ENEMY CAPTURES A HIGHLANDS POST

By The Associated Press

• Nov. 3, 1972

Credit...

View on timesmachine

About the Archive

T

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Friday, Nov. 3—Tank‐led North Vietnamese troops overran another border camp in the Central Highlands yesterday as both Communist and South Vietnamese forces fought to expand their territorial control before a cease‐fire.

Ducco, 12 miles from the Cambodian border and 27 miles southwest of Pleiku, reportedly fell before dawn despite roundthe‐clock efforts by United States and South Vietnamese gunships and bombers to turn back the enemy attacks. Ducco was one of a series of frontier base camps set up to counter enemy infiltration.

The Saigon command reported that enemy forces made 142 attacks throughout South Vietnam in the 24 hours ended at dawn. Spokesmen said it was the largest number recorded in any 24‐hour period in several years, but many of them were small‐scale rocket and mortar barrages.

The Hanoi radio said the United States delay in signing the draft peace settlement had left “no other choice than to step up the fight on all fronts.” In the battle for Ducco, at least three enemy tanks were reported knocked out by allied air attacks.

Advertisement

SKIP ADVERTISEMENT

Government rangers defending the base abandoned it after being pounded by artillery and missiles and assaulted on three sides on the ground. Scores of defenders reportedly broke out to the relative safety of a jungle plateau 500 yards away where, according to reports from the field, they joined other Government troops.

Air strikes ‘on Communist troops in the area continued through the day, it was reported, to prepare for a Government counterattack.

3 Camps Overrun

Ducco was the third border camp to be overrun in the Central Highlands in less than month. Benhet and Dakseang fell in October.

In other action yesterday, North Vietnamese troops were reported to have penetrated a hamlet less than four miles outside Pleiku. Reports from the field said Government troops retook the hamlet, known as Pleiblang 3, yesterday morning, killing four enemy soldiers and capturing a number of documents.

Advertisement

SKIP ADVERTISEMENT

Officers in Pleiku said the incident indicated that units of the North Vietnamese main forces were breaking into small groups and trying to penetrate as many areas as possible in preparation for a cease‐fire. Similar reports came from Danang, headquarters for the country's northern military region.

Reporting on the fighting near Saigon, a South Vietnamese military spokesman said that Communist troops had been driven out of four hamlets they had seized in the area and that all major highways in the captal region were open.

A communiqué said the reoccupied hamlets ranged from 12 miles northwest of Saigon to 20 miles east of the capital

Related Content

More in Archives

SKIP ADVERTISEMENT

 https://www.specialforces78.com/ii-corps-and-the-battle-to-split-vietnam-part-ii/

               

Ý nghĩa của các số:

1/ Trại DSCĐ Đức Lập bị tấn công bởi quân CSBV từ 23 - 26 tháng 8/1968.

2/ Hầm hố, bịnh viện, khu tập kết và vị trí đặt rocket của CS dấu trên các đồi núi.

3/ Khu vực đồi núi chiếm giữ bởi quân của BCH 2 Mike Force từ Pleiku vào đêm 23 và 24/8.

4/ BCH chi khu Đức Lập cố thủ bởi lính VNCH dù bị tấn công liên tục từ 23 - 28/8.

5/Đường tiến quân của quân của BCH 5 Mike Force từ Nha Trang vào ngày 25/8, nơi mà họ tái chiếm ngọn đồi bắc đã bị chiếm trước đó bởi csbv.

6/ Đường tiến quân của BCH 2 Mike Force vào ngày chủ nhật nơi mà giúp Mike Force 5 Nha Trang chiếm lại đồi bắc.

 NDC -- SAU NĂM Ở LÍNH.

Rồi cũng chẳng nghỉ ngơi được bao lâu, chúng tôi nhận lệnh : tiếp ứng và giải vây cho căn cứ Đức Cơ nơi Tiểu Đoàn 81 BĐQ đã bị bao vây 3 tuần lễ.

