Check the overload protector.
The overload protector is located under the sink, on the bottom of the garbage disposal, facing the floor. It is a small square red button. If the overload protector has tripped, you will see the red button dropped down about a quarter of an inch (5mm). Gently press the red button. If it does not stay up, wait ten minutes and try again.
Ngày 8/10, tướng Hay, TL của 1 bộ binh, rút TĐ 1 của Stauffer về Phước Vĩnh (sau này gọi là Phú Giáo) để làm lực lượng phản ứng của sđ. Trung tá Terry Allen, chỉ huy TĐ 2/28, được lịnh di chuyển khỏi Lai Khê với ba đ.đ. (Alpha, Bravo, và Delta) và trực thăng vận đến 1 địa điểm khoảng 21 km tây bắc của làng Chơn Thành, và 3 km tây bắc của tđ 1 của Cavazos. đ.đ. Charlie của 2/28 tăng phái bảo vệ cho trung đoàn 15 pháo -- có nhiệm vụ yểm trợ các đv trong khu vực.
Hai ngày sau, TĐ của Stauffer chuyển tới 1 vị trí án ngữ mới, vì có tin vc chuyển về đồn điền Michelin. Ngày 11/10 Cavazos dẫn hai đ.đ. tiến về phía bắc để thăm dò, và lập tức bị vc tấn công. Vì gặp hỏa lực mạnh, Cavazos cho đ.đ. đầu rút về phía sau chu vi do đ.đ. 2 thiết lập. Sau khi đ.đ. này rút, phi pháo được gọi để dập đội hình vc. Khi dứt tiếng súng có 21 xác địch, trong khi thiệt hại ngày đó của Mỹ là 1 chết 4 bị thương. Sau đó TĐ trở về Phước Vĩnh để nghỉ ngơi và bổ sung quân số.
Vào giữa tháng 10, tướng Hay nghĩ rằng trung đoàn 271 bị thiệt hại nặng và sắp rút khỏi mật khu Long Nguyên. Do vậy ông sẵn sàng chấm dứt HQ Shenandoah II. Tuy nhiên, hoạt động gia tăng của vc gần Suối Ông Thành, nơi lữ đoàn 1 thường chạm súng, cho thấy 1 thực tế khác.
TRẬN ĐÁNH
Vào buổi sáng ngày 16/10, allen dẫn hai đ.đ. Bravo và Delta của TĐ rời vị trí đóng quân đêm hay NPD để tiến dọc Suối Ông Thành nhằm lục soát 1 khu ở phía đông nam, bao phủ bởi rừng rậm nhiều tán lá. sau khi đi khoảng 2 km, tđ gặp một hệ thống bunker kiên cố của vc; vì nghi là 1 căn cứ địa (base camp) của vc nên allen cho quân rút lui để máy bay đánh bom.
sau khi máy bay đánh bom, quân của allen tiến vào và chạm súng xảy ra với VC bắn sẻ từ các ngọn cây ở khu vực chung quanh. allen lại cho lính thụt lui, và lập 1 chu vi để bảo vệ thương binh, trong khi pháo binh tác xạ vào các bunker này. Sau đó khi tiến vào căn cứ này đã thấy 17 xác vc. TĐ di chuyển về cạnh phía tây của căn cứ này, và 1 chạm súng khác với khoảng 60 vc.
vào cuối buổi chiều, TĐ đoạn chiến và trở về vị trí đóng đêm đã kể. Tuy nhiên, sau đó ông gọi máy bay ném bom vào căn cứ địa, mà ông nghĩ là của trung đoàn 271. Tối hôm đó, chuẩn tướng William Coleman và các sq cao cấp của sđ 1 bộ binh thăm vị trí đóng quân đêm của TĐ 2/28, khen ngợi các cố gắng của quân sĩ, và trao huy chương Sao Bạc cho thiếu úy Clark Welch, chỉ huy của đ.đ. Delta, về chiến công trong ngày của ông. Sau đó Allen mở cuộc HQ để tấn công trực diện căn cứ địa của tr.đ. 271 VC, để xác định chúng còn ở đó ko.
Tuy nhiên, do thiếu quân, Welch đề nghị với Allen nên hoãn tấn công hay chờ thêm quân. Allen ko đồng ý, và chỉ định đ.u. James George, chỉ huy đ.đ. Alpha, dẫn đầu cuộc tấn công.
Trong khi đó, trung đoàn 1.200 quân của Võ minh Triết được tăng phái 200 người thuộc đ.đ. C1 của Đoàn Hậu Cần 83--dưới quyền của đ.u. Nguyễn văn Lắm--và họ lập 1 cuộc phục kích ba-cạnh và chờ đợi TĐ Mỹ. Khoảng 0800 ngày 17/10, TĐ 2/28 rời vị trí đóng quân với Alpha đi đầu, kế đó là BCH/TĐ, bọc hậu bởi Delta. Đ.đ Bravo ở lại để giữ vị trí đóng quân đêm, với các khẩu cối của Alpha và Delta. Theo lịnh của lữ đoàn trưởng mới, Allen phải đi bộ với tđ, dù rằng ông thích điều quân từ trực thăng. Do đi đầu nên Alpha được yểm trợ bởi pháo 105 và 155 từ ba căn cứ hỏa lực (CCHL) Caison V, Caison III-S và Lorraine III.
TĐ ko tiến về căn cứ địa vc theo hướng chính nam, nhưng hơi nghiêng 1 chút về phía tây. Dù có pháo binh liên tục tạo tường lửa chung quanh đội hình, nhưng TĐ thường xuyên ngừng để cho các trung đội lục soát kỹ lưỡng phía trước, phía sau và cạnh sườn.
