Chúng tôi khẳng định một chân lý hiển nhiên rằng mọi người sinh ra đều bình đẳng, rằng tạo hóa đã ban cho họ những quyền tất yếu và bất khả xâm phạm, trong đó có quyền sống, quyền được tự do và mưu cầu hạnh phúc . . . (Lời Mở Đầu Của Tuyên Ngôn Độc Lập Mỹ)
Friday, August 15, 2025
Sunday, August 10, 2025
1 April 1970: The SF Camp at Dak Seang came under siege by an estimated three (3) Regiments of the NVA. During the siege, the 189th AHC flew a total of 1381 sorties, resulting in an estimated 114 KIA.
1 April 1970: The 119th unit history states that laxity no longer persisted as the enemy, comprised of NVA main force units, swept down from the north and set siege to Dak Seang, Dak Pek, Dak To, and Kontum. An estimated force of three regiments had encircled Dak Seang. The 189th AHC did most of the support for the 2d ARVN Rangers, the MIKE Strike Force, and the CIDG; but concentrations of automatic 37mm and .51 cal fire brought ships down one after another. Air strike after air strike, the enemy continued to bring down helicopters. During the first 16 days of the siege, the Gators stood idle flying missions for the 4th Inf Div. As the situation increased at Dak Seang, almost being over run twice, the Gators were mustered to assist further actions against the enemy. The Crocs were at Pleiku in case further contact was encountered. Thus far there had been four (4) Hueys, one (1) F-100, two (2) C-47As, one (1) A10-2, and two (2) Gunships shot down from enemy fire. A few of the Gators were still supporting the 4th Inf Div around the Hard times area and some saw action.
1 April to 12 April 1970: SF SFC Wade, in his book “Assault on Dak Pek,” provided a second- hand account of the NVA attack on Dak Seang. What follows is an edited version of his account. Aircraft from the 52nd CAB did the majority of lifts and insertions described by SFC Wade. At first light, the NVA 28th Infantry augmented by artillery started a daylight attack on Dak Seang. The initial bombardment was with mortars and RRs which destroyed several buildings and part of the camp's commo. The first NVA assault was beaten back when they got to the wire. Luckily not all of the camp's commo was out. The C-detachment at Pleiku sent in reinforcements right away by airlifting a company from Plateau Gi outside the wire, but they got surrounded before they could move into the camp. This force spent the entire night pinned down and almost got overrun themselves. The reinforcements moved into the camp on the 2nd after the USAF napalmed a path for them. The NVA were not discouraged and made two (2) more daylight assaults that day. There were reports that the NVA were dug in about 30 meters from the perimeter wire. B-52s were used on suspected enemy base locations. The 4th Inf Div had built a FSB equipped with 155's on the large mountain near the camp. When they withdrew, the NVA occupied the site and were directing their fire support from it. After several napalm sorties on the site, the plan was to insert part of a SOG Hatchet force to secure an LZ to be used for a Mike Force. According to Wade's account, a Jolly Green Giant carried the Hatchet force troops and followed the last napalm strike. Just as it flared to land, it was hit by an RPG-7 and blew up killing all on board. //Editor's Note: The VHPA KIA and HELICOPTER databases do not show any losses that correlate to this account. Their only non-Army helicopter loss in early April was a Jolly Green Giant on the 15th in Kontum Province while attempting to rescue the crew of a downed Army Huey.// Wade's account states that emergency medeivaced and resupply missions were flown into Dak Seang and American wounded were replaced with members from other SF teams. A Mike Force was inserted some distance from the camp as a means of flanking the NVA, but the NVA sent a force to engage it. The NVA did not seem to be intimidated by the air support as they continued to send infantry and sappers against the camp even during the day. After a few days, the pressure on the camp lessened as the NVA seemed to turn their attention to the surrounded Mike Force. When Dak Pek was attacked on the 12th, Wade does not provide any more details about the action around Dak Seang. The source for this information was Assault on Dak Pek by Leigh Wade.
1 April to 12 April 1970: SF SFC Wade, in his book “Assault on Dak Pek,” provided a second- hand account of the NVA attack on Dak Seang. What follows is an edited version of his account. Aircraft from the 52nd CAB did the majority of lifts and insertions described by SFC Wade. At first light, the NVA 28th Infantry augmented by artillery started a daylight attack on Dak Seang. The initial bombardment was with mortars and RRs which destroyed several buildings and part of the camp's commo. The first NVA assault was beaten back when they got to the wire. Luckily not all of the camp's commo was out. The C-detachment at Pleiku sent in reinforcements right away by airlifting a company from Plateau Gi outside the wire, but they got surrounded before they could move into the camp. This force spent the entire night pinned down and almost got overrun themselves. The reinforcements moved into the camp on the 2nd after the USAF napalmed a path for them. The NVA were not discouraged and made two (2) more daylight assaults that day. There were reports that the NVA were dug in about 30 meters from the perimeter wire. B-52s were used on suspected enemy base locations. The 4th Inf Div had built a FSB equipped with 155's on the large mountain near the camp. When they withdrew, the NVA occupied the site and were directing their fire support from it. After several napalm sorties on the site, the plan was to insert part of a SOG Hatchet force to secure an LZ to be used for a Mike Force. According to Wade's account, a Jolly Green Giant carried the Hatchet force troops and followed the last napalm strike. Just as it flared to land, it was hit by an RPG-7 and blew up killing all on board. //Editor's Note: The VHPA KIA and HELICOPTER databases do not show any losses that correlate to this account. Their only non-Army helicopter loss in early April was a Jolly Green Giant on the 15th in Kontum Province while attempting to rescue the crew of a downed Army Huey.// Wade's account states that emergency medevac and resupply missions were flown into Dak Seang and American wounded were replaced with members from other SF teams. A Mike Force was inserted some distance from the camp as a means of flanking the NVA, but the NVA sent a force to engage it. The NVA did not seem to be intimidated by the air support as they continued to send infantry and sappers against the camp even during the day. After a few days, the pressure on the camp lessened as the NVA seemed to turn their attention to the surrounded Mike Force. When Dak Pek was attacked on the 12th, Wade does not provide any more details about the action around Dak Seang. The source for this information was Assault on Dak Pek by Leigh Wade.
