Bệnh xơ cứng teo cơ, được biết đến với tên gọi ALS, là một bệnh về hệ thần kinh ảnh hưởng đến các tế bào thần kinh trong não và tủy sống. ALS gây ra sự mất kiểm soát cơ bắp. Bệnh có xu hướng trở nên tồi tệ theo thời gian. ALS thường được gọi là bệnh Lou Gehrig theo tên cầu thủ bóng chày đã được chẩn đoán mắc bệnh này. Nguyên nhân chính xác của bệnh vẫn chưa được biết rõ. Một số ít trường hợp là di truyền. ALS thường bắt đầu với sự co giật và yếu cơ ở một cánh tay hoặc chân, khó khăn trong việc nuốt hoặc nói ngọng. Cuối cùng, ALS ảnh hưởng đến khả năng kiểm soát các cơ cần thiết để di chuyển, nói chuyện, ăn và thở. Hiện chưa có thuốc chữa cho căn bệnh chết người này.

Các triệu chứng

Các triệu chứng của ALS khác nhau từ người này sang người khác. Các triệu chứng phụ thuộc vào những tế bào thần kinh nào bị ảnh hưởng. ALS thường bắt đầu với tình trạng yếu cơ, ngày càng lan rộng và trở nên tồi tệ theo thời gian. Các triệu chứng có thể bao gồm: Gặp khó khăn khi đi lại hoặc thực hiện các hoạt động hàng ngày thông thường. Hay vấp và ngã. Yếu ở chân, bàn chân hoặc mắt cá chân. Yếu hoặc vụng về ở tay. Nói lắp hoặc gặp khó khăn khi nuốt. Yếu kém liên quan đến chuột rút cơ và co giật ở cánh tay, vai và lưỡi. Khóc, cười hoặc ngáp không đúng lúc. Thay đổi trong suy nghĩ hoặc hành vi.

ALS thường bắt đầu ở tay, chân, cánh tay hoặc chân. Sau đó, nó lan rộng đến các phần khác của cơ thể. Các cơ bắp trở nên yếu đi khi nhiều tế bào thần kinh chết đi. Điều này cuối cùng ảnh hưởng đến việc nhai, nuốt, nói và thở. Thông thường không có cảm giác đau trong giai đoạn đầu của ALS. Đau cũng không phổ biến trong các giai đoạn muộn hơn. ALS thường không ảnh hưởng đến khả năng kiểm soát bàng quang. Nó cũng thường không ảnh hưởng đến các giác quan, bao gồm khả năng nếm, ngửi, chạm và nghe.

 Greetings all,

Here is a Vietnam war era incountry made P.R.U patch from my collection.This particular unit operated around Quang Tri and the Ben Hai river,which was an important landmark in the partition of the country into a northern and a southern zone along the 17th parallel by the Geneva Accords of 1954. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two parts extended about 5 kilometers (3.1 mi) from either side of the river. Many of the P.R.U's in this area were led by American Marine advisors,possibly because of the large USMC presence in the northern section of South Vietnam.I can only imagine these tough little units saw alot of action so close to North Vietnam.

The P.R.U's (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit)were a CIA sponsored "action arm" of the Phoenix Program.Contrary to popular opinion,the P.R.U's were not solely assassination teams.Although it sometimes proved unavoidable, killing a suspect was not the primary intention of PRU operations. Rather, in the words of John Mullins, an American PRU adviser, “prisoner snatches were key. You can’t get information out of a dead man.”

 

Here is some info that I gleaned from the Rand Organization:

Although PRU operations continued until the end of the war in 1975, their greatest level of activity occurred during 1967–1972.Operating in all of South Vietnam’s provinces, and never numbering more than 5,000 men, the PRUs were in essence an intelligence-driven police force—better trained, equipped, and paid than the South Vietnamese National Police, and with a highly specialized mission, to be sure, but a police force nonetheless. To help ensure that individuals were not targeted for personal or narrowly political reasons, multiple sources of information were required before an operation could be launched.
Units served in their native provinces, giving them a depth of knowledge about local conditions unmatched by any other South Vietnamese government (let alone U.S.) forces. “Successful PRUs,” according to a CIA study, “developed [their] own sources of information, such as defectors, informants, and personal contacts in contested areas.” As American adviser John Walsh recalled, the PRU members “knew their territory intimately . . . . We advisors came to rely on their knowledge of who lived where and what their loyalties were.”
The Phoenix intelligence centers, the National Police, the Special Police Branch, and other agencies were supposed to provide the PRUs with intelligence, but the PRUs typically gathered, developed, and exploited their own intelligence. According to Andrew Finlayson, another American adviser, “seventy-five percent of the time, the PRUs did their own targeting: ‘This guy’s sister is pro-VC, he comes to the market and is buying way too much food,’ etc.”The PRUs had informants in nearly every village and hamlet, and they also relied heavily on family members and friends to provide information. This self-generated intelligence was of much higher quality than that provided by U.S. or Vietnamese agencies.
A typical PRU was made up of five 18-man teams, which were in turn broken down into smaller units for operations at the district level. To maximize the element of surprise, operations most often took place late at night or early in the morning. Operations were of relatively short duration, rarely lasting more than a few hours. Although the units were led by South Vietnamese, American advisers helped plan operations and typically accompanied PRUs in the field. U.S. involvement in planning and carrying out “snatch-and-grab” operations was invaluable. With American advisers accompanying their operations, PRUs had access to air support when they encountered heavy resistance. The ability of Americans to call in helicopters to quickly evacuate the wounded helped sustain PRU morale. Finally, direct participation in field operations helped American personnel gain a first-hand appreciation of strengths and weaknesses of the units they were advising. Although the PRUs obtained excellent intelligence, their American advisers exercised tight control, frequently rejecting proposed operations if they deemed intelligence inadequate.
Most PRU recruits had previous military experience, often in elite South Vietnamese military units, such as the Marines. Many had lost family members to VC violence, and revenge often served as a strong motivating factor.Thanks to the CIA’s largesse, members of the PRUs were well paid by Vietnamese standards, but it would be a mistake to characterize them as mercenaries, as some critics have: “Most were professional soldiers, they liked soldiering, and they were nationalistic. And they had scores to settle with the communists,” recalls Finlayson. Generous pay, specialized training from the CIA, and relatively low casualties contributed to high morale. Careful CIA control over the selection of PRU leaders helped ensure the generally high quality of unit commanders.
The PRUs’ American advisers also frequently had a military background. Indeed, until the late 1960s, most of the American advisers were serving military officers detailed to the CIA, which lacked the manpower to support what had become a nationwide program. Still, the number of advisers was small relative to the overall number of U.S. military and civilian personnel stationed in South Vietnam. As of May 1970, 102 U.S. military personnel and five civilians were advising the PRUs. Whether civilian or military, all PRU advisers fell under CIA operational control, with a chain of command extending down from the agency’s regional officer in charge and to the agency’s province officer, who oversaw PRU field operations.

 

 

Some info about the Phoenix "program":
In June 1967, in an effort to centralize and better coordinate anti-VCI operations, Ambassador Robert Komer, the director of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam’s (MACV’s) overall pacification program, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), won approval for a CIA plan to establish a program called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX), later known as Phoenix.
The central element of coordination was Vietnamese, as the Saigon government provided the bulk of the manpower. This program was known as Phung Hoang, named after a mythical Vietnamese bird somewhat similar to the phoenix. Phung Hoang was not an independent bureaucratic entity; rather, it was a structure of coordinating bodies composed of the numerous agencies involved in the anti-VCI campaign. Phung Hoang was created by decree in 1968, and by 1970, these coordinating committees were organized at the national, regional, and provincial levels.These committees included representatives from the National Police, the Special Police Branch, the National Police Field Force, the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, the RD cadre, the Military Security Service, the military intelligence and current operations staff (G2 and G3, respectively), the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), and others.
Most of the coordination under Phung Hoang took place at the provincial and district levels. At these levels, a somewhat more formal entity consisting of the Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (PIOCC) and the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) was created. These centers had (or were intended to have) a physical presence and a staff of detailed personnel—they were not merely committees that met occasionally. In addition, Province Interrogation Centers were established to provide a central location to question captured or surrendered VCI personnel, who were technically civilians.On the U.S. side, the advisory effort for Phung Hoang was the program actually named Phoenix. Phoenix was backed by two U.S. agencies: the CIA and MACV. Both provided funding and advisers to Phung Hoang, although they did so in different ways at different times.
CIA support for anti-VCI activities was most substantial in the early years of the Vietnam War. As the cost of the campaign increased, the agency’s ability to support it declined.CIA support to Phung Hoang thus tended to be concentrated at the PIOCC level, as even the large CIA country team based in Saigon simply did not have sufficient personnel to staff the hundreds of DIOCCs.MACV, in contrast, was well endowed with both personnel and resources. Phoenix activities fell under the aegis of MACV’s CORDS organization, and MACV therefore could draw on the thousands of American officers in Vietnam to staff the DIOCCs. By 1970, more than 700 advisers were serving in Phoenix, with military officers making up the majority of personnel.

For more info on the Phoenix Program here is a link to a well written PDF that can be saved to your computer:

 

 

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP258.pdf

A Vietnamese made P.R.U(Provincial Reconnaissance Unit) patch - ARMY AND USAAF - U.S. Militaria Forum

 Who Were the Tay Ninh PRU?

Bài của: Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.

