Chiến dịch Wayne Grey là một chiến dịch được thực hiện bởi lữ đoàn 1, Sư đoàn Bộ binh 4 Mỹ và các lực lượng hỗ trợ, từ ngày 1 tháng 3 đến ngày 14 tháng 4 năm 1969. Mục tiêu chính của chiến dịch là cắt đứt các tuyến liên lạc và cung cấp cho các Trung đoàn Bộ binh 24 và 66 của Quân đội Nhân dân Việt Nam (PAVN) cũng như ngăn chặn họ rút lui vào Campuchia.

Mở đầu

Các tài liệu bị bắt giữ và các cuộc thẩm vấn đối với tù binh đã tiết lộ rằng vào cuối tháng Giêng đến đầu tháng Hai, Trung đoàn 66 và Trung đoàn 24 và các đơn vị của đoàn Pháo binh 40 thuộc CSBV đã di chuyển về phía bắc vào khu vực núi Chu-Mom-Ray và đã bắt đầu thực hiện các hoạt động tấn công. Trinh sát trên không đối với các căn cứ ở phía tây Trại Polei Kleng đã phát hiện ra lưu lượng xe cộ dày đặc và việc xây dựng các con đường sâu vào các núi Chu-Mom-Ray và từ biên giới Campuchia vào thung lũng Plei Trap phía đông. Việc xác nhận sự hiện diện của pháo binh và khả năng có các đơn vị thiết giáp của địch cho thấy một cuộc tấn công lớn đang được lập kế hoạch và có khả năng cao nhắm vào thị xã kontum và trại Polei Kleng.

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Chiến dịch Wayne Grey bắt đầu vào ngày 1 tháng 3, khi đại đội (đ.đ.) A của Tiểu đoàn 3, Trung đoàn 12 Bộ binh từ Polei Mrong đã được trực thăng đổ xuống bãi đáp hay LZ Swinger (14.429°N 107.627°E). Mục tiêu của họ là bảo vệ LZ và thiết lập một vị trí pháo để đặt súng. Vị trí này sẽ được dùng để hỗ trợ các TĐ 3/12, 1/8 và 3/8 Bộ binh khi họ thực hiện các hoạt động ở Plei Trap. Trực thăng đầu tiên đã hạ cánh và đổ quân một cách an toàn. Sau khi trực thăng thứ hai bắt đầu đổ quân, họ đã bị tấn công bởi đặc công từ TĐ công binh K25B của Quân đội Nhân dân Việt Nam. Cuộc giao tranh ban đầu kéo dài hơn ba giờ trước khi quân csbv rút lui và đơn vị thuộc 1/92 Pháo binh Dã chiến đã có thể đáp xuống và thiết lập các khẩu pháo của họ. Đại đội B của 1/8 đã tấn công vào căn cứ hỏa lực (CCHL) 20 (14.492°N 107.597°E) và đại đội C của 3/8 tấn công vào Firebase Pause (14.36°N 107.655°E), sau đó là các Công ty A và C của Trung đoàn 6/29. Trung đoàn 6/29 hiện đã vào vị trí để hỗ trợ cuộc lùng sục của Lữ đoàn 1 tại Plei Trap. Vào ngày 2 tháng 3, Công ty A, 1/8 đã giành được LZ Turkey (14.474°N 107.598°E) và bắt đầu các hoạt động do thám, trong khi các Công ty C và D, 1/8 tấn công vào LZ Susan (14.49°N 107.54°E). Các công ty còn lại từ 3/8 đã được triển khai tại các LZ ở và quanh LZ Mary (14.386°N 107.578°E).

Giai đoạn I

Các hoạt động dọc theo đường Plei Trap được thực hiện bởi các Công ty A, C và D, Trung đoàn 1/8 Bộ binh. Bắt đầu từ ngày 1 tháng 3, với sự hỗ trợ của A/7-17th không kỵ, trung đoàn 1/8 đã có thể xác định và tiêu diệt các liên lạc, vật tư và phương tiện dọc theo đường Plei Trap, cũng như tái thu hồi hai khẩu lựu pháo M101 bị PAVN bắt giữ.

Trận đánh tại Khu đất Hạ cánh Brace là trận đánh lớn nhất và quan trọng nhất của chiến dịch. Nó bắt đầu vào ngày 3 tháng 3 khi Đại đội A, tiểu đoàn 3/8 Bộ binh, liên lạc với một tiểu đoàn quân PAVN tại tổng hành dinh của họ trên đỉnh một ngọn đồi (14.345°N 107.605°E). Đại đội A phải chịu nhiều thương vong trong trận đánh và buộc phải rút lui. Họ được rút ra vào ngày 4 tháng 3 sau những trận giao tranh ác liệt tại vị trí đêm của họ. Các Đại đội B và C, tiểu đoàn 3/8, đã thành công trong việc chiếm giữ ngọn đồi vào ngày 6 tháng 3.

Một firebase đã được xây dựng sau khi LZ, bây giờ được gọi là Brace, đã được bảo đảm và vào ngày 16 tháng 3, công ty C, 6/29 thuộc pháo binh đã được đặt tại đó cùng với phần còn lại của công ty A, 3/8 và tổng hành dinh 3/8.

OP Wayne Grey Di chuyển IIIOP Wayne Grey Di chuyển IIIOP Wayne Grey Di chuyển IVOP Wayne Grey Di chuyển IVĐồi 947 (14.337°N 107.604°E) đã được thành lập vào ngày 3 tháng 3 bởi công ty D, 3/8 bộ binh để chặn PAVN rút lui từ LZ Brace. Vị trí này đã bị tấn công nhiều lần giữa ngày 3 và ngày 8 tháng 3 cũng như phải đối mặt với các cuộc tấn công bằng cối và pháo binh liên tục. Công ty D đã thành công trong việc giữ ngọn đồi trước các cuộc tấn công của PAVN và đến chiều ngày 8 tháng 3, PAVN đã từ bỏ nỗ lực chiếm giữ vị trí này.Vào ngày 7 tháng 3, công ty D đã di chuyển qua đất liền đến Firebase 20 để hỗ trợ công ty B trong các cuộc tuần tra nhằm giúp một cuộc tuần tra tại đồi 1030. Các công ty A và C tiếp tục hoạt động dọc theo con đường Plei Trap.Giữa ngày 10 và 14 tháng 3, Lực lượng tác chiến Swift gồm các Công ty B và D, 3/12 cùng với một đại đội trinh sát, đã củng cố vị trí tại đồi 947. Vào ngày 11, Swift đã tiếp xúc với một công ty PAVN và rút về vòng ngoài để yêu cầu không kích B-52; họ lại tiếp tục bị bắn phá bằng đạn cối. Hôm sau, họ đã tấn công và chiếm giữ vị trí của PAVN.Vào ngày 17 tháng 3, các công ty A và C đã thành lập một căn cứ tuần tra mới từ Đồi 467 để tiến hành các cuộc tuần tra chung dọc theo các tuyến liên lạc của PAVN và ngăn chặn dòng chảy cung cấp cho pháo binh 40.[1][3]Giai đoạn IILực lượng tác chiến AlphaSau khi các công ty A và C đã xác định và tiêu diệt một lực lượng PAVN ở phía nam Đồi 467, họ đã tổ chức lại thành Lực lượng tác chiến Alpha vào ngày 17 tháng 3. Nhiệm vụ của họ là thiết lập các vị trí chặn có quy mô công ty giữa căn cứ của họ tại Đồi 467 và Firebase 20, với mục tiêu cắt đứt nguồn cung cấp và tăng viện của PAVN trong khu vực. Các thiết bị phá hủy cũng được sử dụng để làm tê liệt các hoạt động dọc theo con đường Plei Trap bằng cách biến nó thành không thể đi qua cho các phương tiện.Các hoạt động tiếp tục trong khu vực cho đến ngày 30 tháng 3, QLVNCH sử dụng súng cối và pháo binh chống lại các căn cứ hỏa lực của Sư Đoàn 4 trong khu vực và gửi truyền đơn tuyên truyền kêu gọi binh lính Hoa Kỳ đầu hàng. Lực lượng Đặc nhiệm Alpha được rút ra vào ngày 30 tháng 3. [1][3]

