The Binh Gia Campaign
Enemy preparations for the upcoming offensive were complex. First, guerrilla and
political action would prepare the region for a more active campaign, but in a manner
similar to that performed in other areas so as not to arouse suspicion. In this regard,
the insurgents’ aggressive actions elsewhere in III Corps during the fall helped mask
COSVN’s true intentions. Second, the enemy had to make logistical arrangements. In
areas the Front controlled, it limited the population’s rice consumption to build up
a reserve for the troops. In areas where the Front had influence but did not actually
control, it extorted donations from peasants and plantation owners. National Liberation
Front agents also purchased rice in Saigon and smuggled it out of the city in trucks.
In this manner, the enemy assembled 500 tons of rice to support the offensive. Local
purchases and imported supplies also allowed for the creation of a 300-bed hospital
facility for the coming action. Finally, North Vietnam sent 500 tons of weaponry by
sea to Kien Hoa’s Thanh Phu District. From there, the Front moved the equipment by
sampan through the marshy Rung Sat Special Zone and up the Thi Vai River into the
area of operations. Included in the haul were American rifles and light machine guns,
twelve 70-mm. and 75-mm. pack howitzers, and some of the latest Communist Bloc
weapons.1
Ultimately, the insurgents needed troops. Local resources could supply hamlet
guerrillas, district platoons and companies, and three regional force battalions, but
this was not enough. Consequently, the B–2 Front ordered east its 1st and 2d Regiments,
also known in the Communists’ confusing lexicon as the 761st and 762d Regiments,
and soon to be redesignated as the 271st and 272d Regiments. Accompanying them was
the entire 80th Artillery Group, now four battalions strong and equipped with 81-mm.
mortars, 75-mm. recoilless rifles, and heavy machine guns. Once the troops reached
1. Nguyen Viet Ta, et al., Mien Dong Nam Bo Khang Chien (1945–1975), Tap II [The Resistance War
in Eastern Cochin China (1945–1975), Vol. II] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1993), 170–71;
Su Doan 9 (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1990), 28.
Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965
the area of operations, they picked up the newly arrived equipment. Specialists trained
the men in the use of any unfamiliar items. Altogether, the B–2 Front committed
10,000 troops for the campaign.2
T
he area of operations contained 500 square kilometers. The primary target was
Phuoc Tuy Province. Secondary targets were Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Binh Tuy
Provinces. The B–2 Front’s scheme was to draw the South Vietnamese into a decisive
engagement via the time-honored bait-and-ambush technique before fanning out to
disrupt pacification throughout what Communist officials termed eastern Nam Bo,
or eastern Cochinchina, an area that roughly coincided with the easternmost sections
of Military Region 7, also known as Military Region 1. Initially, insurgent leaders had
thought to make the headquarters of Phuoc Tuy’s Xuyen Moc District the focal point,
but the post’s strong defenses changed their minds. Instead, they settled on Binh Gia,
a 6,000-person community of Catholic refugees from North Vietnam located about
65 kilometers southeast of Saigon. COSVN declared the operation would be its “first
relatively large mobile warfare campaign.”3
Preliminary maneuvers began in October, some of which the enemy intended
as diversions. At Phuoc Thay village on Highway 15, an ambush destroyed a twelve
vehicle convoy moving between Bien Hoa and Vung Tau, and on 1 December the enemy
attacked Thien Giao District headquarters in Binh Thuan Province. Three days later, on
the night of 4–5 December, a PLAF local force company attacked Binh Gia as elements
of the 1st Regiment probed Duc Thanh District headquarters several kilometers away.
By dawn on the fifth, the rebels had only been able to occupy part of Binh Gia because
of stubborn resistance. The government then staged a relief effort. A ranger company
marched unimpeded by road to the hamlet. Americans speculated that the enemy
had decided not to ambush it in the hopes of snaring bigger prey to follow. Instead
of sending more troops by road, however, U.S. Army helicopters delivered the rest of
the 38th Ranger Battalion by air, avoiding the ambush the 2d Regiment set for it. After
linking up with the first company, the South Vietnamese recaptured Binh Gia, losing
seven dead, fourteen wounded, and five missing. The enemy left behind twenty-three
bodies.