Lúc 0956, thành phần đi đầu bất ngờ gặp (stumble) 1 đường mòn chạy hướng đông bắc tây bắc, có vẻ chỉ mới dùng khoảng 1 giờ. Chỉ huy trung đội 1 yêu cầu được phép lục soát theo hình cỏ ba lá về phía đông và tây của đường mòn. Nói thêm: lục soát cỏ ba lá (cloverleaf) là trung đội này cử nửa tiểu đội rời đội hình về phía đông và tây của đường mòn, đi tới 1 khoảng cách nào đó, và đi theo 1 vòng tròn để trở lại trung đội; nếu làm đúng cách sẽ phát hiện phục kích.
Gần như ngay lập tức, trung đội này trong khi lục soát phía tây của đường mòn đã thấy 1 lính vc và chẳng bao lâu 1 toán vc xuất hiện.
George lập tức ra lịnh trung đội 1 phục kích bên kia đường mòn, nhưng địch biến mất và tình hình yên tỉnh. khoảng 10-15 phút sau, trung đội 1 báo cáo cây chuyển động, tiếng lách cách (rattle) của súng lên đạn.
lúc ấy, sườn phải của alpha, do trung đội 2 phụ trách, bị hỏa lực rời rạc của địch. phần còn lại của trung đội 1, bị vc cầm chân bởi súng m-60, đặt 1 bunker ngụy trang kỹ. hỏa lực địch càng lúc gia tăng với đủ loại súng nhỏ và 12.7 ly. vì ko liên lạc với trung đội 1 và 2,
Following various engagements with the U.S. 1st Infantry Division during the previous months, Colonel Vo Minh Triet, commander of the Viet Cong 271st Regiment, was ordered to move his troops into an area known as the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, which was situated between National Highway 13 and the Michelin Rubber Plantation. It was located about 56 kilometers (35 mi) northwest of Saigon, in Binh Duong Province. There, Triet's regiment was supposed to receive troop replacements and food supplies, to prepare for a major offensive against an unspecified target in War Zone D. In previous years, the Viet Cong 9th Division had often used the month of September and October to rest and prepare for their winter-spring offensives, and 1967 was no different. For that reason Hay was determined to disrupt the Viet Cong's resting period by launching Operation Shenandoah II, with the objective of clearing Highway 13 from Chon Thanh to Loc Ninh.
On September 29, Hay ordered Colonel George E. Newman—commander of the 1st Brigade—to place the 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, in the northern portion of Long Nguyen. On the next day, Colonel Frank E. Blazey, commander of the 3rd Brigade, was ordered to deploy the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment to the southern half of the area. In the early stages of Shenandoah II, U.S. forces only made a few contacts with the Viet Cong. On October 2, a South Vietnamese unit operating east of Highway 13 near Chon Thanh made significant contact with a large Viet Cong formation and absorbed heavy casualties. Enemy documents obtained by the South Vietnamese indicated they had clashed with a battalion-sized unit from the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment, sent to attack Chon Thanh in order to cover the movement of the 271st Regiment into the Long Nguyen area. Early in October, Viet Cong soldiers of the 271st Regiment had arrived in Long Nguyen but they could not obtain their much-needed food supplies, as a result of allied search-and-destroy operations which had created significant food shortages for Viet Cong units in the region.
Triet then marched his starving soldiers southward toward the Ong Thanh Stream to link up with Rear Service Group 83, but local Viet Cong units also lacked adequate food supplies of their own, so the 271st Regiment was forced to wait in the area for the arrival of rice and other essential supplies. Meanwhile, on October 4 the Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Stauffer's 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, made contact with a company-sized Viet Cong formation about 9 kilometers (5.6 mi) south-west of Chon Thanh, and claimed to have killed 12 enemy soldiers. To pursue the retreating Viet Cong formation, Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Cavazos—commander of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment—was instructed to conduct an air-assault into a clearing located about 2 kilometers (1.2 mi) west of Stauffer' battalion, in order to block enemy troops. Cavazos' battalion landed unopposed, and they immediately set up their standard field position with wire entanglements to protect the base. On October 6, the 1st Battalion's position was subjected to Viet Cong mortar bombardment; even though the shells had caused little damage, Cavazos believed it was part of the enemy's final preparations for a major ground attack later that evening.
At around 6:00 pm the rain began to fall and the Viet Cong started attacking the battalion's camp from different directions, but Cavazos' men were able to hold their ground, with the support of artillery and mortar fire. By 12:00 am the fight was over, and U.S. casualties included 5 killed in action and 4 wounded. Three weeks later a captured Viet Cong soldier from the 2nd Battalion, 271st Regiment, revealed that his unit lost 59 soldiers killed and 56 wounded, in battle with Cavazos' battalion. On October 8, Hay pulled Stauffer's 1st Battalion back to Phuoc Vinh to act as the division's reaction force. Lieutenant Colonel Terry D. Allen—commander of the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment—was then ordered to depart from Lai Khê with three of his rifle companies (Alpha, Bravo and Delta) and air-lifted into a site about 21 kilometers (13 mi) northwest of Chon Thanh village, and 3 kilometers (1.9 mi) north-west of Cavazos' 1st Battalion. Charlie Company was detached from Allen's 2nd Battalion to protect the supporting 15th Field Artillery Regiment.