8 giờ sáng đã bắt đầu trực thăng vận , tôi theo BCH/TĐ nhảy xuống trong slick đầu tiên, bãi đáp đã được pháo và những phi tuần phản lực “dọn kỹ “, sau này tôi mới hiểu đây là “sự im lặng đầy chết chóc đang rình chờ” ,quân thả xong an toàn, phi cơ cuối là chiếc L 19 làm nhiệm vụ quan sát cũng chào bãi chúng tôi rồi đi về, khi núi rừng sẫm màu hoàng hôn chúng tôi bắt đầu ăn pháo, một trận pháo “chào đón” ra trò, pháo vòng cầu, pháo trực xạ nổ như rang bắp, hầm hố chưa đào sâu, thiệt hại lớn, không quân hẹn tối mới có phi cơ soi sáng, tôi ngạc nhiên vì chuyện này ,nhưng bây giờ “ngộ” ra lúc đó xăng và đạn dược tiếp cho quân đội rất cầm chừng, rất hạn chế…, số phận chúng tôi đã được “ngả giá” bởi những “bàn tay lông lá”, tội nghiệp chúng tôi, những kẻ ra sân đấu mà bị trói tay, chỉ có đôi chân để ” CHẠY LÀNG", để “di-tản chiến-thuật”.

Tổng thống Thiệu đã nói như muốn khóc: làm sao đánh lại cộng sản, họ tiêu tốn cho phương tiện chiến tranh bằng cả núi vũ khí tối tân, của Nga Sô, Trung Cộng, xăng dầu của Việt Cộng chảy tới Tây Ninh… còn quân đội Cộng Hòa chúng tôi chỉ với vài đô la lẻ, làm sao…Có sức mạnh để đánh giặc để làm nhiệm vụ tiền đồn cho vùng Đông Nam Á, trong hội nghị “thượng đỉnh” ở Honolulu lần chót vào năm 1973. Ông đâu hay được “đồng-minh” đã bán đứng ông và một quân-đội còn non trẻ ấy, lại nữa người Mỹ, công dân Mỹ họ có quyền “lên giọng ” với tổng thống của họ nhất là chẳng bao lâu nữa là bầu cử tổng thống, T.T. Thiệu đâu nghĩ tới điều: vì quá dân chủ nên dân Mỹ họ rất “dị-ứng” với hình ảnh con em,chồng cha họ lủi thủi xếp hàng lãnh cơm ở nhà tù “khách sạn Hillton” Hà Nội, họ muốn con em họ trở về ngay tức khắc, một lợi thế rất thuận cho “bên kia”, chúng tôi ở vào hoàn cảnh cùng trên một con tàu không có bản đồ,hải bàn , thuyền trưởng tuyệt vọng vì hải-trình còn xa mà nhiên liệu thì cạn kiệt …

Lãnh pháo liên tục 2 ngày đêm, chiều ngày sau đột nhiên ngưng pháo. suốt 48 giờ căng thẳng chúng tôi mệt nhoài, mắt như có ai kéo lại , ai cũng ngủ như chưa bao giờ được ngủ…

Chúng tôi chợt tỉnh trong tiếng kèn thúc quân của địch, những lằn đạn AK xanh lè quét sát chúng tôi, bộ binh đối phương đông như kiến. Tôi nghe nói “tấn công biển người ” đã lâu, nay được chứng kiến, tham chiến thì đúng hơn, tôi cầm cây M 16 của người lính trinh sát bảo vệ cho BCH/Tiểu-đoàn đã gục chết; qua lổ châu mai lố nhố những chiếc mũ cối, địch tiến gần lắm rồi. Tôi chụp handset của máy PRC 25, người lính hỏi tôi: trung úy kêu chỗ nào, chỉ còn cái này đang liên lạc với thằng 1 (đại đội 1), Thiếu Tá T.Đ.Trưởng và trưởng ban 3 tai bị ù vì góc hầm bị sập do pháo đối phương. Tôi bảo: cậu qua tần số liên đoàn; tôi nghe giọng sĩ quan trực ban 3 liên đoàn tỉnh rụi: tụi nó ghẹo sơ đó mà … tôi đòi cho gặp Alpha (liên đoàn trưởng ), tôi biết sĩ quan trực liên đoàn không đánh giá được tình hình chính xác, tôi nói luôn, anh trình alpha cho pháo hay phi tuần đánh ngay lên đầu chúng tôi.

