Wednesday, July 9, 2025

 Battle of Ong Thanh

17 October 1967

2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry

1st Infantry Division
"No Mission Too Difficult, No Sacrifice Too Great - Duty First!"

28th Inf Rgt               1st Infantry Division

The 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry had been operating west of the village of Chon Thanh since October 8th, conducting "search and destroy" operations in an area known to be occupied by large Viet Cong forces. Only four of the battalion's five companies (HHC, A, B, and D) were involved; C Company was providing fire base security for the supporting artillery unit.

D Company had engaged a large enemy force on 16 October directly south of the Battalion's night defensive position, killing at least 30 VC soldiers with direct fire, mortars, and artillery at the cost of only four men wounded in action. Captain Bernard F. Jones, a MACV Advisor with a Vietnamese Provincial reconnaissance unit attached to D Company, was killed in the action. In the late afternoon the 2/28 elements withdrew to the Battalion position.

LTC Terry Allen, commanding 2/28, set his plans for 17 October based on a two-company search-and-destroy operation led by A Company with the Battalion Command Group and D Company in trail. The two companies would be protected by artillery "marching fire" to its front and flanks.

On the morning of 17 October, Alpha Company, with a total of 65 men, led out from the night defensive perimeter moving south toward the area where the 16 October fight had occurred. D Company, with 73 men and the command group, followed in trail. A Company was moving very cautiously, with point and flank patrols; by late morning the force had moved only about 1200 meters. Shortly before noon Alpha was engaged by a very much larger enemy force.

The action took place in heavy jungle west of the Village of Chon Thanh (Highway 13) in Binh Long Province. Although considered the dry season, it was humid and moist with daytime temperatures in excess of 90 degrees. The double canopy jungle was in relatively flat ground surrounded by intermittent streams (such as Suoi Ong-Thanh), which flowed south and west.

The opposing force consisted of two battalions of the 271st VC Regiment (300-400 or more soldiers). The VC had suffered heavy losses in an engagement with the 1/18 Infantry on 06-10 October and the firefight with Delta 2/28 the previous day. They had withdrawn to a base camp called the "Long Nuguyen Secret Zone" to refit and rearm. The VC did have plentiful supplies of ammunition for AK-47 rifles, RPD machine guns, some captured .50 caliber machine guns, perhaps some Chinese 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, Chicom claymores, and many RPGs.

The action was initiated when the Alpha Company point reported sighting a small group of enemy soldiers moving across their front. CPT George, Alpha's commander, ordered a hasty ambush. As the ambush force moved forward they were engaged by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and Claymore mines. The friendly force was not so much surprised by the enemy fire as they were overwhelmed by it. Two platoon leaders were immediately killed, and within 15 minutes, after trying to regain control of the situation, CPT George was blinded, deafened and wounded by an enemy Claymore while attempting to personally attack an enemy machine gun with hand grenades. Alpha's First Sergeant moved forward, retrieved CPT George, and led CPT George east away from the enemy fire which coming from the west. This action, while saving CPT George, left A Company leaderless. Practically every man in A Company was killed or wounded in the first 30 minutes of action.

D Company, commanded by 1LT Welch, formed a perimeter around the battalion command group. LTC Allen had no radio contact with A Company, and enemy fire was now hitting D Company. LTC Allen directed 1LT Welch to move forward to contact with A Company. 1LT Welch moved part of Delta forward, but found only Alpha's dead and wounded rather than a fighting force. Welch then directed a fighting withdrawal to the Delta perimeter, collecting as many of Alpha's wounded as possible. LTC Allen was on the radio requesting air strikes when Welch reported that it appeared that A Company had ceased to exist as an effective fighting force. Delta pulled into a tight perimeter approximately 60 feet in diameter and prepared to defend itself.

Enemy fire was heavy, with small arms, machine guns, and RPGs chopping through the underbrush into the Delta position. It became apparent that the enemy was maneuvering around both sides of the Delta perimeter, intent on destroying the Americans. LTC Allen was desperately trying to direct air strikes against the enemy, but they were ineffective due to the nature of the double-canopy jungle and the proximity of friend and foe. Delta's Artillery Forward Observer, 2LT Durham, brought artillery fire closer into his position while avoiding the area to Delta's front where Alpha's dead and wounded were laying in the jungle. Enemy soldiers were already maneuvering through that location, killing any Alpha Company wounded they found.

Practically all the D company radios had been destroyed or damaged by enemy fire and radio communications were maintained only by gathering damaged radios so they could be cannibalized. 2LT Durham, the artillery forward observer, was protecting his artillery net radio with his body while operating his radio handset to talk with the stub of his wrist, as his hand had been blown off by enemy fire. He continued to adjust the artillery fire more closely in, still smiling and calling to both 1LT Welch and Delta's First Sergeant.

At this point LTC Allen ordered 1LT Welch to withdraw along their ingress route, but doing so would have required abandoning the wounded and Welch ignored the order. Enemy fire continued to hit the Delta perimeter from three directions and casualties continued to mount.

At about 1400, some 2-1/2 hours after the contact began, a relief force fought its way to the Delta perimeter. By that time LTC Allen and everyone in the Battalion Command Group was dead, Alpha was destroyed, and Delta was more than decimated.

The fight at Ong Thanh resulted in the loss of at least 60 Americans - 55 killed in the action, 2 missing, and 3 who would die of their wounds. The VC left 163 bodies on the battlefield. The American dead were



You may read more about events of the Battle of Ong Thanh here and also at Black Widows website here and more about Lieutenant Colonel Terry Allen here

 TRẬN ÔNG THÀNH

The Ordenl of the Big Red Olle 

On the morning of 17 October Hay left to attend a MACV conference 

in Saigon. At the time he noted that his forces had accounted for about 

one hundred fifty enemy dead in the Long Nguyen, had found and 

destroyed many base camps, and had captured over sixty tons of rice. 

Although some Viet Cong obviously remained in the base area, many 

signs suggested that the 27151 had suffered a major defeat and was in the 

process of attempting to leave the Long Nguyen. Assuming the enemy 

would move west into the Michelin Plantation, blocking forces of the 25th 

Division had already deployed there to prevent his escape. 

OngThanh 

General Hay appeared ready to end his campaign in the Long 

Nguyen, but increased enemy activity in the area of the Ong Thanh 

Stream caused him to reconsider. The stream flowed near the Binh 

Duong-Binh Long provincial boundary, where the 1st Brigade had made 

all its major contacts. The enemy's continued presence there suggested 

that the Viet Cong were determined to defend their jungle bases. '9 

On the morning of 16 October Colonel Allen had moved out from his 

temporary base along the Ong Thanh with two companies to patrol to the 

southeast. After traveling two kilometers, the point of his column spotted 

a fo rtified enemy camp. Allen pulled his men back and placed air strikes 

on the area in accordance with 1st Division policy. 

After the bombing runs, the Americans entered the camp. Suddenly, an 

enemy mine exploded, and sniper fire erupted from the surrounding trees. 

Several soldiers went down in the hail of bullets. Allen ordered a quick 

withdrawal and formed a two-company perimeter around his casualties. 

Meanwhile, several batteries of artillery rained shells into the camp from 

firebases along Highway 13, and within an hour enemy fire had ceased. 

Allen's men returned to the area and counted seventeen enemy dead. 