Núi Cu-Đôn

Cu-Don là một căn cứ nổi tiếng của QLVNCH nằm trên một sườn núi phía nam LZ Brace và bị nghi ngờ là điểm rút lui của Trung Đoàn 66 Bộ binh QLVNCH. Nhiệm vụ của Sư Đoàn 3/12 là ngăn chặn và quấy rối QLVNCH rút lui. Vào ngày 14 tháng 3, Đại đội A và C cùng với một trung đội trinh sát, tấn công vào LZ Cider (14,278°B 107,617°E) để bảo vệ nó làm căn cứ hỏa lực cho Khẩu đội B, pháo binh 6/29. Đại đội D bảo vệ LZ D-Handle (14,33°B 107,609°E) để đặt súng cối 4,2" và Đại đội B di chuyển trên đường bộ đến một căn cứ tuần tra tại YA818856 (14,328°B 107,612°E). Liên lạc mạnh mẽ được thực hiện vào ngày 18 tháng 3 khi Đại Đội D tiếp xúc với một tổ hợp boongke của QLVNCH. Liên lạc đã bị phá vỡ và pháo binh cùng cối đã được gọi đến. Ngày hôm sau, vị trí bị bao vây bởi hỏa lực pháo binh và máy bay chiến đấu cả ngày. Vào ngày 20, Đại đội D đã cố gắng tấn công các hầm hào với sự hỗ trợ của pháo binh và không quân, nhưng đã bị lực lượng phòng thủ đánh bật. Đại đội D đã phải rút về LZ D-Handle. Vào ngày 22, sau một đợt pháo kích mạnh, Đại đội D đã chiếm lấy đồi mà không gặp phải sự phản kháng nào. Vào ngày 27, Đại đội A đã có liên lạc gần LZ Cider và đã buộc phải ngắt liên lạc sau khi bị bắn cối và chịu thương vong. Họ buộc phải để lại những người bị thương của mình. Khi họ cố gắng lấy lại những người mất tích vào ngày hôm sau, họ lại bị buộc phải rút lui về LZ Cider dưới hỏa lực cối. Đại đội B đã bị tấn công tại địa điểm phục kích của họ bằng tên lửa B-40 và Đại đội D ở LZ D-Handle đã bị các đơn vị công binh tấn công, những người đã phá hủy hai hầm hào bằng hỏa lực tên lửa; cuộc tấn công cuối cùng đã bị đánh bạt bằng hỏa lực pháo binh.Vào ngày 30, Công ty A lại cố gắng tìm kiếm những người mất tích của mình. Họ đã thành công, nhưng buộc phải rút lui một lần nữa khi quân PAVN triển khai pháo cối. Công ty A rút lui và liên kết với Công ty C để đảm bảo một một vị trí an toàn cho đêm. Vị trí này sau đó đã bị đánh bom bởi nhiều cuộc không kích của B-52.Sau khi tiểu đoàn 3/12 rút lui, Tiểu đoàn 1, Trung đoàn Bộ binh 22 đã bị tấn công tại LZ Cider và YA806827 (14.302°N 107.601°E) vào ngày 2 tháng 4. Mục tiêu của họ là đảm bảo "Mục tiêu Đỏ", tổ hợp hầm mà đã buộc Công ty A, 3/12 phải rút lui. Vị trí này đã bị bao vây bởi các đợt pháo binh và hỏa lực từ máy bay trực thăng trong khi 1/22 tiếp tục trinh sát mục tiêu dưới hỏa lực mạnh. Tiểu đoàn 1/22 đã được rút về vào ngày 13 tháng 4 và phần còn lại của tiểu đoàn 3/12 vào ngày 14 tháng 4.

Hậu quảChiến dịch Wayne Grey kết thúc vào ngày 14 tháng 4. Liên đoàn 1, Sư đoàn 4 đã gây thiệt hại nặng nề cho các Trung đoàn Bộ binh 24 và 66 của PAVN và các đơn vị hỗ trợ của họ. Mặc dù PAVN đã có thể rút lui về Campuchia, chiến dịch Wayne Grey được coi là một thành công vì nó ngăn chặn được bất kỳ cuộc tấn công nào ngay lập tức vào Kontum.Vị trí của pháo bị bắt giữTheo các nhân chứng của cuộc tấn công, cụ thể là Trung úy Nolan và Đại úy Yamashita, họ tin rằng nhiệm vụ đã diễn ra ở bên kia biên giới tại Campuchia chứ không phải ở Việt Nam như báo cáo hành động sau và tọa độ bản đồ đã chỉ ra.

Họ giải thích rằng các người lính thuộc Công ty D không được cung cấp tọa độ của vùng hạ cánh hay bản đồ thông thường, mà thay vào đó là những bản đồ địa hình đen trắng cần phải có đào tạo sâu rộng để đọc. Điều này cộng với việc Công ty D phải bay lâu hơn nhiều so với thời gian bình thường cho một chuyến bay với quãng đường đó và có sự khác biệt đáng kể về địa hình, bản đồ cho biết họ đang ở trên một ngọn đồi khi thực tế thì không phải như vậy, tất cả những điều này làm một phần tăng thêm sự nghi ngờ của Nolan và Yamashita. Tám ngày sau khi Công ty D tái chiếm các khẩu pháo và khoảng giữa cuộc chiến, Bộ Tư Lệnh Không Quân Chiến Lược Hoa Kỳ bắt đầu chiến dịch ném bom bí mật chống lại Campuchia.

Tài liệu tham khảoHale, Knight (30 tháng 4, 1969). "Báo cáo Hành động Sau Chiến đấu cho Chiến dịch Wayne Grey" (PDF). ivydragoons.org. Truy cập ngày 30 tháng 8, 2020.Thompson, Lee. "Một Cuộc Chiến Trên Thung Lũng Plei Trap". bravecannons.org/. Truy cập ngày 31 tháng 8, 2020.Nolan, J.L. (1–31 tháng 3, 1969). "Đại đội 4, Công ty D, Tiểu đoàn 1, Trung đoàn Bộ binh 8, D Division, Việt Nam, tháng 11 năm 1968 – tháng 8 năm 1969 J. L. Nolan". swampfox.info. Truy cập ngày 30 tháng 8, 2020.Fisher, Dan. "30 Năm Sau: Một Bí Ẩn Việt Nam". members.tripod.com. Truy cập ngày 30 tháng 8, 2020.Hickey, Pennel (14 tháng 3, 1969). "Báo cáo Hành động Sau Chiến đấu" (PDF). ivydragoons.org. Truy cập ngày 25 tháng 8, 2020.