– Bộ tới mức này sao. Ráng đi để tui cho pháo chớ fighter giờ này chắc gì có. Ráng cầm cự.

– Tụi tôi hết tiền (đạn) rồi làm sao “tố” được .

– Cũng không có pháo, chúng tôi bắt đầu cận chiến, khẩu colt 45 của tôi còn 1 băng với 6 viên đạn đã lên nòng.

– Tôi nghĩ không thoát ra hầm sẽ chết chùm vì khi áp sát được, địch sẽ đánh lựu đạn hoặc bộc phá, chúng tôi lao ra, tôi cũng quét 1 băng M 16 và cùng tụt con dốc xuống chân đồi theo 1 hướng không thể có chọn lựa nào khác hơn, địch dành cho chúng tôi con đường này và cái giá chúng tôi phải trả cũng quá đắt, toán lính truyền tin và tiểu đội trinh sát còn được 6 người kể cả tôi, với vài cây súng, một máy Prc 25, không còn đơn vị nào trong hệ thống liên lạc, tôi biết “thiệt hại ” là rất lớn, tôi nhắm hướng, cho Kpui-Thup một hạ sĩ tr/tin rất to con, mở lối, rừng rậm không thấy mặt trời, chúng tôi theo hướng địa bàn đi về chi khu Thanh An, sang ngày thứ 2 chạm súng với 1 tổ du kích mà thoạt đầu tôi cứ tưởng quân bạn vì địch che mấy khẩu AK quá kỹ, khi họ lia 1 băng AK 47 về phía chúng tôi làm cho một người lính Biệt-Động trong toán chết ngay tại chỗ, lần đầu trong cuộc đời tôi phải quyết định một chuyện: để lại tử sĩ trên đường rút lui, không có cuốc xẻng để chôn, không thể mang thi hài theo vì chính tôi cũng chưa biết sẽ đưa được toán tới chi khu Thanh-An hay không, qua các làng dân tộc hầu hết là vùng kiểm soát của “bên kia”, súng đạn và quân số địch rất dồi dào … , cứ chạm thì né, ngày thứ 3 mọi người bủn rủn vì đói , chúng tôi đâu có ý định “di-tản” nên tất cả quân lương vẫn còn trong các ụ chiến đấu, tôi bảo Thup trèo lên cây cao coi có làng nào để tìm đồ lót dạ, định hướng xong chúng tôi đi trong cái đói cồn cào, mắt thường bị hoa lên, vậy mà tới xế chiều mới tới 1 làng nhỏ, gọi là làng nhưng thực ra chỉ có chừng 5 cái nhà sàn bé tí, sau khi đã quan sát kỹ, tiến vô làng có 2 bà cụ già người Thượng đang vắt khoai mì thành nắm [có khi họ tiếp tế cho du kích ] tôi cho tản ra, Thup là người “đồng hương“ tiếp xúc thương lượng, còn tiền trong túi tôi móc ra trả, bảo Thup “thông dịch” và gói lẹ chỗ khoai mì thành 5 gói, có lẽ chưa lần nào được ăn ngon như vậy, trên đường đi chúng tôi nghe tiếng máy bay L 19, tôi dò mọi tần số để kêu giúp đỡ nhưng vô vọng, buổi chiều lại “chạm” nhỏ với du kích, cũng may vô sự. 2 ngày sau chúng tôi tới được chi khu Thanh An, tôi được đại tá Võ Hữu Hạnh chỉ huy trung đoàn 53 /Sư Đoàn 23 BB chuẩn bị tiếp cứu cho Đức Cơ; ông đãi tôi bữa cơm chiều sau khi nghe tôi “tường thuật di tản” khỏi Đức Cơ cho ông nhà văn mang lon Đại Tá.

