Check the overload protector.
The overload protector is located under the sink, on the bottom of the garbage disposal, facing the floor. It is a small square red button. If the overload protector has tripped, you will see the red button dropped down about a quarter of an inch (5mm). Gently press the red button. If it does not stay up, wait ten minutes and try again.
Ngày 8/10, tướng Hay, TL của 1 bộ binh, rút TĐ 1 của Stauffer về Phước Vĩnh (sau này gọi là Phú Giáo) để làm lực lượng phản ứng của sđ. Trung tá Terry Allen, chỉ huy TĐ 2/28, được lịnh di chuyển khỏi Lai Khê với ba đ.đ. (Alpha, Bravo, và Delta) và trực thăng vận đến 1 địa điểm khoảng 21 km tây bắc của làng Chơn Thành, và 3 km tây bắc của tđ 1 của Cavazos. đ.đ. Charlie của 2/28 tăng phái bảo vệ cho trung đoàn 15 pháo -- có nhiệm vụ yểm trợ các đv trong khu vực.
Hai ngày sau, TĐ của Stauffer chuyển tới 1 vị trí án ngữ mới, vì có tin vc chuyển về đồn điền Michelin. Ngày 11/10 Cavazos dẫn hai đ.đ. tiến về phía bắc để thăm dò, và lập tức bị vc tấn công. Vì gặp hỏa lực mạnh, Cavazos cho đ.đ. đầu rút về phía sau chu vi do đ.đ. 2 thiết lập. Sau khi đ.đ. này rút, phi pháo được gọi để dập đội hình vc. Khi dứt tiếng súng có 21 xác địch, trong khi thiệt hại ngày đó của Mỹ là 1 chết 4 bị thương. Sau đó TĐ trở về Phước Vĩnh để nghỉ ngơi và bổ sung quân số.
Vào giữa tháng 10, tướng Hay nghĩ rằng trung đoàn 271 bị thiệt hại nặng và sắp rút khỏi mật khu Long Nguyên. Do vậy ông sẵn sàng chấm dứt HQ Shenandoah II. Tuy nhiên, hoạt động gia tăng của vc gần Suối Ông Thành, nơi lữ đoàn 1 thường chạm súng, cho thấy 1 thực tế khác.
TRẬN ĐÁNH
Vào buổi sáng ngày 16/10, allen dẫn hai đ.đ. Bravo và Delta của TĐ rời vị trí đóng quân đêm hay NPD để tiến dọc Suối Ông Thành nhằm lục soát 1 khu ở phía đông nam, bao phủ bởi rừng rậm nhiều tán lá. sau khi đi khoảng 2 km, tđ gặp một hệ thống bunker kiên cố của vc; vì nghi là 1 căn cứ địa (base camp) của vc nên allen cho quân rút lui để máy bay đánh bom.
sau khi máy bay đánh bom, quân của allen tiến vào và chạm súng xảy ra với VC bắn sẻ từ các ngọn cây ở khu vực chung quanh. allen lại cho lính thụt lui, và lập 1 chu vi để bảo vệ thương binh, trong khi pháo binh tác xạ vào các bunker này. Sau đó khi tiến vào căn cứ này đã thấy 17 xác vc. TĐ di chuyển về cạnh phía tây của căn cứ này, và 1 chạm súng khác với khoảng 60 vc.
vào cuối buổi chiều, TĐ đoạn chiến và trở về vị trí đóng đêm đã kể. Tuy nhiên, sau đó ông gọi máy bay ném bom vào căn cứ địa, mà ông nghĩ là của trung đoàn 271. Tối hôm đó, chuẩn tướng William Coleman và các sq cao cấp của sđ 1 bộ binh thăm vị trí đóng quân đêm của TĐ 2/28, khen ngợi các cố gắng của quân sĩ, và trao huy chương Sao Bạc cho thiếu úy Clark Welch, chỉ huy của đ.đ. Delta, về chiến công trong ngày của ông. Sau đó Allen mở cuộc HQ để tấn công trực diện căn cứ địa của tr.đ. 271 VC, để xác định chúng còn ở đó ko.
Tuy nhiên, do thiếu quân, Welch đề nghị với Allen nên hoãn tấn công hay chờ thêm quân. Allen ko đồng ý, và chỉ định đ.u. James George, chỉ huy đ.đ. Alpha, dẫn đầu cuộc tấn công.
Trong khi đó, trung đoàn 1.200 quân của Võ minh Triết được tăng phái 200 người thuộc đ.đ. C1 của Đoàn Hậu Cần 83--dưới quyền của đ.u. Nguyễn văn Lắm--và họ lập 1 cuộc phục kích ba-cạnh và chờ đợi TĐ Mỹ. Khoảng 0800 ngày 17/10, TĐ 2/28 rời vị trí đóng quân với Alpha đi đầu, kế đó là BCH/TĐ, bọc hậu bởi Delta. Đ.đ Bravo ở lại để giữ vị trí đóng quân đêm, với các khẩu cối của Alpha và Delta. Theo lịnh của lữ đoàn trưởng mới, Allen phải đi bộ với tđ, dù rằng ông thích điều quân từ trực thăng. Do đi đầu nên Alpha được yểm trợ bởi pháo 105 và 155 từ ba căn cứ hỏa lực (CCHL) Caison V, Caison III-S và Lorraine III.