On my second day, in a rela tively informal gathering, I would meet many of the mem bers of the 92-man Tay Ninh PRU that I would command and advise. I would find them to be brave and experienced troops. Some had military experience with the Cao Dai Army (a local militia that fought the Viet Minh), the South Vietnamese Airborne Division, or the Civil ian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), which had been com manded by US Special Forces. Most of the PRU’s troops were members of the Cao Dai religion, but a few were Roman Catholic, and even two or three ethnic Cambodians were assigned. All of them had a deep hatred for the Viet Cong, primarily because of atrocities committed against them and their families. Religion and family played large parts in their lives. The Tay Ninh PRU was divided into five 18-man teams (each team was broken further into three squads), one for each of the four districts in Tay Ninh Province and one for Tay Ninh City. The headquarters of the Tay Ninh PRU, which was collocated with the Tay Ninh City team, consisted of just two individuals, the commander and his opera tions officer. The commander of the city team also served as the Tay Ninh PRU’s deputy com mander. The PRU was armed with M16 rifles, M60 machine guns, 45-cal iber automatic pistols, and M79 grenade launchers; however, individuals also had a variety of other weapons they had acquired from disparate sources. The units also possessed PRC-25 radios, 7 by-50 binoculars, medical kits, 4 by-4 Toyota ¾-ton trucks, and Honda motorcycles. In garrison at their district headquarters, the men wore civilian clothes; in the field they wore tiger-stripe camouflage uniforms or black pajamas. The units’ US advisers were similarly outfitted and armed. In my first assessment of the Tay Ninh PRU’s operational capabili ties, I found that the teams func tioned well in most situations, but they lacked fire discipline. That is, the teams did not maneuver well under fire, and they were not proficient in calling for and adjusting supporting arms, generally artillery fire. Thus, the units did not perform well when they and the enemy met by chance or when the enemy was prepared for them. In part, this was a product of their training, which was unsystematic and erratic. Most PRU members were highly experienced combat veterans, who had survived many years in elite combat units before coming to the PRU, but a few had received only rudimentary field training or had served in noncombat units. At the national level, training took place from time to time at a camp near Vung Tau on the shore of the South China Sea; but at the local level, US commanders and advisers led training when operational lulls permitted. As a result, training was uneven and so was performance. The PRU’s strong suits lay in its intimate and complete knowl edge of the people and terrain of Tay Ninh Province. This knowl edge was central to their success in mounting operations against local VCI cadre and in compen sating for training shortcomings. This knowledge of the province led to a great ability to develop accurate intelligence on the VCI and to plan methodically. The members of the PRU also were masters in camouflage, conceal ment, and night movement. As a result they tended to rely heavily on surprise and ambush to achieve decisive results.