Two days later, Stauffer's battalion was deployed into new blocking positions, as Viet Cong units were believed to be moving toward the Michelin Rubber Plantation. On October 11, Cavazos led two of his companies out on a northward probe, and they were immediately attacked by the Viet Cong. While under heavy fire, Cavazos ordered the lead company to pull back behind a perimeter formed by the second company. As the lead company fell back, artillery and air support were called in to pummel the Viet Cong's attacking formation. When the battle was over, 21 Viet Cong soldiers were found dead, whereas U.S. casualties for the day were 1 killed and 4 wounded. Shortly afterwards, Cavazos' battalion pulled back to Phuoc Vinh for rest and refitting. By mid-October, Hay believed the Viet Cong's 271st Regiment had suffered a major defeat and was ready to withdraw from the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, so he was ready to terminate Shenandoah II. However, increased Viet Cong activity near the Ong Thanh Stream, where the 1st Brigade made most of its contacts, had indicated otherwise.
On the morning of October 16, Allen led two rifle companies (Bravo and Delta) of the 2nd Battalion out from their temporary night defensive position along the Ong Thanh Stream to patrol an area to the southeast, which was covered by thick jungle canopy. After marching for about 2 kilometers (1.2 mi), the battalion found a fortified Viet Cong bunker, so Allen ordered his men to pull back and directed airstrikes against Viet Cong positions. When the bombing runs were over, Allen’s men entered the camp and a firefight broke out with Viet Cong snipers firing down from trees in the surrounding areas. Again, Allen ordered his men to pull back and form a perimeter to protect their wounded soldiers, as artillery strikes were called in against Viet Cong bunker positions. The 2nd Battalion re-entered the camp, and they discovered the bodies of 17 dead Viet Cong soldiers. Allen's men then moved through the western end of the camp, and another fire-fight broke out with an estimated 60 Viet Cong soldiers.
Later that afternoon Allen decided to break contact and return to base, to avoid fighting a battle that could last until the evening. In the meantime, however, he called in air-strikes to inflict further damage on the base camp of his primary target, the 271st Regiment. That evening Brigadier General William Coleman and other senior officers of the 1st Infantry Division visited the 2nd Battalion's camp, where they praised Allen's men for their efforts, and presented First Lieutenant Clark Welch—commander of Delta Company—with a Silver Star for his actions earlier in the day. Allen then decided to launch a full-frontal attack against the 271st Regiment's base camp, to determine if the enemy unit was still there. However, due to the lack of sufficient manpower, Welch suggested that Allen should either call off the assault or get more soldiers on the ground for the operation. Allen dismissed Welch's suggestions, and responded by giving Captain James George—commander of Alpha Company—the responsibility of leading the attack instead of Welch.
Meanwhile, Triet's 1,200-strong regiment was joined by 200 soldiers from the C1 Company of Rear Service Group 83—under the command of Captain Nguyen Van Lam—and they set up a three-sided ambush and waited for the arrival of a reported U.S. battalion. At around 8:00 am on the morning of October 17, the 2nd Battalion departed from their night defensive position with Alpha Company in the lead followed by the Battalion Command Group, and the tail of the formation was covered by Delta Company. Bravo Company stayed behind to protect the battalion's base, along with the mortar sections of Alpha and Delta Companies. In accordance with the 1st Brigade's policy, Allen personally led his unit out as part of the Battalion Command Group, although he preferred to supervise actions from a helicopter. For artillery support, Alpha Company was authorized to call upon the 105mm and 155mm howitzers located at Fire Support Bases Caisson V, Caisson III-S and Lorraine III.
Allen's men marched southward from the base, with the intention of entering the enemy base camp from a slightly different direction to the west. Preceded by marching artillery fire, the 2nd Battalion stopped periodically to conduct cloverleaf patrols to their front, rear and both flanks. At 9:56 am the lead element of Alpha Company stumbled upon a northeast-southwest trail, which appeared to have been used within the last hour. The 1st Platoon Leader then requested and received permission to make cloverleaf patrols to the east and west of the trail. Almost immediately, the 1st Platoon sighted a Viet Cong soldier while scouting west of the trail and another group of Viet Cong soldiers soon appeared. George then ordered the 1st Platoon to set up a hasty ambush across the trail, but by the time they were in position the Viet Cong soldiers had disappeared and everything was quiet. About 10–15 minutes later, the 1st Platoon Leader reported that trees were moving, in addition to the sound of weapons clicking and the rattle of ammunition.
In response, George ordered the 1st Platoon to reinforce their ambush position. While that was happening Alpha Company's right flank, which was covered by the 2nd Platoon, began to receive sporadic enemy fire. The rest of the 1st Platoon was then pinned down when the Viet Cong, from within concealed bunker positions, fired on them using captured M60 machine-guns. The Viet Cong steadily increased their fire which came in the form of various small arms, .50 caliber and 12.7mm machine guns. Unable to communicate with the 1st and 2nd Platoons, George moved forward with the 3rd Platoon only to find his lead platoons held in their positions by enemy fire. A M18 Claymore mine then exploded in front of Alpha Company's command element, killing the radio operator and severely wounding both George and his Forward Artillery Observer. At around 10:40 am gunfire had died down, but Alpha Company was virtually destroyed during 30 minutes of fighting, with the company commander wounded and the leaders of 1st and 2nd Platoons both killed.
To break contact with the Viet Cong units which fired on Alpha Company from the western flank, First Sergeant Jose Valdez quickly organized an assembly area on the eastern side to round up the survivors. Shortly after the assembly area was established George, who was severely wounded from the Claymore explosion, turned his company over to Valdez. Allen then ordered Valdez to lead the survivors of Alpha Company northward to join the rest of the battalion. The survivors, mostly from the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of Alpha Company, were then ordered to withdraw through a perimeter formed by Delta Company. As the surviving elements of Alpha Company pulled back, Delta Company began to receive sporadic fire from their southern flank, so Allen ordered his command group to remain in place near a prominent anthill with the 1st and 2nd Platoons of Delta Company. The 3rd Platoon, on the other hand, was instructed to move forward to assist the wounded men from Alpha Company.
