Beans and Bullets for Sea Lords
On 2 November 1968, U. S. Navy river patrol boats (PBR) moved to Rach Gia, a small coastal town on the Gulf of Thailand, about 120 miles southwest of Saigon. Here is the western edge of the low, canal-laced lands of the Mekong Delta. By road, it was inaccessible to the major support areas. It was supportable by sea, however, and had the advantage of being the location of a Vietnamese Navy (VNN) junk repair base. When the U. S. PBR sailors moved in with the VNN, the initial accommodations for the Americans were miserable, consisting of shanty huts, tents, and whatever could be "cumshawed." C-rations were the main staple for those who-did not care to share the Vietnamese diet. This diet, though definitely not up to the same sanitary standards the U. S. sailors were used to, was quite good in the coastal towns where fish, shrimp, crabs, and crayfish were abundant.
About 22 miles northwest, at Ha Tien, the situation was similar. Ha Tien was the jumping offpoint for Operation Foul Deck, later called Operation Than Hung Dao, in honor of the patron saint of the VNN. East of Ha Tien was the winding Rach Giang Thanh River and the narrow Vinh Te Canal, which led to the city of Chau Doc on the Bassac River. At Chau Doc, the river was deep enough for a repair, berthing, and messing barge (YRBM) or landing ship, tank (LST) But, at Ha Tien, the shallow coastal waters prohibited such a station ship from mooring close enough to provide continuous support. Initially, the forces there included only U. S. Nary inshore patrol craft (PCF), better known as "Swift" boats, and VNN junks. The PCFs operated from the support base at An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island, 19 miles southwest of Ha Tien. The junk crews and their U. S. Navy advisors stayed at Ha Tien. The Nary advisors generally stayed with a U. S. Army advisor team at their small compound. They also pitched tents on top of a small three-story hotel in Ha Tien for several months. On this perch they slept, cooked, and guarded their position with machine guns at the corners of the building. Their supplies (C-rations, ammunition, and fuel) were brought in from An Thoi by the PCFs en route to raids and interdiction operations upriver.
Meanwhile, another operation had begun almost concurrently, and it absorbed most of the attention of the combat support forces at the time. Operation Giant Slingshot, which began on 6 December 1968, presented" Giant" logistic problems. To appreciate these problems, one must understand that logistic transportation and common item support in IV Corps tactical zone is controlled by the U. S. Army, and that service, though co-operative, could not be sufficiently responsive to Navy operational logistic needs. In any event, the areas where naval bases were required were remote from support areas, and, in some cases, totally inaccessible by road. Where roads did exist, they were of poor quality, and through Viet Cong controlled areas. The whole operating area consisted of swamps, thick plains of elephant grass, and jungles of nipa palm. There was intense heat and, in season, monsoon rains.
Large support ships, such as LSTs and light cargo ships (AKL), could go only to the lower reaches of the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay rivers. Beyond this point, there were low bridges across the rivers, and only small boats, such as landing craft, medium (LCM), could transit 30 to 40 miles of winding river. In addition, the dense foliation along the river banks made excellent areas for an ambush.
A new basing system was required for this type of warfare. Ben Luc, where Highway 4 crosses the Vam Co Dong, was planned as the major support base, and small advance bases were to be built upriver as satellites of Ben Luc. These were called advance tactical support bases (ATSB). Sites close to existing Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) or U. S. Special Forces compounds were used, to take advantage of the security from attack they would provide. An ATSB was to be a small, quickly-constructed unit, which could provide basic berthing and messing facilities, and operational support. Each was designed to support a 10-boat, 65-man, PBR division augmented by up-to-six river assault craft. Two types of bases were planned-one to be constructed all on shore where land was available; and a floating base built on pontoons in swampy areas. In some cases, a combination of limited land and pontoons was used. ATSB Tuyen Nhom and Tra Cu were the first shore sites. The Moc Hoa and Ben Keo ATSBs were primarily built on pontoons, with some facilities ashore. ATSB Go Dau Ha was built on filled land and supplemented with pontoons.
Ammi pontoons, compartmented steel barges equipped with coupling devices and built with a special design for strength and durability, were used. These pontoons were towed to the site with construction materials on board. There, Seabees joined them into a base complex and built the facilities in about six months. The hollow Pontoons were also used for storage of fuel and water. In order to provide protection against mortar attack a specially constructed pontoon, called a "Turtle Ammi," was developed. This had steel girders supporting steel matting covered with several layers of sandbags. Other defensive measures included installation of machine gun pintles, barbed wire, and concertina barricades on adjoining land areas, use of claymore mines and trip flares, and installation of acoustic and magnetic sensors, and radar to detect approaching personnel. Protection against mining and swimmer attack was provided by boats using chain drags and periodic detonation of concussion grenades. The bases were manned by about 20 men.