Đơn vị tôi thay chỉ huy mới: Đại-Úy Nguyễn Ngọc Lân, ông về thay cho Thiếu Tá Nguyễn Đỗ Tước nhận nhiệm vụ mới, thời gian này khu vực căn cứ Pleime im ắng một cách bình an, thường cứ có “dấu lặng” là sẽ có “màn” mới .

Không bao lâu chúng tôi lại được thay Tiểu Đoàn Trưởng mới : Thiếu Tá Vương Mộng Long , vị chỉ huy trực tính, tài ba , kiên cường ( về điểm này tôi biết qua những anh em còn lại sau 1975 Họ kể cho tôi nghe lòng bất khuất của ông vào những giờ hấp hối của một quân đội, của một miền Nam,một trận để đời tại Xuân Lộc,Long Khánh, người Tiểu Đoàn Trưởng Biệt Động Quân mà Thiếu Tướng Lê Minh Đảo trong nhiệm vụ chỉ huy có thẩm quyền cao nhất giữ phòng tuyến Xuân Lộc khâm phục…Có nhiều tank 54 của đối phương còn vết sơn “xịt” nơi pháo tháp : T.Đ 82 B.Đ.Q, nhưng giờ thứ 25 của vận mệnh một Quốc Gia quá oan nghiệt từ lệnh đầu hàng của một tên tướng nội tuyến cho địch , quân lực VNCH đã “nuôi ong tay áo” vài tên tướng như vậy …

Với riêng tôi trong trận 33 ngày đêm trấn giữ Pleime mà Tiểu Đoàn chúng tôi với quân số một “chọi” với mười đã chiến đấu trong tháng mưa dầm dề (hầu như sự yểm trợ của Không Quân bị hạn chế tối đa , hạn chế vì thời tiết , hạn chế vì ngân sách viện trợ cho Quân Đội bị cắt giảm tối đa ). Nếu không phải là Thiếu Tá Vương Mộng Long chỉ huy thì căn cứ Pleime có lẽ đã mang số phận khác, một số phận mà không người lính mũ nâu Biên Phòng nào mong muốn : di tản chiến thuật…Ông đã “làm bàn thắng” ngoạn mục , đưa Tiểu Đoàn 82 Biệt Động Quân về sân vận động thị xã Pleiku để khao quân ,mừng chiến thắng do đồng bào và chính quyền thị xã Pleiku tổ chức đón tiếp.

 Vietnam War

In August 1967, 25 A-37As were deployed to Vietnam under the "Combat Dragon" evaluation program, and flew from Bien Hoa Air Base on USAF "air commando" missions, including close air support, helicopter escort, FAC, and night interdiction.^[10] Combat loads included high-explosive bombs, cluster munition dispensers, unguided rocket packs, napalm tanks, and the SUU-11/A Minigun pod.^[3] For the majority of missions, the aircraft also carried two additional external fuel tanks on the inner stores pylons.

During this period, the A-37As flew thousands of sorties; none were lost to enemy fire, although two were wrecked in landing accidents. While the aircraft was formally named the "Dragonfly", many pilots called it the "Super Tweet". The Combat Dragon program was successful, but unsurprisingly the combat evaluation revealed some of the deficiencies of the A-37A.^[11] The most noticeable problem was that the aircraft lacked range and endurance. Other concerns were heavy control response during attack runs (the flight controls were not power-boosted) and the vulnerability of the aircraft's non-redundant flight control system. Some pilots also criticised the machine gun as ineffective and negatively impacting the pilot's view.^[12][13]

An OA-37 Dragonfly aircraft over Edwards AFB, California

The USAF signed a contract with Cessna in early 1967 for an improved Super Tweet, designated the "A-37B". The initial order was for 57 aircraft, but this was quickly increased to 127; the unit cost of these aircraft were roughly one quarter of the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II all-weather fighter aircraft.^[14] The A-37Bs were primarily intended to be supplied to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) as replacements for their A-1 Skyraiders. The A-37B prototype was rolled out in September 1967, with deliveries to the South Vietnamese beginning in 1968.