2 April to 2 May 1970: The 189th AHC primarily supported the 4th Inf Div with some support being provided II ARVN Corps and CORDS. Major support was provided to the 24th Special Tactical Zone during the battle of Dak Seang and Dak Pek.
3 April 1970: These men distinguished themselves by exceptionally valorous actions while serving as pilots and crew-members on GHOSTRIDER aircraft during insertions three (3) kilometers SE of the besieged Dak Seang SF Camp. Approaching the LZ, the ships came under a barrage of enemy automatic weapons, rocket, hand grenade and small arms fire. Undaunted, they continued their approach and landed, allowing the troops on the aircraft to join the battle. Again and again they landed in the area with badly needed reinforcements taking intense enemy fire. Due to their high regard for the mission, the lives of the ground troops and complete disregard for their own safety, the area was secured. The following were awarded the Air Medal with “V” Device, (First Award) SP5 Gilbert R Gonzalez, SP4 David B Pickens, SP4 Luis E Rivera (Second Award) WO Patrick C Buchan, WO Brian D Cope, WO Ward W Dunning, and WO James H Riovo SP4 Richard W Matthes, PFC Albert D Sena, (Third Award) SP4 Phillip H Kelley, SP4 Stephen J Sawyer, (Forth Award) Richard C Pryze, for heroism.
4 April 1970: Serving aboard GHOSTRIDER aircraft as medeivaced helicopters just three (3) miles SE of Dak Seang, the allied forces were completely surrounded and had been under continuous attack throughout the night. The GHOSTRIDERS were assigned the reinforcement mission. Each time they flew into the area, their ships were subject to enemy fire, but their highly accurate effective fire made the mission more successful. In the midst of enemy fire, these men displayed great courage in aiding the wounded men aboard their aircraft. The following were awarded the Air Medal with “V” Device (First Award) SP4 Kenneth L Howard, SP4 Edward J Icovitti, SP4 Gordon S Roberts, PFC Earl R Phillips, SP4 David G Heckendorn, SP4 Johnny W Smith, SP5 James E Gault, SP5 Larry D McGaha, (Second Award) SP4 Robert W Gray, SP4 Luis E Rivera, SP5 Gilbert R Gonzalez, PFC Albert D Sena, SP4 Hohn L Harris for heroism.
6 April 1970: CARETAKER 962 was parked in the 604th Maintenance area and was damaged on the left side by a satchel charge thrown by a VC that penetrated the fence line.
10 April 1970: CPT Karig (P) brought the aircraft to a hover and moved forward off the pol pad. He was forced to set the aircraft down between the pol pads because the aircraft was losing rpm’s. Operating rpm was considered acceptable at 6400, and he hovered left for about 30 feet and again he was forced to set the aircraft down. This time the ship was put down in a low spot, but the other crew members WO Hatton (AC), SP4 Smith (CE), and PFC Ament (G) were not cognizant of the aircraft’s position. CPT Karig then proceeded forward in a low hover along a path where the ground raised about one (1) foot. As he approached the psp runway, the rpm began to bleed off and the left skid struck the edge of the psp causing the aircraft to roll over. No crew members were injured.
15 April 1970: A GHOSTRIDER aircraft was on a sniffer mission at Dak Seang, WO Wilkinson (AC), PFC Lee (CE) and Sp4 Holt (G), as they departed the dirt strip at the camp, spider holes started to open up and they began seeing NVA coming out of holes and heading toward the CIDG Camp at Dak Seang. As the GHOSTRIDER left the AO they were called back to FSB Ben Het. Shortly after arrival they were called back to Dak Seang to extract some Australian soldiers that were wounded. They requested a blivet of water and some whiskey. The water and whiskey was delivered but the wounded Aussie refused to leave. The aircraft did not receive any enemy fire going in or out of the LZ.
16 April 1970: SP4 Ralph E Reed was flying back from Kontum when an armor piercing round went through his machine gun mount and into his groin, bouncing off his back plate and back through his body lodging in his front armor plate.
18 April 1970: Kameron (Kim) Brooks GHOSTRIDER 25 recalls an adventure he had on his way back from Qui Nhon. It’s not too smart but worth reading. (Enclosure 7)
25 April 1970: The battle on Hill 833 near Dak Seang was a major battle. AVENGER 158 was supporting the troops on the ground when they came under heavy enemy ground fire. All crew members including WO Pierce (AC), CPT Mc Kibben (P), SP4 Smith (CE)), and PFC Adkins (G) were placing effective fire on the enemy positions when the aircraft lost power and crashed in the dense jungle killing all on board and destroying the aircraft. A GHOSTRIDER slick was on approach with troops on board and the citation given to the gunner for valor reads, in part, “While on final approach, PFC Lee's aircraft was riddled by a hail of enemy fire. With the intense volume of suppressive fire from PFC Lee, the pilots were able to continue the approach. Because two (2) aircraft had been shot down in the LZ by heavy automatic weapons fire, the small area was almost inaccessible. PFC Lee was forced to hang out of the aircraft in order to keep the approach into the hostile area until the mission was completed.” It was his third (3) day as a gunner.
27 April 1970: GHOSTRIDER 282 was flying with WO Dowd (IP) at the controls when the 90 -degree gear box and tail rotor failed and separated from the aircraft. Part of the assembly struck an indigenous female on the ground and she was injured (extent of injuries was unknown). The aircraft landed without further damage and no injury to the crew and passengers. Suspect components were submitted for tear-down and inspection.
28 April 1970: GHOSTRIDER 865 piloted by WO Brooks (AC) was on approach and started to lose power so the crew started throwing supplies off aircraft causing center of gravity variations that caused the main rotor blades to strike a tree and was charged as incident damage.
Motor vehicle shortages have become a problem. Recent messages from the 1st Logistic Command indicated that assistance should be rendered in the month of May on ¼ ton and 2 1/2 ton vehicles. The 189th received none, zip, Eada.
