3
New Threats in the Highlands
history.army.mil/html/books/091/91-15-1/cmhPub_91-15-1.pdf
As October 1967 drew to a close, General Rosson’s most pressing concern
in the Central Highlands was the ominous sign of an offensive buildup by elements of the B3 Front. The news was not unexpected. Every year since 1965,
the B3 Front had launched a major attack at the beginning of the dry season
somewhere in western II Corps. The questions in Rosson’s mind were not if,
but where and when.4
The I Field Force commander believed that the most likely targets were the
CIDG camps and other installations in western Kontum and Pleiku Provinces
that were within easy reach of the enemy’s Cambodian base. Dak To stood
at the top of the list. Long-range patrols from the 4th Infantry Division and I
Field Force had detected enemy troops camped near the border. Helicopter2
First quote from Senior Ofcr Debriefing Rpt, Lt Gen William R. Peers, 23 Jun 69, p. 3.
Second quote from Interv, 4th Inf Div Historian with Lt Col John A. Smith, 16 Sep 68, p. 7.
MFR, MACV, 3 Dec 67, sub: MACV Commanders’ Conference, p. 4, Encl 4. All in Historians
files, CMH. 3
Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, vol. 2, pp. 376–77, 380–81; Luc
Loung Vu Nang Nhan Dan Tay Nguyen Nong Kong Chien Chong My Cuu Nouc [The People’s
Armed Forces of the Western Highlands During the War of National Salvation Against the
Americans] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1980), pp. 67–109 (hereafter cited as
People’s Armed Forces of the Western Highlands); Periodic Intel Rpt no. 32, I FFV, 6–12 Aug
67, 12 Aug 67, Historians files, CMH. 4
MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967, pp. 67–76.
149
Across the Central Highlands
mounted sniffer devices had detected signs of smoke released by campfires,
and OV–1 Mohawk aircraft from the 225th Surveillance Airplane Company
had also picked up those unseen fires using their infrared sensors.
More evidence came from I Field Force radio research units, which intercepted a series of transmissions coming from the 1st Division headquarters.
Using sophisticated decoding and triangulation techniques, and employing
aircraft crammed with detection gear, U.S. intelligence determined that the
messages had gone to the 24th Regiment, somewhere north of Dak To, and to
the 32d and 66th Regiments, somewhere to its west. There were also reports
that the 174th Regiment had taken up station in Laos no more than a day’s
march away.5
Rosson examined other possibilities, too. Recent information indicated
that the 33d Regiment was “planning an adventure in northwestern and
central Darlac,” news that had led General Peers to shift his 2d Brigade
down to Ban Me Thuot for the time being. He also had to consider a new
thrust toward Pleiku City. On 28 October, North Vietnamese gunners had
bombarded the city with forty-six 122-mm. rockets, the first time such
weapons had been used against the provincial capital. For Rosson, however, the weight of evidence pointed toward Dak To. Back in June, elements
of the 1st PAVN Division had fought a series of bloody battles with the
173d Airborne Brigade in the hills south of Dak To, nearly overrunning a
U.S. paratrooper company at one point. Now with dry weather settling in,
5
AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div, 3 Jan 68, pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH; Cdr’s
Analysis, Battle of Dak To, Maj Gen William R. Peers, 10 Nov 67, pp. 1–2, Historians files,
CMH; Periodic Intel Rpt no. 42, I FFV, 15–21 Oct 67, 21 Oct 67, p. 14, box 1, Periodic Intel
Rpts, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, I FFV, USARV, RG 472, NACP.
An OV–1B Mohawk surveillance aircraft equipped with a side-looking
airborne radar pod
Staying the Course
150
General Thao might be planning a similar operation but on a larger scale.