As Viet Cong fire increased in intensity, the soldiers of Delta Company picked up the distinctive sound of a U.S.-made M-60 machine-gun firing from the southern flank. Allen assumed that Alpha Company was approaching his perimeter, so he ordered them to cease-fire because he feared his rifle companies were firing on each other. However, the order was also passed down along the formation of Delta Company, which enabled the Viet Cong soldiers of the 271st Regiment to gain fire superiority. At around 11:35 am, Triet unleashed his 2nd Battalion which was placed in reserve during the battle, and they attacked Welch's Delta Company from three different directions. During that time Allen tried to request artillery support, but that had become impossible due to the close proximity between U.S. and Viet Cong soldiers. In a scene that had characterized the destruction of Alpha Company earlier, both Allen and Welch were wounded in battle as Viet Cong snipers fired down from the trees. Nonetheless, just before 12:00 pm, Allen instructed Delta Company to begin a northward march toward the battalion's base, and Bravo Company to move forward to cover the withdrawal.
The withdrawal quickly descended into a scene of chaos, as U.S. soldiers scrambled to avoid heavy enemy fire. During the last moments of the battle, Allen was struck in the head by machine-gun fire which grazed his helmet, and was finally killed when another burst of machine-gun fire hit him. At around 12:20 pm Newman flew into Ong Thanh to assume command of the 2nd Battalion, while Coleman took control of the 1st Brigade. Meanwhile, Alpha Company had linked up with Bravo Company, which had taken up positions about 450 meters (1,480 ft) to the south of the battalion's night defensive position with the task of assisting the wounded. At around 2:00 pm that afternoon, the 2nd Battalion's Charlie Company was airlifted into Ong Thanh from FSB Caisson V, as Bravo Company moved into the battle area to help evacuate the wounded. Coleman, who was coordinating the evacuation of U.S. casualties from a helicopter, decided to assemble the bodies of the dead in an area and protect it with artillery fire. By that stage, however, Triet's 271st Regiment had withdrawn from the battlefield, and medivac flights were only challenged by sporadic sniper fire.
At around 12:00 pm Triet had already ordered his troops to disengage from the battle without annihilating the remaining Americans caught in his ambush. His men were tired and hungry and he was behind schedule in his movement toward his next assignment. Moreover, he feared that American air power and artillery would begin to inflict heavy casualties on his unit.
The battle at Ong Thanh was a costly affair for the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment. During two hours of fighting the 2nd Battalion lost 64 men killed in action, including Lieutenant Colonel Terry Allen and every member of the Battalion Command Group, as well as 75 wounded and 2 missing. For their efforts in the battle, 13 American soldiers were awarded the Silver Star, while Allen and Welch received the Distinguished Service Cross. Forward Observer Second Lieutenant Harold B. Durham, who was attached to the 2nd Battalion on the day from the 15th Field Artillery Regiment, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions. Despite the losses that had been inflicted on the 2nd Battalion by the Viet Cong, the U.S. military told the media that the fight at Ong Thanh had resulted in a major American victory.
General Hay initially portrayed Ong Thanh as an American victory and cited 101 enemy dead in the battle. However, American veterans who survived the ordeals of the battle were adamant they were ambushed and defeated by the Viet Cong's 271st Regiment. The estimate of 101 enemy dead officially provided by the U.S. military was likely much inflated to emphasize the scale of the 'American victory'. For retired U.S. Army Brigadier General James E. Shelton, who was then a major and served as an Operations Officer with the 2nd Battalion, the lack of reliable intelligence and overconfidence on the part of Allen as the battalion commander, were some of the factors that led to the disastrous outcome in the Ong Thanh battle. Furthermore, the American soldiers under Allen's command lacked fighting experience, whereas the Viet Cong soldiers of the 9th Division were tough and experienced light infantry. The Viet Cong 271st Regiment, after their victory at Ong Thanh, withdrew back towards their base area near the Cambodian border.
Meanwhile, the rest of the Viet Cong 9th Division was planning for a major attack on Loc Ninh, with the objective of capturing the district town and the Special Forces Camp. To accomplish their goals the Viet Cong deployed the 272nd and 273rd Regiments, reinforced with two battalions from the 165th Regiment and the Vietnam People's Army 84th Artillery Regiment. During the days before the battle, U.S. military intelligence had noticed the build-up of Viet Cong units around Loc Ninh. Hay, in response, planned to insert four battalions of the 1st Infantry Division and position them around Loc Ninh, thereby trapping the Viet Cong inside the town. On the evening of October 28, the 272nd Regiment marched into position from the northeast, and the 273rd Regiment from west. At 1:15 am on October 29, the 273rd Regiment began assaulting the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp, but they were quickly repelled by U.S.-led Special Forces. At around 6:30 am the remaining elements of Bravo and Charlie Companies 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, were airlifted onto the Loc Ninh airfield, to set up a firebase at the field's south-western end. The soldiers of Alpha and Delta Companies were sent back to their Base Camp at Lai Khe to adjust to the losses they had suffered, and to be kept away from enemy activity.
Battle of Ong Thanh - Alchetron, The Free Social Encyclopedia
Cái chết của ĐT Đặng Phương Thành dưới lăng kính tâm linh.
Viết sau khi nghe bài "Tưởng niệm Cựu Thiếu sinh quân - Cố Đại tá Đặng Phương Thành" vừa phát trên YouTube của anh TTT.