 

The Battle at Khe Gio Bridge Location Coordinates: 164656N 1065415E (YD029563) by Don Wittenberger Copyright © 1999, All Rights Reserved The U.S. Army outpost at Khe Gio Bridge on Highway 9 near the DMZ was overrun by North Vietnamese troops on 12 March 1970. Of the 14 Americans who fought in this battle, 2 were killed, 5 wounded, and 1 captured. The ARVN garrison had 6 dead and 9 wounded. The NVA lost about 40 men. From a tactical perspective, the attackers neither damaged the bridge nor dislodged the garrison. But the enemy’s real objective was to inflict American casualties, in the hope of hastening the U.S. withdrawal already underway in northern I Corps, and in pursuit of an overall strategy to win the war in America’s living rooms. To this end, the NVA would accept high relative losses. In another context, the U.S. losses comprised 9% of the 33 Americans killed in Vietnam this day. The enemy profited more, without cost, from the loss of 14 men of the 25th Infantry Division in a non-hostile helicopter accident later in the day. But every loss devastated the families and communities back home and increased the cumulative effect on the U.S. populace, which was growing tired of losing sons. The enemy’s plan was to sneak into the perimeter, pin down the defenders with rocket and mortar fire, and kill them in the bunkers with grenades and explosives. The strength of the assaulting force was in the range of 150 to 400 troops. For the 11 U.S. survivors, 4 of whom would have died if a squad leader had not sacrificed himself to save them from a grenade, it was a terrifying experience. The U.S. casualties were: 2d Lt. Gary Bernard Scull, 30, Advance Team 3, MACV, from Harlan, Iowa, assistant advisor to the 2/2 ARVN Regiment, who by a stroke of incredible bad luck arrived at the bridge only a few hours before it was attacked. He had been in Vietnam since November 1969. Sgt. Mitchell William Stout, 20, C Battery, 1/44 Artillery, from Lenoir City, Tennessee, who was five weeks into his second Vietnam tour, having served previously with 1st Platoon, B/2/47 (Mech), 9th Infantry Division. Sp/4 Terry Lee Moser, 21, also of C/1/44, from Barto, Pennsylvania (a suburb of Philadelphia), who had been in Vietnam nine months and undoubtedly was looking forward to going home. Except for Lt. Scull, the U.S. personnel were from 1/44, an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) battalion attached to 108th Artillery Group and headquartered at 3rd Marine Division’s large base (pop. 30,000) near the village of Dong Ha on Highway 1 north of Quang Tri City. Lt. Col. Richard L. Myers and Capt. Douglas Mehle were the commanding officers of 1/44 and C Battery, respectively. After Khe Sanh was deactivated in 1967, Highway 9 beyond Camp Carroll was kept open to support operations in northwestern I Corps. Khe Gio Bridge, about 20 miles west of Dong Ha, one of 49 bridges on this road, was guarded by two dusters from C/1/44, a searchlight from G/29 (a 1/44 line battery), and 40 or so men of the 2/2 ARVN Regiment. Getting there wasn’t easy because the road went through rugged country, had to be swept for mines, and was subject to ambushes. I made this trip on 28 Sept 1969 and 5 April 1970 riding with a couple tons of ammunition and watching artillery rounds impacting along the road ahead of us. To protect the bridge, the weapons and camp had to abut the road, which followed the low topography through the hilly terrain, giving the high ground advantage to the enemy. Wooded ridges concealed their advance, provided mortar positions looking down on the target, and masked the line-of-sight fire from our dusters. The living quarters occupied a small compound on a hill above a road-cut through a ridge. Vehicles could get up there by a short access road. On the opposite side, an easy slope fell to the river which could be waded nearly everywhere. The defenses consisted of a “cow fence” and apron with limited concertina and some trip flares in the wire. I felt the place was exposed, and have been reminded of it every time I’ve seen the movie "Apocalypse Now". The duster was a powerful weapon. It could fire 240 explosive rounds per minutes to an effective range of 2,000 yards, and unlike field artillery, could rapidly shift fires to engage moving targets. Although obsolete as anti-aircraft weaponry, and not needed in Vietnam for air defense, it was ideal for smashing ground attacks, thus in demand for protecting truck convoys and small firebases such as Khe Gio Bridge. Duster crews had plenty of confidence in their weapon, and the men at the bridge expected the dusters to deter attacks. The weather in early March was scorching and humid with dense fog at night. During the night of March 7, artillery at Quang Tri shot aerial flares to mark a flight path for a medevac mission up north near Gio Linh; the night of March 12 was foggy again, and the NVA columns approaching the bridge were aided by poor visibility. They walked into the camp, reached occupied structures, and were climbing through windows and doors when our guys awoke and began shooting from their bunks. Back at Dong Ha, I was in the radio shack with RTO John Goss when Khe Gio’s perimeter exploded and he received the first distress calls from the bridge. The frantic voice, heavy explosions, and stuttering gunfire mingled with radio static are forever etched in my memory. The time was 1:30 a.m., and nobody at battalion headquarters would get any more sleep that night. The NVA had set up a dozen or more rocket pads and mortar tubes in the surrounding hills, and when the firing began inside the camp, they laid a barrage which killed many of their own men but also pinned the defenders inside the bunkers. A letter I wrote later that day, after hearing four survivors tell their story, states “the rain of shells was so heavy no one could go outside without being killed instantly.” Sgt. Stout, in a bunker down by the road with Jimmy Silva and Robert E. Foster of C/1/44 and Richard E. Dunn and John H. Laughridge of G/29, picked up an enemy grenade and carried it outside where it exploded at the same time a mortar round landed nearby. He died instantly, but this act spared the four other men, who all survived the war and made it home. Moser was killed by a mortar burst during this intense bombardment as he sprinted across open ground for a duster. There were two dusters at the bridge, but an RPG destroyed one before it could be manned. The other got into action after the incoming fire slackened but one of its guns jammed immediately. So the battle was fought with only one of the four 40mm Bofors guns counted on for the defense of the camp. The crew fired until the barrel burned out, which probably didn’t take very long, because with NVA running everywhere and mortars firing from numerous emplacements, it’s a safe bet they were slamming shells into their only gun as fast as they could and firing automatic. During the night, Headquarters Battery was assembled and 50 men were recruited for a reaction force. We were 104 enlisted strength at the time, and all stepped forward. Venturing into pitch darkness to confront enemy forces of unknown strength is nobody’s idea of a good time, but we’d go wherever our guys were in trouble, it’s real basic. The reaction force got ready but never left Dong Ha because the embattled survivors saved themselves. With both dusters out of action, the camp could no longer be defended, so the C/1/44 men shot their way out and fled to Camp Carroll two miles away. Some escaped on a deuce-and-a-half, whose driver had been hit and slumped unconscious over the wheel upon getting there. Someone drove the duster through the camp under fire picking up wounded, then crashed the perimeter at Camp Carroll, where the vehicle was seen in the morning draped with barbed wire. The battle had lasted three hours, and the enemy hurried off the battlefield leaving some of their dead, as they wanted to get away before daylight brought jets and gunships. An officer’s daily log entry by Major David W. Wagner, the S-3, identifies the dusters in the battle as C-122 and C-142. The destroyed duster probably was C-122, which is recorded in unit records as a “total loss,” so the fighting duster (and the one reaching Camp Carroll) must have been C-142, which was booked as “salvage” and used for parts. An ARVN company with U.S. advisers who reached the camp at 0700 searched in vain for signs of Lt. Scull. A detail from Dong Ha arriving at 0845 reported finding “enemy 14 KIA and still counting.” My letter states they recovered 17 NVA bodies and estimated from drag marks that 40 enemy troops died inside the perimeter. This number is based on statements made to me by witnesses. I’ve heard claims, then and recently, that ARVNs had shot at Americans; but when the battlefield was seen in daylight, ARVN and NVA bodies were found on top of each other, indicating they had fought to the death in hand-to-hand struggles. The camp itself was a shambles and had to be completely rebuilt. I visited Khe Gio Bridge again three weeks after the battle. It was considerably beefed up with more wire, especially concertina, overhead cover for gun pits, and two replacement dusters. The tenants were understandably nervous, but this was locking the barn after the horse is gone. The NVA did not risk impulsive attacks; they spent weeks or months planning and rehearsing this type of operation. At that moment, Khe Gio Bridge probably was the safest place in I Corps. We eventually turned it over to the ARVNs, who ran like hell, and the NVA recorded their deed without a fight. You can go there as a tourist now, but Highway 9 is still primitive and infrequently traveled. The wartime bridge and camp are gone. I don’t know if there is any trace of the battle, but I’m tempted to wonder whether ghosts of the 48 people who died there return on dark, foggy nights. The survivors who returned to Dong Ha on March 12 thought Lt. Scull was killed in the fight, but an ARVN officer reported his bunker was hit and on fire, and he was led away by NVA soldiers. U.S. intelligence analysts concluded that a report by a former NVA officer in December 1974 about a U.S. POW he saw in June 1971 matched Lt. Scull’s disappearance in terms of description and incident. Nothing else has been learned of his fate. On October 16, 1978, the U.S. Government changed Lt. Scull’s status from “missing” to “died while missing” and upgraded his rank to Major, as was always done for MIAs to maximize government benefits to their families. He is survived by his mother and sister. A memorial web site and photo may be seen at http://geckocountry.com/scull.htm Rumors started circulating at 1/44 headquarters before the sun had set on the day of battle that Sgt. Stout would be recommended for the Medal of Honor. Lt. Col. Myers signed the paperwork, and Jack Stout and Faye Thomas went to Blair House on July 17, 1974, during the last days of the Nixon Administration, to accept their son's medal from Vice President Ford. Jack Stout donated it in 1991 to the National Medal of Honor Museum, where it is on permanent display. Buddy White, a childhood friend, organized a fundraising drive and Mitch's home town built a hero's monument over his grave. A