Although the allies had made strides in pacifying this area during 1967,
several Viet Cong units, most notably the 840th Main Force Battalion and
the 482d Local Force Battalion, still lurked near the capital. These units and
six local force companies posed a continuous threat not only to Phan Thiet,
but also to the many small South Vietnamese outposts scattered through
out the countryside.39
Heading into the final two months of 1967, one of General Westmoreland’s
main goals on the southeastern coast was to open and improve Highway 1 from
Xuan Loc to Phan Rang, thereby restoring the ground line of communica
tions between III Corps and II Corps. Task Force Byrd was a centerpiece in
that mission. Protected by the soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, U.S.
engineers rebuilt or improved damaged sections of Highway 1 throughout the
length of Binh Thuan Province. Those engineers had also helped Vietnamese
engineers construct platoon-size outposts at intervals along the highway that
were now being manned by territorial soldiers. Work was also under way on
several company-size firebases to give the South Vietnamese 44th Infantry
Regiment the ability to station troops in forward areas near Highway 1 instead
of holding them back near Phan Thiet. This new line of outposts allowed the
province chief to create a forward defensive screen around the Revolutionary
Development areas of the Phan Thiet basin, making it harder for Communist
units based in the western mountains to cross the highway undetected.
The enemy moved against this new defensive barrier on 8 November 1967
when the 840th Battalion and the 450th Local Force Company attacked Fort
Mara, a small post on Highway 1 some fifteen kilometers northeast of Phan
Thiet. The post contained the headquarters and an infantry company from
the South Vietnamese 3d Battalion, 44th Regiment, and some Vietnamese
engineers who were still working on the unfinished fort. The U.S. adviser
==
at Fort Mara called for air support. The commander of Task Force Byrd,
Lt. Col. Joseph T. Griffin Jr., quickly dispatched three UH–1 helicopters,
which formed a Night Hunter team. The first helicopter carried infantry
men equipped with night-vision scopes and tracer rounds for their M16s.
It flew low to the ground, while a second helicopter dropped flares from a
higher altitude. Bringing up the rear was a third helicopter armed with aerial
rockets. An AC–47 fixed-wing gunship joined the team over Mara . The air
craft enabled the South Vietnamese to hold on until dawn when a company
from the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, chased off the attackers. The cost that
the defenders paid, twenty-eight killed and thirty-five wounded, reflected
the ferocity of the battle. Viet Cong losses came to forty-two dead. Despite
the attack, Vietnamese engineers completed Mara two days later, giving the
allies a strong base to defend that stretch of Highway 1.40
Two weeks later, General Chau showed his willingness to fight the
Americans, provided it was on his terms. The battle began with a mortar
attack on Thien Giao, a Vietnamese Army post located some twenty kilome
ters southwest of Fort Mara. Colonel Griffin dispatched a platoon of infan
try to search for the enemy gunners. When helicopters deposited the soldiers
in a clearing near the post, the surrounding area exploded with small arms and
machine gun fire. Having guessed correctly where the Americans would land,
General Chau had set a trap with the 482d Battalion. The hail of fire drove
off the helicopters, several with damage, as the U.S. platoon fought for its life.
Colonel Griffin quickly dispatched the remainder of his battalion to relieve
the stranded platoon. The North Vietnamese greeted the incoming helicopters
with a hail of machine gun bullets and rocket-propelled grenades. The helicop
ters pressed through the storm and deposited their passengers, though many
aircraft suffered damage and two were forced to crash-land. After several
hours of combat, the soldiers from the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, managed
to rescue the trapped platoon and to drive off the 482d Battalion. The cost to
the Americans had been high, eleven dead and thirty-six wounded, while the
enemy lost an estimated twenty-one killed.41
The 2d Battalion suspended Operation Byrd on 1 December in order
to join the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, in a new operation code
named KlaMath Falls along the border between Binh Thuan and Lam
Dong Provinces. Three battalions of the South Vietnamese 44th Regiment
and the South Vietnamese 11th Ranger Battalion joined in the effort to
locate and destroy the headquarters of Military Region 6 and any main force
units that were operating in the area. Of particular concern was the 186th
Local Force Battalion, which had mauled several Regional Forces companies
and elements of the South Vietnamese 44th Regiment on 12 November, kill
ing at least sixty-five government soldiers and damaging or destroying two
105-mm. artillery pieces. A secondary goal of the operation was to improve
security on Highway 1 so traffic could move freely between Phan Thiet and
Nha Trang.42
Over the six weeks that followed, the allies located and destroyed many
supply caches and bunker complexes along the border between Lam Dong
and Binh Thuan Provinces, some large enough to serve a battalion, but the
Viet Cong made only fleeting appearances. Intelligence gathered during
KlaMath Falls suggested that the main enemy units in the area had with
drawn to safer locations just prior to the start of the operation, suggesting
that the Viet Cong had advance warning of some kind. The ninety-five
man headquarters of Military Region 6, for example, had split into several
groups and fled in different directions. In the end, the Americans could
claim no more than 156 Communists killed over the six-week period. Of
those, nearly half fell to just one of the five participating U.S. infantry
battalions, the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, probably due to its greater famil
iarity with the area.43
As for the operation’s second objective, the reopening of Highway 1, a
South Vietnamese convoy successfully drove from Nha Trang to Phan Thiet
and back between 18 and 21 December. Though some parts of Highway 1
emained dangerous at night, commercial traffic began to flow in increasing
volume between Phan Thiet and Phan Rang during the day, opening new mar
kets for the people who lived on the southeastern coast and providing oppor
tunity for greater prosperity.44
===
Route 20 lnterdicted in Lam Dong Province 4 Early on 12 November, an enemy force of un- known size blew up a bridge on strategic Route 20, some 25 miles east of Bao Loc, the capital of Lam Dong Province. A South Vietnamese reaction force, sent to the scene, was ambushed along the highway near the bridge site. At the same time, another enemy force attacked South Vietnamese military com- pounds at nearby Di Linh. Both of these engagements continued on 13 November and South Vietnamese and American reinforce- ments have been moved into the area. Incomplete casualty reports list 65 South Vietnamese soldiers killed, 25 wounded,and 25 missing. Two enemy soldiers have been killed thus far. Traffic between Bao Lac and Da Lat in neighboring Tuyen Duc Province has been temporarily suspended. I —l TOP RET 13 November 1967 A 3501 350 - (2) 395 D-\/ -°°$ X2) 3.5 3-5<° \//6 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029764 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003029704 4. \-y\J,l-I\.Il.\..l-l.l. _\ ‘ 6. ‘ The recent increase in Communist military activity directed at South Vietnamese forces in this area of southern II Corps is consistent with the avowed enemy objective of destroying security forces and degrading government authority. Since last May, South Vietnamese forces have secured Route 20, denying the Viet Cong some one to two million piasters a day in tax booty. Current enemy action also draws friendly forces from southwestern Lam Dong Province, where most enemy tax collection points were located, thus allowing an opportunity for renewed collection in that area.