On the night of 7–8 December, two enemy companies attacked Binh Gia again,
while two battalions attacked Dat Do District headquarters and insurgent artillery
bombarded Xuyen Moc and Duc Thanh District headquarters and the CIDG camp at
Van Kiep. The bombardments proved inconsequential, and Binh Gia held. At Dat Do,
f
ifty-four territorial soldiers and an armored car repulsed four ground attacks with the
help of fighter-bombers.4
2. Ta, et al., Mien Dong Nam Bo Khang Chien, vol. 2, 169, 174; Military History Institute of Vietnam,
Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, trans. Merle L.
Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 138–39; Chien Dich Tien Cong Binh Gia,
Dong Xuan 1964–1965 [The Binh Gia Offensive Campaign, Winter-Spring 1964–1965], (Hanoi: Military
History Institute of Vietnam, 1988), 11.
3. Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc 1945–1975: Nhung Su Kien Quan Su [The Anti-U.S.
Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–1975: Military Events] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing
House, 1980), 65 (quote); Ban Chap Hanh Dang Bo Dang Cong San Viet Nam Tinh Dong Nai [Executive
Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Dong Nai Province] Dong Nai: 30 Nam Chien Tranh
Giai Phong (1945–1975) [Dong Nai: 30 Years War of Liberation, 1945–1975] (Dong Nai, Vietnam: Nha
Xuat Ban Dong Nai [Dong Nai Publishing House], 1986), chap. 5, 23; Ta et al., Mien Dong Nam Bo Khang
Chien, vol. 2, 174.
4. Ta et al., Mien Dong Nam Bo Khang Chien, vol. 2, 173–76; Associated Press (AP), “115 Reds Slain,
Viets Win Big Battle,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 8 Dec 1964, 2; AP, “3 Advisers Killed, Battles Spread,”
Pacific Stars & Stripes, 10 Dec 1964, 1, 24.
406
A Darkening Horizon
III Corps responded to the expanding threat on the ninth by sending a troop of
M113s to clear Highway 2 between Duc Thanh and Binh Gia. The 2d Regiment had
been waiting for four days for such a move. It assaulted the convoy where the road
passed through a rubber plantation, about 12 kilometers north of Phuoc Tuy’s capital
of Baria. The engagement began when a mine exploded under the lead armored
personnel carrier, knocking it out and killing the troop commander. The enemy then
opened fire from one side of the road. The troop responded by turning off the road and
moving in between rows of rubber trees toward the enemy. The tree rows permitted
forward and backward movement but hindered any other kind of maneuver. As the
carriers advanced, enemy recoilless rifles posted on the opposite side of the road fired
into the carriers’ rear. Front soldiers then rushed forward to deploy demolition charges
and to throw grenades into vehicle openings. The fighting was fierce. Nine U.S. Army
gunships arrived within 15 minutes of the start of the ambush, firing in support and
marking targets for fourteen fighter-bomber sorties. After about an hour, eight of the
fourteen M113s succeeded in disengaging. At 2100, the surviving carriers linked up
with a Ranger company delivered by U.S. Army helicopters and they advanced to
recover the wounded, but the enemy blocked the attempt.
Over the next two days, the South Vietnamese probed the ambush site and a
nearby mangrove swamp where they thought the enemy might be hiding, with no
results. The ambush destroyed six M113s, six 3.5-inch rocket launchers, one 81-mm.
mortar, and one .50-caliber machine gun. The insurgents captured two .50-caliber
machine guns, five .30-caliber machine guns, two Browning automatic rifles, and
twenty-four small arms. The government also lost twelve dead, thirty-one wounded,
and ten missing. The revolutionaries left behind one corpse and one weapon, with the
allies estimating that they had evacuated another one hundred casualties. Americans
believed the results would have been much worse for the government had it not been
for the prompt response by allied aviation.5
Concerned by the situation, MACV recommended to the Joint General Staff on
11 December that it commit reinforcements from the General Reserve. Westmoreland
then personally appealed to Khanh to take proactive measures. Khanh agreed, and on
the sixteenth he ordered III Corps to locate and destroy the main force units operating
in Phuoc Tuy. III Corps adviser Col. Jasper Wilson pressed his counterpart, Maj. Gen.
