formu lating these restrictions, but I can say that during my assign ment in Tay Ninh, I never wit nessed and never even heard of a single operational act by either an American or a Vietnamese MACV’s policy [of keeping US commanders out of the field] devastated the PRU’s morale and effectiveness. PRU member that violated the code. The new policy devastated the morale and effectiveness of the men in Tay Ninh. The PRU relied heavily on the Americans who accompanied them on dan gerous missions to provide radio contact with US supporting units, especially medevac heli copters and artillery units. Without the prospect of Ameri cans by them, PRU members became reluctant to carry out missions into contested areas north and west of Tay Ninh City, such as War Zone C and the An Thanh-Cay Me border area with Cambodia. They knew if they got into difficulty, without Ameri cans they would be unable to receive prompt medical evacuation, supporting arms fire, or emergency extraction by US helicop ters. This was no small mat ter for the Tay Ninh PRU. Its teams operated in areas in which the North Vietnamese Army’s 5th, 7th, and 9th Divi sions operated. And, as lightly armed units, the PRU teams needed rapid US fire support if they engaged with NVA or VC main force units. ing to venture into contested areas. I admit that in some cases, my loyalty to the PRU and my understanding of leadership caused me to question MACV’s restrictions. I formally requested reconsideration of the policy but the request was denied. Why Were PRU Teams Successful in Destroying the VCI? While my experience in Tay Ninh does not necessarily represent the experience of other PRU advisers and their units, I can say confidently that the Tay Ninh PRU was successful during my tour. From September 1969 to June 1970, the Tay Ninh PRU After November 1969, it took several months and many hours of training before the Tay Ninh PRU members were again willing to venture into contested areas. I admit that some cases, my loyalty to the PRU and my understanding of leadership caused me to question MSCV's restrictions. I formally requested reconsideration of the policy but the request was denied.
Why were PRU Teams Successful in Destroying the VCI?
While my experience in Tay Ninh does not necessary represent the experience of other PRU advisers and the units, I say confidently that the Tay Ninh PRU was successful during my tour. From Sep 1969 to Jun 1970, the Tay Ninh PRU killed 31 VCI and captured 64— at a cost of only two PRU mem bers killed and two wounded. As early as December 1968, it was apparent to the Tay Ninh PRU that most of the senior VCI cadre had been either killed or captured in the months after Tet or had been driven into neighbor ing Cambodia. As a credible political threat, the VC had ceased to function in any meaningful way by the time I left Viet nam in June 1970.4 Further proof of the PRU’s effec tiveness came in 1975, when the communists finally defeated the South Vietnamese. The NVA commander occupying Tay Ninh Province would put in a hurried request to North Vietnam for 200 civilian political cadre. He reported that there were only six local VC cadre left in the prov ince to manage the province’s affairs. The Tay Ninh PRU was successful primarily because it was a locally recruited outfit whose members had an intimate knowledge of their province, its people, and the enemy. They also had discipline, strong leadership, and an intense personal motivation to defeat the VC. They had an accu rate and highly effective intelli gence system that was difficult for the enemy to infiltrate or
// (4) I obtained the information about the sta tus of the VCI in Tay Ninh Province after I left Vietnam from an interview with two former Tay Ninh PRU members who resettled in the United States in 1985//
defeat because it was based on strong family loyalties and reli gious and civic affiliations. The American commanders and advisers came and went and played important roles. But few served more than a year in any province. And as much as I (or I think any of my fellow PRU advisers) would like to find ways to take credit for the success of the PRU, I (and we) cannot. Long after the Americans left South Vietnam, the Tay Ninh PRU con tinued to root out the VCI. The concept may have been an Ameri can one, but the execution and adaptation were entirely Viet namese. After the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the lives of Tay Ninh PRU members changed dramatically for the worse. They were hunted down and arrested or killed. Many served long terms in reedu cation camps, where they were tortured and made to work under inhumane conditions. Some escaped the camps and made their way to the United States, where they were settled by the US government and given jobs. Most, however, were executed or died in squalid camps. A few never surrendered and contin ued to fight the Vietnamese com munists and their southern allies. They organized a “stay behind” unit in Tay Ninh called the “Yellow Dragons,” and their activities were still reported on by the communist authorities in the province well into the 1990s.
Lessons learned
With the Tay Ninh experience behind me, I have often pon dered if units similarly orga nized, equipped, and trained could duplicate the PRU’s suc cess in other places and times. Could special police units drawn from local communities to iden tify and apprehend insurgents be successful and be so in keeping with the fundamental demo cratic principles we espouse? I believe they can if the following conditions are met: •The units are imbued with both a professional and civic ethical standards that make them accountable to the people for their actions, not only to spe cific government officials or political leaders. •They are equipped and trained to a high level of professional ism. •They are paid well (and regu larly) and rewarded for tangi ble results—a crucial element in preventing corruption and enemy infiltration. •They are organized into small, tightly knit teams whose ranks are filled by members of the communities they serve. (Out of a population of over 17 million, there were never more than 4,500 PRU members in all of South Vietnam during the Viet nam War. Most of these PRU members were natives of the provinces in which they served.) •They are subject to effective judicial and political oversight
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and not free to conduct unau thorized missions, without orders from a competent legal authority. •The units are not responsible for interrogating or incarcerat ing captives beyond seeking identifying information and holding them until transfer elsewhere. •A clear separation is made between PRU-type units and other police units, especially those involved in criminal investigations and arrests. •The units’ members and their families are protected by the state from retribution and given assurances that their names will not be revealed to the press or any other unautho rized source. •They are provided with the highest level of professional and ethical leadership •They receive full access to per tinent targeting intelligence through some form of inter agency coordinating group, like the South Vietnamese DIOCCs. •If US advisors are assigned to such a unit, they should receive pre-assignment training con centrating on language profi ciency, cultural sensitivity, intelligence management, small unit tactics, and staff planning./.
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