3 May to 29 May 1970: The 189th AHC provided support to the 4th Inf Div for massive operations into Cambodia during this period. Not all operations are recorded but many were fought. During the remainder of the quarter, general support was given to the 5th SFG, II Corps and the 52nd CAB.
6 May 1970: The 189th CO Maj Morgan, flying as Mission Commander, directed the initial insertion of three (3) Battalions of US Infantry into Cambodia. The operation was a highly successful one consisting of one hundred plus aircraft.
Wednesday, August 6, 2025
Monday, August 4, 2025
The United States Helicopter in Vietnam V

HH-53 rescue helicopter.

U.S. SAR tactics in Vietnam evolved from an operation developed by the German Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain during World War II; they were refined during the Korean War. Four A-1Es called “Sandy” from their call signs, or A-7 jet fighters, broken into a high and low section of two aircraft each, escorted two HH-3 or, after 1967, HH-53 rescue helicopters into the Pickup Zone (PZ). The helicopters and two escorts orbited out of range of antiaircraft fire. The high section of fighters reconnoitered the site to determine enemy resistance and attacked antiaircraft weapons in the vicinity. The leader then called in the first helicopter with its two escorts. The second helicopter orbited out of danger, ready to replace the first if it was shot down or damaged. Many times the alternate helicopter swooped in to rescue both the downed helicopter crew and the object of the initial rescue mission. On several occasions, several U. S. aircraft and men were lost attempting to rescue downed airmen.
The helicopter most identified with U. S. long-range SAR operations in SEA first entered service as an ASW helicopter with the U. S. Navy. On March 11, 1959, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation test pilots lifted off in the S-61, or H-3 Pelican, later known as the Sea King. The twin-engined, all weather Pelican became operational with the U. S. Navy in June 1961. The H-3, although designed primarily to detect, classify, track, and destroy enemy submarines, rapidly became a multipurpose ship or land-based aircraft with Navy, Marine, and USAF units. Powered by two GE T58-GE-10 1,250- horsepower turboshafts, soon upgraded to 1,400 horsepower, the H- 3 cruised at an airspeed of 120 knots to a maximum range of 542 nautical miles and reached a service ceiling of 14,700 feet. The H-3 had a maximum gross takeoff weight of 21,000 pounds, with the capability of a 6,000-pound slingload on some models.
Of conventional design, the Sea King’s five-bladed main rotor system measured 62 feet and its fuselage 54 feet, 9 inches. Designed for overwater flights the H-3 possessed emergency amphibious capabilities. The H-3 carried a crew of four and up to twenty-eight passengers in its transport configuration. For ASW operations the helicopter crew usually consisted of two pilots, two to three sensor operators, and up to three passengers. Dubbed the “Jolly Green Giant” by rescued aircrewmen, the USAF SAR version of the HH-3 usually carried two pilots, a door gunner, a parajumper (PJ), and a flight engineer who doubled as the rescue hoist operator. In 1967 two USAF Air Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) HH-3s demonstrated the viability of air refueling of helicopters by self-deploying from the United States to France in a flight of almost thirty-one hours (Pember 1998, 49).
Sikorsky produced two basic models of the S-61, the original with a watertight hull, which Navy personnel called “Big Mother,” and later, the elongated version with aft cargo doors and a loading ramp for larger cargo. The United States, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, Italy, Spain, Egypt, and Malaysia used several variants of the Sea King: search and rescue HH-3 and SH-3D also used to pluck U. S. Apollo astronauts and their space vehicles from the ocean after splashdown, ASW SH-3, tactical transport CH-3, mine sweeping RH-3, VIP transport VH-3 (used by the U. S. Marines to transport the president), special operations MH-3, and commercial transport helicopter. Armament included a dipping sonar, sonobuoys, magnetic anomaly detectors, two MK 46 torpedoes for ASW, and at least two 7.62-mm door-mounted miniguns on SAR helicopters for selfprotection. The aircraft contained cockpit instrumentation for allweather operations, including both search and weather radars. Later models included Doppler radar navigation systems. In the early 1990s many Sea Kings received upgraded T-58-GE-402 1,500- horsepower engines and global positioning systems (GPS). The USCG HH-3F had the capability to fly 300 miles, hover for twenty minutes, and return to base with fuel in reserve.
Sikorsky built more than 1,100 S-61s, while Westland, Mitsubishi, and Agusta manufactured over 400 versions of the H-3 under license. Westland installed a pair of Rolls Royce Gnome H. 1400 turboshafts and a Louis Newmark Mk 31 automatic flight control system in the British Sea Kings. The RN initially ordered fifty-six HAS1 Sea Kings, with 700(S) Squadron receiving the first for test and evaluation in August 1969. Testing resulted in the more powerful HAS2, and the HAS5 with a longer cabin to accommodate the Sea Searcher radar. Westland provided the Egyptian Air Force with a twenty-one-seat Sea King utility transport, minus the external floats, called the “Commando.” The British Royal Marines also ordered this version as the HC4, which conducted extensive combat operations in the Falklands War.
Westland also produced a completely self-contained SAR helicopter that carried a crew of four, nine stretchers, a weather/search radar, smoke and flare dispensers, a flight director system with an auto hover mode, and folding blades for shipboard storage. The RAF made use of this version as the HAR Mk3 and the West German Navy as the Mk 41. Westland exported Sea King variants to India, Norway, Belgium, Pakistan, Australia, and Qatar.
In 1962 the U. S. Marine Corps awarded Sikorsky Aircraft a contract to design and build a new all-weather assault transport helicopter. The S-65, designated the CH-53A Sea Stallion, made its first flight on October 14, 1964, and in 1966 it entered service as the Marine Corps’s heavy lift helicopter, as well as replacing the H-3 as the primary USAF SAR helicopter. The Navy also purchased the Sea Stallion to bolster its ASW and SAR operations. Twin T64-GE-6 turbines powered a 79-foot, seven-bladed main rotor that turned above a 73-foot, 4-inch fuselage, designed for emergency water landings. The tailboom supported a tall vertical fin, which in turn supported a horizontal stabilizer attached to the starboard side and a four-bladed tailrotor mounted on the port. Capable of carrying a 14,000-pound load, which might include thirty-eight troops or twenty-four stretchers and three or four medical attendants, the CH-53 “Super Jolly Green Giant” could also accommodate fifty-five passengers with center seating installed. In one emergency situation in Vietnam the CH-53 lifted off with seventy-five Marines aboard. Large rear doors and a ramp facilitated loading either wheeled or palletized cargo.