Cao Van Vien, to do just that, but he declined to act. Why Vien demurred is uncertain,
but just days later another coup rocked Saigon, with the military disbanding the
civilian High National Council.6
After about a week of inactivity, the enemy resurfaced on 17 December. Front
soldiers wearing South Vietnamese ranger uniforms and red berets ambushed a
convoy near Long Hai, Phuoc Tuy, killing four, wounding three, and destroying an
armored car and a truck. They damaged another armored car and truck and captured
a machine gun and twenty-nine individual weapons. Twenty-one government troops
went missing. Five days later, a North Vietnamese ship landed 44 tons of supplies
on a newly built dock near Loc An, Phuoc Tuy Province. Meanwhile, guerrillas and
5. Ta et al., Mien Dong Nam Bo Khang Chien, vol. 2, 176–77; United Press International (UPI), “Viet
Reds Smash Armored Column, in Phuoc Tuy,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 13 Dec 1964, 6; History, 2d Air
Div, Jul–Dec 1964, 2: 102–3; Rpt, Armor Organization for Counterinsurgency Operations in Vietnam,
Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA) Office of the Director, 9 Feb 1966, 30–31, Historians Files, U.S.
Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC.
6. Msg, COMUSMACV (Cdr, U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Vietnam) MAC J–312 0686 to CINCPAC, 8
Jan 1965, sub: Analysis of Situation in Phuoc Tuy, RVN, Historians Files, CMH.
407
Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965
Chief of Staff of the Army Johnson (right) visits III Corps Tactical Zone Commander
Maj. Gen. Cao Van Vien in December 1964.
National Archives
local forces assisted political cadre in weakening the government’s hold over hamlets
throughout the area.7
On 28 December, as tensions between Khanh and Taylor nearly bubbled over,
the National Liberation Front launched the next phase of its campaign. At 0445, the
insurgents made their third attempt at Binh Gia. While mortars and recoilless rifles
bombarded Duc Thanh post, a PLAF battalion easily captured the community from a
Popular Forces platoon. Later that day, 124 U.S. Army helicopters delivered the 30th
and 33d Ranger Battalions south and west of Binh Gia. Supported by thirty Skyraider
sorties, the force battled its way toward town before withdrawing under heavy pressure
to Duc Thanh.8
T
he allies returned on the twenty-ninth. In the morning, a company of the 30th
Rangers advanced from the west but was unable to break into Binh Gia. Then, at 1300,
25 U.S. Army helicopter transports and 24 gunships tried to land 2 U.S. advisers and 170
men of the 33d Ranger Battalion 100 meters north of Binh Gia. After heavy antiaircraft
f
ire drove off the helicopters, they landed their passengers at two locations southeast
of the hamlet. The battalion’s senior adviser, Capt. James E. Behnke, accompanied
one of the companies. As it advanced toward Binh Gia, insurgents dressed in ranger
uniforms sprang an ambush and Behnke and three Vietnamese soldiers became
separated from the rest of the unit. After radioing for helicopter evacuation, Behnke
dropped a white smoke grenade to guide the helicopter to their location. The device
malfunctioned, releasing only a small amount of smoke. He then told the pilot that he
would drop a green smoke grenade, but as he did so, two other green smoke grenades
detonated nearby. The enemy, it seemed, was monitoring the radio traffic, and set off
7. Rpt, Weekly Operations/Intelligence Highlights: Week Ending 19 Dec 1964, HMBF, Historian
Background Files (HBF), MACJ03, RG 472, NACP; Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in
Vietnam, 138–39; Ta et al., Mien Dong Nam Bo Khang Chien, vol. 2, 177–78.
8. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS (Ofc of the Dep Ch Staff for Ops), 11 Jan 1965, sub: Southeast Asia
Briefing, Intel Collection Files, MHB (Mil History Br), MACJ03, RG 472, NACP; Col. Nguyen Tuan
Doanh, “Maneuver Attack at Binh Gia-Xuan Son (Ba Ria Province) by 761st Infantry Regiment, Eastern
Military Region, on 29 and 31 December 1964,” in Senior Col. Nguen Quang Dat and Senior Col. Tran
Hanh, eds., Mot So Tran Danh Trong Khang Chien Chong Phap, Khang Chien Chong My, 1945–1975, Tap
I [A Number of Battles During the Resistance Wars Against the French and the Americans, 1945–1975,
Volume I] (Hanoi: Military History Institute of Vietnam, 1991), 212–13.
408
A Darkening Horizon
smoke grenades of their own to confuse the pilot. Fortunately, the pilot chose to land at
the marker closest to where he had seen the initial white smoke, rescuing Behnke and
the wounded Vietnamese rangers. As they flew to safety, enemy fire downed one of the
escorting gunships. The helicopter carrying Behnke immediately landed to rescue the
downed crew, then headed to Vung Tau airfield to rearm.9
At Vung Tau, Behnke learned that the enemy had surrounded and annihilated the
second ranger company that had landed outside of Binh Gia. S. Sgt. Harold G. Bennett
and another American had twice refused extraction by U.S. helicopters, preferring to
remain on the ground, rallying the survivors, and directing the gunships until the
enemy captured them. At 1430, the rest of the 33d Rangers landed further to the west.
With the help of U.S. Army helicopter gunships, they managed to fight their way to the
center of town. The 30th Rangers joined in the attack, and that night, the enemy finally
withdrew from the hamlet. The price, however, had been high, with about half of the
33d Rangers killed, wounded, or missing.10
On 30 December 1964, U.S. helicopters delivered the 4th Marine Battalion to Binh
Gia. The move took several hours as MACV could muster only enough helicopters
to lift one company at a time. Together with the rangers, the troops swept the town
to ensure it was free of enemy soldiers. Colonel Wilson took the lead, brandishing
a 9-mm. pistol as he walked ahead of the marines. In the evening, enemy gunners
downed a U.S. Army helicopter gunship 2 kilometers southeast of town. The craft
burned on impact, leading the Americans to believe, correctly, that no one survived
the crash. That event became the catalyst for more tragedy the following day.11
At 0700 on 31 December, the commander of the 4th Marines, Maj. Nguyen Van
Nho, sent a company to recover the remains of the downed American aviators. The
battalion’s senior adviser, Marine Maj. Frank P. Eller, attended the company. After
reaching the crash site in the Quang Giao rubber plantation, the company came under
attack. The Marines put up, in the words of a Communist author, “ferocious resistance.”
With the assistance of U.S. helicopter gunships, they repulsed multiple assaults, each
heralded by blaring bugles. Eventually, however, the insurgents forced the marines to
retreat. The company withdrew to Binh Gia where a wounded Major Eller reported on
the situation to Major Nho before boarding a helicopter to Saigon where he underwent
surgery for his wounds.12
Later in the day, Nho, an experienced and competent officer, led three of his four
companies back into the rubber plantation. Four U.S. Skyraiders led the way, dropping
napalm and bombs, before the battalion reached the crash site at 1515. Under increasing
enemy pressure, the battalion formed two defensive perimeters, one at the crash site and
a second at a nearby road junction. At 1630, the enemy attacked with three battalions
supported by mortars and recoilless rifles. Dressed in full uniforms, helmets, and boots,
the enemy pressed in hard. Once again, the marines fought feverishly against steep odds.
Eventually, the insurgents overran the company at the crash site. Fire from U.S. Army
Huey gunships seemed to have little impact on the foes, covered as they were by the thick
9. Ralph B. Young, Army Aviation in Vietnam,1963–1966: An Illustrated History of Unit Insignia
Aircraft Camouflage & Markings (Ramsey, NJ: The Huey Co., 2000), 25; James E. Behnke, Dai-Uy
(Bisbee, AZ: Behnke Books, 1992), 205–11.
10. Talking Papers, ODCSOPS, 4 and 11 Jan 1965, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, Intel Collection
f
iles, MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP; Doanh, “Maneuver Attack,” 215–16; Silver Star Award Citation, S.
Sgt. Harold George Bennett, n.d.; Silver Star Award Citation, Sp4c. Charles Earle Crafts, n.d., Historians
Files, CMH.