The A-37Bs were all newly built airframes that were considerably stronger than those of the A-37A, capable of pulling six g instead of five, and were built to have a longer fatigue life of 4,000 hours. Field experience would demonstrate that 7,000 hours between overhauls could be tolerated. The A-37B weighed almost twice as much as the T-37C; a remarkable fraction of the loaded weight, 5,800 lb (2,600 kg), could be external stores. In practice, the A-37B usually operated with at least two and sometimes four underwing fuel tanks to improve combat endurance. The A-37B added a refueling probe to the nose, leading to pipes wrapped around the lower lip of the canopy, for probe-and-drogue aerial refueling. This was an unusual fit for USAF aircraft, which traditionally are configured for boom refueling. Other improvements included updated avionics, a redesigned instrument panel to make the aircraft easier to fly from either seat, an automatic engine inlet de-icing system, and revised landing gear. Like its predecessors, the A-37B was not pressurized.

In order to accommodate the increased weight, the A-37B was powered by General Electric J85-GE-17A engines, providing 2,850 lbf (12.7 kN) thrust each. These engines were canted slightly outward and downward to improve single-engine handling.^[15] Air commando pilots in Vietnam operating the A-37A had found single-engine cruise an effective means of improving their flight endurance. Modifications were made to control surfaces to improve handling. To improve aircraft and crew survivability, the A-37B was fitted with redundant elevator control runs that were placed as far apart as possible. The ejection seats were armored, the cockpit was lined with nylon flak curtains, and foam-filled self-sealing fuel tanks were installed. To extend endurance, pilots were authorized to fly the A-37 on only one active engine, an uncommon practice outside of emergency situations at that time.^[9]

A-37B Minigun in nose compartment

The 20 mm (0.787 in) GPU-2/A and AMD 30 mm (1.18 in) cannon pods were tested with favorable results on the A-37B,^[16] but reports indicate that such pods were either seldom or never used in operation.

The A-37 proved to excel at the close air support mission.^[10] It was able to engage targets at speeds roughly 100 miles per hour slower than swept-wing fighters and by doing so improve its bombing accuracy; pilots were reportedly able to achieve an average accuracy of 45 feet (14 m). While the aircraft's slow speed was feared to make it more vulnerable to hostile ground fire, the A-37's relatively small size, atypical speeds, and relatively low altitudes combined to make it somewhat hard to effectively hit with gunfire.^[10] The A-37 required a relatively low amount of maintenance compared to contemporary fighters—only two hours of maintenance for each hour of flight time, six times less than that of the McDonnell F-101 Voodoo; a feat was partially due to the convenient placement of multiple access panels at strategic locations.^[17][18]

The A-37 did not typically attract attention from the media, unlike many other USAF combat aircraft used in the theatre; one reason for this was that the type was never flown into North Vietnam, where hostile air defenses were proved to be challenging, claiming to have downed almost 200 F-4s and 300 F-105s by the conflict's end. Instead, A-37s operated in the south, as well as in neighboring Laos and Cambodia, where it was typically used to support US ground forces.^[9]

A total of 577 A-37Bs were constructed, 254 of which being delivered to the RVNAF. By the war's end, the A-37 had flown over 160,000 combat sorties, during which only 22 USAF aircraft were recorded as lost due to combat. The type remained active in the theatre right up until the Fall of Saigon, shortly prior to which efforts were made to retrieve as many as possible before they fell into North Vietnamese hands.^[19] As a consequence of the North Vietnamese capture of Da Nang Air Base at the end of March 1975, their forces captured large amounts of stores and equipment, including 33 intact A-37s.^[20][21] On 28 April 1975, several of these captured A-37s were used by the North Vietnamese to attack Tan Son Nhut Air Base, still held by the South Vietnamese.^[22][23]