“More than ever,” Rosson wrote, the enemy “needs a dramatic tactical victory to buoy the morale of his troops and to convince the man in the village
of Communist invincibility.”6
The enemy had long regarded the northwestern part of Kontum
Province as a key strategic area in his plans for winning the war. The Dak
To Valley, which ran west-east from Laos into Kontum Province, offered
a natural invasion route for enemy forces. Featuring an old colonial road
named Route 512 that ran the length of the valley, the Dak To corridor
was one of the few places in western I Corps or II Corps that offered easy
cross-border movement. If the enemy won control of the Dak To Valley,
he would have a high-speed invasion route that could feed troops, supplies, and vehicles into the Central Highlands from depots on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. On a more defensive note, North Vietnamese leaders wanted
to prevent the allies from stockpiling enough supplies in the Dak To area
to support a cross-border incursion, should General Westmoreland get
the approval for such an operation. Finally, General Thao had specific
orders from the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense to wage a major
battle in the Dak To area in the autumn of 1967 in order to wipe out one
or more U.S. battalions, giving Hanoi a powerful propaganda victory that
6
Both quotes from Msg, Rosson NHT 1391 to Westmoreland, 9 Nov 1967, sub: Evaluation
and Assessment of Situation in II CTZ October 1967, p. 1, Historians files, CMH.
A map from a 4th Infantry Division after action report showing the layout of
the Dak To II base in early November 1967
151
Across the Central Highlands
could challenge Westmoreland’s claims of progress and strike a blow at
American morale (see Map 14).7
Allied defenses in the Dak To area consisted of three military camps and
half a dozen firebases that lined Route 512 on the northern side of the valley.
The first of those military camps, Dak To I, was a battalion-size facility
located just west of Tan Canh, itself garrisoned by a South Vietnamese battalion from the 42d Regiment. Dating back to the early 1960s, Dak To I had a
small airstrip that could accommodate helicopters and observation aircraft.
Three kilometers farther to the west was a newer and larger facility called
Dak To II whose airfield could handle C–130 aircraft. Fourteen kilometers
to the west was the Ben Het Special Forces camp, where U.S. engineers were
building a new firebase that would soon house 175-mm. batteries from the
52d Artillery Group capable of hitting targets across the border. South of
Route 512, a narrow horizontal plain led to a series of high mountain ridges
and narrow valleys that generally ran from north to south. Some of those
valleys wound their way to the Cambodian border, giving the enemy several
routes to the Dak To battlefield.8
General Peers began strengthening the Dak To bases on 28 October 1967.
He replaced the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mechanized), currently defending
the valley, while troops from the 299th Engineer Battalion improved Route
512 between Tan Canh and Ben Het, with straight-leg infantry units from the
1st Brigade that were more capable of fighting in the hills. Lt. Col. John P.
Vollmer’s 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, arrived at Dak To airfield on a flight of
C–130s. Another flight delivered the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, commanded
by Lt. Col. Glen D. Belnap, the next day. The brigade commander, Col.
Richard H. Johnson, likewise established a forward headquarters at Dak To.
General Rosson further reinforced him with the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry,
from the 173d Airborne Brigade, airlifted from the Tuy Hoa airfield in Phu
Yen Province. Johnson settled the paratroopers into Ben Het. A trio of batteries from the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, rounded out Johnson’s force.9
The Battle Begins, 2–6 November
The allies gained an unexpected windfall on 2 November when Sgt. Vu
Huong from the 66th Regiment turned himself in to a small government out7
Senior Gen Chu Huy Man, Thoi Soi Dong [Time of Upheaval] (Hanoi: People’s Army
Publishing House, 2004), p. 464 (hereafter cited as Time of Upheaval). 8
AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div, pp. 4, 56, 65–67, Encl 2. The information on Ben Het
is in Interv, George L. MacGarrigle with Lt Gen William B. Rosson, 13 Sep 77, Historians files,
CMH. 9
AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div, p. 1, Encl 2; Periodic Intel Rpt no. 51, I FFV, 17–23
Dec 67, 23 Dec 67, an. C-3, box 1, Periodic Intel Rpts, Asst Ch of Staff , G–2, I FFV, USARV,
RG 472, NACP; Interv, MacGarrigle with Rosson, 13 Sep 1977; Msg, Rosson NHT 1334 to
Westmoreland, 28 Oct 67, Historians files, CMH; Hay, Tactical and Material Innovations, pp.
78–96; John A. Cash et al., Seven Firefights in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief
of Military History, 1989), pp. 85–108.