Designed with a flight direction system and folding blades for shipboard or land-based operations, the big machines soon earned their own distinctive place in aviation history. In August 1970 two CH-53s assigned to the U. S. Air Force Air Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), using integral aerial refueling systems, completed a nonstop flight across the Pacific Ocean. The same year the United States used HH-53As in the daring raid on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp, only 23 miles outside Hanoi. Although the pilots and Special Forces troops executed a perfect raid, the NVA had previously moved the prisoners to another location. Variants of the helicopter include the HH-53A/B, HH-53C, CH-53D, RH-53D, CH-53G, and HH-53H. Sikorsky Aircraft built a total of 412 Sea Stallions with an additional 110 built in the Federal Republic of Germany. Austria, Iran, Japan, and Israel also employed variants of the CH-53. Sikorsky engineers later used the S-65 as a basis for developing the three-engined CH-53E Super SeaStallion/MH-53E Sea Dragon.
The Sikorsky Aircraft S-64, which first flew on May 9, 1962, was the last Sikorsky project in which Igor himself was personally involved. It was a company-funded “flying crane” designed to lift a minimum of 10,000 pounds; Pratt & Whitney T73-P-1 4,500-horsepower engines turned the 79-foot, 6-inch six-bladed main and 15- foot, 4-inch four-bladed conventional tailrotors. Final versions of the helicopter could carry a maximum load of 22,800 pounds. Able to reach a top speed of 111 knots, the large aircraft had a service ceiling of 13,000 feet. Resembling a large insect, the machine sat on an extended stiltlike landing gear that allowed the helicopter to straddle large, palleted cargo loads, or a “people pod” capable of holding forty-five infantrymen or twenty-four litters and fifteen seated passengers. The helicopter could also transport pods containing a mobile headquarters or field hospital. Two pilots sat side by side in the forward flight deck, and a third pilot sat in a lower, rear-facing cockpit that allowed him to fly the aircraft during slingload operations.
It was first delivered to the West German Defense Ministry in 1963, and the U. S. Army ordered six of the machines in June 1963; they eventually bought ninety-seven CH-54 Tarhees between June 1964 and 1972, the last being retired in 1993 from the 113th Aviation Company of the Army National Guard. The CH-54 set several international records, including a time-to-climb record and, in 1965, a world record by lifting off with ninety persons aboard, including eighty-seven combat-loaded paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division. During the aircraft’s service in Vietnam, in addition to a gamut of heavy lift missions in support of U. S. and RVN operations, the “flying crane” recovered 380 downed aircraft. The “Sky Cranes” continued flying in civilian service, fighting forest fires, and in construction, remote oil exploration, and logging operations.
During the Vietnam War the success of U. S. helicopters radicalized modern warfare. Generals and admirals the world over realized that the helicopter had become an integral, and indispensable, element of war planning. Boeing CH-47 Chinooks, Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhees (Skycranes), CH-3 Sea Knights, and CH-53 Sea Stallions magnified the combat versatility of units in Vietnam by lifting towed 155-mm and 8-inch artillery pieces to remote firebases that provided fire support for infantry units moving into contact. Helicopters inserted large numbers of infantrymen and Marines onto precarious mountaintop LZs and, employing a long rope ladder that dangled down through the trees, delivered Rangers and Special Forces into triple canopy jungles. Outlying firebases and Special Forces camps relied on frequent resupply from U. S. workhorse helicopters. Airmobile units used helicopters to preposition fuel and ammunition for future operations. Forward Area Refueling Points (FARPs) reduced the turnaround time for helicopters to return to their missions. By slingloading downed aircraft back to repair facilities the CH-37, CH-47, CH-53, and CH-54 salvaged aircraft that would have been a total loss in other circumstances.
Marine helicopter operations followed much the same pattern as the U. S. Army, with a few innovations. Despite visibility limitations, Marine helicopter crewmen conducted several early night operations. In August 1965 they flew the first night assault in Vietnam, using CH-34s to insert Marine grunts into Elephant Valley northwest of Da Nang. Marine medevacs also extracted several severely wounded men during night operations. Radar operators guided the pilots to the wounded while other aircraft dropped flares to illuminate LZs long enough for the medevac to evacuate casualties.
Radar guidance allowed the Marines to resupply units under inclement weather conditions. During the siege of Khe Sahn and operations in the A Shau Valley in 1969, CH-46s and CH-53s made instrument climbs through the overcast at Quang Tri and Da Nang, and with radar directions flew to the beleaguered Marines. When an opening in the clouds appeared the pilots spiraled down to drop their external loads of water, rations, ammunition, and medical supplies into small LZs hacked into the cloud-covered rain forests.
From administrative assignments (“ash and trash” missions) to combat and service operations, helicopters changed U. S. military doctrine forever. Used properly, helicopters proved much less fragile than some doomsayers had predicted, flying thousands of hours per aircraft lost or damaged. By the end of 1972, U. S. helicopter losses neared 4,500, but most were lost to operational accidents and mechanical failures. Many of those listed as destroyed in combat were lost to mortar and rocket fire while the aircraft sat on the ground, partially protected by sandbag revetments.
During the Vietnam War, medevac and SAR pilots flew their aircraft into every conceivable situation: firefights, dense jungles, remote mountaintops, rice paddies, river bottoms, steep ridges, even to the outskirts of Hanoi itself, considered the most defended city in the world. For example, the USAF Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, flying a variety of helicopters, rescued 3,883 U. S. servicemen in SEA who might otherwise have been killed or captured. U. S. helicopters also evacuated hundreds of Americans and South Vietnamese during the fall of Saigon in April 1975.