While probing the western edge of the camp, the Americans saw and 

fired on two Viet Congo That set off a second firefight against an estimated 

sixty enemy soldiers hiding in the jungle. Again, Allen formed a perimeter 

and called in air strikes, but late that afternoon, to avoid committing to a 

fi ght that might continue into the night, he broke contact and returned to 

his base. Allen's mission for 17 October was to reenter the area of the previ

ous day's encounter to determine if the enemy was still there.20 

At the time Colonel Newman, who had commanded the brigade for 

only a month, believed that battalion commanders should accompany 

their men in the jungle. Allen, also in command of his unit for a month, preferred supervising the action from a helicopter. Although that practice 

was normal in the 3d Brigade, as long as Allen was serving under 1st 

Brigade control he followed Newman's policy. (Mnp 36) 

At 0800 on 17 October, a bright, sunny morning, Allen's unit struck out, 

with Company A in the lead followed by Company D. He intended to 

move directly south for 1,500 meters and then to head east to reenter the 

enemy camp from a slightly different direction. The column would then 

continue farther east to assess the damage in an area that 8-52s had hit on 

the fourteenth. Allen and a command group of six went with Company O. 

Both companies were far below their normal combat field strength of 

100 to 120 men, and some of their leaders had left for training or other 

temporary duty. Each company had left behind its mortar sections, a divi

sion policy, to help guard the battalion base along with Company B and 

the men from the battalion headquarters company. Allen's fourth rifle 

company was under the direct control of the 1st Brigade, protecting 

another supporting firebase, CAISSON V. Because of the reduced strength

Company A had only sixty-five men and Company 0 seventy-three

each unit had reorganized two of its three rifle platoons into two-squad 

platoons. Allen could count on artillery support from four batteries of 

105-mm. howitzers and one battery of 155-mm. howitzers located at CAIS

SON V and two other firebases, CAISSON IIl-S and LORRAINE III. The men of 

both companies carried extra ammunition. 

Preceded by marching artillery fire, Allen's men entered the jungle 

with flank security extending twenty to thirty-five meters. During the 

first forty-five minutes, they traveled no more than five hundred meters, 

periodically halting to conduct cloverleaf patrols to the front, rear, and 

fl anks. At 0956, after continuing in the same manner for another five hun

dred meters, the point squad of the column from the 1st Platoon, Compa

ny A, came upon a well-traveled northeast-southwest trail that had been 

used within the hour. The acting platoon leader, sensing that another 

enemy camp was close by, obtained permission to make cloverleaf patrols 

east and west of the trail. The rest of the column halted, placed flank secu

rity out at a greater distance, and awaited the findings of the patrols. 

At that time most of Allen's men were in moderate jungle that did not 

form a complete canopy. The vegetation did not obstruct movement by 

foot, but it obscured ground visibility beyond fifteen to twenty meters. At 

a greater distance to the flanks and to the south, where the lead unit of 

Company A was moving, the jungle was more dense, with some trees as 

high as forty meters. 

Almost immediately, the men of the 1st Platoon, scouting west of the 

trail, sighted a Viet Cong soldier. Moments later a group of enemy troops 

appeared on the trail just ahead. The commander of Company A, Capt. 

James E. George, told the patrol to form a hasty ambush, but by the time 

his men were in position the enemy had disappeared and all was quiet. 

As they lay silent on the jungle floor, the 1st Platoon leader heard 

movement in the trees, the clicking of rifle bolts, and the rattle of metal. George told him to reinforce the ambush patrol at once. Moving out, the 

rest of the men of the platoon immediately ran into sniper fire. They 

pressed on until a machine-gun burst from a well-camouflaged bunker 

killed one man and wounded two others. Then heavy fire poured into 

both flanks and the platoon was pinned down. 

The next platoon in the column, the 2d, tried to reinforce but was 

brought up short by the same hidden machine-gun nest. As the bullets 

fl ew, the radio went dead and the company commander could no longer 

communicate with either platoon. 

Captain George had few options. His trail unit, the 3d Platoon, had 

only eleven men, and since he needed to maintain a link with Company 

D, George decided to move his own command group forward to join his 

beleaguered platoons. Maneuvering to a position some fifteen meters in 

front of the enemy bunker, he tossed in a flurry of grenades and tem

porarily silenced the troublesome machine gun. 

But the enemy was still in the fight. Perhaps an alert Viet Cong soldier 

spotted the antennas on the radios carried by members of George's com

mand group and realized the importance of what he had found. Whatev

er the case, one soldier dashed forward with a claymore-type mine and 

set off the explosive before the Americans could cut him down. The blast 

killed a radio operator and wounded Captain George and most of the rest 

of the command group. 

As Company A battled on, Company D began drawing sniper fire 

from trees west of its position. The shooters wounded two men before 

return fire silenced them. Colonel Allen directed his command group to 

remain in place beside a prominent ant hill and told the Company D com

mander, 1st Lt. Albert C. Welch, to form a two-platoon perimeter around 

the command group. Welch's leading platoon, the 3d, was to stay in con

tact with Company A's rear. Since he needed to call in artillery and air 

strikes, Allen radioed George to break contact and withdraw into Compa

ny D's perimeter, the same kind of maneuver the battalion had conducted 

successfully the day before. 

Captain George, blind and deaf from the explosion of the claymore, 

gave the order to pull back. But all three of his platoons were under heavy 

fire, and all three platoon leaders were wounded. With his officers out of 

action, George radioed Allen that he was placing his senior noncommis

sioned officer, M. Sgt. Jose B. Valdez, in command of the company. 

Company A's plight was serious. The fight had unfolded so quickly, 

and it was so difficult to see through the underbrush, that few survivors 

would remember seeing the enemy. Despite heavy return fire by the 

Americans, enemy fire continued undiminished. And with most of the 

company's officers wounded early in the action, communication within 

the unit broke down almost immediately. 

As the firefight degenerated into a general melee, withdrawing to 

safety became a matter of individual initiative. Pfc. James c. Jones, the 

artillery forward observer's radio operator, found himself with two jobs-calling in artillery and fighting off the enemy closing in around 

h;m. After emptying his .45-caliber pistol at his attackers, he snatched up 

a wounded soldier's M16 and kept firing. As the bullets flew, Jones 

stayed on the radio, walking in the artillery fire so close that shell frag

ments spattered all around him. When the enemy fire lessened, Jones, 

believing himself to be the sole survivor in the area, crawled to the rear, 

eventually rejoining Company A's command group. 

Meanwhile, many of the men from Company A's 2d and 3d Platoons 

were able to join Company D. Some reached the perimeter arow1d Colonel 

Allen and Ius command group, wlule others joined a second perimeter that 

Company D's 3d Platoon had set up some fifty meters away. Having no con

tact with Company A's platoons, Sergeant Valdez and Company A's surviv

ing command group formed their own perimeter a hundred meters or more 

east of where the fight had started. In an effort to assemble all survivors, 

Valdez repeatedly fired shots into the air, shouting, "Come to the shot in the 

air! Come to us! Be calm!" Individuals and small groups gradually filtered 

into Valdez's position, most of them from the 1st Platoon." 

The use-or possibly misuse-of air strikes influenced how the bat

tl e would play out. Earlier that morning F-100s and B-57 Canberras had 

fl own preplanned air strikes against known and suspected enemy base 

camps within the 1st Brigade's sector, but none were in direct support of 

Allen's advance. The last was completed at 1012, only minutes before 

Company A ran into the enemy and Colonel Newman, flying overhead 

at 1020, called for close air support for Allen's battalion. Even so, appar

ently 110 planes were immediately available to answer Newman's 

request. Thirty minutes would pass before A-37 Dragonflies on strip 

alert at Bien I-Ioa Air Base, nearly sixty kilometers from the fight, could 

arrive. Another ten minutes would elapse before a forward air controller 

could brief the pilots on the target. By then, about nOD, only sporadic 

fire threatened Allen's men. 