Staying the Course
152
post north of Dak To. Huong, a member of a reconnaissance team that had
been scouting the terrain around Dak To, had overheard one of his officers
saying that the 66th and 32d Regiments were spread out south and west of
Dak To along with a battalion from the 40th Artillery Regiment. The remainder of the artillery unit and the 24th Regiment were apparently north of Dak
To, as was the 174th Regiment. According to Huong, the attack was to have
taken place on 28 October, timed to coincide with the rocket attack on Pleiku
City, but the commander of the 1st Division, General An, had pushed back
the date because his artillerymen at Dak To were not ready.10
Allied interrogators questioned his story. How, they wondered, could a
mere sergeant know so much about the plans of the 1st Division? Was he part
of a ploy to mislead the allies? However, the details he provided fit well with
what the Americans already knew or suspected. Peers and Rosson decided
that Huong was telling the truth: the B3 Front was preparing a division-size
attack on Dak To, hoping to engage U.S. forces on rugged, forest-covered
terrain that negated some of the Americans’ advantages in firepower and
helicopter mobility.11
Hoping to preempt the artillery barrage that Huong had predicted, Peers
ordered Colonel Johnson to send his infantry into action. The 1st Brigade
commander directed Colonel Belnap and his 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, to
investigate the long series of peaks known as “Rocket Ridge,” a favorite
North Vietnamese launching site, that lay to the south of Dak To I. Johnson
instructed Colonel Vollmer and his 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, to search a
smaller cluster of peaks to the west of Rocket Ridge known as Ngok Dorlang.
At I Field Force headquarters, General Rosson alerted the 173d Airborne
Brigade headquarters in Phu Yen Province to be ready to join its 4th
Battalion, 503d Infantry, at Ben Het. When those reinforcements arrived,
the 173d Airborne Brigade would move into the Dak Klong Valley, south of
Ben Het, where Sergeant Huong said that his own unit, the 66th Regiment,
was located. General Vinh Loc agreed to place South Vietnamese troops to
the north of Dak To in case the 24th Regiment made its appearance. U.S.
Special Forces units and long-range reconnaissance patrols from I Field
Force would screen the area west of Ben Het. Four squadrons of F–100 Super
Sabre fighter-bombers, flying from Phu Cat airfield in the lowlands west of
Qui Nhon, remained on call for tactical air support.12
Colonel Johnson’s infantry soon confirmed that enemy soldiers were
on both principal ridgelines to the south of Dak To. On the morning of 3
November, helicopters flew two companies from the 3d Battalion, 12th
Infantry, seven kilometers south to Rocket Ridge, landing them about 1,500
meters to the south of Hill 1338, an observation point that offered sweeping
views of the Dak To Valley. As Colonel Vollmer’s men set out for the peak,
10 Periodic Intel Rpt no. 44, I FFV, 29 Oct–4 Nov 67, 4 Nov 67, an. C-1, pp. 1–2, box 1,
Periodic Intel Rpts, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, I FFV, USARV, RG 472, NACP. 11 Ibid.; Interv, MacGarrigle with Rosson, 20 Sep 77, Historians files, CMH.
12 This section is based on AAR, Battle of Dak To, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, 9 Dec 67, pp. 5, 7–8,
10, Encl 6 to AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div.
1
PAVN
X X
66
PAVN
III
32
PAVN
III
174(-)
PAVN
III
24
PAVN
III
PAVN
40 31
I I
3 8
I I 3 12
I I
4 503
I I
1 4
X
Dak Poko
Dak
Poko
Dak Psi
a D
H
k
do
ar
i
BEN HET
DAK TO 2
DAK TO 1
TAN CANH
Hill 1049
Hill 1338
Hill 823
Hill 875
512
512
512
511
511
613
613
14
14
Dak Ri Peng
Polei Lang Lo Kram
Dak Wang Kram
Dien Binh
Kon Hojao
S O U T H V I E T N A M L A O S
S O U T H V I E T N A M C A M B O D I A
L A O S C A M B O D I A
BAT TLE FOR DAK TO
PHASE ONE
2–6 November 1967
Fire ght
Enemy Axis of Attack
Ground Assault
Air Assault
Military Installation
0
0 5 Kilometers
Miles 5
0 300 800 1400 and Above
ELEVATION IN METERS
Map 14
Staying the Course
154
scanning the area for rocket or mortar positions as they climbed, heavy fire
erupted from camouflaged bunkers farther up the slope. The soldiers from
the 3d Battalion had no way of maneuvering around the bunkers that blocked
the trail ahead, and found them impossible to knock out with grenades. After
losing four killed, Colonel Vollmer pulled his companies back so air and
artillery strikes could go to work. The North Vietnamese defenders endured
several hours of punishment, including a bombing sortie that hit them with
twenty-four 1,000-pound bombs equipped with delayed-action fuses, before
they finally withdrew from their bunkers.