11. Behnke, Dai-Uy, 215–16.
12. Doanh, “Maneuver Attack,” 220 (quote), 221–22.
409
Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965
canopy of trees. Eight U.S. Air Force A–1Es arrived, but communication and procedural
problems kept them from attacking. Meanwhile, the marines at the intersection fought
bravely in hand-to-hand combat against great odds before implementing a fighting
withdrawal back to Binh Gia. They left behind 122 dead, including Maj. Nho and 28 of
his 34 officers. Another seventy-one marines suffered wounds, and several fell prisoner
to the enemy. Among the prisoners was a wounded American marine posted to the
battalion as an observer, Capt. Donald G. Cook.13
T
he main battle was over, but reverberations continued for days. On 1 and
3 January 1965, the 2d Regiment smashed convoys of ten and sixteen vehicles
respectively. In between those two actions, at dusk on 2 January, the regiment attacked
an understrength Regional Forces battalion and a tank troop that guarded the road
between Binh Gia and Baria. It used rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifles to
hammer the M24 tanks. A second tank troop tried to assist, but two burning tanks
blocked the road and rubber trees bordering the thoroughfare made it impossible to
advance in the darkness. The battle raged through the night. Dawn revealed twenty
South Vietnamese casualties and four tanks and an M113 damaged or destroyed. After
these series of engagements, the B–2 Front recalled its two main force regiments. The
South Vietnamese made a futile attempt to intercept them, uncovering in the process
a large tunnel complex. Meanwhile, National Liberation Front guerrilla and political
forces, assisted by detachments of PLAF regulars, continued to erode government
control over the countryside in a myriad of small actions.14
T
he Binh Gia campaign marked the highpoint of the initial stages of the Winter
Spring Offensive. The Communists had shown that they could conduct successfully a
large, multiregiment operation over an extended period. People’s Liberation Armed
Forces commanders had deftly maneuvered their units to hit the South Vietnamese with
advantage. In the words of one Communist history, Binh Gia represented “a great leap
forward” in the implementation of the main force war. The Communists claimed that
the operation had resulted in the destruction of two government battalions—the 33d
Rangers and 4th Marines—along with an armored cavalry troop and several smaller
elements. They also claimed they had killed 1,731 South Vietnamese and 52 Americans,
and captured 297 South Vietnamese and 3 Americans. They reported allied materiel
losses as 35 helicopters, 1 L19 aircraft, 2 Skyraiders, 22 M113 armored personnel carriers,
5 M24 tanks, 18 trucks, 2 jeeps, 611 weapons, and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. Finally,
the Communists asserted that they had gained control of more than 20,000 people.
Communist authors acknowledge that their own “casualties were high.”15
T
he allies’ recounting of the carnage was far smaller, but bad enough. MACV
reported that between 28 December and 6 January, the allies lost 201 killed, 192
wounded, and 68 missing. The American portion of these losses was five dead, eight
wounded, and three missing or captured. Other losses included 2 M113s destroyed, 4
helicopters shot down, 4 M24 tanks damaged, and 9 crew and 231 individual weapons
13. H. D. Bradshaw, “United States Marine Corps Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1964,”
Historical Br, G–3, HQ, USMC (United States Marine Corps), 1966, 43–44; Frank P. Eller, “Binh Gia:
Before the March 1965 Landing,” n.d.; both in Historians Files, CMH. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 11 Jan
1965; Robert F. Futrell, The Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1981),
261.
14. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 138–41; Hai Mai Viet, Steel and
Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2005), 20–21.
15. Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc 1945–1975, 64–65, 66 (first quote); Doanh, “Maneuver
Attack,” 223 (for a somewhat different Communist tally of allied losses), 224 (second quote); Dong Nai,
chap. 5, 25.
