Kit Carson
Although Chaplain McGonigal's 1966 survey and General Walt's message reflected some of the negative features resulting from Marine infantry units operating in populated areas, Marines more often than not demonstrated that they could work with individual South Vietnamese to bring stability to the countryside . One of the most unusual and yet successful of these attempts was the formation of special cadre made up of former VC. These men, former enemy troops, had taken advantage of the government "open arms" (Chieu Hoi) policy and rallied to the government cause. The Marines began to use a selected few of these "ralliers" or Hoi Chanhs during the spring of 1966. In May, a group of VC surrendered to units of the 9th Marines, asking for asylum. The enemy im mediately started a rumor among the people that the Marines had tortured and killed one of the ralliers by the name of Ngo Van Bay. Colonel Simmons, the regimental commander, asked Bay and two of his
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Former Viet Cong who defected to the government attend an indoctrination class. The Marines recruited several of these "ralliers" or Hoi Chanhs as "Kit Carson scouts" to accompany Marine units in the field. // A former VC (right), now a Kit Carson scout assigned to the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines in the An Hoa sector, points out a possible enemy hiding place.// These former VC were not only a valuable tactical asset, but served to further allied propoganda. Marine Corps Photo A370000 compatriots to return to the village and put the rumor to rest for once and for all. The three former Viet Cong agreed and, according to Simmons, this, in a small way, was the beginning of the program. Other Marine units at Da Nang, and eventually in all of the TAORs, started using former VC as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents. By October 1966, the program was established on a permanent, official basis. General Nickerson, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, who was part Indian and a Western history buff, designated the former VC working with the Marines as "Kit Carson scouts." He selected the name because the Hoi Chanhs working with the Marines were good scouts, in the tradition of Kit Carson, the famed frontiersman, Indian agent, and soldier. *4
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From October to December 1966, III MAF credited the Kit Carson scouts with the killing of 47 VC, the capture of 16 weapons, and the discovery of 18 mines and tunnels. The scouts repeatedly proved themselves a valuable tactical asset. For example , in November, one scout attached to the 1st Marine s at Da Nang led a Marine company at night over unfamiliar terrain to an objective area, resulting in the surprise and capture of 15 Viet Cong. The scouts provided more than just tactical capability. They were also a valuable propaganda tool. Villagers were much more ready to listen to them than to representatives of the government. During a December County Fair one scout gave a speech to the gathered villagers and evoked applause from his audience several times. According to the Marine report, the scout then : . . . ventured into the VCC/VCS compound and spoke to them. . . . A definite response was observed by the facial expressions of some of the individuals. Attention seemed to follow the Kit Carson Scout wherever he went, including an apparent interest generated among the ARVN troops who participated in the operation. Psychological Warfare
The Kit Carson program was only part of an intensive psychological warfare campaign that III MAF had begun in the latter half of 1966 . In fact, it was an officer in the III MAF Psychological Warfare Sec tion, Captain Stephen A. Luckey, who recommend ed the formal implementation of the Kit Carson pro ject and it was the Psychological Warfare Section that developed the Kit Carson SOP . The section had consisted of only Luckey and a senior staff NCO un til 4 August, when General Walt assigned Colone l Robert R. Read as the psychological warfare officer . In September the section became a special staff sec tion, directly responsible to the III MAF Chief of Staff. According to the force order establishing the section, Colonel Read had four basic missions: 1. to reduce the combat efficiency of the VC ; 2. to further the effort of the South Vietnamese Govern ment in establishing control by attempting to modify at titudes and behavior of special audiences ; 3. to coordinate psychological operations with civic ac tion programs; 4. and finally to obtain the assistance and cooperation o f the South Vietnamese villagers .43 General Walt did not expect Colonel Read to ac complish miracles, but he wanted "an increased em 247 phasis on psychological operations by all III MAF commands." Colonel Read was to coordinate the III MAF efforts within the command and with the ARVN, MACV, and U.S. Information Agency and its South Vietnamese counterpart. Read remembered that his two initial problems were that "There were no T/ 0 billets for PsyWar personnel and there were no Marines trained in PsyWar opera tion. " He and his small staff took several steps to overcome these difficulties. They persuaded III MAF to direct its subordinate organizations to establish psychological warfare sections and instituted mon thly meetings of PsyWar personnel. Moreover, III MAF requested Headquarters, Marine Corps "to pro vide school trained PsyWar personnel in replacemen t drafts, which they did ." On 18 September, Read ob tained operational control of the U .S. Army's 24th Psychological Operations Company's two detachments in I Corps, one at Da Nang and th e other in Quang Ngai . Believing that the physical separation seriously hampered the company, Read consolidated both detachments at Da Nang and established there in October a Psychological Warfare Operations Center. By the end of the year, III MAF had a coordinated program that included the preparation of leaflets and broadcasts aimed at the enemy forces, as well as the screening of Hoi Chanh's for employment as Kit Carson scouts . According to Read, the increase in former VC rallying to the Viet namese Government through the Chieu Hoi pro gram was in part due to the new emphasis on psychological warfare operations. 44 C