Vì có nghiên cứu về Lý thuyết Số (Numerology) từ khi đến Mỹ năm 1994, tôi mới biết ĐT Thành vì chịu tác động của số 12 (vì chỉ huy Trung đoàn 12), nên mới chết thảm thương như vậy.
1/ ĐT Võ Ân, chỉ huy trung đoàn 53, người hùng trong Trận Sân bay Phụng Dực, dù chỉ với 1 TĐ và đại đội Trinh sát 45, đã đánh nhau cả tuần lễ với vài trung đoàn CSBV, trước khi thất thủ -- dù lúc đó không có phi pháo hay xe tăng M-113 yểm trợ, như lúc ĐT Thành đánh trận Thủ Thừa Long An tháng 4/1975. Lúc ĐT Thành trốn trại với 3 ĐT khác, ĐT Thành bị đánh đến chết, trong khi ĐT Võ Ân, làm nhà bếp cùng trại, bị quản giáo kêu lên điều tra vì nghi giúp đỡ ĐT Thành trốn trại. (Theo hồi ký của ĐT Võ Hữu Hạnh, cùng trại). Nếu chúng ghét ĐT Ân, nhân dịp này, chúng cũng có cớ để giết ông hầu trả thù cho các đồng chí đã chết trong trận Phụng Dực.
2/ Trung tá Nguyễn văn An, chỉ huy trưởng cuối cùng của liên đoàn 12 BĐQ vùng 1. Khi đi tù ở Trại Nam Hà, vì là người lúc nhỏ sống ở địa phương này (gốc Nam Định) nên trốn trại: lần đầu bị bắt, chỉ bị đá đít, đánh vài bộp tay và cho về Đội; sau đó ông lại trốn trại, bị bắt, và bị CA đánh gẫy chân, ko chữa trị tới lúc chết. Theo hồi ký "Một lần qua sông Đáy" của Vương mộng Long.
3/ Lữ đoàn 147 TQLC đã tan hàng 1 cách tức tưởi tại Cửa biển Thuận An. Nếu LĐ này về Đà Nẳng theo QL-1, thì dù bị chận đánh, vẫn chống cự dễ dàng vì quân số và vũ khí đầy đủ. Trong khi đó, đang đóng ở KM 17, họ được lịnh "chỉ mang vũ khí cá nhân và 1 ngày ăn, còn bao nhiêu bỏ lại, để rút về Thuận An, có tàu đón, đưa về Đà Nẳng".
Theo Lý thuyết Số, 147 = 1 + 4 + 7 = 12.
ĐT Thành, trung tá An, và Lữ đoàn 147 đã "chết" một cách tức tưởi vì chịu tác động của số 12, mà ý nghĩa là "Nạn nhân của một Định mạng nghiệt ngã".
Tôi sẽ kể những ví dụ về tác động của số 12 trong các bài khác.
SJ ngày 19/7/2025
Tài Trần
QUÂN MIKE FORCE TIẾP ỨNG TRẠI DAK SEANG THÁNG 4/1970
LỜI NÓI ĐẦU: Trong bài Trận Dak Seang 1970 của cựu thiếu tá BĐQ Vương Mộng Long, tác giả kể rằng TĐ 23 BĐQ, trong đó có bạn ông, đã bị thiệt hại nặng khi tiếp viện trại này. Ông cũng kể, vài TĐ của trung đoàn 42 thuộc sđ 22 VNCH cũng dự trận này. Qua tìm hiểu trên mạng, tôi biết, ngoài các đv trên, còn có lực lượng MIKE Force của QĐ-2 cũng dự trận này. Chữ MIKE phải viết chữ in, vì là chữ tắt của Mobile Strike (xung kích lưu động). Sau đây là chuyển ngữ của bài viết này.
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"Trại Dak Seang nằm khoảng 15 km đông bắc của vùng tam-biên, khoảng 12 km cách biên giới Lào và 64 km tây bắc Kontum. Trại được lập bởi Bộ chỉ huy 5 Lực lượng Đặc biệt Mỹ và trú đóng bởi lính Dân sự Chiến đấu (DSCĐ) từ năm 1964 để theo dỏi việc xâm nhập dọc theo đường mòn HCM và cũng là 1 thành phần của một loạt các trại lực lượng đặc biệt (LLĐB) trải dài từ Làng Vei ở bắc Quảng Trị tới Tô Châu tỉnh Kiên Giang. Từ tháng 10/1966, trại được điều hành bởi Toán A-245 của LLĐB Mỹ; và vào lúc trại bị vây tháng 4/1970, có khoảng 400 DSCĐ người địa phương chỉ huy bởi LLĐBVN.
Ngày 1/4/1970, trại bị vây bởi trung đoàn 28 CSBV, yểm trợ bởi Đoàn 40 pháo binh CSBV và các thành phần của trung đoàn 60 CSBV. Một tiểu đoàn (TĐ) thuộc BCH MIKE Force quân khu 2, viết tắt là 2MSF, do thiếu tá người Úc Patrick Beale chỉ huy, cùng với hai TĐ BĐQ (có lẽ là 22 và 23 BĐQ -- người dịch (ND), được lịnh phá vở vòng vây. Trong ba đại đội (đ.đ.) của TĐ MIKE Force 400 quân này, có hai đ.đ. chỉ huy bởi sĩ quan Úc, trong khi đ.đ. thứ ba chỉ huy bởi LLĐB Mỹ. Đ.đ. 211 chỉ huy bởi đại úy Úc Peter Shilston, xem hình, với các đồng hương như thiếu úy (WO2) John Petit, George Jamieson, Des Cochrane và Peter Sanderson làm trung đội trưởng. Đ.đ. này sẽ dẫn đầu cuộc tấn công. (Theo tổ chức QĐ Úc, WO1 là chuẩn úy, WO2 là thiếu úy -- ND).