Believing that the Viet Cong were withdrawing south, Newman 

directed the air strikes to two hundred meters south of the southernmost 

point where he had seen smoke, which Company A had used to mark its 

position. Before the first of what would eventually total sixteen strikes 

went in, Newman agreed to halt the supporting artillery fire coming from 

CAISSON III-S and CAISSON V; during the partial check-fire only the two 

artillery batteries at LORRAINE III continued to fire, striking an area west of 

Company A's initial contact. According to Colonel Allen's operations offi

cer, Maj. John F. Sloan, the check-fire was against Allen's wishes, but he 

deferred to the judgment of his brigade commander. 

The target that Colonel Newman had indicated was in dense jungle, 

and the forward air controller who was to vector in the fighter-bombers had no direct communication with the troops on the ground. For these 

reasons, the air controller had the attacking aircraft make several passes 

over the designated target to ensure that the pilots knew exactly where to 

deliver their bombs. After obtaining final clearances, the first of two air

craft attacked at 1110. The second began its run ten minutes later, at which 

time Allen informed Newman that all enemy fire had ceased. 

The duration of the check-fire was difficult to reconstruct. Conflicting 

reports ranged from fifteen to forty-five minutes. Whatever its length, the 

enemy, far from withdrawing, used the respite to redeploy into a horse

shoe with troops west, south, and east of Company D. 

Starting at 1135 enemy fire against Company 0 began to intensify. 

Lieutenant Welch had chosen his position around a prominent ant hill, 

and the small landmark may have made it easier for the Viet Cong to pin

point his location. Because the men could make out few targets in the 

underbrush, Welch told them to hold their fire until they either had the 

enemy in their sights or could pick out muzzle flashes. As the enemy fire 

grew in volume, the men could make out the distinctive sound of an 

American-made M60 machine gun firing at them from the south. 

When Sergeant Valdez had assumed command of Company A, 

Colonel Allen had instructed him to move on an azimuth of 360 degrees 

(due north) to join him. When Allen heard the machine-gun fire, he 

assumed that it indicated Company As approach and that Valdez's men 

were mistakenly firing into Company D. He yelled for Company A to cease fire, but the word also passed down the line of Company D. With 

American fire slacking, the volume of enemy fire grew, forcing Allen's 

troops to hug the ground and making it impossible for them to challenge 

enemy fire superiority. 

Colonel Newman later recalled that as soon as the new enemy attack 

began at 1135, Allen contacted him by radio, saying, "Sir, I can use my 

artillery now." Newman halted all further air strikes and ordered the 

artillery to resume firing. Newman later noted that the switch took about 

two minutes, but explained that "it was never made known to me that he, 

Allen, was experiencing difficulty with artillery fire support."2l 

Meanwhile, Sergeant Valdez and the twenty-four men with him, 

many of them wounded, stumbled through the jungle, dodging not only 

enemy fire, but also friendly artillery rounds. Although they had hoped 

to link up with Company D, they never found it and eventually arrived 

instead at the battalion base. 

Within Company D's perimeter, the situation was also deteriorating. 

Allen himself had been wounded, and enemy snipers in trees and 

machine gunners firing low grazing fire six to twelve inches off the 

ground were pounding the trapped Company D from three sides. Any 

American who tried to move instantly became a target. Many of the com

pany's leaders were now casualties, including the company commander, 

Lieutenant Welch. 

Shortly before noon Allen ordered the wounded Welch to pull the wlit 

back to the battalion base and Company B to come forward to cover the 

withdrawal. Refusing assistance from those men about to leave, the battal

ion commander elected to remain with those wounded who were immobile. 

The withdrawal proved costly. As the troops began to move back, 

enemy fire cut down several of them, and the movement north quickly 

turned into a disorganized scramble. A platoon sergeant moving to the 

rear was the last to see Allen alive. With the help of the sergeant, Allen 

had begun removing a radio from the back of a dead operator to call in 

more artillery fire. Moments later a short burst of machine-gun fire 

grazed Allen's helmet, knocking him down. Allen told the sergeant to for

get the artillery and get his people "the hell out of there."" Shortly after 

leaving, the sergeant looked back and saw either an RPG round or a clay

more mine explode near Allen, followed quickly by a burst of machine

gun fire, which killed him. 

As the withdrawal proceeded, the brigade commander, Colonel New

man, headed for the battalion base to assume command of the unit. An 

assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. William S. Coleman, in his heli

copter above the battlefield, took control of the brigade. Soldiers arriving 

at the base said that many of the wounded had been left behind, so the brigade operations officer, Maj. Donald W. Holleder, who had landed 

with Newman, organized a small group of men to attempt to reach Com

pany D's old position. Holleder himself took the lead and soon outdis

talKed the other men by fifty meters. Suddenly, an enemy sniper in a tree 

fired and Holleder fell mortally wounded. 

Meanwhile, Colonel Newman obtained helicopters to evacuate the casu

alties and to bring Allen's Company C from CAISSON V. Newman planned to 

lead Company C and the battalion's reconnaissance platoon to Company 

D's former position while Company B kept a corridor open to the base. 

Expecting to find many wounded, he instructed the battalion surgeon and 

medical aid men, augmented from division by another physician and other 

aid men, to accompany him. Unsure as to where the wounded were, he 

intended to advance without artillery support for fear of hitting them. 

While Newman gathered the relief force, a wounded grenadier from 

Company A, Pfc. Joseph J. Costello, managed to locate a radio near Allen's 

last position and about 1330 sent a message over the battalion conunand net: 

"This is Costello, please help, we need help."" Overhead, General Coleman 

heard his call and told him to mark his position with a smoke grenade. 

Seeing the smoke rise from the trees, Coleman told Costello that help 

would soon arrive. Instructing those stations on the battalion command 

net to switch to an alternate frequency so he and Colonel Newman could 

remain in continuous contact with Costello, Coleman planned to vector 

Newman's relief to Costello's position. Meanwhile, he encouraged Costel

lo to set up a perimeter defense with the surviving troops and gave him 

advice for treating the wounded. When the enemy fire around Costello's 

position finally ended at 1430, a helicopter dropped bags of smoke 

grenades and medical supplies. 

By that time Newman's relief force, with the reconnaissance platoon in 

the lead, was on the move with volunteers from Companies A and D to 

assist in the search for their comrades. The relief force arrived at Costello's 

location at 1515, reporting that it had found 30 to 40 dead or wounded 

Americans. As Company C passed through the reconnaissance platoon and 

began to form a perimeter, the company came upon another group of 

Americans, raising its estimate to 50 killed and wounded. On a sweep 

around the area, the reconnaissance platoon found 3 enemy weapons, sev

eral blood-covered trails leading away from the area, and 22 enemy bodies. 