 Charles Shaw grew up in Brooklyn and Nassau County on Long Island. He attended several different high schools, including Chaminade and Sewanhaka, where he had the opportunity to take several college-level classes. He learned about West Point through popular television shows and movies in the 1950s, and from a teacher who had graduated from the academy in the 1940s. He had earned an NROTC scholarship to Columbia University, but accepted a slot at West Point two weeks before R-Day. While at the Military Academy, he was part of the nascent parachute team, which had been started by a prior-service Cadet in the Class of ’61. The first year the team was in existence, every member had to be airborne qualified. By the second year, non-airborne Cadets were permitted to join, and Shaw began jumping. Upon graduation, he commissioned into the Infantry, and after completing Airborne, Ranger, and Jump Master school, he was assigned as a Platoon Leader in C Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Following his assignment at Ft. Bragg and completion of the MATA (Military Advisor Training Academy) Course, he deployed to Vietnam, where he was assigned to the 43rd Ranger Battalion under the 9th ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Division in the IV Corps area. He was assigned to Vinh Long, east of the headquarters in Sa Dec. Initially, he worked for an incompetent ARVN commander, but his second commander, Captain Nguyen Van Hiep, exemplified all the leadership traits that made his Rangers want to follow him. Shaw’s Ranger unit was employed primarily in an emergency response role, and when contact was imminent, they were a competent and dependable unit. Returning from Vietnam in the summer of 1965, Shaw was assigned to the new Advanced Infantry Training unit, Tigerland, at Ft. Polk, Louisiana. There he was responsible for training young Soldiers and providing them with lessons learned from his experiences in Vietnam. After Ft. Polk, he returned to Vietnam, where he was assigned to A Co, 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, in the 9th Infantry Division. He quickly learned that his unit was the worst company in the Battalion, quite possibly in the Division, and he determined to fix the leadership issues. After he got the NCO leadership on his side, the company began improving, saving lives in the long run. When he was promoted to Major, he left the company and joined the Brigade Staff, running the “Reliable School” for incoming Soldiers among other tasks. As the Division began redeploying to the United States, he took command of an ad hoc Battalion of short-timers to lead them in rotating back to the United States. Following his second tour in Vietnam, he returned to Ft. Benning, Georgia, before joining a PSYOPS unit at Ft. Bragg. From there, he became a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) specializing in Thailand. Following several years in Thailand, his final assignment was at Central Command (CENTCOM), where he put his FAO skills to work in countries across Africa. In this interview, he talks about his childhood, his West Point experiences, and his career in the Army. He discusses working with the 43rd Battalion of ARVN Rangers, highlighting their professionalism and contrasting it later with the poor state of the company he later commanded in the 9th Division. He compares working with the Vietnamese to working with other Americans, and examines what he learned in both situations. He describes his experiences as a FAO, and the importance of cultural understanding. Finally, he expresses what West Point means to him.

VIDEO DETAILS

conflicts	Vietnam War
topics	West Point HistoryLeadershipARVNCamaraderieTeamworkMilitary TechniquesUSMA 1962
interviewer	David Siry
date	03 April 2019

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

name	Charles Shaw
institution	USMA
graduation year	1962
service	Infantry
unit	C/2-504 PIR, 82nd Airborne Division; 43rd Ranger BN, 9th ARVN Division; A/4-39 Infantry, 9th Infantry Division
specialty	Vietnamese Ranger Advisor
service dates	1962 1987

RELATED VIDEOS

James R. Ellis

 PACIFIC STARS & STRIPES

Saturday, April 11, 1970

Besieged Dak Seang: 'Scar' That Fights Back

by Spec. 4 Jack Fuller
S & S Vietnam Bureau

TAN CANH, Vietnam -- "They're crazy. You come in there in a gunship and they fire at you, knowing that they'll get a world of fire back, but they fire anyway."

That's how Spec. 4 Robert Barber, 24, who has been flying as a gunship crew chief into the valley where the Dak Seang Special Forces camp lies embattled, describes the North Vietnamese army troops circling the camp.

The Dak Seang camp, under attack was described by pilots as a scar -- charred and flattened by shelling, littered with the green-camouflage canopies of parachutes that eased resupply loads to earth. A landing strip -- unused since March -- stretches just outside the thick perimeter.

Nearby is a burnt-out village that was once the home of relatives of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) fighters who help man the camp.

The CIDG dependents are now underground in fortified bunkers. And there are others, including 11 members of a Vietnamese band and drama group who played an engagement there March 31 and never got a chance to leave.