Sources of Intelligence

Thanks to the introduction of systems associated with CORDS, the Tay Ninh PRU in theory had a wide array of intelligence sources available to it. Every thing from local agent reports to national-level intelligence could in theory be funneled to them via the system of District Intelli gence and Operations Coordina tion Centers (DIOCCs). US military district advisers could channel operational leads to dis trict PRU units for exploitation. At the provincial level, the same organizational structure existed for coordination; however, at that level, the US PRU adviser filled the role US military advisers played at the district level. In practice, however, few opera tional leads were shared with the PRU for a host of reasons. Petty jealousies between the Vietnam ese National Police, the Vietnam ese Special Branch Police, and district chiefs often prevented the transmission of good operational leads to the PRU. This same problem existed on the American side, where US mili tary commanders and civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the Vietnamese for fear of compromise. Sadly, US civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the PRU even when they were specif ically directed to do so by the US Embassy in Saigon—and many of them even refused to share their intelligence with other US agen cies for fear of others getting a share of the credit. In theory, the DIOCC system should have worked well in developing operational leads, and on occasion it did. By and large, however, it did not function prop erly in Tay Ninh Province because of personal intransi gence and bureaucratic in-fight ing. The sources that were uniformly inaccurate were the agent reports developed by US military intelligence units. During the 10 months that I served as the PRU adviser, not a single agent report received by the PRU from the US military proved to be of value. Most agents were paid for their information in a piecework fash ion, and this led to the manufac ture of a large volume of worthless reports. Vietnamese National Police agent reports were equally worthless to the Tay Ninh PRU, and in some cases, dangerously inaccurate. National-level intelli gence sources were accurate but often did not pertain to VCI activities, so they were of little value to the PRU in rooting out the VCI in the province. Of moderate importance and value to the PRU were reports from the interrogation of prison ers by the Vietnamese Police Special Branch at the Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC). Many of the prisoners held at the PIC provided accurate and timely information on VCI personalities and activities. When this infor mation was shared with the PRU, which was rare, the results were usually highly successful. Of particular value were the many VC who rallied to the South Vietnamese government as part of the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) Program. These Hoi Chanhs (returnees) were screened after they surrendered to the South Vietnamese govern ment and then interrogated at the PIC, where they often volun teered to guide PRU teams into highly contested areas to cap ture VCI. Hoi Chanhs were usu ally far more reliable than other prisoners, although many VC guerrillas and North Vietnam Army (NVA) soldiers also pro vided useful information on VCI targets. Another source of intelligence that was often productive, but time consuming to exploit and difficult to process, was the vast store of data collected by Census Grievance teams during 1963–64. These teams conducted inter views in conjunction with a national census at that time. Their interviews led to the devel opment of maps of the province’s districts and villages that were color-coded to illustrate degrees of loyalty to the South Vietnam ese government. Green-colored houses were deemed loyal; yel low meant neutral; and red indi cated VC sympathy. In addition, these maps would often contain the names of fam ily members who were VCI mem bers or sympathetic to the communists. This storehouse of data was kept at the CIA villa in Tay Ninh City and reviewed peri odically by the US adviser for operational leads. In most cases, the information was dated or dif ficult to exploit because of the inaccessibility or the death or capture of the communist sympa thizer, but in some notable cases important mid-level VCI cadre were arrested or killed as a result of information on the Cen sus Grievance maps. Had these maps been digitized and the information contained in a readily accessible database, the time taken to absorb their infor mation probably would have been greatly reduced and many more operational leads developed. By far, the most prolific source of intelligence for the PRU was the PRU’s own intelligence system. The Tay Ninh PRU was forced to develop its own source of opera tional leads because of the afore mentioned reluctance of other agencies to share information on VCI targets. As natives of Tay Ninh Province the PRU mem bers had lived and worked in the province for most, if not all, of their lives. They were part of the fabric of the provincial society, and their families engaged in all kinds of commerce throughout the province. Through family contacts, PRU members developed an extensive intelligence system that success fully gathered accurate informa tion on the VCI at the hamlet and village level to map VCI activities. In many cases, the PRU members knew personally the VCI cadre they were hunt ing; indeed, many had known them since childhood. They knew the families of the VCI and the details of their personal lives. In some cases, the Tay Ninh PRU was actually successful in infil trating the VCI. This intimate knowledge of the VCI led to many highly accurate operational leads and the elimi nation of several important VCI cadres during my tour there. While I was the US adviser to the Tay Ninh PRU, approximately two-thirds of the VCI the PRU captured or killed were uncov ered by the intelligence devel oped by the PRU’s organic system. Operational Relationships While the PRU program was a national organization under CORDS on the American side and the Ministry of Interior on the Vietnamese side, it was much more a provincial “action arm.” By that I mean the operational direction and authority for any PRU came from the Vietnamese province chief, who was the only official who could sign an arrest order or operational order for the PRU. Thus, as the US PRU adviser in Tay Ninh, I could coordinate with Vietnamese and American mili tary units and plan operations, but I could not authorize them. To conduct any operation by the Tay Ninh PRU against a VCI tar get, I had to submit a written request for a signed authoriza tion from the province chief. Since the province chief and his key subordinates and US advis ers met almost daily, this requirement never really was an impediment to successful use of the PRU. Down the line, at the district level, Vietnamese dis trict chiefs could not use the PRU teams located there on missions without the approval of both the US PRU adviser and the prov ince chief. Even so, because the district coordination centers, the DIOCCs, were set up to rapidly process such operational requests, I saw no meaningful delays in approving PRU opera

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tions at the district level while I was there.

The Impact of the Changing Role of American Participation

I arrived at a time of shifting arrangements. Installed as a “commander” of the PRU in Sep tember, I became an “advisor after November 1969. Until then, “command” rested with the US military officers and senior noncommissioned officers assigned to the PRUs. This arrangement changed after November because General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, had become con cerned about perceived abuses in the Phoenix program and the effect allegations of abuse were having on support of the war in the United States. That month, he issued an order that changed the status of US military men assigned to the PRU from “commander” to “adviser.” He also stipulated that no American was to accompany PRU teams on operations in the field. This he did to avoid the possibility that US personnel might involve themselves in actions that could be construed as violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I was not privy to the rationale of Abrams or his staff in formu lating these restrictions, but I can say that during my assign ment in Tay Ninh, I never wit nessed and never even heard of a single operational act by either an American or a Vietnamese MACV’s policy [of keeping US commanders out of the field] devastated the PRU’s morale and effectiveness. PRU member that violated the code. The new policy devastated the morale and effectiveness of the men in Tay Ninh. The PRU relied heavily on the Americans who accompanied them on dan gerous missions to provide radio contact with US supporting units, especially medevac heli copters and artillery units. Without the prospect of Ameri cans by them, PRU members became reluctant to carry out missions into contested areas north and west of Tay Ninh City, such as War Zone C and the An Thanh-Cay Me border area with Cambodia. They knew if they got into difficulty, without Ameri cans they would be unable to receive prompt medical evacuation, supporting arms fire, or emergency extraction by US helicop ters. This was no small mat ter for the Tay Ninh PRU. Its teams operated in areas in which the North Vietnamese Army’s 5th, 7th, and 9th Divi sions operated. And, as lightly armed units, the PRU teams needed rapid US fire support if they engaged with NVA or VC main force units. ing to venture into contested areas. I admit that in some cases, my loyalty to the PRU and my understanding of leadership caused me to question MACV’s restrictions. I formally requested reconsideration of the policy but the request was denied. Why Were PRU Teams Successful in Destroying the VCI? While my experience in Tay Ninh does not necessarily represent the experience of other PRU advisers and their units, I can say confidently that the Tay Ninh PRU was successful during my tour. From September 1969 to June 1970, the Tay Ninh PRU After November 1969, it took several months and many hours of training before the Tay Ninh PRU members were again willing to venture into contested areas. I admit that some cases, my loyalty to the PRU and my understanding of leadership caused me to question MSCV's restrictions. I formally requested reconsideration of the policy but the request was denied.