An examination of the partially destroyed bunkers showed Vollmer and
his men why they had been so hard to knock out. Each fighting position was
crowned on the top and sides by thick mahogany logs harvested from the
surrounding forest, making them impervious to anything less than a direct
hit from a bomb or artillery shell. It would have taken the North Vietnamese
several days to build such bunkers, using only handsaws to carve through the
iron-hard wood. The enemy had clearly come for a long fight.
At the same time that Colonel Vollmer’s troops landed on Rocket Ridge,
Colonel Belnap touched down on the eastern end of Ngok Dorlang with two
companies from his 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry. Belnap’s plan was to sweep
west across Hills 882, 843, and 785, before reaching his final objective, Hill
724, some three kilometers away. Meanwhile, a third company from his battalion traveled by helicopter from Dak To to a spur of Rocket Ridge, Hill
1001, four kilometers to the north of where Belnap was positioned. The site
Men of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, establish an
outpost on Rocket Ridge.
155
Across the Central Highlands
known as Firebase 6 became operational later that day when the howitzer
battery attached to the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, flew to the site and readied
its weapons to support the two infantry companies across the valley.
As evening approached, Belnap’s men received intermittent sniper fire
from the surrounding woods. Pushing west, the two companies flushed
out and killed eight North Vietnamese soldiers. Four soldiers from the 3d
Battalion, 8th Infantry, also lost their lives that day. The two companies
made their night encampment on Hill 882, the tallest point on Ngok Dorlang,
and some two kilometers west of Hill 724.13
The fighting on Rocket Ridge and Ngok Dorlang appeared to confirm
Sergeant Huong’s story. On 4 November, Peers informed Rosson that the
threat was credible enough to justify the deployment of additional troops
from the 173d Airborne Brigade. The I Field Force commander agreed. The
next day, Rosson made arrangements to fly the 1st and 2d Battalions from
the 173d Airborne Brigade, most of its artillery and its brigade staff, from
Phu Yen to Dak To. The brigade’s 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry, which had
just arrived in South Vietnam, stayed behind to protect Phu Yen’s rice harvest. Rosson provided additional support through a steady apportionment of
B–52 strikes. Soon the high-altitude bombers were hitting areas to the south
and west of Dak To that Sergeant Huong said might contain staging areas for
the 1st PAVN Division.
Two days later, Brig. Gen. Leo H. Schweiter established his 173d Airborne
Brigade command post at Ben Het, reporting to General Peers. Schweiter, who
had seen action at Normandy and Bastogne during World War II and who had
later fought in Korea, had gone on to command the 5th Special Forces Group
before coming to Vietnam in August 1967 to lead the 173d Airborne Brigade.
At the direction of General Peers, Schweiter ordered the commander of his 1st
Battalion, 503d Infantry, Lt. Col. David J. Schumacher, to secure Ben Het, and
the commander of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, Maj. James R. Steverson, to
take over the defenses at Dak To I and II. That allowed Colonel Johnson’s 1st
Brigade to focus on Rocket Ridge and Ngok Dorlang, and permitted General
Schweiter to use his remaining unit, the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, for a
sweep of the Dak Klong Valley, which lay due south of Ben Het.
Schweiter directed the commander of the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry,
Lt. Col. James H. Johnson, to march three of his companies south about
seven kilometers to secure Hill 823 at the mouth of the Dak Klong Valley.
There, near the outer range of the artillery batteries firing from Ben Het,
helicopters would deliver Company B with tools and materials to build a
new firebase, followed by a battery of 105-mm. howitzers, to support further
advances into the valley.