Military sources say the band, an extension of the Saigon government's political warfare campaign, now works as a first-aid unit. "They're working in their secondary MOS (military occupational specialty)," one American said.

Along the wooded ridges and in the tree-specked valley, Vietnamese forces are pressuring the NVA to take the pressure off the camp.

The NVA is fighting back. "You take fire from some trees and slam them with rockets," one chopper pilot said, "then you make another pass and they fire again. They’re dug in. That's all you can say."

Though it was learned [that] U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence sources showed some increased activity in the Dak Seang area before the beginning of the month, the April 1 eruption came as a surprise to some helicopter pilots.

"We got a call to go into the camp as support for a medevac," said 1st Lt. Pat Cooper, 25, who broke in as a gunship pilot over Dak Seang. "We just expected to go in, pelt the positions and never hear about it again. It didn't work out that way."

"When we got there the camp was taking heavy indirect fire and the medevac had to wait to go it. Finally, there was a lull in the shelling and the chopper set down. All hell broke loose. On the radio they were yelling, 'We're taking ground fire. We're taking automatic fire.' That's how it started."

Pilots say it's easier working near Dak Seang now. But as one crewman put it, "it is definitely not 'no sweat'."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PACIFIC STARS & STRIPES
Sunday, April 12, 1970

Battle in 11th Day
Viets Bolster Dak Seang Force

by Spec. 4 Jack Fuller
S & S Staff Correspondent

TAN CANH, Vietnam -- Fresh Vietnamese infantry troops slammed into the bitter fighting around Dak Seang Special Forces Camp Saturday as the battle for Dak Seang valley bled into its eleventh day.

A battalion of ARVN infantrymen were air assaulted outside the camp's perimeter to help Vietnamese mobile advisory (MIKE) Forces dig out an estimated 1,500 enemy soldiers who continued to harass the camp, according to II Corps commander Gen. Lu Lan.

Meanwhile, the first group of survivors of the savage bombardments and brutal ground attacks were lifted from the camp and brought to the forward command post here, 13 miles to the southeast.

One Green Beret who had been in the camp since fighting erupted April 1 said 560 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) troops and their 700 dependents within the camp were out of direct radio contact with Tan Canh command post for three days after a rocket destroyed part of the radio gear. An emergency radio beamed messages to planes flying above the camp during those three days, he said.

Sgt. Daniel Noonan, 22, a medic in the camp, said people left the camp's bunkers only on medevac, forward observation and resupply missions during the heavy fighting. "The Mike forces," he said, "sat out there for days drawing fire away from us, giving us a little rest."

Even as he left the camp, Noonan again faced enemy fire. "I was on the outside waiting for the chopper, "Noonan said, "when a mortar hit on our east perimeter. The chopper dropped in, I dove on board, and a mortar round hit right under our tail." The chopper returned here safely with no casualties.

Noonan was helping rocket shrapnel victims on a medevac helicopter the first day when the enemy opened up the massive attacks. "That chopper pilot (W.O.1 Danny Floyd) had guts. He was taking hits all over -- mortars, AK-47 rounds, everything." Noonan said. "But he waited there until we got everyone in. If I see that guy again, I'll buy him a beer."

Noonan said that the situation in and around the camp "looked good now."

"I have a feeling that the enemy has exhausted all the potential of his first wave and is preparing a new attack with replacements from across the border," Lan said.

Though fighting continued around the camp Saturday, the pace of activity diminished, according to Lan.

He said he expected the second wave to come within a week.

Lan said the siege of Dak Seang was a typical seasonal move against an isolated Green Beret camp. But he added that this year the siege came sooner than usual.

"Often the enemy seems to want only to get a headline," Lan said. "In this one I think he really wanted to overrun Dak Seang."

Lan said 104 Vietnamese and Mike force troops lost their lives in the battle, 35 of them within the camp's perimeter, while another 430 were wounded.

Lan put enemy casualties at 896 killed in ground actions and 472 killed by air strikes.

The U.S. command said that one American and one Australian adviser were killed in action and 11 Air Force personnel were killed on re-supply runs into the camp.