While air and artillery struck likely routes of withdrawal, Colonel 

Newman's most pressing problem was how to evacuate the large number 

of American casualties from the area. There were no clearings for Hueys 

to land, and moving the dead and wounded overland would take too 

much time. Flying above the battlefield, General Coleman found the solu

ti on. Within a short distance from where Colonel Allen's body had been found, he spotted a deadfall that could be made into a helicopter landing 

zone. While troops cut down the vegetation with machetes and chain 

saws, a helicopter lowered a jungle penetrator rig to take out the most 

critically wounded. Not until late that afternoon was "the hole," as the 

men called it, large enough for a helicopter to land, and not until 1810 

was the last of the wounded finally evacuated. Because of the presence of 

enemy snipers and the lateness of the day, Newman decided to leave the 

American dead near the hole until the next morning. 

Throughout the night, to keep the enemy away from the bodies, 

"skyspots" (radar-directed air strikes) and artillery fire boxed the area. 

The next morning, when Newman's men returned to remove the dead, 

they found no evidence that the enemy had tampered with the bodies, 

and none were booby trapped, a common enemy practice. A further 

search turned up 17 more American dead, none of whom showed evi

dence of having been hit by artillery fire or air strikes. That accounted for 

all who had participated in the fight except for two soldiers. American 

losses came to 56 killed, 75 wounded, and 2 missing-totaling almost the 

entire complement of Allen's original force. 

Viet Cong losses were unknown. Based on an estimate from each of 

the companies, the 1st Brigade reported an enemy body count of 101, but 

the relief force that removed the American dead on the following morn

ing found only 2 enemy bodies. 

Looking back, General Coleman felt that when Company A had first 

become embroiled in heavy combat at 1020 and had taken casualties, Allen 

should have instructed the unit to form a perimeter and then reinforced it 

with Company D. Yet 1st Division policy stated otherwise, supporting 

Allen's action. The same maneuver had been successfully executed by 

Colonel Cavazos' men on the eleventh and by Colonel Allen's men on the 

sixteenth. The error, if there was one, may have been using the same tactic 

repeatedly and automatically, without considering alternatives. 

On the afternoon after the dead had been removed from the battle

fi eld, General Westmoreland met with General Hay to determine why the 

engagement had been fought on the enemy's terms. Hay made no 

attempt to gloss over the calamity. Allen's men had been ambushed. 

Although they had apparently fought well under extreme circumstances, 

they had been dealt a terrible blow, taking more casualties in a single 

action than any other battalion under Hay's command. 

Early in November the 2d Battalion, 28th Infa ntry, would again join 

the 1st Brigade to participate in a fight against two enemy regiments of 

the 9th Division at Loc Ninh. Missing at Loc Ninh was the 9th Division's 

remaining regiment, the 271sl. According to prisoners captured later, 

members of the 271s1 who had fought in the Long Nguyen during Octo

ber, their regiment had taken heavy casualties there and for months was 

in no condition to fight. But such news was no consolation to Americans 

mourning the loss of their own.

Tuesday, July 8, 2025

 TƯỚNG MỸ HỒI HƯU VIẾT SÁCH KHEN SĐ 9 CSBV* GIỎI NHẤT THẾ GIỚI. NHẤT THẾ GchuIỚI 

* Chuyển ngữ từ bài giới thiệu sách của tướng Mỹ hồi hưu James shelton mà năm 1967 cấp bậc thiếu tá,

đã chỉ huy TD được kể trong trận đánh Suối Ông Thành.


* Đây là sđ tân lập đầu tiên, thành lập trong năm 1964 vì trước giờ VC chưa có cấp sđ, gồm lính VC địa phương nhưng chỉ huy bởi các sĩ quan (gốc miền nam) từ bắc vào; sđ này đã dự trận Bình Giả, Đồng Xoài, và trận tiêu diệt trung đoàn 7 sđ VNCH, v.v... Sau 1954, rất nhiều cán bộ miền nam tập kết ra bắc. Sau khi học tập và thụ huấn kỹ lưỡng, họ lần lượt trở về miền nam để chỉ huy hay lãnh đạo đám VC miền nam.

- "Sđ 9 VC, thành lập từ ba trung đoàn--271, 272, và 273--đúng là đv bộ binh giỏi nhất thế giới," tướng hồi hưu Shelton đã nói. "Những người lính VC này đã chiến đấu nhiều năm. Họ đã chiến đấu và đánh bại quân Pháp trong thập niên 1950.

"Những người của chúng ta đều mới và chưa bao giờ dự 1 trận đánh như trận này. Họ ko được huấn luyện kỹ càng. Dù họ đã ko biết điều đó, nhưng những "Hắc sư" này, một thành phần của 'Anh cả đỏ', đã chiến đấu 1 chống 10 với kẻ thù. Đây là chuyện của chiến tranh. Điều này đã xảy ra trước đây và sẽ xảy ra lần nữa," tướng quân nói

Sau đây là phần chuyển ngữ từ quân sử Mỹ.

====

"Các 'Sư tử Đen' hay 'Hắc Sư' đang chờ đợi 1 trận đánh. TĐ này đã HQ tìm và diệt địch hơn 1 tuần. Giờ đây người lính của TĐ 2/28 sđ 1 bộ binh này đã mệt lả do săn đuổi VC trong rừng rậm 50 dặm bắc SG.

Ngày 17/1/1967, dọc theo 1 dòng suối có tên Suối Ông Thành ở tây của QL-13, con đường đất chánh nối SG với biên giới, các Hắc Sư đã tìm thấy cái mà họ đang tìm kiếm. TĐ 2/28 đã đối đầu với trung đoàn 271 thiện chiến VC, đang chờ họ trong rừng.

Khi dứt tiếng súng, 57 chiến sĩ 'Hắc Sư' của 1 TĐ thiếu quân số  đã về quê hương trong túi đựng xác.(TĐ có bốn đ.đ. đóng ở Lai Khê, nhưng 1 đ.đ. phải đi bảo vệ đoàn xe và 1 đ.đ. canh giữ địa điểm đóng quân qua đêm, do vậy khi HQ chỉ có hai đ.đ. --ND). 77 người khác bị thương trong trận đánh nửa ngày này. VC để lại 103 xác trên chiến địa.

Chuẩn tướng (BG) hồi hưu James Shelton đã in 1 sách, "Con Thú Đã Ở Đó," nói về trận đánh trong rừng này. Sách của ông kể câu chuyện của các "Hắc Sư" cách đây 37 năm trong 1 trận đánh, đã bị đánh bại bởi 1 một đv Việt Cộng mạnh và dầy dạn kinh nghiệm chiến trận hơn.

"Điều cuối cùng đã khiến tôi viết quyển sách này là bài báo trên 1 thông tấn xã (wire service) đã xuất hiện trên nhiều báo chí khắp nước Mỹ trong thời chiến. (Thông tấn xã (TTX) là một hãng thu thập và phân phối cho những khách hàng như nhật báo, đài phát thanh, và đài truyền hình. Thời chiến có hãng AP, UPI, AFP, Reuters, v.v... -- ND). Bài báo nói rằng sđ 1 bộ binh đã thắng trận này," Shelton nhận xét. "Chúng tôi đã ko thắng trận này".

Ngoài việc nói lên sự thật, Shelton 68 tuổi, đã viết sách này để các người tương lai sẽ làm TĐ trưởng hiểu rằng họ có thể vấp phải lỗi lầm tương tự (get themself into the same predicament). Khi đó họ sẽ giết lính nếu họ quá tự mãn (cocky) về khả năng đánh thắng kẻ thù trong những trận chiến tương lai.

Đôi khi hỏa lực vượt trội của 1 phía ko tạo sự khác biệt trong kết quả của 1 trận đánh. Trận Suối Ông Thành là một ví dụ.

