Plei Me Under Siege
As a first step in his highl ands campaign, General Man targeted the
Special Forces camp at Plei Me, some forty-five kilometers southwest of
Pleiku City, certain that his enemies would fi ght to protect a fa cility criti
cal to the defense of the province capital. Using two North Vietnamese
regiments, Man devised a three-part plan. In the first phase the 33d Regi
ment would surround and assault the camp, applying enough pressure
to compel the South Vietnamese to send reinforcements. In the second
phase the 32d Regimel1t, positioning itself on the only road a relief col
unm could take, Route 6C, would ambush and destroy that force. In the
third phase the 32d would join the 33d in a final overwhelming push
against the camp. Man's troops began preparations for the operation in
mid-September. One month later, at sunset on 19 October, the time set
for the Plei Me a ttack, they were read y.'O
The Plei Me garrison was a varied group, consisting of twelve Ameri
can advisers, fourteen South Vietnamese Special Forces troops, and a
ClOG unit of over four hundred Montagnard tribesmen. Of these,
eighty-fi ve Montagnards and two Americans were on a mission fifteen
kilometers northwest of the camp. Another forty Montagnards were con
ducting security ambush patrols in its immediate vicinity, and forty more
were mmming two listening posts located about two kilometers to the
north and southwest of the facility. The remaining members of the
garrison were inside the campll
The 33d Regiment began its attack at approximately 1900, when some
of its troops opened fire on a Montagnard patrol. At 2200 a company of
the 33d's 1st Bnttnlion overran the outpost southwest of the ca mp. At the
same time, the camp itself came under mortar and recoilless rifle fire.
Shortly after midnight the North Vietnamese attacked from the north
and northwest. Around 0100 they began a second push from the south
and east, penetrating the camp's wire barriers before being turned back.
These initial assaults set the pattern for the next several days. Keeping
9
In tervs, Holmes with Larsen, 26 Oct 76, sec. 5, p. 6 (quotation), Senior Officer
Oral History Program, MHI, and SandstrLlITI vvith Larsen, 11 Mar 70, p. 11, Historians
fil es, CMH.
]0 Wesfem Highlnllds, pp. 23-24; Boyle and SamabriCl, "Lure and An1bush," p. 4;
Vinh Loc, Wily Pie; Me? (Pleiku, 1966), p. 59.
" Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct-31 Dec 65, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, incl. 1, p. [I],
Historians files, CMH .
99
Stel1lming the Tide
Plei Me Special Forces calllP IInder attack
one battalion in reserve, the 33d Regiment poured small-arms, mortar,
and recoilless rifle fire into the camp while carrying out intermittent
probes and larger attacks to maintain the pressure. In response, the ad
visers called in fighter-bombers, and the South Vietnamese commander,
as Man had expected, requested reinforcements."
The first air strikes arrived around 0400 on 20 October, fo llowed by
more than a hundred others over the next twenty-six hours, along with
airdrops of food and ammunition. During the late evening hours of the
twentieth Vinh Loc authorized the creation of a relief force, consisting
of elements from an armored cavalry squadron, a ranger battalion, and
a few other units. The contingent was to take Highway 14 south to Route
6C and then to turn southwest toward Plei Me. Since the assembly of
the task force might take several days, the dispatch of interim reinforce
ments seemed imperative. The commander of the 5th Special Forces
Group (Airborne), Col. William A. McKean, who was responsible for
organizing the relief effort, proposed a parachute drop into the camp,
but Vinh Loc's American adviser, Col. Theodore D. Mataxis, rejected
the idea. After some discussion, all concerned agreed tha t it would be
12 Ibid., pp. [1- 2]; AA R, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cay Div (A mbl), 4 Mar 66, p. 18, box
10, 67A/5216, RG 319, NARA; Weste,." Higillnllds, p. 32; Contemporary Historical
Evaluation of Combat Operations (CHECO) Rpt, Pacific Air Porces (PACAF), 24 Peb
66, sub: The Siege at Plei Me, pp. 2-3, copy in Historia ns files, CMH.