major building at Fort Bliss is named for him, along with the I-75 bridge across the Tennessee River and the Mitchell W. Stout Medal of Honor Memorial Golf Tournament, an annual event in Lenoir City. He also is survived by two sisters. A memorial web page may be seen at https://members.tripod.com/~msg_fisher/moh.html I am seeking information about Sp/4 Terry Moser. I'm proud to have served in 1/44 with the men who fought at Khe Gio Bridge and other battles in the Vietnam War's most honored artillery battalion. My time with them shaped my character and life. Sources and acknowledgements: The author served with HHB/1/44 as the intelligence and operations clerk and other duties as assigned from April 1969 to May 1970. The author's letter of March 12, 1970 describing the battle is a primary source of material for this article; a copy has been donated to the National Medal of Honor Museum. The author was a newspaper reporter before the war and for the last 25 years has been a lawyer residing in Seattle, Washington. The following individuals cooperated in providing information, photographs, and contacts: Gary Puro of the National Dusters, Quads, and Searchlights Association; Ed Hooper of the Tennessee Star Journal and National Medal of Honor Museum; the Harlan (Iowa) Tribune News, Col. Dave Althoff (USAF, retired), Harold "Doc" Peterson (2/47 Mech, 9th Infantry Division), M/Sgt Danny L. Fisher (USA, Retired), John Goss (HHB/1/44), Ben Johnson and Windell Crowell (C/1/44) (military ranks are given where known). I sincerely apologize if I inadvertently left anyone out. Research of this story is an ongoing project and anyone knowing the names of battle participants, possessing photographs of the camp and battle area, or any information about the battle is encouraged to contact the author at dwitt@ctr.net Copyright © 1999, All Rights Reserved Brief excerpts may be quoted for non-profit educational, scholarly, or historical purposes. Any commercial use of this material without written permission is prohibited. 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Battle Memories: 1st Bn, 8th Infantry & A Btry, 6/29 FA Near Pleiku, South Vietnam 18 - 23 May 1967 by Raymond A. Harton LTC, FA, Retired Preface:  The 1/8th Infantry Battalion and A Btry 6/29th Artillery were part of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division during Operation "Francis Marion". The mission was: Search and Destroy.         The Infantry Battalion and A 6/29th airlifted into position just West of Duc Co at coordinates YA 790239 on 13 May 67. The artillery (Commanded by Cpt. McCreight) hurriedly prepared their firing position and prepared to support the infantry. The FSB was initially secured by C Company 1/8th Infantry. The infantry companies A & B continued their normal sweeping and patrolling action with little contact.                      This is my analysis as to what took place during the period 18-23 May 1967. The general scenario is related in the book, 4th Infantry Division, Vietnam, on pages 96-100. The artillery was placed on restrictive firing. No recon by fire missions were authorized unless personnel we're in contact. I told my Forward Observers that if they were in contact that I would give them all the support they required. Early in the afternoon of 18 May 67 the FO told me and the FDO (Lt. Dlugosz) that they were in contact. I authorized firing the artillery. The Infantry had a platoon that was receiving fire. I went with the Infantry Battalion Commander (Ltc. Gannon (MUSTANG)) in his C&C chopper to monitor the battle and assist in any way possible. The FO had A Btry 6/29th firing for him, while I had C 5/16th (Cpt. Meek) firing for me. Other artillery and air assisted in fire support.         An Infantry platoon (4th platoon, B Company) had got ambushed and were pinned down. I placed blocking fires to the west of the pinned down platoon (C 5/16th 155mm howitzers). This went on for quite a while. Suddenly MUSTANG (BN CO) tapped me on the shoulder and told me they (the platoon) wanted the artillery on top of them. I said "Are you sure that is what they want?". He said "YES" put it on top of them. I immediately made a correction for C 5/16th and fired many rounds of 155 mm artillery on top of the platoon. Ltc. Gannon made the decision. I made the correction and ordered the firing. In the meantime, the Bn S-2 with personnel of the Bn formed a Company Minus and they were dropped in by chopper to try and find the platoon. At darkness, MUSTANG and I went back to the TOC (Tactical Operation Center of the Battalion). Around 9 p.m., MUSTANG told the Company Minus to secure for the night and told them to start at first light in the morning. We got the Company Minus's coordinates and I got the did hit data from C 5/16th. After checking the two plots, I can remember telling Mustang that if they went so many mils in that direction that they would find the platoon. I recall this vividly because MUSTANG said "That is Artillery talk (mils), put it in Infantry talk". I converted the mils to degrees. The platoon was only 500-600 meters from the Company Minus. The Company Minus pushed out at first light and found the platoon shortly after they started. They found 8 people left alive. They had been stripped of their valuables, weapons etc.         On 19 May 67,we regrouped and MUSTANG stayed on the ground with the troops that evening (forward CP). I declined to stay on the ground because I would not be able to get up in the air to assist if trouble began again. We fired many DEFCONS (defensive concentrations) and H&I"s (harrassing & interdiction fires) for the people on the ground throughout the night.         The following morning, I took the C&C chopper with some replacements into the area. Mustang called me enroute and told me not to shut it down. I was to take a passenger to the hospital. When they set the stetcher in the chopper,the BN S-2 looked up at me and said "What the f--- happened? I told him I did not know. (It seems like he had been sitting on his helmet briefing his troops,when a large limb came down and landed on his head. Got hurt pretty bad. I was told that they evacuated him to the states for surgery.). While laying on the stretcher in the chopper enroute to the aid station I asked him what the conditions were like where the platoon was at. He told me he could not see how people got out of there alive. The artillery had cut everything to shreds. After bringing the S-2 to the aid station I returned to pick up MUSTANG and we went back to the TOC.         The Infantry set up their perimeters and security and the artillery prepared their DEFCON's. About dusk the sh-t hit the fan. On 20 May 67, MUSTANG and I flew for 20 hours. The only time we were not in the air was when we ran from one chopper to another chopper. There was always another one waiting with radio's,food etc. During the evening and early morning hours A Btry fired continuous fire. Lt. Dlugosz (FDO) called me a couple of times. Once he told me his tubes were getting hot. I asked him if he could put his hands on them. He said "Barely". I told him that they were not hot enough and to continue to fire. What made it worse is that all the firing was "DANGER CLOSE" (Less than 100 meters from the troops). In one instance,I asked Lt. Schoeck, one of the FO's on the ground if he was sure he wanted that correction. He said "Yes". I told him "get in your holes" (The next morning he showed me his back which had shrapnel burns through his clothes).                      Another time Lt. Dlugosz (the FDO) called me and told me he was running low on ammunition. I told him to call the S-4 (Cpt. Borders). He told me the S-4 could not get any birds (choppers). I also called the S-4 and he told me he could not get any birds. I told him he better sh-t some birds. A few minutes later he called me and told me he had four birds on the way with some passengers. The 6/29th had gathered up cooks, mechanics and anyone else around and flew them into the firebase to help with the ammo etc.         During the period 18-23 May 67 A Btry 6/29th fired 8300 rounds of 105mm rounds in support of the operation. C Btry 5/16th fired 1845 rounds of 155 mm rounds. B Btry 6/14th fired 1794 rounds of 8 inch and 690 rounds of 175mm rounds in support of this operattion. In addition 57 air sorties were utilized in this operation (18-26 May 67). On 23 May 67, a decision was made to pull the 1/8th Infantry and A 6/29th from the field. All the preparations were made. Control of the fire base was passed on and we went to bed early for a change. Suddenly we heard thump-thump of mortar rounds coming in. Lt Dlugosz said "Are those good guys or bad guys"?. We hustled out of our tent into the TOC.I called my counterpart, who had taken control of the security and asked him if he was going to fire or should we fire. He told me he had a patrol out but didn't know exactly where it was. I told him "You better fire or I will". I gave the Firing Battery clearance to fire and told them to fire vt fuze with a zero time setting and to fire at such and such an elevation and azimuth. The mortar firing stopped. Lt. Dlugosz and I had both saw the light from the mortars being fired. That woke up the patrol and the rest of the night passed without incident. The following morning the 1/8th Infantry and A Btry 6/29th artillery retired from the field. We became the palace guard for a short time in order to lick our wounds and get replacements.         During this operation the 6/29th lost one man, SGT Leland Thompson. He was acting as the observer for the platoon that was ambushed. Others were wounded. The 1/8th infantry lost 45 KIA and 96 WIA. Enemy body count was 157 KIA. The 1/8th Infantry had three "Medal of Honor" recipients during this operation. Platoon Sgt Bruce Grandstaff, Staff Sgt Frankie Molnar and PFC Leslie Bellrichard. Sgt Thompson received the Silvar Star. Unfortunately all these awards were posthumously.         These memories are based on my recollection of the events. No attempt was made to corelate them with the actions of the 1/8th Infantry.These events have stayed with me for the past 33 years.I think you might understand why some nights I wake up in the IA DRANG valley. Raymond A Harton, LTC, FA, Retired Artillery Liaison Officer with 1/8 Infantry Photos were provided by Cpt. McCreight, A Btry, 6/29th Arty Return to Stories of Vietnam [ Our Regimental History ] [ Our Separate Unit Histories ] [ Our Memorial Tribute of Honor to Fallen Comrades ] [ He Was My Friend, And, I Remember... ] [ Our Vietnam War POW-MIA Pages ] [ Our Korean War POW-MIA Pages ] [ Our Medal of Honor Tribute ] [ Individual Combat Awards ] [ Individual Service Awards ] [ Our Email Listings ] [ Our Postal Listings ] [ Message Archives ] [ Related Links ] [ Favorite Links ] [ Acknowledgements ] [ Our Site Awards ] [ About the Webmaster ] [ Sign Our Guestbook ] [ View Our Guestbook ] [ Discussion/Message Board ] [ Our Member's Personal Home Pages ] [ Stories of WWII ] [ Stories of Vietnam ] [ Stories of the Gulf War ] [ WW I Photo's ] [ WW II Photo's ] [ Vietnam Photo's ] [ Gulf War Photo's ] [ Bosnia Photo's ] [ Peacetime Photo's ] [ Our Supplemental Web Site Pages ] [ Awards We Give ] [ Master Site Index ]