Why were PRU Teams Successful in Destroying the VCI?

While my experience in Tay Ninh does not necessary represent the experience of other PRU advisers and the units, I say confidently that the Tay Ninh PRU was successful during my tour. From Sep 1969 to Jun 1970, the Tay Ninh PRU killed 31 VCI and captured 64— at a cost of only two PRU mem bers killed and two wounded. As early as December 1968, it was apparent to the Tay Ninh PRU that most of the senior VCI cadre had been either killed or captured in the months after Tet or had been driven into neighbor ing Cambodia. As a credible political threat, the VC had ceased to function in any meaningful way by the time I left Viet nam in June 1970.4 Further proof of the PRU’s effec tiveness came in 1975, when the communists finally defeated the South Vietnamese. The NVA commander occupying Tay Ninh Province would put in a hurried request to North Vietnam for 200 civilian political cadre. He reported that there were only six local VC cadre left in the prov ince to manage the province’s affairs. The Tay Ninh PRU was successful primarily because it was a locally recruited outfit whose members had an intimate knowledge of their province, its people, and the enemy. They also had discipline, strong leadership, and an intense personal motivation to defeat the VC. They had an accu rate and highly effective intelli gence system that was difficult for the enemy to infiltrate or

// (4) I obtained the information about the sta tus of the VCI in Tay Ninh Province after I left Vietnam from an interview with two former Tay Ninh PRU members who resettled in the United States in 1985//

defeat because it was based on strong family loyalties and reli gious and civic affiliations. The American commanders and advisers came and went and played important roles. But few served more than a year in any province. And as much as I (or I think any of my fellow PRU advisers) would like to find ways to take credit for the success of the PRU, I (and we) cannot. Long after the Americans left South Vietnam, the Tay Ninh PRU con tinued to root out the VCI. The concept may have been an Ameri can one, but the execution and adaptation were entirely Viet namese. After the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the lives of Tay Ninh PRU members changed dramatically for the worse. They were hunted down and arrested or killed. Many served long terms in reedu cation camps, where they were tortured and made to work under inhumane conditions. Some escaped the camps and made their way to the United States, where they were settled by the US government and given jobs. Most, however, were executed or died in squalid camps. A few never surrendered and contin ued to fight the Vietnamese com munists and their southern allies. They organized a “stay behind” unit in Tay Ninh called the “Yellow Dragons,” and their activities were still reported on by the communist authorities in the province well into the 1990s.

Lessons learned

With the Tay Ninh experience behind me, I have often pon dered if units similarly orga nized, equipped, and trained could duplicate the PRU’s suc cess in other places and times. Could special police units drawn from local communities to iden tify and apprehend insurgents be successful and be so in keeping with the fundamental demo cratic principles we espouse? I believe they can if the following conditions are met: •The units are imbued with both a professional and civic ethical standards that make them accountable to the people for their actions, not only to spe cific government officials or political leaders. •They are equipped and trained to a high level of professional ism. •They are paid well (and regu larly) and rewarded for tangi ble results—a crucial element in preventing corruption and enemy infiltration. •They are organized into small, tightly knit teams whose ranks are filled by members of the communities they serve. (Out of a population of over 17 million, there were never more than 4,500 PRU members in all of South Vietnam during the Viet nam War. Most of these PRU members were natives of the provinces in which they served.) •They are subject to effective judicial and political oversight

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and not free to conduct unau thorized missions, without orders from a competent legal authority. •The units are not responsible for interrogating or incarcerat ing captives beyond seeking identifying information and holding them until transfer elsewhere. •A clear separation is made between PRU-type units and other police units, especially those involved in criminal investigations and arrests. •The units’ members and their families are protected by the state from retribution and given assurances that their names will not be revealed to the press or any other unautho rized source. •They are provided with the highest level of professional and ethical leadership •They receive full access to per tinent targeting intelligence through some form of inter agency coordinating group, like the South Vietnamese DIOCCs. •If US advisors are assigned to such a unit, they should receive pre-assignment training con centrating on language profi ciency, cultural sensitivity, intelligence management, small unit tactics, and staff planning./.