"Tôi muốn kể câu chuyện của những con người can đảm đã chiến đấu và chết cho đồng đội và đất nước họ," ông nói. "Tôi muốn xây 1 đài tưởng niệm cho những người này ở Bảo tàng của sđ 1 Bộ binh tại Wheaton, bang Illinois, bên ngoài Chicago. Mọi lợi tức từ việc bán sách sẽ chuyển về đài tưởng niệm này."

Lúc xảy ra trận Ông Thành, Shelton là thiếu tá làm ở ban hành quân của sđ 1 mà TĐ "Hắc Sư" là 1 thành phần. Mười ngày trước đó, ông là sq ban 3 của TĐ này.

"Sđ 9 VC, lập từ ba trung đoàn--271,272, và 273--đúng là đv bộ binh giỏi nhất thế giới," tướng Shelton nói. "Những người lính VC này đã chiến đấu nhiều năm. Họ đã chiến đấu và đánh bại quân Pháp trong thập niên 1950".

"Những người của chúng ta đều mới và chưa bao giờ dự 1 trận đánh như trận này. Họ ko được huấn luyện kỹ càng. Dù họ đã ko biết điều đó, nhưng những "Hắc Sư" này, một thành phần của 'Anh cả đỏ', đã chiến đấu 1 chống 10 với kẻ thù. Đây là chuyện của chiến tranh. Điều này đã xảy ra trước đây và sẽ xảy ra lần nữa," tướng quân nói.

Sđ 1 bộ binh được giao nhiệm vụ lục soát các căn cứ địch dọc QL-13 từ SG đến biên giới Cam-bốt -- đây cũng là con đường huyết mạch chạy từ thủ đô VNCH tới biên giới.

Trung tá Terry Allen, TĐ trưởng của "Hắc Sư", là một quân nhân chuyên nghiệm, dày dạn chiến trận.

Vấn đề mà đv của ông mắc phải cũng giống các đv Mỹ tại VN đã gặp: Bởi vì thời gian phục vụ của người lính Mỹ tại VN chưa tới 1 năm, chưa kể người đến kẻ đi trong hàng ngũ của TĐ, khiến khả năng chiến đấu của họ ko cải thiện. 

Các người lính "Hắc Sư" và sĩ quan của họ chỉ ở với nhau 3-4 tháng khi họ dự trận Suối Ông Thành. Theo ý kiến nhiều người, họ ko là người lính kinh nghiệm.

Nhưng điều đã xảy ra với TĐ còn sâu xa hơn việc người lính thiếu kinh nghiệm chiến đấu.

"Đó là 1 sai lầm trong phán đoán. Là thiếu tin tức về đối phương. Là sự cả tin của TĐ trưởng," Shelton nói. Terry Allen ko biết quân số của địch mà đv của ông đang đụng. Tôi cho rằng ông đã nghĩ chúng ta có thể đánh bại thế giới hay chúng ta là bách chiến bách thắng."

Tướng quân nói rằng TĐ "Hắc Sư" cạn kiệt quân số này, vì chỉ còn 150 người, đã đối diện với 1.500 VC. Trung úy Clark Welch của đ.đ. D là người đầu tiên của đv đã nhận ra rằng TĐ có thể phải gánh chịu nhiều hơn những gì nó có thể chịu đựng vào ngày 16/10.67 trước cuộc phục kích (xem chú thích ở dưới).

Khi trung úy này gặp Terry Allen với gợi ý rằng họ nên hủy bỏ nhiệm vụ tìm và diệt này và cần thêm quân, TĐ trưởng nói với ông, "Đó là lý do chúng ta có mặt ở đây. Chúng ta sẽ đến đây lần nữa vào ngày mai, nhưng đ.đ. của ông sẽ ko đi đầu.' Trung úy đã tuân lịnh.

Lúc 0805 đ.đ. A rời khỏi vị trí đóng quân đêm để tìm VC. Trung đội 1 thoáng thấy vài VC trên đường mòn và đại úy James George, đ.đ. trưởng ra lịnh cho binh lính tổ chức phục kích. Địch đã biến mất vào rừng trước khi bị tấn công.

Một lát sau, đ.đ. A bị tấn công mạnh từ 1 súng máy ngụy trang kỹ. Trung đội này bị cầm chân.

Đ.đ. A bị quét sạch trong 20 phút," Shelton nói. Hai trung đội trưởng gần như chết lập tức và đại úy George bị thương.

"Khi súng bắt đầu nổ, trung úy Welch, người chỉ huy đ.đ. D, đi sau đ.đ. C, đã lập 1 chu vi quanh BCH TĐ bao gồm TĐT Allen và trung sĩ Francis Dowling. Họ ở trong chu vi của đ.d. D," Shelton nói.

VC đang núp trong rừng--đôi khi chỉ cách các Hắc Sư 30 feet hay 9 m--khi họ tấn công lần đầu. Họ cũng đánh vào cạnh sườn của đ.đ. A và nổ súng vào đ.đ. A đang rối loạn hàng ngũ.

Do hai bên ở thế "cài răng lược" nên các Hắc Sư ko thể gọi máy bay hay pháo binh vì sợ chết vì bắn lầm. Trước khi trận đánh chấm dứt, trung úy Harold Durham, tiền sát viên (TSV) của đ.đ. D, buộc phải gọi pháo binh 105 ly bắn lên vị trí của mình để đ.đ. của ông bị tràn ngập.

"Trung úy Welch nhớ đã thấy trung úy pháo binh dũng cảm này ấn nút "bấm-để-nói" trên ống nghe của máy truyền tin với cổ tay đầy thương tích vì bàn tay đã đứt rời," Shelton viết trong sách. "Durham đã được truy tặng Anh dũng Bội tinh về chiến công này."

Dù cố gắng anh hùng của Durham, ông đã ko cứu trung tá Allen hay trung sĩ Dowling. Cả hai đã chết gần tổ mối giữa bãi chiến trường.

"Một trung sĩ trung đội trưởng di chuyển về phía sau là người cuối cùng thấy Allen còn sống. Trung sĩ nhìn về phía sau và thấy một quả B-40 hay 1 mìn Claymore nổ gần Allen, tiếp sau đó là 1 loạt đạn liên thanh, đã giết Allen," tướng quân viết.

"Qua các mọi tường trình, người ta thấy ngày 17/10/1967, các "Hắc Sư" vừa thiếu quân số, hỏa lực yếu hơn, chiến thuật kém hơn," Shelton viết trong sách. (outgunned, outmanned, outmaneuvered).

Vì lý do nào đó, trung đoàn 271 đã không khai thác chiến thắng của mình. (didn't press home its victory). (Theo tài liệu của CS, ngày đó trung đoàn 271 hết gạo ăn đã 6 ngày, đang chờ gạo tiếp tế. Do đó họ đã miễn cưởng chiến đấu với quân Mỹ và nhanh chóng rút lui, vì sợ B-52 ném bom trả đũa -- như đã ném vào tối 16 tây sau khi họ tấn công 1 thành phần của tđ này).

"Sau 2 giờ, đối phương đã bắt đầu rút lui trong khi chúng tôi cũng rút quân ra khỏi cái lổ mà chúng tôi đã tạo ra bằng cưa máy," tướng quân nói. Chúng tôi đã đưa trực thăng tới để bốc họ. VC đã có thể dễ dàng tràn ngập vị trí đóng quân qua đêm này và quét sạch toàn TĐ.