Colonel Johnson’s three companies set out that morning, marching along
parallel routes to sweep the area between Ben Het and Hill 823. The colonel
monitored his troops from a helicopter. Company D, consisting of three platoons plus a platoon of Montagnards from Ben Het, reached an intermediary
hill called Ngok Kom Leat just before noon. When one of the soldiers spotted
13 AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div, p. 9.
Staying the Course
156
communications wire snaking up the
slope, Johnson instructed Company D
to investigate. Cautiously, the soldiers
and the accompanying platoon of
Montagnards headed up Hill 823.
Finding fresh footprints and
human waste halfway up the hill,
Company D formed a defensive circle
in a small clearing. The squad of
Americans who crept out to search
the neighboring area ran into North
Vietnamese soldiers almost immediately. Both sides opened fire; the
patrol returned to the perimeter with
the enemy hot on their heels. The skirmish turned into a full-blown firefight
with North Vietnamese soldiers closing on the U.S. position from several
directions. Colonel Johnson ordered
Companies A and C to join the fight
as soon as possible, while he called in
air and artillery strikes to defend the
beleaguered unit.
With those supporting fires,
Company D held the enemy at bay until
Company A arrived several hours later. As it arrived, the North Vietnamese
attackers melted away. The casualty roll in Company D totaled four killed
and more than a dozen wounded. Company C, which had been delayed by
enemy snipers, reached the hill the next morning. After searching the hill,
finding twenty-eight enemy dead, the three companies from the 4th Battalion,
503d Infantry, resumed their march toward Hill 823 where Company B was
fighting its own battle.14
The previous afternoon, Colonel Johnson had decided to land Company
B on Hill 823 to establish a firebase that could help his other men on Ngok
Kom Leat. Company B touched down on Hill 823 at around 1430, following
a day-long bombardment that cleared away the dense foliage on its summit
and killed any North Vietnamese hiding there. The soldiers from Company
B found discarded rucksacks and newly smashed rifle stocks on the summit,
but no bodies. After posting several two-man listening teams farther down
the hill, the remaining soldiers began digging foxholes and hacking at undergrowth to improve their fields of fire.15
14 AAR, Battle of Dak To, 6 Nov 67, 173d Abn Bde, n.d., pp. 1–4, Historians files, CMH.
For more on the 6 November battles, see Cash et al., Seven Firefights in Vietnam, pp. 85–108. 15 AAR, Battle of Dak To, 6 Nov 67, 173d Abn Bde, pp. 15–16; and AAR, Battle of Dak To,
Inf action on 6–8 Nov 67, Co B, 4th Bn, 503d Inf, Encl 2; AAR, Battle of Dak To, 1st Bde, 4th
Inf Div, pp. 8–10.
General Schweiter
(shown as a major general)
157
Across the Central Highlands
The enemy appeared thirty minutes later, moving up the slope along a
broad front while spraying the U.S. positions with AK47 assault rifles and
RPD light machine guns. The initial burst of fire killed two Americans manning a listening post; five more of their comrades also died when they rushed
down the hill to help their buddies. The remainder of Company B dove into
foxholes and bomb craters around the summit and returned fire. Within minutes, howitzers from Ben Het began to pound the lower slopes, while a flight
of fighter-bombers circled above, waiting for a chance to drop their ordnance.
Colonel Johnson had no good way of reinforcing his soldiers before nightfall. The other companies from his 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, were already
committed to the fight at Ngok Kom Leat several kilometers to the north.
Even if he had other troops, hostile fire would surely damage or destroy any
helicopters that tried to land on the summit of Hill 823. Likewise, it was
too risky to land troops onto the valley floor at the base of the hill without
knowing the strength and disposition of the enemy. Company B had to hold
the hill until morning.
The fight raged throughout the afternoon and continued into the night.
Enemy soldiers crawled close enough to the American foxholes to hurl grenades; the men from Company B threw some back before they exploded, as
well as some of their own grenades. The single U.S. mortar crew on Hill 823
lobbed shells at the enemy from the bottom of a large crater, their 81-mm.
tube pointing nearly straight up as they brought fire to within one hundred
meters of the U.S. perimeter. An AC–47 fixed-wing gunship circled the hill
Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade, check
their bearings during a search for enemy positions.
Staying the Course
158
throughout the night, dropping illumination flares and firing its six-barreled
machine guns at the enemy-held woods on the lower slope. North Vietnamese
fire slackened and then ceased shortly before dawn on the seventh. The
morning roll call for Company B revealed that sixteen of its soldiers had been
killed and more than twice that number wounded.