Go Dau Ha is a small town on the Vam Co Dong River approximately 14 miles northwest of Saigon, where a bridge crosses the river to accommodate Route One between Saigon and Phnom Penh, Cambodia. It is about three miles from the Cambodian border. Seven miles south is the village of Hiep Hoa. The river between Hiep Hoa and Go Dau Ha became known as "Blood Allev." Because it was along this stretch of muddy water that the most ambushes and firefights occurred.
The only site available at Go Dau Ha was a swampy area adjacent to the bridge on the west side of the river and it had to be filled in. Permission to use it had to be obtained from the Vietnamese Provincial authorities and the Ruff-Puff (RF/PF or regional/provincial forces) Bridge Security Force camped near the bridge. Co-ordination with the U. S. Army's 25th Infantry Division also in that area had to be obtained. Boats were temporarily stationed at Hiep Hoa, at the site of an abandoned sugar mill, and U. S. Army engineers began filling in the small land area at Go Dau Ha.
On 29 December 1968, a four-truck Navy convoy made the run from Saigon to Hiep Hoa carrying tents, bunker materials, field mess equipment, and food to the sailors at Hiep Hoa, demonstrating that overland resupply was feasible. Shortly thereafter, however, a decision was made to move from Hiep Hoa to the yet-to-be-completed ASTB Go Dau Ha, because of enemy ground probes and sentiment of the Hiep Hoa population toward the VC.
It was here that the "ammi" Pontoon proved its worth. Six of these giant pontoons were towed upriver, through Blood Alley to Go Dau Ha, laden with supplies and tents. These pontoons were moored on the east bank of the river, and a temporary base was erected on them. The standard of living began to go up as generators, reefers, electric stoves, and a liberal supply of steaks were brought in by truck, helicopter, and also boats.
In March of 1969, the fill at Go Dau Ha was completed and the Seabees began constructing "sea huts" and facilities ashore. Bunkers were built next to the sea huts to use during mortar attacks. Chain link fence and concertina wire sprang up around the base. Machine gun emplacements and a watch tower were erected. Ammi pontoons were used to supplement the land area, and the mess hall and galley were built on them.
ATSB Go Dau Ha suffered rocker and mortar attacks, ground probes, sniper fire, and minings, but each attack was repulsed by the fire of the base and the boats stationed there. And, as lessons were learned, the defenses were strengthened. Stand-off rocket fences were built beyond the perimeter to pre-detonate incoming rounds. A large chain link fence was erected along the north side of the bridge to prevent a Honda-mounted sapper from dropping a satchel charge on the base as he crossed the bridge. Trip flares and claymore mines were also installed. And, the Viet Cong found that the Nary had come to stay.
A fleet of six ammi pontoons with tents arrived to supplement the base in July 1969, followed by the first of over 100 boats deployed to that area for Operation Double Shift. Go Dau Ha became the staging area for ATSB Ben Keo, located ten miles north, in the defense of Tay Ninh City against a major VC-North Vietnamese army (NVA) attack. This rapid concentration of boats, plus the ability to mobilize the required support instantaneously, demonstrated the flexibility of the riverine forces and the expertise which they had acquired in six months. Army and Navy forces were working closely together in interdicting enemy infiltration routes. The large U. S. Army base at Cu Chi, east of Go Dau Ha began regular resupply runs to the proven naval forces at both Go Dau Ha and Ben Keo.
In July 1969, the major support base at Ben Luc was officially commissioned as the first combined U. S.-Vietnamese Support Activity. This marked a major advance in the Vietnamization program.
The VNN, long dependent on the ARVN for support. and having no organic support themselves, began to develop this capability with the commissioning of Ben Luc. They were ready to demonstrate their willingness to support remote operations when plans for Operation Seafloat in the Ca Mau Peninsula, were being made in late May 1969. The object of Operation Seafloat was to put a combined U. S. Navy-VNN base in the most remote river of Vietnam. All of the expertise developed in Giant Slingshot support operations was brought to bear to build this base.
The base at Song Ong Doc 12 miles north of Seafloat was a further refinement of the now expert combat support provided to riverine forces. No longer did the boats deploy with little or no support. At Song Ong Doc, the support facilities went with them.
As the fall of t969 approached, the VC/NVA primary threat shifted back to the western side of the Delta. Because of the many lessons learned in the Vam Co Dong area on the eastern side, and the fact that ATSB facilities were already manned and had been designed for Rach Gia and Ha Tien, it was an easy matter to move in supplies and equipment to complete the building of these two sites. More PCF, PBR, and armored boats were deployed to that area. The completion of these two sites provided a complete network of operating bases throughout the Mekong Delta. Boats could be deployed freely along any of the rivers and canals with the assurance that support was nearby.
The Vietnam War has been one of logistics, and Operation Sea Lords made a big dent in "Charlie's knapsack." The combat support forces, by providing the beans and bullets for Sea Lords, made this accomplishment possible.
Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)
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