                                       LUẬT ĐI ĐƯỜNG Ở CALI 

  Bệnh xơ cứng teo cơ, được biết đến với tên gọi ALS, là một bệnh về hệ thần kinh ảnh hưởng đến các tế bào thần kinh trong não và tủy sống. ALS gây ra sự mất kiểm soát cơ bắp. Bệnh có xu hướng trở nên tồi tệ theo thời gian. ALS thường được gọi là bệnh Lou Gehrig theo tên cầu thủ bóng chày đã được chẩn đoán mắc bệnh này. Nguyên nhân chính xác của bệnh vẫn chưa được biết rõ. Một số ít trường hợp là di truyền. ALS thường bắt đầu với sự co giật và yếu cơ ở một cánh tay hoặc chân, khó khăn trong việc nuốt hoặc nói ngọng. Cuối cùng, ALS ảnh hưởng đến khả năng kiểm soát các cơ cần thiết để di chuyển, nói chuyện, ăn và thở. Hiện chưa có thuốc chữa cho căn bệnh chết người này.

Các triệu chứng

Các triệu chứng của ALS khác nhau từ người này sang người khác. Các triệu chứng phụ thuộc vào những tế bào thần kinh nào bị ảnh hưởng. ALS thường bắt đầu với tình trạng yếu cơ, ngày càng lan rộng và trở nên tồi tệ theo thời gian. Các triệu chứng có thể bao gồm: Gặp khó khăn khi đi lại hoặc thực hiện các hoạt động hàng ngày thông thường. Hay vấp và ngã. Yếu ở chân, bàn chân hoặc mắt cá chân. Yếu hoặc vụng về ở tay. Nói lắp hoặc gặp khó khăn khi nuốt. Yếu kém liên quan đến chuột rút cơ và co giật ở cánh tay, vai và lưỡi. Khóc, cười hoặc ngáp không đúng lúc. Thay đổi trong suy nghĩ hoặc hành vi.