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Ngày 3/4, sau khi di chuyển đường bộ tới Dak To, TĐ MIKE Force này chuẩn bị để được trực thăng vận đến trại vào chiều cùng ngày; tuy nhiên sau khi thám sát bằng trực thăng, họ thấy hỏa lực phòng không hùng hậu của địch và phải dùng 1 bãi đáp khác khoảng 2.5 km nam của trại. Cuối cùng, lúc 1700, ngay trước trời tối, đ.đ. của Shilston, được trực thăng vận và trong lúc ở trên trời, lại nhận lịnh xấu: sẽ không được phi pháo dọn bãi vì hai thứ này cần dùng cho trại này.
Khi đợt UH-1D đầu tiên bắt đầu đáp, họ đã bị hỏa lực dữ dội gồm đủ loại súng, kể cả B-40 từ rừng rậm chung quanh. Khi chiếc đầu tiên chạm đất, Shilston và Sanderson phóng ra ngoài dưới hỏa lực của 1 khẩu 12.7 ly từ hông của bãi đáp. Theo sau bởi lính MIKE Force người Thượng, cả hai phóng tới hầm trú ẩn, nơi đặt khẩu súng này trong khi chiếc trực thăng của Cochrane cũng bay tới ổ súng. Cochrane nhảy ra và câm họng nó bằng lựu đạn. Các trực thăng khác đổ quân và diệt thêm 6 hầm trú ẩn khác. (Tác giả dùng chữ bunker: đây là hầm trú ẩn có nắp dầy, xem hình, làm bằng những khúc gỗ, trên phủ đất, ngụy trang cẩn thận, chống được đạn pháo binh, có hai cửa ra vào. Có nơi nắp hầm ngang mặt đất -- nếu ko lục soát kỹ, binh sĩ sẽ đi qua và bị đánh bọc hậu -- Theo Vương Mộng Long trong bài Dakto và em).
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Over the years I have been fortunate to acquire a number of Australian Army Training Team Vietnam and ARVN Mike Force insignia from the family of the late Peter Shilston MC who is featured in some of the iconic Special Forces related photographs of the Vietnam War.
Mike Force was a colloquial name for the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) which was a key component of the United States Special Forces involvement in the Vietnam War. They were made up largely of indigenous Montagnard soldiers trained through the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) programme and led by American Special Forces (USSF) and Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) personnel. The Mike Force units fulfilled a number of roles during the war but are best known as a quick reaction force, securing, reinforcing and recapturing CIDG / USSF A-Camps. The short film below, shot by a member from the 221st Signal Company in early 1969 shows Special Forces at Ban Me Thuot and also includes the Pleiku based Australian Army Training Team advisors who trained and led Mobile Strike Force units in II Corps.
25415 Captain Peter John Shilston, an infantry officer, deployed to Vietnam in late August 1969, initially serving with the Headquarters, Australian Force Vietnam (Army Component). On 28 February 1970 he was reassigned to the AATTV in Pleiku as commander of 211 Company 1 Mike Force Battalion, 2nd Mobile Strike Force Command, Det B-20, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
In April 1970 Peter Shilston was involved in the action to lift the siege on the Special Forces camp at Dak Seang, that would result in the award of a Military Cross in recognition of his bravery and leadership. The siege and relief of Dak Seang was hard fought and came at great cost to the allied troops. It also resulted in two American’s, USSF Sgt Gary B. Beikirch and Ranger advisor, SFC Gary L. Littrell, being awarded the Medal of Honor.
Dak Seang Camp was located approximately 15 km north-east of the Tri-Border intersection about 12 km east of the Laos border and 64 km northwest of Kon Tum. It was an area of Kon Tum Province where the mountains rose to 1218m and the camp was on the eastern edge of Route 84 that ran along the Annamite Chain. The camp was first established by the 5th Special Forces Group and CIDG troops in 1964 to monitor infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and was part of a long line of border outposts stretching from Lang Vei in northern Quang Tri province to To Chau in Kien Giang province in the south. From October 1966 it was manned by USSF Detachment A-245 plus, at the time of the siege, some 400 locally recruited Montagnards commanded by Vietnamese Special Forces.
On 1 April 1970, the camp was besieged by the 28th North Vietnamese Army Regiment supported by the 40th NVA Artillery and elements of the 60th NVA Regiment. 1 Bn 2MSF, under the command of Australian Major Patrick Beale was, along with two Vietnamese Ranger Battalions given the task of breaking the siege. Of the three companies in the 400 strong Mike Force battalion, two were commanded by Australians whilst the third, by the USSF. 211 Company, under the command of Shilston, with fellow AATTV advisors, Warrant Officers Class 2 John Petit, George ‘Geordie’ Jamieson, Des Cochrane and Peter Sanderson serving as platoon commanders, were to lead the assault.
On 3 April, after redeploying by road to Dak To, the 1st Bn 2MSF then prepared for a direct air-mobile assault by helicopter onto the camp that same afternoon, however after doing a helicopter reconnaissance of the assault area they realised that air activity was too intense and an alternate LZ was selected some 2500m south of the camp. By 1700, just before dusk, Shilston’s, company was finally airborne and whilst in the air they received bad news. There would be no artillery or air support softening the LZ as it was needed in direct support of the camp itself.