From the late 1950s through the mid-1970s helicopters proved their adaptability and capability to operate in searing desert heat, Arctic cold, and all environmental conditions in between. Flying a miscellany of missions including military assault and transport, SAR, vertical replenishment of both military and commercial shipping, minesweeping, advanced early warning, and various humanitarian aid missions such as air ambulance and disaster relief, helicopter pilots aptly demonstrated that rotorcraft are much more versatile than conventional airplanes. Flying these missions in all weather conditions, aviators permanently established the helicopter’s reputation as a machine that could accomplish any assigned task. As to air ambulance and rescue, Igor Sikorsky, in 1969, stated: “For me the greatest source of comfort and satisfaction is the fact that our helicopters have saved . . . over fifty thousand lives and still continue with their rescue missions. I consider this to be the most glorious page in the history of aviation.” Both Larry Bell and Sikorsky believed that of the “great varieties of service rendered by the helicopters . . . the most important [have been] the saving of many thousands of lives” (Keogan 2003, 44).
Wednesday, July 30, 2025
Dak Seang
15 APRIL 1970

WO Albert J. Barthelme Jr. enjoying life between missions.
Original by Donald Summers, edited by Robert L. Noe
In March of 1970, Prince Sihanouk was in France, and his cousin Prime Minister Sitik Matak, as temporary ruler in his absence, was making enemies of the NVA inside of Cambodia. He had issued the impossible ultimatum to the North Vietnamese to remove all NVA troops from Cambodia within 48 hours. That left the NVA with only two possible moves to make: 1) withdraw, which was impossible within the time given; or, 2) take over Cambodia. The later was their choice. The NVA, by mid-April had already seized control over two major provinces and were planning to take over the capitol. To assure non interference from the Americans, a major effort was also taking place in the Central Highlands of Vietnam around Dak Seang, Dak Pec, Bien Het, Dak To, and small villages up and down II Corp area. By April, SOG missions were increased in both frequency and intensity, while in the Central Highlands units were in constant contact with a building NVA force. April, of 1970 was becoming a busy month for the 170th Assault Helicopter Company.
By the second week in April, intelligence showed that a massive buildup of forces of NVA was occurring around the Special Forces camp of Dak Seang, 20 miles north of Dak To. Dak Seang sat in a valley, with large mountainous ridgelines on both sides of it. Activity around the area had been building continuously. Intelligence was reporting a possible Division size NVA force had taken up positions around the SF Camp by April 14th, and attack of the camp was imminent.
One single vantage point existed in the form of an old NDB (Night Defensive Position) known as LZ Orange. LZ Orange was the sole open spot of an otherwise dense jungle mountain, and was the highest peak of the range overlooking the valley where the SF Camp could be seen. LZ Orange provided a perfect observation/control vantage point for the forthcoming battle. Saigon had determined ARVN forces must take possession of LZ Orange.
A plan was devised where the 170th, accompanied by Buccaneer Gunships for support, would insert the 3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The 3rd battalion was to serve a dual role in taking possession of LZ Orange. First, was to gain the vantage point of the valley, and second, should Dak Seang fall under siege, the 3rd Battalion could drop down the side of the ridge, fight their way through enemy lines around the base and hopefully enter the camp to support the besieged inhabitants. So it was, that at 0430 in the morning on April 15th the flight-line at Kontum Air Field came alive with Pilots, Crew Chiefs and Gunners busying themselves with their pre-flight checks, mounting weapons and loading rocket pods.
As the sun slowly rose over the mountains turning the sky from black, to red and orange, and then finally to hints of blue, a flight of Bikini?s with their ARVN passengers lifted off, and headed direct to LZ Orange. At 0600 hours the flight of Bikinis with their Gunship escorts broke over the lush green valley and lined up for their insertion. There was little doubt of where they were going. LZ Orange was a bald spot in an otherwise dense jungle mountain range. It?s red and gray dirt contrasted each other and stood out boldly in the bright morning sun. The pilots concentrated on their target LZ, while gunners checked ammo and weapons one more time to assure they were ready for whatever lay below.
WO Alan Hoffman commanding the lead ship entered the LZ without incident and unloaded the first of the force. CPL Herndon A. Bivens, and SGT Rosindo Montana sat in the doorway. Both men were American Pathfinders with the 52nd Aviation Battalion Security Detatchment. Before the skids even touched the ground, Bivens and Montana were on the ground followed by six ARVN of the 3rd Battalion. Montana was carrying the radio and he ran the short fifteen feet to the crest of the hill, stopping alongside of a large bomb crater. Bivens was right behind him and they began to busy themselves with the task at hand, landing the flight of Hueys carrying the ARVN Battalion . . . it was 0615 hours.
When the two Pathfinders reached their position, the second bird carrying eight ARVN soldiers, was on short final to the LZ. Inside the second bird was veteran pilot WO Albert J. Barthelme Jr., his second WO1 Roger A. Miller, who was in his second week in country and flying his second mission; SP4 Vincent S. Davies as Gunner, who was nearing the end of his first tour; and, SP5 Donald C. Summers, as Crew Chief, an ex-Ranger, who had submitted his request for his third tour. Like the first aircraft, the second helicopter was approaching the LZ without obstruction. Bivens raised his hands to direct the bird on final, and Montana busied himself with the radio. WO Miller was in control of the helicopter, and was less than fifty feet from the LZ when the NVA opened up from 360 degrees.
The first volley of fire dropped SGT Montana where he stood. Montana dropped to his knees, and managed to get a single transmission out that they were taking heavy concentrated fire from left and right sides of the LZ, when another volley of fire concentrated on him and he folded like an accordion into a fetal position, dead.
Bivens dove into the crater, rolling out of the line of fire. He came back up to the crest of the crater returning fire to the wood line. He was out of ammunition in a matter of minutes. The six ARVN soldiers ran to the back side of the hill below the crater to another crater some twenty feet, or less, from Bivens? location and sought cover. None of the ARVN soldiers returned fire.