"Nó giống như tướng George Custer ở Little Big Horn. Các 'Hắc Sư' đã bị bao vây và kẻ thù đang tiến tới từ 2 phía. Suối Ông Thành là sự lập lại của lịch sử. Chúng ta đã ở ko đúng chỗ và ko đúng lúc, và chúng ta đã thua (got whipped). Chúng ta may mắn vì ko chết sạch (vì chỉ chết 57 người).

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Tđ 2/28 đã HQ phía tây của làng Chơn Thành từ 8/10 nhằm lùng và diệt địch trong 1 khu của 1 lực lượng lớn vc. Chỉ có 2 đ.đ. tham dự (đ.đ. A và D, đ.đ. chỉ huy bảo vệ vị trí đóng quân đêm); riêng đ.đ. C bảo vệ cho 1 đv pháo.

Đ.đ. D hay Delta đã đụng 1 quân số lớn vào ngày 16/10 ở ngay phía nam của vị trí đóng quân đêm, viết tắt là NDP, giết ít nhất 30 VC với đạn bắn thẳng, cối, và pháo, với 4 lính bị thương. Đại úy Bernard Jones, 1 cố vấn của trung đội thám sát tỉnh, gọi tắt là PRU, đi với Delta, lại chết trong chạm súng này. Vào cuối chiều của ngày 16, cả TĐ trừ rút về vị trí qua đêm.

Trung tá Terry Allen, TĐ trưởng, dự định HQ ngày 17/10 dựa trên hai đ.đ. với Alpha đi đầu, kế đó là BCH TĐ và Delta bọc hậu. Họ sẽ được liên tục bảo vệ bởi đại bác bắn phía trước và hai hông của đội hình. (Theo 1 số tài liệu, lẽ ra Allen sẽ điều quân bằng trực thăng, theo thông lệ của sđ, nhưng lữ đoàn trưởng mới về, yêu cầu các TĐT phải đi bộ với đv của mình).

Sáng hôm đó, Alpha, với 65 người, rời vị trí qua đêm, tiến về nam tới khu vực xảy ra trận đánh ngày 16 (làm bị thương 4 người nhưng chết cố vấn Mỹ của thám sát tỉnh đi với Delta).

Delta, 73 người và BCH TĐ, đi sau. Alpha di chuyển cẩn thận, với các toán nhỏ bung rộng về phía trước và 2 bên; vào cuối buổi sáng, họ chỉ đi khoảng 1000 m. Ngay trước buổi trưa, Alpha đã chạm súng với 1 lực lượng lớn của kẻ thù.

Đụng độ xảy ra ở khu rừng rậm phía tây của Làng Chơn Thành (có lẽ là quận lỵ Chơn Thành), nằm trên QL13. Dù là mua khô, nhưng không khí ẩm ướt với nhiệt độ trên 90 độ F. Rừng hai tán lá với mặt đất tương đối phẳng xen kẻ nhiều suối (như Suối Ông Thành), chảy về nam và tây.

Đối phương gồm 2 TĐ của trung đoàn 271 vc (300-400 hay nhiều hơn). VC đã bị thiệt hại nặng khi đụng với TĐ 1/18 từ 6-10/10 và với Delta ngày hôm trước. Chúng đã rút về căn cứ có tên "Mật khu Long Nguyên" để bổ sung quân và súng đạn. VC đã có tiếp tế dồi dào về đạn cho AK-47, trung liên RPD, 1 số súng 12.7 lấy được từ quân CP, có lẽ một số đại liên 12.8 của TC, mìn Claymore TC, và nhiều súng B-40.

Trận đánh bắt đầu khi người đi đầu báo cáo 1 nhóm nhỏ di chuyển ngang họ. Đại úy (đ.u) George của Alpha, ra lịnh tổ chức phục kích. Khi toán phục kích tiến tới, họ bị chận đứng bởi hỏa lực dữ dội của súng liên thanh và mìn claymore. Quân bạn đã ko ngạc nhiên lắm vì họ từng bị áp đảo bởi chúng ngày 16/10. Hai trung đội trưởng chết liền, và trong 15 phút, sau khi cố gắng kiểm soát tình hình, đ.u. George bị mù mắt, điếc tai và bị thương bởi 1 mìn Claymore khi ông định đích thân tấn công 1 súng liên thanh địch bằng lựu đạn. Trung sĩ nhất của Alpha nhào tới trước, dìu đ.u. George về phía sau để xa làn đạn địch. Hành động này, dù cứu đ.u. George đã khiến Alpha như rắn mắt đầu. Thực tế mọi người của Alpha bị chết hay bị thương trong 30 phút đầu.

Delta, chỉ huy bởi thiếu úy Welch, lập 1 chu vi bảo vệ bch TĐ. Trung tá Allen ko thể liên lạc với Alpha, và Delta đang bị tấn công. Ông ra lịnh Welch phải tiến tới để bắt tay với Alpha. Welch đi với 1 thành phần của Delta, nhưng chỉ gặp chỉ gặp xác và thương binh của Alpha. Welch bèn ra lịnh đám tàn quân này rút về chu vi của Delta, kéo theo kẻ bị thương nặng. Trung tá Allen gọi máy yêu cầu ném bom khi Welch báo cáo rằng Alpha đã tan hàng. Delta rút về 1 chu vi mới với đường kính 60 feet hay 18 m và chuẩn bị tử thủ.

Hỏa lực kẻ thù dữ dội với súng nhỏ, liên thanh và B-40 khiến lá rơi đầy xuống vị trí của Delta. Có vẻ địch đang tấn công vào 2 mặt của chu vi phòng thủ, nhằm tiêu diệt lính Mỹ.

Trung tá Allen đang tuyệt vọng cố gắng hướng dẫn máy bay ném bom nhưng ko hiệu quả do rừng 2 tán lá và hai bên "trộn trấu". Thiếu úy Durham, tiền sát viên của Delta, đã chuyển pháo gần vị trí hơn nhưng tránh khu vực phía trước của Delta-nơi đặt xác và kẻ bị thương của Alpha. Địch đã chạy ngang vị trí này, giết bất cứ lính bị thương của Alpha mà chúng thấy.

Thực tế mọi máy truyền tin của Delta đều bị phá hủy hay hư và liên lạc truyền tin có được nhờ thu nhặt và sửa chữa những máy hư. Dù bị bay mất bàn tay, tiền sát viên Durham đã dùng phần còn lại của cổ tay, để liên lạc với pháo binh. Ông tiếp tục điều chỉnh pháo binh càng lúc càng gần hơn, trong lúc mĩm cười và gọi thiếu úy Welch và trung sĩ nhất của Delta.

Vào lúc này, tđ trưởng ra lịnh Welch phải rút theo đường mà trước đó họ đã đi vào (ingress), nhưng làm vậy phải bỏ thương binh nên Welch ko nghe. Hỏa lực kẻ thù tiếp tục bắn vào chu vi của Delta từ 3 hướng và thương vong tiếp tục tăng.

Khoảng 1400, từ 1-2 giờ rưởi sau khi đụng độ bắt đầu, quân cứu viện đã đến chu vi của delta. Vào lúc đó, trung tá Allen và mọi thành viên trong bch TĐ đều chết, Alpha tan hàng, và Delta thì chưa đến nỗi như vậy.

KẾT QUẢ: ít nhất 60 quân Mỹ chết - 55 chết tại chỗ, 2 mất tích, 3 chết sau đó do thương tích. VC để lại 153 xác.