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Studies_v51no2_2007.book

 CA law: Can I use map app on phone while driving? Call? Text? | Sacramento Bee

 SỐ 16 ĐỒNG NGHĨA VỚI THÀNH LŨY TAN NÁT (SHATTERED CITADEL)

LÂM = 314 = 8

QUANG = 16153 = 16 = 7

THI = 451 = 10 = 1

Cộng lại: 8 7 1 = 16.

Phạm văn Phú sanh ngày 16/10/1928.

Hai vị tướng này, một người có tên bằng 16, người kia có ngày sanh là 16. Sau đây là 1 phần của ý nghĩa của số 16, dựa theo sách Linda Goodman's Star Signs.

"Theo nguời Chaldeans cổ đại thì số 16 đuợc biểu tuợng bởi hình ảnh “một Tòa Tháp bị Sét đánh, từ đó một nguời đang rơi xuống, với một Vuơng miện trên đầu” (a Tower struck by Lightning, from which a man is falling, which a Crown on his head”). Số này cảnh báo về một tai họa tiền định lạ lùng (strange fatality), cũng như sự nguy hiểm của các tai nạn và sự thất bại của những kế hoạch của nguời mang số đó. Nếu tên bằng 16, điều dĩ nhiên là khôn ngoan đổi tên để tránh tác động của nó. Nếu ngày sanh là ngày 16 của bất cứ tháng nào, sự thử thách của số 16 phải đuợc cẩn thận đón nhận/đáp ứng, để cho tác động/ảnh huởng có thể giảm nhẹ tới một mức không khắc nghiệt lắm (the challenge of the 16 must be met, so that its effect may be diluted to a milder vibration). Để tránh khuynh huớng tiền định đầy khắc nghiệt này (the fatalistic tendency) của ngày sanh là số 16, nguời (có ngày sanh là 16) này phải cố gắng lập kế hoạch truớc khi làm bất cứ việc gì (one must endeavor to make all plans in advance), để chắc chắn rằng mọi khả năng của thất bại phải đuợc tiên liệu/biết truớc (making certain that any possibility of failure is anticipated) và phải đuợc né tránh/đi vòng quanh/đổi huớng (circumvented) bằng cách chú ý cẩn thận từng chi tiết.

Trong khi đó khi nhận lịnh rút bỏ Kontum, Pleiku, và Phú Bổn của tổng thống Thiệu, tướng Phú đã làm 1 cách hấp tấp, ko chuẩn bị kỹ lưỡng, bất chấp ý kiến của ĐT Lê khắc Lý tham mưu trưởng của QĐ 2 là phải cần ít nhứt 1 tuần để soạn thảo kế hoạch rút quân. Cuộc rút quân bắt đầu ngày 16/3, nghĩa là chỉ sau 2 ngày từ cuộc họp tại Cam Ranh.

Cũng như vậy, tướng LQ Thi, có tên bằng 16, đã hấp tấp thảo kế hoạch rút quân khỏi phía bắc đèo Hải Vân (do ông phụ trách), và trình lên tướng Trưởng. Theo hồi ký của chỉ huy các đơn vị ở bắc đèo Hải Vân, thì tính đến trước ngày 25/3/75, tình hình ở khu vực này như sau:  

"Theo hồi ký của Đại Tá Nguyễn Thành Trí, lúc đó là Tư Lệnh mặt trận Tây Bắc Huế thuộc đạo quân Tiền Phương QĐI, thì lệnh hành quân lui binh này được soạn thảo bởi Trung Tướng Lâm Quang Thi tại Thuận An vào trưa ngày 24/3/75 và được Đại Tá Lê Ngọc Hy, Tham Mưu Trưởng QĐI TP mang về Đà Nẳng trình cho Trung Tướng Ngô Quang Trưởng TL QĐI, được Tướng Trưởng ký chấp thuận lúc 5 giờ 30 chiều 24/3/75. (TT2 TQLC trang 537-538)

- Theo Đ/Úy Nguyễn Quang Đan thì vào một buổi sáng tháng Ba, anh không nhớ ngày, (theo tôi thì có lẽ là sáng 25/3/75) anh nhận được bản sao của lệnh hành quân triệt thoái QĐI Tiền Phương đã được Tướng Trưởng ký, anh vội vã đưa cho Tướng Lân, đọc xong ông than: “ĐM thế này thì chết lính tao rồi!”, sau đó ông ra lệnh cho anh bay ra Thuận An đưa cho Đại Tá Nguyễn Thế Lương LĐT/LĐ147 một lá thư kèm theo lời dặn “Tìm ra QL1 mà đi” rồi Tướng TL đi thẳng lên Trung Tâm Hành Quân Sư Đoàn. Tiếc thay Đ/Tá Lương đã không nghe lời.