As the first wave of UH1D helicopters began to descend they were met by an intense barrage of rifle, machine gun and rocket fire from the surrounding jungle. Shilston and Sanderson were in the first helicopters to touch down, right into the sweeping fire of a 12.7mm heavy machine gun at the side of the LZ. Followed by their Montagnards, the two advisors charged towards the emplacement whilst at the same time Cochrane’s helicopter moved to within meters of the bunker. Cochrane jumped out and silenced the gun with grenades. As the helicopters disgorged their troops a further six bunkers were cleared. WO2 Sanderson who had been wounded by a grenade was evacuated. The landings had been delayed by events prior to their departure from Dak To and by nightfall only 250 of the Mike Force troops were on the ground before the remainder of the insertion was postponed. The troops on the ground dug in and were subjected to mortar, rocket and heavy small arms fire throughout the night.
The following morning, 4 April, the battalion waited for the remaining troops and supplies to arrive whilst enemy fire continued to rain down. Smoke and dust reduced visibility and caused mayhem as one of the helicopters landed with both gunners firing into the battalion area killing one soldier and wounding three. Then a helicopter gunship accidently shot up the battalion wounding the American commander of 213 Company and four Montagnards. Incoming mortar rounds eventually forced off the remaining helicopters with only six out of the ten scheduled able to get in.
At 1300 the battalion started to move off to Dak Seang with Shilston’s company leading but within 20 minutes the lead platoon, commanded by three tour AATTV veteran WO2 John Pettit, had run into a bunker complex. Three Montagnards were hit and Pettit crawled forward alone, applying first aid to the wounded before attacking the nearest enemy bunker. Firing as he went, he got to within two meters of the enemy before being fatally wounded. For his bravery he was posthumously Mentioned in Dispatches and in April 2002 awarded the Silver Star by the USA in recognition of his ‘personal heroism, professional competence, and devotion to duty’.
Progress was slow and by the end of the first day the battalion had only managed to cover 500m before they were forced to halt for and aerial resupply of food, water and ammunition. The following morning, WO2 Lachlan ‘Locky’ Scowcroft arrived to join Shilston’s company. Shortly after beginning their advance north they encountered a new line of enemy bunkers which were eventually cleared by airstrikes and grenades. The NVA defences consisted of a serious of mutually supporting, camouflaged positions about 100m in depth. As one strongpoint was attacked it drew fire from at least one other. The Mike Force troops accounted for at least ten bunkers but had no time to check for enemy dead and continued to push forward.
After two hours the battalion had reached a point approximately 1300m south of Dak Seang when the NVA opened fire on Shilston’s company which had been given a ‘breather’ in the rear. The battalion closed into a defensive position, but no sooner had this been completed than they came under a heavy ground attack from the south-west and south-east from a company sized force which quickly overran two perimeter positions. The attack was only stalled by the arrival of a ‘Spooky’ gunship. Then as the attacks continued various sorties arrived over the area, delivering payloads of bombs, rockets and napalm. Unfortunately, one of the napalm cannisters exploded in the middle of one of the platoons killing four and wounding a further seventeen Montagnard troops. Fighting continued for the remainder of the afternoon and into the night as the NVA pressed the attack with mortars and ground probes.
The following morning, 6 April, dawn clearing patrols found enemy dead, discarded weapons and blood trails all around the position. All the patrols encountered resistance, but it became apparent that the largest concentration was to the south-western side facing 212 Company, commanded by AATTV WO2 Alan ‘Aggie’ White, who also had fellow Australians WO2 Alex McCloskey and WO2 Ray Barnes serving as platoon commanders. This area to the southwest was the only ground which could possibly be prepared as a helicopter LZ. But, despite continued fighting the enemy would not be budged and the situation was becoming desperate. Surrounded, low on ammunition, out of water and with depleted numbers an atmosphere of fatalism had become to settle over the weary Montagnards. Death chants could be heard as the more seriously wounded began to die. Then, at dusk, with patrols fighting to keep the NVA at bay, the helicopter pilots decided to take a risk and descended into the clearing from tree-top level, evacuating the wounded and then the heavens opened with heavy rainfall, both delivering a much needed morale boost to the Mike Force troops.
That night and the following day mortars continued to fall on the position and the battalion was still fighting to keep their position intact when, in the afternoon, reinforcements from the 4th Battalion 2MSF, which also included AATTV advisors, arrived by helicopter from Nha Trang, landing on top of their position. They were placed under Beale’s command and sent to form the outer perimeter as NVA the assaults continued. ‘Locky’ Scowcroft was badly wounded necessitating his evacuation with the other wounded.
At first light of 8 April a clearing patrol from White’s 212 Company made contact with an enemy bunker just 30m outside the perimeter and withdrew with one killed and two wounded. A company of the 4th Battalion made three assaults into the position, supported by airstrikes and was forced back, but by early afternoon they had eventually fought their way into the enemy area. They found an extensive well developed HQ complex, measuring 100 by 250m, consisting of seventeen big bunkers, observation posts in trees and an outer perimeter with weapon pits and more bunkers. The reason for the savage reaction by the NVA was now obvious, the Montagnards perimeter was within meters of the NVA regimental headquarters and also between that and their objective of Dak Seang. By coincidence, the Mike Force troops had caused a major disruption to the control of the siege.
The following morning, the Montagnards moved out, with the 4th Battalion leading. When they reached a river obstacle, the 1st Battalion formed a perimeter on the west bank and the 4th on the east. Here the 1st Battalion was subjected to further attacks resulting in three Americans and five Montagnards wounded. In the afternoon a LZ was established in the 4th Battalion area, enabling the casualties to be evacuated and an ammunition resupply. But for the 1st Battalion on the other side of the river, ammunition had once again, become desperately low and they were only able to survive due to the bravery of four Vietnamese helicopter pilots who ran the gauntlet of enemy fire to throw out ammunition boxes over the position. Of the four helicopters, three were so damaged by fire that they were forced down on their way back to base and the fourth, which managed to limp home was written off as beyond repair.