Aboard the aircraft Summers was struck repeatedly in the left shoulder and side, slammed against the bulkhead to his right, then down to the left. He struggled back up and had just grabbed his M60 and started to return fire when the bird pitched violently to the left, then right and crashed, coming to rest on its side some ten feet or so from the dense jungle. Summers was buried under the bodies of the ARVNs who had all been killed in the initial volley. Vincent Davies opened fire immediately from the left side, laying down a sweeping return while avoiding the Pathfinder?s position with his fire. The thrashing of the bird caused him to stop firing and when the bird came to rest on its side he was able to escape over the side, and down onto the ground.
WO Hoffman had just leveled off his aircraft when the radio reported what was happening behind him. He swung his helicopter around, holding to the hillside, returned to the LZ, popping up even with the downed helicopter. He saw Al Barthelme wrestling with his harness, Roger Miller starting for the broken chin bubble opening, and reported that they were alive. The volume of fire descending on his aircraft prohibited another landing on the LZ, and Hoffman was forced to bank away and depart the LZ area.
Miraculously, neither Miller nor Barthelme was wounded or injured in the crash. Al Barthelme being on the low side of the aircraft, escaped the bird through the shattered chin bubble, with Roger Miller following suit.
Bivens, out of ammunition, left the bomb crater and ran to the wreckage as soon as it came to rest to help with survivors of the crash. As he approached, Al Barthelme was shot several times in the back and fell. Miller grabbed Barthelme and drug him away from the helicopter to the side of the hill below the crater. Miller then took up a position along the side of the hill between a bomb crater where the ARVN soldiers had run to, and Al Barthelme. Davis ran to where Barthelme lay and the two lay flat as gunfire continued to sweep across the hillside.
Bivens meanwhile climbed to the top of the chopper and looked inside. Summers was just emerging from under the bodies, spitting and cussing. Buried under the dead ARVN passengers, Summers had several bodies across his chest and face. The body which had fallen across his face had an open stomach wound, and it had been seeping intestines and blood into his mouth as he had struggled to unbury himself from the wreckage. Bivens reached down and pulled Summers the rest of the way out, and the two crouched for a moment inside the gunners well as gunfire continued outside. After a brief discussion, Summers jumped down to check the battery in the nose of the aircraft and found it was shot full of holes. Taking more fire, he returned to the gunner?s well with Bivens.
They decided that their best defensive position was on the backside of the hill where Miller, Davies, and Barthelme lay. The crater on the top where Bivens had been was within twenty meters of a fortified bunker with a machine gun and no less than three NVA. Summers and Bivens reviewed the situation. They were totally surrounded by fortified positions and NVA soldiers; a crossfire existed between the bunker Bivens had seen, and another positioned along the ridge line west of the LZ. This allowed for all approaching aircraft to be caught in a crossfire on final approach; Al Barthelme was laying still and had gaping holes in his back, but he was alive; Miller was unhurt at that point; and Davies was injured but functioning. Summers had been hit several times in the shoulder and side. The M60 on the topside of the aircraft was still usable, but the weapons of the ARVN troops, who were in the bird, had either been thrown clear or were dug deep into the dirt, shattered by the crash. Six ARVNs were armed and laying in the bomb crater some five feet from where Miller lay. Bivens gave Summers two hand grenades and Summers left the bird. Bivens manned the M60 and, using the gunner?s well for cover, laid down suppressing fire, while Summers carrying the grenades sprinted to Millers? position. Summers then went to the ARVN position and took an M16 and several clips from one of the soldiers and returned to Miller. As he did, all six of the ARVNs got up and ran into the jungle, deserting the Americans.
Bivens left the aircraft and sprinted to Montana?s body. He checked the radio and found it had also been shot beyond repair, and he returned to the aircraft to man the 60.
As the men on the ground were taking position on the hill, Buc Gunships formed a circle around the LZ firing their miniguns and rockets. As they did, the next two aircraft in line for insertion attempted to get into the LZ. The first helicopter flown by WO Don Johnson, started taking fire immediately. Bullets ripped through the windshield striking Johnson three times in the breast plate. The third round ricocheted and struck a smoke grenade in his survival vest setting it off and filling the cockpit with yellow smoke. The aircraft received multiple hits in the transmission and dropped to the left diving for the valley floor. Lt Larry Leonard, who was also with the lift, fell in behind Johnson following him down watching as yellow smoke flowed out of the aircraft, believing it to be on fire. Johnson regained control as he reached the valley floor and leveled off, turning and immediately headed for Dak To for an emergency landing.
The second aircraft did not fare any better. Within a quarter of a mile, was force to turn with main gearbox damage. He too, headed for Dak To. CPT Gary Knight, Buccaneer Leader, watching as the two slicks limped away, decided the LZ was too dangerous, and he pulled his aircraft back. Bikini?s from the scheduled lift returned to Pleiku, dropped off their ARVN passengers, and refueled. Meanwhile more Bikini?s were arriving on site to attempt rescue of the downed men on the LZ.
Around 0900 hours two Bikini?s other and their escorts, the Pink Panther Cobra Gunships of the 361st, were returning from a SOG mission, to the Dak To staging area, when they heard the radio traffic of their fellow Bikini?s 20 miles to the North at Dak Seang. WO James Lake followed by WO William MacDonald landed at Dak to and immediately went to SOG Command to request their release from SOG standby to go to assist with the downed aircraft. MacDonald had attended High School with Barthelme, joined the Army with him, and gone to flight school with him. MacDonald explained that not only was Barthelme a friend, he and Summers were regular SOG mission flight personnel, and were part of the SOG Operations. SOG released Lake?s and MacDonald?s ships, along with two Pink Panther Cobras who also asked to be released to support the rescue efforts. Lake and MacDonald also requested a Bright-Light team, and SOG Command contacted Kontum. MacDonald and Lake left Dak To for Kontum to pickup a team at 1000 hrs.
In Pleiku, CPT Knight and his flight had been told to remain at base. The Air Force had been notified and they were sending air rescue and fast movers to the site. Many of the Bikini?s refueled and returned anyway, as did all of the aircraft who had gone to Dak To for refueling. At this point, all rescue efforts, other than the Air Force SAR efforts, were on individual pilots own initiative. Command had made the determination that rescue of the downed crew was not possible without an unacceptable loss of men and aircraft.