LÊ = 35 = 8

KHẮC = 2513 = 11 = giữ nguyên

LÝ = 31 = 4

Cộng lại: 8 11 4 = 23 = rất may mắn. 

 Kit Carson

Although Chaplain McGonigal's 1966 survey and General Walt's message reflected some of the negative features resulting from Marine infantry units operating in populated areas, Marines more often than not demonstrated that they could work with individual South Vietnamese to bring stability to the countryside . One of the most unusual and yet successful of these attempts was the formation of special cadre made up of former VC. These men, former enemy troops, had taken advantage of the government "open arms" (Chieu Hoi) policy and rallied to the government cause. The Marines began to use a selected few of these "ralliers" or Hoi Chanhs during the spring of 1966. In May, a group of VC surrendered to units of the 9th Marines, asking for asylum. The enemy im mediately started a rumor among the people that the Marines had tortured and killed one of the ralliers by the name of Ngo Van Bay. Colonel Simmons, the regimental commander, asked Bay and two of his

==

Former Viet Cong who defected to the government attend an indoctrination class. The Marines recruited several of these "ralliers" or Hoi Chanhs as "Kit Carson scouts" to accompany Marine units in the field. // A former VC (right), now a Kit Carson scout assigned to the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines in the An Hoa sector, points out a possible enemy hiding place.// These former VC were not only a valuable tactical asset, but served to further allied propoganda. Marine Corps Photo A370000 compatriots to return to the village and put the rumor to rest for once and for all. The three former Viet Cong agreed and, according to Simmons, this, in a small way, was the beginning of the program. Other Marine units at Da Nang, and eventually in all of the TAORs, started using former VC as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents. By October 1966, the program was established on a permanent, official basis. General Nickerson, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, who was part Indian and a Western history buff, designated the former VC working with the Marines as "Kit Carson scouts." He selected the name because the Hoi Chanhs working with the Marines were good scouts, in the tradition of Kit Carson, the famed frontiersman, Indian agent, and soldier. *4

===

From October to December 1966, III MAF credited the Kit Carson scouts with the killing of 47 VC, the capture of 16 weapons, and the discovery of 18 mines and tunnels. The scouts repeatedly proved themselves a valuable tactical asset. For example , in November, one scout attached to the 1st Marine s at Da Nang led a Marine company at night over unfamiliar terrain to an objective area, resulting in the surprise and capture of 15 Viet Cong. The scouts provided more than just tactical capability. They were also a valuable propaganda tool. Villagers were much more ready to listen to them than to representatives of the government. During a December County Fair one scout gave a speech to the gathered villagers and evoked applause from his audience several times. According to the Marine report, the scout then : . . . ventured into the VCC/VCS compound and spoke to them. . . . A definite response was observed by the facial expressions of some of the individuals. Attention seemed to follow the Kit Carson Scout wherever he went, including an apparent interest generated among the ARVN troops who participated in the operation. Psychological Warfare

The Kit Carson program was only part of an intensive psychological warfare campaign that III MAF had begun in the latter half of 1966 . In fact, it was an officer in the III MAF Psychological Warfare Sec tion, Captain Stephen A. Luckey, who recommend ed the formal implementation of the Kit Carson pro ject and it was the Psychological Warfare Section that developed the Kit Carson SOP . The section had consisted of only Luckey and a senior staff NCO un til 4 August, when General Walt assigned Colone l Robert R. Read as the psychological warfare officer . In September the section became a special staff sec tion, directly responsible to the III MAF Chief of Staff. According to the force order establishing the section, Colonel Read had four basic missions: 1. to reduce the combat efficiency of the VC ; 2. to further the effort of the South Vietnamese Govern ment in establishing control by attempting to modify at titudes and behavior of special audiences ; 3. to coordinate psychological operations with civic ac tion programs; 4. and finally to obtain the assistance and cooperation o f the South Vietnamese villagers .43 General Walt did not expect Colonel Read to ac complish miracles, but he wanted "an increased em 247 phasis on psychological operations by all III MAF commands." Colonel Read was to coordinate the III MAF efforts within the command and with the ARVN, MACV, and U.S. Information Agency and its South Vietnamese counterpart. Read remembered that his two initial problems were that "There were no T/ 0 billets for PsyWar personnel and there were no Marines trained in PsyWar opera tion. " He and his small staff took several steps to overcome these difficulties. They persuaded III MAF to direct its subordinate organizations to establish psychological warfare sections and instituted mon thly meetings of PsyWar personnel. Moreover, III MAF requested Headquarters, Marine Corps "to pro vide school trained PsyWar personnel in replacemen t drafts, which they did ." On 18 September, Read ob tained operational control of the U .S. Army's 24th Psychological Operations Company's two detachments in I Corps, one at Da Nang and th e other in Quang Ngai . Believing that the physical separation seriously hampered the company, Read consolidated both detachments at Da Nang and established there in October a Psychological Warfare Operations Center. By the end of the year, III MAF had a coordinated program that included the preparation of leaflets and broadcasts aimed at the enemy forces, as well as the screening of Hoi Chanh's for employment as Kit Carson scouts . According to Read, the increase in former VC rallying to the Viet namese Government through the Chieu Hoi pro gram was in part due to the new emphasis on psychological warfare operations. 44 C

 Wednesday, October 21, 2020

Người tuổi Hợi (year of pig) - tuổi của tôi, theo tử vi Trung Hoa. (Dịch từ quyển The Complete Book of Chinese Horoscopes by Chris Marshall).