ALS thường bắt đầu ở tay, chân, cánh tay hoặc chân. Sau đó, nó lan rộng đến các phần khác của cơ thể. Các cơ bắp trở nên yếu đi khi nhiều tế bào thần kinh chết đi. Điều này cuối cùng ảnh hưởng đến việc nhai, nuốt, nói và thở. Thông thường không có cảm giác đau trong giai đoạn đầu của ALS. Đau cũng không phổ biến trong các giai đoạn muộn hơn. ALS thường không ảnh hưởng đến khả năng kiểm soát bàng quang. Nó cũng thường không ảnh hưởng đến các giác quan, bao gồm khả năng nếm, ngửi, chạm và nghe.

 Greetings all,

Here is a Vietnam war era incountry made P.R.U patch from my collection.This particular unit operated around Quang Tri and the Ben Hai river,which was an important landmark in the partition of the country into a northern and a southern zone along the 17th parallel by the Geneva Accords of 1954. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two parts extended about 5 kilometers (3.1 mi) from either side of the river. Many of the P.R.U's in this area were led by American Marine advisors,possibly because of the large USMC presence in the northern section of South Vietnam.I can only imagine these tough little units saw alot of action so close to North Vietnam.

The P.R.U's (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit)were a CIA sponsored "action arm" of the Phoenix Program.Contrary to popular opinion,the P.R.U's were not solely assassination teams.Although it sometimes proved unavoidable, killing a suspect was not the primary intention of PRU operations. Rather, in the words of John Mullins, an American PRU adviser, “prisoner snatches were key. You can’t get information out of a dead man.”

 

Here is some info that I gleaned from the Rand Organization:

Although PRU operations continued until the end of the war in 1975, their greatest level of activity occurred during 1967–1972.Operating in all of South Vietnam’s provinces, and never numbering more than 5,000 men, the PRUs were in essence an intelligence-driven police force—better trained, equipped, and paid than the South Vietnamese National Police, and with a highly specialized mission, to be sure, but a police force nonetheless. To help ensure that individuals were not targeted for personal or narrowly political reasons, multiple sources of information were required before an operation could be launched.
Units served in their native provinces, giving them a depth of knowledge about local conditions unmatched by any other South Vietnamese government (let alone U.S.) forces. “Successful PRUs,” according to a CIA study, “developed [their] own sources of information, such as defectors, informants, and personal contacts in contested areas.” As American adviser John Walsh recalled, the PRU members “knew their territory intimately . . . . We advisors came to rely on their knowledge of who lived where and what their loyalties were.”
The Phoenix intelligence centers, the National Police, the Special Police Branch, and other agencies were supposed to provide the PRUs with intelligence, but the PRUs typically gathered, developed, and exploited their own intelligence. According to Andrew Finlayson, another American adviser, “seventy-five percent of the time, the PRUs did their own targeting: ‘This guy’s sister is pro-VC, he comes to the market and is buying way too much food,’ etc.”The PRUs had informants in nearly every village and hamlet, and they also relied heavily on family members and friends to provide information. This self-generated intelligence was of much higher quality than that provided by U.S. or Vietnamese agencies.
A typical PRU was made up of five 18-man teams, which were in turn broken down into smaller units for operations at the district level. To maximize the element of surprise, operations most often took place late at night or early in the morning. Operations were of relatively short duration, rarely lasting more than a few hours. Although the units were led by South Vietnamese, American advisers helped plan operations and typically accompanied PRUs in the field. U.S. involvement in planning and carrying out “snatch-and-grab” operations was invaluable. With American advisers accompanying their operations, PRUs had access to air support when they encountered heavy resistance. The ability of Americans to call in helicopters to quickly evacuate the wounded helped sustain PRU morale. Finally, direct participation in field operations helped American personnel gain a first-hand appreciation of strengths and weaknesses of the units they were advising. Although the PRUs obtained excellent intelligence, their American advisers exercised tight control, frequently rejecting proposed operations if they deemed intelligence inadequate.
Most PRU recruits had previous military experience, often in elite South Vietnamese military units, such as the Marines. Many had lost family members to VC violence, and revenge often served as a strong motivating factor.Thanks to the CIA’s largesse, members of the PRUs were well paid by Vietnamese standards, but it would be a mistake to characterize them as mercenaries, as some critics have: “Most were professional soldiers, they liked soldiering, and they were nationalistic. And they had scores to settle with the communists,” recalls Finlayson. Generous pay, specialized training from the CIA, and relatively low casualties contributed to high morale. Careful CIA control over the selection of PRU leaders helped ensure the generally high quality of unit commanders.
The PRUs’ American advisers also frequently had a military background. Indeed, until the late 1960s, most of the American advisers were serving military officers detailed to the CIA, which lacked the manpower to support what had become a nationwide program. Still, the number of advisers was small relative to the overall number of U.S. military and civilian personnel stationed in South Vietnam. As of May 1970, 102 U.S. military personnel and five civilians were advising the PRUs. Whether civilian or military, all PRU advisers fell under CIA operational control, with a chain of command extending down from the agency’s regional officer in charge and to the agency’s province officer, who oversaw PRU field operations.

 

 

Some info about the Phoenix "program":
In June 1967, in an effort to centralize and better coordinate anti-VCI operations, Ambassador Robert Komer, the director of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam’s (MACV’s) overall pacification program, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), won approval for a CIA plan to establish a program called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX), later known as Phoenix.
The central element of coordination was Vietnamese, as the Saigon government provided the bulk of the manpower. This program was known as Phung Hoang, named after a mythical Vietnamese bird somewhat similar to the phoenix. Phung Hoang was not an independent bureaucratic entity; rather, it was a structure of coordinating bodies composed of the numerous agencies involved in the anti-VCI campaign. Phung Hoang was created by decree in 1968, and by 1970, these coordinating committees were organized at the national, regional, and provincial levels.These committees included representatives from the National Police, the Special Police Branch, the National Police Field Force, the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, the RD cadre, the Military Security Service, the military intelligence and current operations staff (G2 and G3, respectively), the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), and others.
Most of the coordination under Phung Hoang took place at the provincial and district levels. At these levels, a somewhat more formal entity consisting of the Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (PIOCC) and the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) was created. These centers had (or were intended to have) a physical presence and a staff of detailed personnel—they were not merely committees that met occasionally. In addition, Province Interrogation Centers were established to provide a central location to question captured or surrendered VCI personnel, who were technically civilians.On the U.S. side, the advisory effort for Phung Hoang was the program actually named Phoenix. Phoenix was backed by two U.S. agencies: the CIA and MACV. Both provided funding and advisers to Phung Hoang, although they did so in different ways at different times.
CIA support for anti-VCI activities was most substantial in the early years of the Vietnam War. As the cost of the campaign increased, the agency’s ability to support it declined.CIA support to Phung Hoang thus tended to be concentrated at the PIOCC level, as even the large CIA country team based in Saigon simply did not have sufficient personnel to staff the hundreds of DIOCCs.MACV, in contrast, was well endowed with both personnel and resources. Phoenix activities fell under the aegis of MACV’s CORDS organization, and MACV therefore could draw on the thousands of American officers in Vietnam to staff the DIOCCs. By 1970, more than 700 advisers were serving in Phoenix, with military officers making up the majority of personnel.

For more info on the Phoenix Program here is a link to a well written PDF that can be saved to your computer:

 

 

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP258.pdf

A Vietnamese made P.R.U(Provincial Reconnaissance Unit) patch - ARMY AND USAAF - U.S. Militaria Forum

 Who Were the Tay Ninh PRU?

Bài của: Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, USMC (Ret.