410
A Darkening Horizon
lost. Adding these numbers to the losses suffered before 28 December, including
the defeat of an armored troop on the ninth and many small engagements between
territorials and insurgents around hamlets, would raise the total, though it would still
be much lower than the Communist accounting. That the government lost influence
in the surrounding countryside was undeniable. Perhaps the only place where the
government did not lose influence was Binh Gia itself. The strongly progovernment
community emerged from its ordeal remarkably unscathed, with its morale high and
its hatred for the National Liberation Front as strong as ever.16
Such could not be said for the morale of allied officials. According to General
William DePuy, the debacle sent “shock waves through [the] GVN, MACV, and the
U.S. government.” It seemed to herald, if the offensives earlier in the year had not,
that the enemy truly had entered the final, quasi-conventional stage of revolutionary
warfare. Le Duan captured the battle’s significance: “After the battle of Ap Bac the
enemy knew it would be difficult to defeat us. After the Binh Gia campaign, the enemy
realized that he was in the process of being defeated by us.”17
Several factors contributed to the outcome. Political turmoil in Saigon had diverted
the attention of both Khanh and Vien. They had ignored MACV’s warnings about the
unfolding offensive and had committed troops piecemeal into a maelstrom. The enemy’s
careful selection of the battlefield worsened the predicament. The region had few
roads, and those that existed were vulnerable to ambush as they passed through many
wooded areas. The ambush threat had led the allies to deploy reinforcements largely by
helicopter, but this too had its disadvantages. The extensive rubber plantations meant
that there were relatively few landing sites available for helicopters. Those that were
accessible, the insurgents had carefully prepared in advance. Moreover, helicopters were
not always available to move entire units at once, leading to drawn out deployments
that denied the allies the advantages of shock and surprise. Together, these factors
exacerbated the government’s disjointed deployments to the enemy’s advantage. Binh
Gia was also out of artillery range, and MACV criticized the South Vietnamese for not
moving artillery into the area during the campaign. It also criticized them for not using
enough airpower to bombard landing zones before airmobile assaults. Insufficient use
of fighter-bombers during combat had also imperiled the ground troops, as dense
foliage and well-prepared entrenchments had limited the effectiveness of the weapons
carried by U.S. Army UH–1 gunships. The insurgents had further minimized their
losses to air power by “clinging to the enemy’s belts.” The rangers and marines had
fought bravely, but the high command had failed them.18
War by Numbers
It was an old story and its ending seemed to be getting worse. Indeed, many statistics
confirmed it. During 1964, the allies had killed fewer insurgents than they had the
16. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC J-312 0686 to CINCPAC (Cdr in Ch, Pacific), 8 Jan 1965, sub:
Analysis of Situation in Phuoc Tuy, RVN; Memo, Walter A. Lundy for Melvin L. Manfull, 2–3, encl.
to Msg, Saigon A–544 to State, 13 Jan 1965, sub: Provincial Reporting; both in Historians Files, CMH.
17. Henry G. Gole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 159 (first quote); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An
International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2012), 74 (second quote).
18. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 11 Jan 1965; Doanh, “Maneuver Attack,” 224, 226, 228 (quote);
Interim Rpt, Project Checo, U. S. Air Force, The Battle of Binh Gia, #3, n.d., iii, 4–7, Historians Files,
CMH; Msg, COMUSMACV MAC J-312 0686 to CINCPAC, 8 Jan 1965, sub: Analysis of Situation in
Phuoc Tuy.
411
Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965
year before, with the number of enemy dead dropping from 20,575 in 1963 to 16,785
in 1964. The number of enemy soldiers taken prisoner had also declined slightly, to
4,157. Conversely, deaths in the South Vietnamese security forces had risen from 5,665
in 1963 to 7,457 in 1964. Another 16,700 soldiers suffered wounds and 5,000 became
prisoners or went missing. The National Liberation Front had kidnapped or killed 2,490
officials and 9,782 civilians as part of its campaign to paralyze the government and to
terrorize the population into submission. Losses of weapons also told an increasingly
uneven tale, with the government giving up more than 14,000 weapons, up from
8,267 in 1963, while capturing 5,881 weapons, 400 more than it had acquired in 1963.
Finally, 73,000 men had deserted, double the number of the previous year. In contrast,
of enemy defections plummeted, from 11,428 in 1963 to 5,417 in 1964, a clear sign that
indicated that the Communists’ star was rising.19
For the United States, the toll was increasing as well. The number of co