The enemy’s retreat from Hill 823 permitted Colonel Johnson to finally
bring in more troops. Helicopters delivered a company from the 1st Battalion,
503d Infantry, which joined Company B from Johnson’s own 4th Battalion
as it searched the bomb-scarred slopes. Patrols located eighty-nine enemy
corpses and a large abandoned camp at the base of the hill. Documents recovered from the scene revealed that the dead belonged to the 66th Regiment,
confirming the presence of 1st Division units in the Dak Klong Valley. With
sizable North Vietnamese units also on Ngok Dorlang and Rocket Ridge to
the east, the unfolding battle was shaping up to be the biggest clash in the
highlands since the enemy had tried to overrun the Duc Co Special Forces
camp in western Pleiku Province six months earlier.16
The Allied Counteroffensive, 7–15 November
The quiet that returned in the Dak Klong Valley on the seventh gave
General Peers an opportunity to move the headquarters and support elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade from Ben Het to the older Dak To
airfield just west of Tan Canh. Despite being farther from the Dak Klong
Valley, Dak To I was more spacious, had a larger stock of supplies, and
was less vulnerable to attack or temporary road closures on Route 512
(Map 15).17
Using the intelligence his men had gathered during the last few days,
Peers formally divided the battlefield south of Route 512 into two operational
zones. The eastern zone belonging to Colonel Johnson’s 1st Brigade stretched
from Highway 14 and the Dak Hodrai River, encompassing both Rocket
Ridge and Ngok Dorlang, where the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, and the 3d
Battalion, 12th Infantry, were currently looking for the 32d Regiment and the
31st Battalion of the 40th Artillery Regiment. The western zone between the
Dak Hodrai River and the Cambodian border went to General Schweiter’s
173d Airborne Brigade, which continued its search for the 66th Regiment in
the Dak Klong Valley. The 174th Regiment from General An’s 1st Division
had yet to make an appearance.18
General Peers also had to consider the independent 24th Regiment,
last reported somewhere to the north of Dak To. To prevent the North
Vietnamese unit from disrupting the allied supply channel on Highway 1,
16 AAR, Battle of Dak To, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, 9 Dec 67, pp. 2, 7; AAR, Battle of Dak To,
4th Inf Div, p. 16; AAR, Battle of Dak To, 6 Nov 67, 173d Abn Bde, 10 Dec 67, p. 12. 17 AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div, pp. 9–10.
18 Cover Ltr, Maj Gen William R. Peers to AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div, and pp. 9–10;
and Cdr’s Analysis, Battle of Dak To, Peers, 10 Nov 67, pp. 66–68.
1
PAVN
X X
66
PAVN
III 32
PAVN
III
174(-)
PAVN
III
24
PAVN
III
PAVN
40 31
I I
3 8
I I
1 4
X
3 12
I I
4 503
I I
173
X
2 503
I I
1 503
I I
ARVN
9
I I
1 8
I I
Dak Poko
Dak Poko
Dak Psi
a D k Hod ar i
BEN HET
DAK TO 2
DAK TO 1
TAN CANH
Hill 1049
Hill 1338
Hill 823
Hill 875
512
512
512
511
511
613
613
14
14
Dak Ri Peng
Polei Lang Lo Kram
Dak Wang Kram
Dien Binh
Kon Hojao
S O U T H V I E T N A M L A O S
S O U T H V I E T N A M C A M B O D I A
L A O S C A M B O D I A
BAT TLE FOR DAK TO
PHASE TWO
7–12 November 1967
Fire ght
Ground Assault
Air Assault
Military Installation
0 300 800 1400 and Above
ELEVATION IN METERS
0
0 5 Kilometers
Miles 5
Map 15
Staying the Course
160
General Loc borrowed the South Vietnamese 9th Airborne Battalion from
the Joint General Reserve. U.S. aircraft flew the paratroopers from Saigon
to Dak To, where they passed to the command of the South Vietnamese 24th
Tactical Zone headquarters based at Kontum City. Arriving on the seventh,
the paratroopers joined the South Vietnamese 1st Battalion, 42d Regiment,
at Tan Canh for Operation Le Loi 45 in the hills northeast of Dak To.19
While the 173d Airborne Brigade and South Vietnamese forces completed
their movements on 7 November, Col. Richard Johnson’s 1st Brigade continued to search the hills south of Dak To. On the ninth, Colonel Vollmer’s 3d
Battalion, 12th Infantry, discovered an enemy bunker complex on the lower
slopes of Hill 1338. Mindful of the costly battle his men had fought three
days earlier, Vollmer waited several hours, while air and artillery softened
the target. His men took the position as well as a second bunker line farther
up the hill the next day. The engagements cost the North Vietnamese at least
twenty-five dead and the Americans seven killed. Behind the second line
of bunkers, Vollmer’s men found an abandoned mortar pit that was large
enough to accommodate a 120-mm. mortar, a weapon with sufficient range
to hit the Dak To bases.20
As three companies from the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, fought their way
toward Hill 1338, Companies A and D from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry,
continued their westward progress across Ngok Dorlang. As they headed
toward Hill 724, Company B remained at Firebase 6 on Hill 1001, five kilometers to the northeast, to defend the battalion’s howitzer battery.