On my second day, in a rela tively informal gathering, I would meet many of the mem bers of the 92-man Tay Ninh PRU that I would command and advise. I would find them to be brave and experienced troops. Some had military experience with the Cao Dai Army (a local militia that fought the Viet Minh), the South Vietnamese Airborne Division, or the Civil ian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), which had been com manded by US Special Forces. Most of the PRU’s troops were members of the Cao Dai religion, but a few were Roman Catholic, and even two or three ethnic Cambodians were assigned. All of them had a deep hatred for the Viet Cong, primarily because of atrocities committed against them and their families. Religion and family played large parts in their lives. The Tay Ninh PRU was divided into five 18-man teams (each team was broken further into three squads), one for each of the four districts in Tay Ninh Province and one for Tay Ninh City. The headquarters of the Tay Ninh PRU, which was collocated with the Tay Ninh City team, consisted of just two individuals, the commander and his opera tions officer. The commander of the city team also served as the Tay Ninh PRU’s deputy com mander. The PRU was armed with M16 rifles, M60 machine guns, 45-cal iber automatic pistols, and M79 grenade launchers; however, individuals also had a variety of other weapons they had acquired from disparate sources. The units also possessed PRC-25 radios, 7 by-50 binoculars, medical kits, 4 by-4 Toyota ¾-ton trucks, and Honda motorcycles. In garrison at their district headquarters, the men wore civilian clothes; in the field they wore tiger-stripe camouflage uniforms or black pajamas. The units’ US advisers were similarly outfitted and armed. In my first assessment of the Tay Ninh PRU’s operational capabili ties, I found that the teams func tioned well in most situations, but they lacked fire discipline. That is, the teams did not maneuver well under fire, and they were not proficient in calling for and adjusting supporting arms, generally artillery fire. Thus, the units did not perform well when they and the enemy met by chance or when the enemy was prepared for them. In part, this was a product of their training, which was unsystematic and erratic. Most PRU members were highly experienced combat veterans, who had survived many years in elite combat units before coming to the PRU, but a few had received only rudimentary field training or had served in noncombat units. At the national level, training took place from time to time at a camp near Vung Tau on the shore of the South China Sea; but at the local level, US commanders and advisers led training when operational lulls permitted. As a result, training was uneven and so was performance. The PRU’s strong suits lay in its intimate and complete knowl edge of the people and terrain of Tay Ninh Province. This knowl edge was central to their success in mounting operations against local VCI cadre and in compen sating for training shortcomings. This knowledge of the province led to a great ability to develop accurate intelligence on the VCI and to plan methodically. The members of the PRU also were masters in camouflage, conceal ment, and night movement. As a result they tended to rely heavily on surprise and ambush to achieve decisive results.

Sources of Intelligence

Thanks to the introduction of systems associated with CORDS, the Tay Ninh PRU in theory had a wide array of intelligence sources available to it. Every thing from local agent reports to national-level intelligence could in theory be funneled to them via the system of District Intelli gence and Operations Coordina tion Centers (DIOCCs). US military district advisers could channel operational leads to dis trict PRU units for exploitation. At the provincial level, the same organizational structure existed for coordination; however, at that level, the US PRU adviser filled the role US military advisers played at the district level. In practice, however, few opera tional leads were shared with the PRU for a host of reasons. Petty jealousies between the Vietnam ese National Police, the Vietnam ese Special Branch Police, and district chiefs often prevented the transmission of good operational leads to the PRU. This same problem existed on the American side, where US mili tary commanders and civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the Vietnamese for fear of compromise. Sadly, US civilian advisers were reluctant to share intelligence with the PRU even when they were specif ically directed to do so by the US Embassy in Saigon—and many of them even refused to share their intelligence with other US agen cies for fear of others getting a share of the credit. In theory, the DIOCC system should have worked well in developing operational leads, and on occasion it did. By and large, however, it did not function prop erly in Tay Ninh Province because of personal intransi gence and bureaucratic in-fight ing. The sources that were uniformly inaccurate were the agent reports developed by US military intelligence units. During the 10 months that I served as the PRU adviser, not a single agent report received by the PRU from the US military proved to be of value. Most agents were paid for their information in a piecework fash ion, and this led to the manufac ture of a large volume of worthless reports. Vietnamese National Police agent reports were equally worthless to the Tay Ninh PRU, and in some cases, dangerously inaccurate. National-level intelli gence sources were accurate but often did not pertain to VCI activities, so they were of little value to the PRU in rooting out the VCI in the province. Of moderate importance and value to the PRU were reports from the interrogation of prison ers by the Vietnamese Police Special Branch at the Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC). Many of the prisoners held at the PIC provided accurate and timely information on VCI personalities and activities. When this infor mation was shared with the PRU, which was rare, the results were usually highly successful. Of particular value were the many VC who rallied to the South Vietnamese government as part of the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) Program. These Hoi Chanhs (returnees) were screened after they surrendered to the South Vietnamese govern ment and then interrogated at the PIC, where they often volun teered to guide PRU teams into highly contested areas to cap ture VCI. Hoi Chanhs were usu ally far more reliable than other prisoners, although many VC guerrillas and North Vietnam Army (NVA) soldiers also pro vided useful information on VCI targets. Another source of intelligence that was often productive, but time consuming to exploit and difficult to process, was the vast store of data collected by Census Grievance teams during 1963–64. These teams conducted inter views in conjunction with a national census at that time. Their interviews led to the devel opment of maps of the province’s districts and villages that were color-coded to illustrate degrees of loyalty to the South Vietnam ese government. Green-colored houses were deemed loyal; yel low meant neutral; and red indi cated VC sympathy. In addition, these maps would often contain the names of fam ily members who were VCI mem bers or sympathetic to the communists. This storehouse of data was kept at the CIA villa in Tay Ninh City and reviewed peri odically by the US adviser for operational leads. In most cases, the information was dated or dif ficult to exploit because of the inaccessibility or the death or capture of the communist sympa thizer, but in some notable cases important mid-level VCI cadre were arrested or killed as a result of information on the Cen sus Grievance maps. Had these maps been digitized and the information contained in a readily accessible database, the time taken to absorb their infor mation probably would have been greatly reduced and many more operational leads developed. By far, the most prolific source of intelligence for the PRU was the PRU’s own intelligence system. The Tay Ninh PRU was forced to develop its own source of opera tional leads because of the afore mentioned reluctance of other agencies to share information on VCI targets. As natives of Tay Ninh Province the PRU mem bers had lived and worked in the province for most, if not all, of their lives. They were part of the fabric of the provincial society, and their families engaged in all kinds of commerce throughout the province. Through family contacts, PRU members developed an extensive intelligence system that success fully gathered accurate informa tion on the VCI at the hamlet and village level to map VCI activities. In many cases, the PRU members knew personally the VCI cadre they were hunt ing; indeed, many had known them since childhood. They knew the families of the VCI and the details of their personal lives. In some cases, the Tay Ninh PRU was actually successful in infil trating the VCI. This intimate knowledge of the VCI led to many highly accurate operational leads and the elimi nation of several important VCI cadres during my tour there. While I was the US adviser to the Tay Ninh PRU, approximately two-thirds of the VCI the PRU captured or killed were uncov ered by the intelligence devel oped by the PRU’s organic system. Operational Relationships While the PRU program was a national organization under CORDS on the American side and the Ministry of Interior on the Vietnamese side, it was much more a provincial “action arm.” By that I mean the operational direction and authority for any PRU came from the Vietnamese province chief, who was the only official who could sign an arrest order or operational order for the PRU. Thus, as the US PRU adviser in Tay Ninh, I could coordinate with Vietnamese and American mili tary units and plan operations, but I could not authorize them. To conduct any operation by the Tay Ninh PRU against a VCI tar get, I had to submit a written request for a signed authoriza tion from the province chief. Since the province chief and his key subordinates and US advis ers met almost daily, this requirement never really was an impediment to successful use of the PRU. Down the line, at the district level, Vietnamese dis trict chiefs could not use the PRU teams located there on missions without the approval of both the US PRU adviser and the prov ince chief. Even so, because the district coordination centers, the DIOCCs, were set up to rapidly process such operational requests, I saw no meaningful delays in approving PRU opera

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tions at the district level while I was there.