Nhận xét: Nếu những ai tuổi Hợi đều có những đặc tính sau đây thì thế giới sẽ tốt đẹp rất nhiều -- nhưng bất hạnh thay, rất ít người tuổi Hợi có đủ các đặc tính này. Tuổi Hợi trong đại gia đình của tôi và bạn bè thân thuộc có: tôi. em gái, em rể, một ng cháu kêu tôi bằng bác, một người cháu kêu tôi bằng cậu, một bạn trẻ sanh năm 1971 (thường xuyên thất nghiệp, bất mãn), v.v...

I / Về tổng quát người tuổi Hợi có đặc tính như sau.

Cũng như mọi việc trên đời, bạn phải chờ đến phút cuối cùng để thấy được phần tốt đẹp nhứt (you have to wait until the very end for the best bit). Những người tuổi này là những “viên kim cương“ theo cung hoàng đạo Trung Hoa (“diamonds” of the Chinese zodiac). Dù cho kim cương có thể chưa cắt gọt bởi một nghệ nhân lành nghề (they may not have been cut by a master craftman), và dù cho kim cương có thể chưa được đánh bóng (they may be rather unpolished), kim cương vẫn là kim cương (but diamonds they are nonetheless). Nguời tuổi Hợi luôn luôn thành thật, cởi mở, ngay thẳng, nói khác đi, họ được rất nhiều người yêu mến (honest, open, and upright, in other words, immensely popular people). Họ không biết đi cửa sau hoặc nham hiểm/đểu giả, mà lại thích giải quyết mọi việc bằng một cách thức hoàn toàn thẳng thắn và lương thiện (do not know how to be devious or underhanded, preferring to deal with all situations in a totally frank and honest manner). Nhiều người có thể xem họ là khờ dại (simple) và cố gắng lợi dụng bản tính tốt đẹp của họ - thật sự thì rất dễ gạt gẩm họ - nhưng người tuổi Hợi thường coi trọng những mặt tốt của kẻ khác, và đặt sự ngờ vực (kẻ khác) vào hàng thứ yếu (but Boars would much rather think the very best of someone, leaving suspicion and mistrust to other signs). Người tuổi Hợi có một dự trữ lớn lao về nội lực (vast reservoir of internal strength), và người khác thường đến với họ và dựa vào, một cách không cố ý, sức chịu đựng và tính chung thủy của họ (other people unwitting come to depend on their fortitude and loyalty). Về căn bản, người tuổi Hợi rất đáng được bạn tin cậy và thuờng sẽ làm việc hết mình để đạt được điều tốt đẹp nhất cho chính họ và cho người chung quanh họ - càng nhiều người càng tốt (In essence, Boars are highly trustworthy and will usually work very hard to achieve the best for themselves and as many people around them as possible). Họ tin tưởng một cách mãnh liệt vào một cuộc sống thanh bình và hầu như sẽ làm hết sức mình để cố gắng giải quyết bất cứ khó khăn (They believe fervently in a peaceful life and will to almost any lengths to try to solve any problem). Ở những người tuổi Hợi KÉM PHÁT TRIỂN (câu này nghe quen quen -- Tài), lại có khuynh hướng đắm say trong thú vui xác thịt, và một vài tác phong/cách cư xử của họ cuối cùng sẽ có thể hoàn toàn thoái hóa/suy đồi (In less-developed Boars, there is a tendency to wallow in sensuality, and some Boars’s behaviour can end up being quite degenerate). May mắn thay, đó chỉ là số ít, nói chung, mặc dù họ thích hưởng thụ những cái tốt/đẹp trong cuộc đời, nhưng họ lại không đắm say/sa ngã vì nó (Fortunately, this is not the norm, and in general, although they enjoy the good things of life, they are not over-indulgent). Cái gì họ có được, họ đều CHIA SẺ, bởi người tuổi Hợi tin rằng “nhà của tôi cũng là nhà của anh“ và sự rộng rải/hào phóng của họ còn đi xa hơn - nếu bất cứ ai gặp khó khăn, bạn có thể nhờ người tuổi Hợi giúp một tay. (What they do have they share, because Boars believe that "my house is your house “, and their generosity goes further - if anyone is ever in trouble, you can depend upon a Boar to lend a hand).