WO Hoffman had returned to site and was circling the LZ to the west when a C123 screamed past him low level over the ridgeline. It?s door was opened, and a loadmaster stood in the doorway. As it overflew the LZ, Hoffman watched as the Load Master kicked a large crate containing a radio, weapon and ammunition out of the door to the LZ, but they had overshot the hill, and the much needed supplies landed on the side of the hill in the jungle away from the LZ and the Americans on top.
Another Bikini decided to try and get to the LZ, this time coming up low level from the valley floor with a Buc Gunship on each side. Halfway up the mountain the three ships were taking crippling fire, and soon had to break off their approach.
Three OH6 LOH arrived at LZ Orange. No one in the flight on site knew who they were, but with little fanfare or discussion, one began an attempt on the LZ. He low leveled across the valley floor and up the side of the mountain towards the LZ. Half way up, the small aircraft suddenly broke from the approach and sped away to the valley floor, his aircraft riddled with bullet holes and in critical condition.
Another Bikini bird arrived from having refueled at Dak To, and aboard was a single SGT from the SF Strike teams (unidentified to date) with a radio. They too made an approach to the LZ with the intent of dropping the SGT off and establishing communications from the hill. Within a quarter of a mile of the LZ, they abandoned their approach, the SGT badly wounded, both crew members wounded, the aircraft critically hit, and they made their way to the Dak To Airfield.
On the ground, things were not progressing any better than the rescue attempts. Only Summers with a few grenades and an M16 with four clips, and Bivens with the M60 from the gunner?s well of the helicopter had weapons. With each rescue attempt someone would fly over the LZ, and each time the men would wave, including Al Barthelme. By late morning though, Al had stopped waving and was now laying still, dying from his wounds. The NVA were repeatedly firing at Bivens? and Summers? positions. Several probes had been made by the NVA and each one repelled. By noon, Summers had used both grenades and was out of ammo for the M16. Bivens and the M60 was now their only defense. Enemy positions were less than twenty meters from them on three sides, and the ARVNs had abandoned them. Between engagements with rescue attempts, things would get quiet on the hill. After a few moments of quiet, the NVA would fire into SGT Montana?s body and the radio, as if using him for target practice. Several times shots spat up dirt from between Summers and Miller, or were concentrated on Al Barthelme.
At SOG Headquarters in Kontum, SSG Dennis Neal, the Team Leader for RT Montana, and SSG Michael V. Kuropas, the Team Leader for RT Vermont, had volunteered to form a compliment of Montagnard to serve as a Bright Light team to insert on the LZ and affect a rescue of the downed men. During their briefing, they were informed that the LZ was a real bad one and that it was now known it was a Division Headquarters for the NVA, surrounded by fortified positions. Both men and their Yards were determined to go in, and shortly after noon boarded WO MacDonald?s aircraft and headed for Dak Seang.
The flight of two, with the SF Team, arrived on site just as two F4's from Pleiku strafed the surrounding hillside, and four A1E Skyraiders dropped napalm. Two Air Force Jolly Green Giants from the 37th ARRS, stationed at Da Nang were on station and ready to approach the LZ. The Bikini aircraft who had been on site for hours warned the aircraft that the standard approach they were taking to the LZ was too risky, but the SARs continued to align themselves for approach.
Jolly 27 was in the lead, commanded by CPT Travis Scott. His co-pilot was MAJ Travis Wofford, and Flight Engineer Jerold Hartzel and Pararescueman L.E. Davis were aboard. Jolly 27 reported taking fire at over a quarter of a mile out from eleven o?clock, followed immediately by reports of more fire at two o?clock, and at a quarter mile from 360 degrees. As soon as he reported fire from 360 degrees he proclaimed hydraulics failure, and Jolly 27 dropped into the jungle hillside bursting into flames. Jolly 29 went down to retrieve the crew from Jolly 27 taking crippling fire. They retrieved the body of CPT Travis Scott, who had died of gunshot wounds, and the rest of the crew, Wofford, Hartzel, and Davis. All three were badly burned. Gerald Hartzel later died in the 71st Evac from his wounds. Jolly 29 returned to Pleiku, and the bird was scrapped as beyond repair due to damage from the volume of fire taken.
WO MacDonald with the Bright-Light Team, and WO James Lake were both circling at a high altitude above the LZ watching the attempts by SAR. Another Bikini decided to make a run for it. This time the crew had donned full body armor and laid Breast Plates under their seats and in the nose bubble of the aircraft to protect the pilots. They came close to the LZ, but were forced to abort and with their engine on fire. They crash landed in a small clearing southeast of the LZ. Another Bikini was able to follow them in and extract the crew safely.
Radio communications between aircraft was depressing. No one could figure how to breach the fire power of the NVA to get to the LZ. To make the situation even more dangerous, bad weather was moving in and dark clouds were starting to form. Soon, the weather would render any attempts impossible. Bill MacDonald declared he was going in.
MacDonald was flying the aircraft. Sitting beside him as co-pilot was WO Tom Bennie. After notifying Neal, Kuropas, and the crew they were going in, Macdonald dropped the Huey into a steep dive and headed to the valley floor. WO Jim Lake with WO John Kenny, copilot, was right behind them as chase ship. MacDonald leveled off above the valley floor, staying low and fast up the side of the mountain to the LZ. Immediately he reported extensive fire from 360 degrees, but he pressed on. As he reached the LZ, MacDonald was taking extremely heavy concentrated small arms and RPD fire from all sides. Behind him, Neal, Kuropas, and the entire Montagnard Team lay dead from multiple gunshot wounds.
As the bird slammed into the LZ, Summers, Miller, and Davies ran for MacDonald?s ship. Behind them a squad of NVA broke through the jungle and into the clearing, firing and pursuing them towards the bird. On the other side, Bivens, in the crashed helicopter, opened fire with the M60 against another squad of NVA who also rushed towards the second downed Bikini from the opposite side. On their way to the rescue ship Summers was struck twice more, once in the lower back and another creased his left leg. Davies received multiple wounds as he sprinted to MacDonald?s ship, and finally collapsed inside with bullets in his jaw, hands, and back.