Số quân nhân tăng phái tử trận gồm:

A/ Thiếu tá Donald Holleder thuộc đ.đ. chỉ huy của lữ đoàn 1 sđ 1.

- Chuyên viên bậc 5 hay SP5 Verland Gilbertson thuộc đ.đ. C của TĐ 121 truyền tin.

- Thiếu úy Harold Durham, pháo đội C, tđ 6/15 pháo binh.

- trung sĩ James Larson, pháo đội C, tđ 2/33 pháo binh.

- Chuyên viên bậc 4 Harry Sarsfield, thuộc đ.đ. C, tđ 2/2 bộ binh.

- Đại úy Bernard Jones, toán cố vấn 71 (tử trận ngày hôm trước-15/10/67).

Họ đi theo do nhu cầu, chứ ko phải là cơ hữu của TĐ.

B/ Đ.đ. chỉ huy của TĐ 2/28 gồm:

- Trung tá Terry Allen, đ.u. James Blackwell, thượng sĩ (sergeant master) Francis Dowling, hai binh nhất, ba chuyên viên bậc 4, và một chuyên viên bậc 5.

C/ Số còn lại thuộc đ.đ. Alpha và Delta.

ĐỌC THÊM

Theo wiki bằng tiếng Việt về "Trận Suối Ông Thành": Cho đến khi Trung tá Triết trung đoàn trưởng VC ra lệnh ngừng bắn và rút quân, giao tranh mới chấm dứt. Theo ông Triết khi đó quân của ông đã nhận thấy toàn bộ trận địa đã bị tiêu diệt và hỏa lực của Mỹ đã tắt. Lính của ông đi kiểm tra thu dọn chiến trường trước khi rút đi theo lệnh của ông. Điều này được Trung úy Welch xác nhận trong cuộc gặp gỡ với ông Triết vào năm 2005 để thực hiện bộ phim tài liệu Two Days in October của đài PBS. Theo Welch thì Đại tá Triết đã nói với ông rằng họ rút đi sau trận đánh để tránh gặp phải B-52 lần nữa.

Kết quả

Trên thực tế, 64 lính và sĩ quan Mỹ đã tử trận, hầu hết số còn lại đều bị thương nặng. Vẫn chưa có chi tiết cụ thể về thương vong của CSBV. Theo Đại úy George, thương vong sẽ còn cao hơn nếu Đại đội A ban đầu không dừng lại tại nơi họ phát hiện dấu chân của bộ đội CSBV. "Nếu chúng tôi tiếp tục tiến thêm, có lẽ toàn bộ chúng tôi sẽ bị tiêu diệt", ông nói.

Trong thời gian diễn ra cuộc chiến tranh Việt Nam, những thông tin chi tiết về trận đánh này đã không được thông báo đầy đủ đến công chúng Mỹ. Nhiều tờ báo và hãng tin của Mỹ vẫn tường thuật trận đánh này là một chiến thắng của quân đội Mỹ.

Trận đánh này đã được David Maraniss chuyển thể vào tác phẩm They Marched into Sunlight, xuất bản năm 2003. Vào năm 2005, đài PBS của Mỹ đã công chiếu bộ phim tài liệu mang tên Two days in October nói về trận đánh này, với những thước phim thô được quay vào thời điểm diễn ra trận đánh và những bài phỏng vấn với những binh lính và sĩ quan chỉ huy trực tiếp tham chiến của cả hai bên.[5]







 

Black Lions’ faced death in Vietnam

Maj. Jim Shelton, author of the book, “The Beast Was Out There” left, is pictured with Lt. Col. Terry Allen, commander of the “Black Lions,” center, and Sgt. Maj. Francis Dowling. Both Allen and Dowling were killed by the VC at Ong Thanh. Photo provided by Jim Shelton

The ”Black Lions” were looking for a fight. The battalion had been on a search-and-destroy mission for more than a week. Now the men of the 2nd Battalion, 28th Regiment, 1st Infantry Division were exhausted from chasing the Viet Cong through the jungle 50 miles north of Saigon.

On Oct. 17, 1967, along a jungle stream called Ong Thanh west of Highway 13, the main dirt road connecting Saigon with the Cambodian border, the “Black Lions” found what they were looking for. The 2nd Battalion of “The Big Red 1” ran head on into the battle-hardened 271st Viet Cong Regiment that was waiting for them in the bush.

When the shooting stopped, 57 “Big Red 1” soldiers from a single under-strength battalion were sent home in body bags. Another 77 were wounded in the half-day jungle fire-fight. The Viet Cong left 103 of its men on the battlefield.

Brig. Gen. James Shelton (Ret.) of Cape Haze, Fla. published a book, “The Beast Was Out There,” about this jungle battle during the Vietnam War. His book tells the story of the “Black Lions’” defeat by a stronger, more experienced and batter led VC unit 37 years ago during an engagement in the heartland of South Vietnam.

“What eventually led me to write this book was a wire service article that appeared in many papers around the United States (during the war). The article said the 1st Infantry Division won the battle against the VC,” Shelton observed. “We didn’t win the battle, but the spin doctors put their spin on what happened.”

Besides wanting to set the record straight on the battle’s outcome, Shelton, 68, wrote the book to make sure up-and-coming battalion commanders understood they could get themselves into the same predicament. They could get themselves and their men killed if they got too cocky about their abilities to whip the enemy in future wars. Sometimes one side’s great fire power doesn’t make a difference in the outcome of a battle. Ong Thanh was one of those times.

“Lastly, I wanted to tell the story of these brave men who fought and died for their comrades and their country, in that order,” he noted. “I wanted to build a memorial to these men at the 1st Infantry Division Museum at Wheaton, Ill., outside Chicago. All the proceeds from the sale of my book will go to the memorial.”

At the time of the Battle of Ong Thanh, Shelton was a major serving as the operations officer for the 1st Division, of which the “Black Lions” were part. Ten days earlier he had been the operations officer for the “Black Lions Battalion.”

“The 9th Viet Cong Division, made up of three regiments—the 271st, 272nd and 273rd –was absolutely the finest infantry in the world,” Shelton said. “These VC soldiers had been in the field for yeas. They had fought and defeated the French in the 1950s.

“Our guys were new and had never been in a fight like this before. They weren’t that well trained. Although they didn’t know it at the time, the ‘Black Lions,’ part of the ‘Big Red 1, were outnumbered 10 to 1, by the enemy. It’s the story of war. It happened before and it will happen again,” the general said.

It was September 1953 when Cadet Pvt. Jim Shelton joined the ROTC at the University of Delaware. Photo provided by Jim Shelton

The 1st Division was given the task of clearing out the enemy base camps along Highway 13 from Saigon north to the Cambodian border. The dirt road was the main artery leading from the country’s capital north to the border.

Lt. Col. Terry Allen, the “Black Lions’” battalion commander, was a seasoned, competent, professional soldier, according to Shelton. His father was Maj. Gen. Terry Allen Sr., commander of the 1st Infantry Division during the invasion of North Africa and Sicily in World War II.

The problem with young Allen’s Vietnam command was that his unit suffered from the same problem all American infantry units in the war had to cope with: Because a soldier’s tour of duty lasted less than a year in Vietnam, there was a lot of coming and going in the ranks, which didn’t improve a soldier’s ability to fight.

The “Black Lions” and their officers had only been together on the front lies three or four months when they fought the Battle of Ong Thanh. They weren’t by anyone’s estimate seasoned troops.