Colonel Belnap’s two companies received intermittent sniper fire from
the front and either side as they descended the western spur of Hill 843, a low
ridge that pointed toward Hill 724 about 1,500 meters away. The column of
platoons moved cautiously as squads to the front and the flanks searched the
adjoining woods. Companies A and D stopped that afternoon at the base of
the spur, 700 meters away from their objective.
The Americans had just started to scratch out foxholes and fill sandbags when the enemy attacked. Mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades
exploded in the trees and on the ground as several hundred North Vietnamese
attacked down the slope that led to Hill 843. Belnap’s men held their line, killing two flamethrower-equipped North Vietnamese soldiers before they could
employ their weapons. Colonel Belnap called in artillery and air strikes, which
relieved some of the pressure. After several hours of combat, the enemy withdrew at 2030. Eleven American soldiers had been killed and another thirty-eight
wounded in the vicious assault. The enemy had also sustained heavy casualties,
leaving behind 230 dead, 37 rifles, and 38 crew-served weapons. A wounded
North Vietnamese soldier captured the next morning said that the attackers
belonged to the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, which had been marching to a
new location when it had spotted the Americans and decided to give battle.21
19 AAR, Battle of Dak To, 4th Inf Div, pp. 9–10.
20 AAR, Battle of Dak To, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div, p. 10.
21 Ibid., p. 9; Periodic Intel Rpt no. 45, I FFV, 5–11 Nov 67, 11 Nov 67, p. 3, box 1, Periodic
Intel Rpts, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, I FFV, USARV, RG 472, NACP.
161
Across the Central Highlands
Colonel Belnap kept his battered units in place the next day as helicopters flew
out their casualties and delivered supplies. The following morning, 9 November,
he moved Company A back to Firebase 6, and flew in Companies B and C from
the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry. The pair of companies stayed there on the western
spur of Hill 843 with Company D, while air and artillery strikes pounded Hill
724, a bombardment that continued for the next two days. Meanwhile, General
Peers airlifted the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, from Darlac Province to the Dak
To II base where it could reinforce Belnap’s battalion, if necessary.
On the morning of 11 November, Colonel Belnap sent his soldiers up the
hill. The Americans encountered no resistance, finding only bomb craters
and smashed trees at the top. Just as the final group of soldiers reached the
summit, however, a mass of North Vietnamese troops emerged from the
trees on the northern and western slopes of Hill 724. The enemy unleashed
a torrent of bullets, killing several Americans who manned the outer listening screen. The surviving scouts ran up the hill, while their comrades at the
summit laid down covering fire. North Vietnamese troops climbed to within
twenty meters of the perimeter, a ragged arc of bomb craters, fallen logs, and
broken stumps, before Belnap’s men stopped their advance.
The fighting raged for the next eight hours as the North Vietnamese
attempted to breach the U.S. line on the northwest slope. As the day wore
on, however, the torrent of bombs, napalm canisters, and artillery shells that
hit the enemy’s staging areas began to tell. The assaults became less frequent
and intense, and finally stopped as darkness gathered. The men from the 3d
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