The Impact of the Changing Role of American Participation

I arrived at a time of shifting arrangements. Installed as a “commander” of the PRU in Sep tember, I became an “advisor after November 1969. Until then, “command” rested with the US military officers and senior noncommissioned officers assigned to the PRUs. This arrangement changed after November because General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, had become con cerned about perceived abuses in the Phoenix program and the effect allegations of abuse were having on support of the war in the United States. That month, he issued an order that changed the status of US military men assigned to the PRU from “commander” to “adviser.” He also stipulated that no American was to accompany PRU teams on operations in the field. This he did to avoid the possibility that US personnel might involve themselves in actions that could be construed as violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I was not privy to the rationale of Abrams or his staff in formu lating these restrictions, but I can say that during my assign ment in Tay Ninh, I never wit nessed and never even heard of a single operational act by either an American or a Vietnamese MACV’s policy [of keeping US commanders out of the field] devastated the PRU’s morale and effectiveness. PRU member that violated the code. The new policy devastated the morale and effectiveness of the men in Tay Ninh. The PRU relied heavily on the Americans who accompanied them on dan gerous missions to provide radio contact with US supporting units, especially medevac heli copters and artillery units. Without the prospect of Ameri cans by them, PRU members became reluctant to carry out missions into contested areas north and west of Tay Ninh City, such as War Zone C and the An Thanh-Cay Me border area with Cambodia. They knew if they got into difficulty, without Ameri cans they would be unable to receive prompt medical evacuation, supporting arms fire, or emergency extraction by US helicop ters. This was no small mat ter for the Tay Ninh PRU. Its teams operated in areas in which the North Vietnamese Army’s 5th, 7th, and 9th Divi sions operated. And, as lightly armed units, the PRU teams needed rapid US fire support if they engaged with NVA or VC main force units. ing to venture into contested areas. I admit that in some cases, my loyalty to the PRU and my understanding of leadership caused me to question MACV’s restrictions. I formally requested reconsideration of the policy but the request was denied. Why Were PRU Teams Successful in Destroying the VCI? While my experience in Tay Ninh does not necessarily represent the experience of other PRU advisers and their units, I can say confidently that the Tay Ninh PRU was successful during my tour. From September 1969 to June 1970, the Tay Ninh PRU After November 1969, it took several months and many hours of training before the Tay Ninh PRU members were again willing to venture into contested areas. I admit that some cases, my loyalty to the PRU and my understanding of leadership caused me to question MSCV's restrictions. I formally requested reconsideration of the policy but the request was denied.

Why were PRU Teams Successful in Destroying the VCI?

While my experience in Tay Ninh does not necessary represent the experience of other PRU advisers and the units, I say confidently that the Tay Ninh PRU was successful during my tour. From Sep 1969 to Jun 1970, the Tay Ninh PRU killed 31 VCI and captured 64— at a cost of only two PRU mem bers killed and two wounded. As early as December 1968, it was apparent to the Tay Ninh PRU that most of the senior VCI cadre had been either killed or captured in the months after Tet or had been driven into neighbor ing Cambodia. As a credible political threat, the VC had ceased to function in any meaningful way by the time I left Viet nam in June 1970.4 Further proof of the PRU’s effec tiveness came in 1975, when the communists finally defeated the South Vietnamese. The NVA commander occupying Tay Ninh Province would put in a hurried request to North Vietnam for 200 civilian political cadre. He reported that there were only six local VC cadre left in the prov ince to manage the province’s affairs. The Tay Ninh PRU was successful primarily because it was a locally recruited outfit whose members had an intimate knowledge of their province, its people, and the enemy. They also had discipline, strong leadership, and an intense personal motivation to defeat the VC. They had an accu rate and highly effective intelli gence system that was difficult for the enemy to infiltrate or

// (4) I obtained the information about the sta tus of the VCI in Tay Ninh Province after I left Vietnam from an interview with two former Tay Ninh PRU members who resettled in the United States in 1985//

defeat because it was based on strong family loyalties and reli gious and civic affiliations. The American commanders and advisers came and went and played important roles. But few served more than a year in any province. And as much as I (or I think any of my fellow PRU advisers) would like to find ways to take credit for the success of the PRU, I (and we) cannot. Long after the Americans left South Vietnam, the Tay Ninh PRU con tinued to root out the VCI. The concept may have been an Ameri can one, but the execution and adaptation were entirely Viet namese. After the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the lives of Tay Ninh PRU members changed dramatically for the worse. They were hunted down and arrested or killed. Many served long terms in reedu cation camps, where they were tortured and made to work under inhumane conditions. Some escaped the camps and made their way to the United States, where they were settled by the US government and given jobs. Most, however, were executed or died in squalid camps. A few never surrendered and contin ued to fight the Vietnamese com munists and their southern allies. They organized a “stay behind” unit in Tay Ninh called the “Yellow Dragons,” and their activities were still reported on by the communist authorities in the province well into the 1990s.

Lessons learned

With the Tay Ninh experience behind me, I have often pon dered if units similarly orga nized, equipped, and trained could duplicate the PRU’s suc cess in other places and times. Could special police units drawn from local communities to iden tify and apprehend insurgents be successful and be so in keeping with the fundamental demo cratic principles we espouse? I believe they can if the following conditions are met: •The units are imbued with both a professional and civic ethical standards that make them accountable to the people for their actions, not only to spe cific government officials or political leaders. •They are equipped and trained to a high level of professional ism. •They are paid well (and regu larly) and rewarded for tangi ble results—a crucial element in preventing corruption and enemy infiltration. •They are organized into small, tightly knit teams whose ranks are filled by members of the communities they serve. (Out of a population of over 17 million, there were never more than 4,500 PRU members in all of South Vietnam during the Viet nam War. Most of these PRU members were natives of the provinces in which they served.) •They are subject to effective judicial and political oversight

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and not free to conduct unau thorized missions, without orders from a competent legal authority. •The units are not responsible for interrogating or incarcerat ing captives beyond seeking identifying information and holding them until transfer elsewhere. •A clear separation is made between PRU-type units and other police units, especially those involved in criminal investigations and arrests. •The units’ members and their families are protected by the state from retribution and given assurances that their names will not be revealed to the press or any other unautho rized source. •They are provided with the highest level of professional and ethical leadership •They receive full access to per tinent targeting intelligence through some form of inter agency coordinating group, like the South Vietnamese DIOCCs. •If US advisors are assigned to such a unit, they should receive pre-assignment training con centrating on language profi ciency, cultural sensitivity, intelligence management, small unit tactics, and staff planning./.

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