100
Illto the Highlnnds
safer and quicker to land a force by helicopter near the camp and send it
overland to Plei Me. One hundred and seventy-five men, the majority
South Vietnamese rangers, received the assignment. Colonel McKean
selected Maj. Charles A. Beckwith, an expert in long-range reconnais
sance, to lead them.13
Beckwith's men landed about five kilometers northeast of Plei Me
on the morning of 21 October. They had worked their way to a point
near the camp by nightfall, but Major Beckwith decided to delay the
final leg of the journey until the fo llowing morning because of the like
lihood that the facility's defenders might mistake his men for the
enemy in the darkness and open fire. Shortly after sunrise on the twenty
second Beckwith instructed his men to "run like hell ... to the gates."I'
Surprising the enemy, the move succeeded. Once inside the camp,
Beckwith became the senior officer present and took command.
Meanwhile, dispatch of the main relief force had been delayed by a
disagreement between Vinh Loc and Colonel Mataxis. Mataxis wanted
a larger relief force to counter the ambush everyone expected. Vinh Loc,
however, considered the attack at Plei Me a possible ruse to lure South
Vietnamese forces away from Pleiku, thus leaving the city unprotected.
He wanted to do nothing until the situation at Plei Me became clear. On
22 October General Larsen broke the stalemate by promising Vinh Loc
that American troops would ensure the safety of Pleiku if he would com
mit his reserves to Plei Me's defense. A short while later the South Viet
namese general increased the size of the relief force by two battalions.
Larsen reciprocated by ordering General Kinnard to dispatch a battal
ion task force, including an artillery battery, to Pleiku. Kinnard sent his
division's 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, under the command of Lt. Col.
Earl Ingram (see Mnp 7).15
Then, seeing an opportunity for combat, Kinnard obtained permis
sion on 23 October to transfer his entire 1st Brigade to Pleiku. Under
acting commander Lt. Col. Harlow G. Clark, elements of the brigade
began the move that day by Caribou transport. By evening Colonel
Clark's headquarters, the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and two artillery
batteries had joined Colonel Ingram's force at the province capital.
Clark's unit had two missions: to provide artillery support for the relief
column and to prepare a reaction force for commitment to the camp. In
the meantime, Vinh Loc added one of his two reserve battalions to the
relief force, increasing its size to some fourteen hundred men. Follow
ing the column's departure for Plei Me, he moved his other reserve bat
13 Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 62- 72. See also Quarterl y Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct-31 Dec 65, 5th SF Gp,
1st SF, inc!. 1, p. [2].
14 Beckwith and Knox, Delfa Force, p. 67.
15 Coleman, Pleikll, p. 76; AAR, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cav Div, p. 18; Interv,
SandstruITI with Larsen, 11 Mar 70, p. 13; Vinh Loc, Wily Pie; Me? I
p. 61; Kinnard, "Victory
in the la Drang," p. 73.
101
Stemmillg tlte Tide
PLEI ME AND THE PURSUIT
19 October-6 November 1965
~ Ground Movement
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_
Air Assault
Enemy Retreat
Engagement
ELEVATION IN METERS
!
o
!
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500 800 and Above
10 Miles
~~~~J-"r-----'
10 Kilometers
•
MAP 7
talion, a ranger unit, by helicopter several kilometers west of what he
suspected would be the ambush site. It had orders to sweep toward the
highway on command.'·
On the twenty-third the relief column made its way cautiously, ap
proaching the edge of the suspected ambush zone around 1700. Armored
personnel carriers and M41 tanks headed up the column, with infantry
on the flanks and with supply trucks and a small infantry force trailing
about two kilometers behind. Around 1800 small-arms, recoilless rifle,
and mortar fire tore into the leading elements of the task force. The tanks
and armored personnel carriers wheeled to the right and left of the road,
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USN 1969-1973, an era vet who will always count my blessings for assignments outside of Vietnam. I am very encouraged to discover that writers like Keith Saliba and a generation of writers and students from the 80’s have been inspired to rise up and see right done on behalf of the Vietnam combat and support vets. All thinking Americans need to know much more about our historical involvement in the Vietnam war, and to understand that ill-founded shaming of our Vietnam vets can be corrected and healed through unbiased knowledge of what our people endured, sacrificed and suffered in their call to duty.
Where was Plei Me in relation to The Ia Drang Valley ? I was with A-1-8, 1st brigade of the 4th division from late ‘66 until late ‘67, and the first time we went through there, we saw the Special Forces camp that was hit earlier, and it was frightening to just see. There were no NVA there during that visit, but the next time we weren’t so lucky. Another great account can be found in a documentary titled “Honor in the Valley of Tears” which can be found through “ Google. Another is a paperback titled “Nine Days in May”