Miller in the meantime was unscathed. He helped Davies aboard the aircraft, and then got back off and returned to Al Barthelme?s body, grabbing him by the left arm and hoisting him up, dragging his body towards the aircraft. Miller was screaming for someone to help and Summers started off the aircraft, but was knocked back inside by the Crew Chief who was still firing steadily into the advancing NVA. Summers grabbed a weapon from one of the Montagnard bodies and started joining in the firing at advancing NVA on the opposite side of the ship.
While this was going on, MacDonald and Bennie were calmly working at keeping the aircraft together under the increasing barrage of fire, holding on to allow the men on the LZ time to board. The advancing NVA were sending a wall of bullets through the canopy attempting to take out the two pilots, and the interior echoed with the sounds of bullets ripping the floor, walls, windshield, and instrument panel. Tom Bennie caught a round along the underside of both legs, cutting a severe grove through his legs and taking a large gash from his rear.
When MacDonald landed he had 1100 pounds of fuel, forty-five seconds later, he calmly reported he was down to 400 pounds of fuel and was lifting off . He had waited until the last possible moment. Fuel was pouring out of a large hole in the fuel cell, and the barrage of small arms fire was threatening their ability to lift off. Faced with no alternative, MacDonald pulled up and nose the aircraft over the side of the mountain. He immediately reported to Lake that he had lost all tailrotor control. Unknown to MacDonald, an unexploded B40 rocket had wedged in the boom, and frozen tailrotor controls. Banking to the south, he aimed the crippled aircraft towards the Dak Seang compound.
As MacDonald?s aircraft left the LZ, Bivens, still in the crashed aircraft?s gunner?s well, covered the extraction by laying down a steady wall of fire at advancing NVA. Roger Miller had been unable to get aboard before MacDonald was forced to leave the LZ.
As MacDonald, followed by Lake, flew through the valley towards Dak Seang, the aircraft continued to take ground fire. Both door gunners were laying down continuous fire. Davies lay behind the left seat shot up and unable to move, while Summers was to the right next to SSG Dennis Neal who was sitting slumped against the back of the pilots seat. Summers recognized Neal from his SOG missions , and he tried to revive him but quickly realized he was dead. He grabbed another weapon from the floor and continued to assist in returning fire to the ground as MacDonald began to approach Dak Seang.
Lake followed MacDonald through the valley, and swung around to approach Dak Seang from the opposite direction as MacDonald. On approach both aircraft came under heavy concentrated small arms fire. Lake landed nose to nose with MacDonald and watched as bodies fell out of the aircraft from the crew doors. Bullets shattered the windshield, and ripped through the instrument panel. The two Bikini rescue aircraft had landed in the middle of a ground attack, and hundreds of hard corp NVA were within 100 meters of their position firing and advancing.
Summers exited MacDonald?s aircraft and stumbled in between the two birds and stopped, turning and frowning at the NVA shooting at them. John Kemper, who was prior Special Forces on his third tour in Vietnam, exited Lake?s aircraft and directed Summers towards Lake?s ship, and Summers stumbled over and boarded Lake?s aircraft. Later Summers told Lake and others he was standing between the two helicopters thinking that was just his luck, to be rescued from the hill only to take part in a major ground attack. Kemper ran to MacDonald?s ship and grabbed Davies, carrying him back to Lake?s bird.
The attacking NVA concentrated their fire on Lake?s aircraft which was positioned between them and the camp defenses. As his crew loaded wounded, Lake watched bullets flying through his aircraft instrument panel, while outside bullets kicking up dirt all around his crew and the wounded men. Lake was taking constant direct hits on his aircraft.
In the meantime, Bennie had managed to get unstrapped, and fell out of the door of his helicopter and onto the ground, injured far worse than he had realized, he was having trouble standing or walking. He and MacDonald finally managed to dive into a nearby bunker.
With his aircraft full of wounded, and under a barrage of small arms fire, Lake was able to lift off from Dak Seang, and headed for the 71st Evac in Pleiku. He turned and surveyed the wounded, and was surprised to discover Al Barthelme was not among them. Until that point, he had believed both Barthelme and Miller had gotten off with MacDonald?s aircraft. Summers informed him that Barthelme was dead, and that Miller and Bivens were still on the LZ.
Lake delivered the wounded men at the 71st Evac in Pleiku, and immediately took off again, returning to LZ Orange. His intent was to make another extraction attempt of Miller and Barthelme. Lake arrived over Dak Seang as nightfall was settling over the valley. The weather had moved into the LZ rendering any extraction attempt impractical. With the knowledge there was no hope for another attempt to rescue the remaining men at LZ Orange, Lake returned to Kontum Airfield.
WO Miller was captured by the Viet Cong and eventually moved to Hanoi and was released in Operation Homecoming in March 1973. When he was released, he reported that he and Bivens had spent the night on the LZ and on the morning of April 16 attempted to return to friendly lines. At an unknown location they were ambushed by two enemy squads. WO Miller saw that Bivens had been wounded in the chest 5 or 6 times by small arms fire. After their capture they were separated and given medical attention. The last Miller saw of Bivens was when he was taken from the site of the ambush on a stretcher. At that time, Bivens was still undergoing medical treatment. About four days later, the camp commander where Miller was being held told him that Bivens had died about 2 hours after capture. On April 29, 1970, a U.S. search and recovery team was able to examine the crash site and recover the remains of WO Barthelme and SGT. Montana. The only identifiable thing about Barthelme was the green St. Mary's County-shirt he wore. Herndon Bivens has been missing nearly 20 years and there can be no question that the Vietnamese know precisely what happened to him, but they deny any knowledge of his fate. Further, even though WO Miller knew that Bivens had been captured, Bivens is classified Missing in Action rather than the more appropriate category of Prisoner of War. His name did not appear on Henry Kissinger's discrepancy case list at the end of the war.