But what happened to the battalion was more deeply rooted than the men’s lack of front line experience.

“It was an error in judgment. It was a lack of good intelligence. It was overconfidence on the part of the battalion commander,” Shelton said. “It didn’t register with Terry Allen that there was a much larger force than he expected. I think he thought we could whip the world. I think he thought we were invincible.”

This is the patch worn by member of the Black Lion Battalion in Vietnam. The unit first made its mark in France during World War I.

The general said Allen’s depleted “Black Lions” battalion of 150 men was facing a regiment of 1,500 VC soldiers. D-Company’s Lt. Clark Welch was the first member of the unit to realize the battalion was possibly taking on more than it could chew the day before the enemy ambushes on Oct. 16, 1967.

“When the lieutenant confronted Terry Allen with the suggestion they should call off the search-and-destroy mission or get more troops on the ground, the battalion commander told him, ‘Look, that’s why we’re out here. We’re going in there again tomorrow, but you’re not gonna be the lead company.’ That didn’t go down well with Welch, but he followed orders,” Shelton said.

At 0805 A-Company moved out of the NDP (Night Defensive Position) looking for the VC. The 1st Platoon spotted several VC soldiers on the trail and Capt. James George, A-Company’s commander, told his men to set up a quick ambush. The enemy disappeared into the jungle before they could be attacked.

Moments later A-Company was hit by heavy fire from a concealed machine-gun. The platoon was pinned down.

“A-Company was wiped out in 20 minutes,” Shelton said. “Two platoon leaders were killed almost immediately and Capt. George was injured.

“When the shooting started, Lt. Welch, who was following behind the lead unit with D-Company, organized a perimeter around the command group that included Lt. Col. Allen and Sgt. Maj. Francis Dowling. They were inside Delta Company’s perimeter,” he said.

Brig Gen. Shelton was speaking to a group of ROTC cadets at Eastern Oregon University in 1981. He was the commanding general of the 4th U.S. Army ROTC Region at the time. Photo provided by Jim Shelton

The VC was hiding in the jungle—30 feet from the “Black Lions” in some cases—when they launched the initial attack. They had also out flanked A-Company during the heat of the battle and were shooting at the disintegrating American unit from both sides.

Because of the closeness of the fighting it made it impossible for the “Black Lions” to call in air strikes or artillery without the risk of being killed by friendly fire. Before the battle was over, Lt. Harold Durham, a forward artillery observer with D-Company, was forced to call in 105 millimeter artillery fire on their position to keep his company from being overrun by the enemy.

“Lt. Welch remembers seeing the brave artillery lieutenant pressing the ‘press-to-talk’ switch on his radio handset with the stub of his wrist because his hand had been blown off,” Shelton writes in his book. “Durham was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his actions that day.”

Despite Lt. Durham’s heroic effort, it didn’t save Lt. Col. Allen or Sgt. Maj. Dowling. They both died near an ant hill in the middle of the jungle fight.

“A platoon sergeant moving to the rear was the last one to see Allen alive. The sergeant looked back and saw either an RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) or Claymore mine explode near Allen, followed quickly by a burst of machine-gun fire, which killed him,” the general wrote.

Brig. Gen. James Shelton of Cape Haze, Fla. is pictured with his new book, “The Beast Was Out There.” It’s about the defeat of the Black Lion Battalion by some of the “best soldier in the world, the 271st Viet Cong Regiment.” Sun photo by Michael McLooner

“By all accounts, on Oct. 17, 1967, the “Black Lions” were out-positioned, out-gunned, out-manned and out-maneuvered,” Shelton added in his book.

For whatever reason, the 271st Viet Cong Regiment didn’t press home its victory.

“After a couple of hours, the enemy started to withdraw as we were pulling our guys out of a hole we chopped in the jungle with chainsaws,” the general said. “We brought in helicopters to get them out of there. The VC could have easily overrun the NDP and wiped out the whole battalion.

“It was kinda like Gen. George Custer at Little Big Horn. The ‘Black Lions’ were surrounded and the enemy was coming from both sides. Ong Thanh was like history repeating itself. We were in the wrong place at the wrong time, and we got whipped. We’re fortunate we didn’t lose every man.”

Shelton’s File

Name: James E. (Jim) Shelton
Age: 68
Hometown: Franklin, N.J.
Address: Cape Haze, Fla.
Entered Service: 11 October 1957
Rank: Brigadier General U.S. Army
Unit: U.S. Army 8th Division and Berlin Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in Combat, Vietnam
Commendations: Three awards Bronze Star Medal, Two awards Air Medal, Combat Infantryman’s Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Expert Infantry badge, Korean and Vietnam Service Medals
Married: Margaret Joan Stephens
Children: Margaret, James Jr., Paul and Terry Shelton; Patricia Rasmussen, Theresa Garcia, Kathleen O’Halloran, and Sarah Senter.

This story was first published in the Charlotte Sun newspaper, Port Charlotte, Florida and is republished with permission.

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Members of Black Lions Battalion in Vietnam met troops at Fort Jackson – Brig. Gen. Jim Shelton of Cape Haze is Black Lions
Charlotte Sun (Port Charlotte, FL) – Thursday, October 28, 2004

DON MOORE
Senior Writer

A dozen or so old soldiers met in Fort Jackson, S.C., outside Columbia for a weekend of reminiscing about a battle they fought in almost four decades ago. While there, they also played golf, enjoy some libation and motivated today’s troops of the 28th Black Lions Battalion.

Brig. Gen. Jim Shelton of Cape Haze was part of the annual pilgrimage this year to Jackson.

They call it their “November Nightmare,” even though this year it was held in late October.

The 2nd Battalion, 28th Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division is a fabled Army unit. It distinguished itself in World War I, World War II and Vietnam .

Members of the current Black Lions battalion serve as part of the training cadre at Fort Jackson. The fort is the largest Army basic training base in the country.

He was a major and had just been transferred to division headquarters for the Black Lions when the unit got mauled by a Viet Cong Regiment.

Thirty-seven years ago, on Oct. 17,1967, these old warriors were young jungle fighters. They took part in the little-known battle of Ong Thah, approximately 50 miles north of Saigon, South Vietnam , during the early part of the war.

They were badly beaten by a regiment of Viet Cong, South Vietnamese guerrillas. The enemy force was much larger and more experienced in jungle warfare than the Black Lions, many of whom had just arrived in Vietnam. The VC outfit had helped run the French out of Vietnam more than a dozen years earlier.

The Black Lions’ objective was to flush the enemy out of the bush and kill him. The under-strength, inexperienced battalion walked into an enemy ambush that resulted in 61 of them getting killed and 87 wounded in a couple of hours. Supposedly, 103 of the VC were killed in the jungle fighting, but that was probably an inflated figure, in view of later accounts of the battle.

For some of the Black Lions soldiers who survived the heat of battle that day, friendships were forged that will last until the last Lion involved fades away. That’s what last weekend’s get-together was all about.

They came to Jackson to be with their buddies who had experienced the horrors of close jungle combat like they had. They came to Jackson to talk about their life experiences with good friends who thought like they did, fought like they did and loved the United States of American like they did.

To be in the presence of these war heroes who put their lives on the line for their friends and their country decades ago was a humbling experience.

Of course, none of them would admit he was a war hero. If asked, they simply say they were just doing their job. They were trying to protect themselves and their buddies from getting killed in the jungle of Vietnam so long ago.