On 10 April, under continuing heavy mortar bombardment, the 1st Battalion commenced moving along the west bank of the river White’s company leading. After covering 300m, 213 Company hit a bunker system which they engaged. Meanwhile, Shilston and White’s companies moved around a flank and formed a hasty position on a hilltop. They had reached the edge of the jungle adjoining the clearing around Dak Seang and could see their objective, a smouldering fortification, ripped, smashed and surrounded by bomb craters and the black napalm scars. Then, after fighting through and clearing two more bunkers, 213 Company joined them in the battalion position.
It had taken seven days of constant fighting to move 2500m to the outskirts of the camp. Then, whilst Major Beale contemplated the next move, a small group of Montagnards from the camp arrived to greet them. It indicated that whilst there may still be fighting ahead, the siege had been broken. Beale decided to keep the battalion in its position and received a further resupply of ammunition in the afternoon. Overnight, the NVA continued to mortar and probe the Mike Force positions causing more casualties but it appeared that they were beginning to pull back from the camp.
This realisation prompted Beale to follow up the enemy and at 0800 on 11 April the battalion moved around the southern and western perimeter of Dak Seang and along a bamboo covered ridge running north-west from the camp. White’s company had covered 500m when they hit another enemy bunker, killing several enemy soldiers before being pushed back by heavy machine-gun fire. Adopting a defensive position, an airstrike was called in and then, after four separate assaults, the position finally taken.
In the evening, after dark, a clearing patrol from Shilston’s company, led by ‘Geordie’ Jamieson went to investigate noises outside the perimeter. Just 30m outside the battalion perimeter they encountered more occupied bunkers and Jamieson was shot in the stomach during the ensuing firefight. WO2 Alex McCloskey from 212 Company crawled forward and dragged the badly wounded Jamieson back to safety. Shilston immediately led a reaction force into the area and with the help of 213 Company cleared the enemy. Jamieson plus other wounded, including an American advisor and six Montagnards were evacuated later that night.
The following morning, the battalion continued to move forward clearing enemy from the edge of the bush surrounding the camp and it was clear that resistance was crumbling, but after ten days of almost continuous fighting the strain was also showing on the Mike Force troops. The soldiers were tired and becoming more reluctant to go into action relying more and more on the advisors, both Australian and American plus a handful of hard-core ‘Yards’ to do the fighting.
At first light on 13 April clearing patrols were once again sent out, but this time there were no contacts. The danger to Dak Seang had passed and the NVA had withdrawn to positions 3000m away. The Mike Force troops had begun to follow them up when orders came over the radio net that the battalion was to be relieved and that afternoon at 1445 helicopters arrived outside Dak Seang to commence the battalion’s extraction to Ben Het. The following day they were taken by road back to Pleiku.
The siege had been broken, but it had come at a heavy cost to the Mike Force troops. They had suffered over a hundred dead or wounded casualties, over a third of the battalion’s strength. Five of the USSF advisors had been wounded. Out of the ten Australian advisors, one, John Pettit was KIA, ‘Geordie’ Jamieson and Lachlan Scowcroft were both badly wounded and evacuated to Australia. Peter Sanderson who was also wounded was evacuated but after a period of recuperation would return to the unit. For their actions during the battle, George Jamieson and John Pettit (posthumously) were Mentioned in Despatches. Des Cochrane received the Military Medal, Alex McCloskey, ‘Aggie’ White and Ray Barnes all received the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Pat Beale was awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Peter Shilston, the Military Cross. In 2010, through the efforts of Bruce Davies, co-author of The Men Who Persevered: The AATTV – the most highly decorated Australian unit of the Vietnam War, the Australian members were also officially recognised as recipients of the US Army Valorous Unit Award (VUA).
Around the same time as siege of Dak Seang was occurring plans were being made to demobilise the Mike Force units as part of the ‘Vietnamization’ programme. Arrangements started for the conversion of the Mike Force Battalions into Vietnamese Regional Force (RF) or Ranger battalions, with the advisor personnel being withdrawn or reassigned. According to Ian McNeill’s The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam 1962 – 1972, “From a strength of fifteen advisors in Pleiku… it fell to eight in May, five in June and four by 1 July.”
Towards the end of April, Pat Beale had become the senior RF/PF advisor in the Phuoc-Tuy sector and command of the 1st Bn 2MSF went to Peter Shilston. He took the 1st Bn 2MSF on its last operation near Route 509 on the Cambodian border from 14 June to 4 July. The operation was largely uneventful but was accompanied by Sergeant John Geoffrey Fairley, a photographer for the (Australians) Directorate of Public Relations whose images of Shilston have become some of the most recognised photographs featuring the Mike Force troops of the war.
On 26 August 1970, Captain Peter Shilston became the last Australian soldier to leave Pleiku and returned to Australia the following day. According to the AATTV Monthly report for July 1970 (R723/1/35) serial/para 7 ‘on that date AATTV will sever its seven year association with US and Vietnamese Special Forces.’ After returning to Australia, he continued to serve in the Australian Army, including spending time as an instructor at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka and ending his career as a major. He was formally presented his Military Cross by the Governor of NSW, Sir Roden Cutler VC, during an investiture ceremony in April 1971. Peter Shilston died on 30 August 1993 and his ashes are interred at Ballarat New Cemetery.
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