TĐ ko tiến về căn cứ địa vc theo hướng chính nam, nhưng hơi nghiêng 1 chút về phía tây. Dù có pháo binh liên tục tạo tường lửa chung quanh đội hình, nhưng TĐ thường xuyên ngừng để cho các trung đội lục soát kỹ lưỡng phía trước, phía sau và cạnh sườn.
Lúc 0956, thành phần đi đầu bất ngờ gặp (stumble) 1 đường mòn chạy hướng đông bắc tây bắc, có vẻ chỉ mới dùng khoảng 1 giờ. Chỉ huy trung đội 1 yêu cầu được phép lục soát theo hình cỏ ba lá về phía đông và tây của đường mòn. Nói thêm: lục soát cỏ ba lá (cloverleaf) là trung đội này cử nửa tiểu đội rời đội hình về phía đông và tây của đường mòn, đi tới 1 khoảng cách nào đó, và đi theo 1 vòng tròn để trở lại trung đội; nếu làm đúng cách sẽ phát hiện phục kích.
Gần như ngay lập tức, trung đội này trong khi lục soát phía tây của đường mòn đã thấy 1 lính vc và chẳng bao lâu 1 toán vc xuất hiện.
George lập tức ra lịnh trung đội 1 phục kích bên kia đường mòn, nhưng địch biến mất và tình hình yên tỉnh. khoảng 10-15 phút sau, trung đội 1 báo cáo cây chuyển động, tiếng lách cách (rattle) của súng lên đạn.
lúc ấy, sườn phải của alpha, do trung đội 2 phụ trách, bị hỏa lực rời rạc của địch. phần còn lại của trung đội 1, bị vc cầm chân bởi súng m-60, đặt 1 bunker ngụy trang kỹ. hỏa lực địch càng lúc gia tăng với đủ loại súng nhỏ và 12.7 ly. vì ko liên lạc với trung đội 1 và 2,
Following various engagements with the U.S. 1st Infantry Division during the previous months, Colonel Vo Minh Triet, commander of the Viet Cong 271st Regiment, was ordered to move his troops into an area known as the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, which was situated between National Highway 13 and the Michelin Rubber Plantation. It was located about 56 kilometers (35 mi) northwest of Saigon, in Binh Duong Province. There, Triet's regiment was supposed to receive troop replacements and food supplies, to prepare for a major offensive against an unspecified target in War Zone D. In previous years, the Viet Cong 9th Division had often used the month of September and October to rest and prepare for their winter-spring offensives, and 1967 was no different. For that reason Hay was determined to disrupt the Viet Cong's resting period by launching Operation Shenandoah II, with the objective of clearing Highway 13 from Chon Thanh to Loc Ninh.
On September 29, Hay ordered Colonel George E. Newman—commander of the 1st Brigade—to place the 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, in the northern portion of Long Nguyen. On the next day, Colonel Frank E. Blazey, commander of the 3rd Brigade, was ordered to deploy the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment to the southern half of the area. In the early stages of Shenandoah II, U.S. forces only made a few contacts with the Viet Cong. On October 2, a South Vietnamese unit operating east of Highway 13 near Chon Thanh made significant contact with a large Viet Cong formation and absorbed heavy casualties. Enemy documents obtained by the South Vietnamese indicated they had clashed with a battalion-sized unit from the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment, sent to attack Chon Thanh in order to cover the movement of the 271st Regiment into the Long Nguyen area. Early in October, Viet Cong soldiers of the 271st Regiment had arrived in Long Nguyen but they could not obtain their much-needed food supplies, as a result of allied search-and-destroy operations which had created significant food shortages for Viet Cong units in the region.
Triet then marched his starving soldiers southward toward the Ong Thanh Stream to link up with Rear Service Group 83, but local Viet Cong units also lacked adequate food supplies of their own, so the 271st Regiment was forced to wait in the area for the arrival of rice and other essential supplies. Meanwhile, on October 4 the Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Stauffer's 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, made contact with a company-sized Viet Cong formation about 9 kilometers (5.6 mi) south-west of Chon Thanh, and claimed to have killed 12 enemy soldiers. To pursue the retreating Viet Cong formation, Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Cavazos—commander of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment—was instructed to conduct an air-assault into a clearing located about 2 kilometers (1.2 mi) west of Stauffer' battalion, in order to block enemy troops. Cavazos' battalion landed unopposed, and they immediately set up their standard field position with wire entanglements to protect the base. On October 6, the 1st Battalion's position was subjected to Viet Cong mortar bombardment; even though the shells had caused little damage, Cavazos believed it was part of the enemy's final preparations for a major ground attack later that evening.
At around 6:00 pm the rain began to fall and the Viet Cong started attacking the battalion's camp from different directions, but Cavazos' men were able to hold their ground, with the support of artillery and mortar fire. By 12:00 am the fight was over, and U.S. casualties included 5 killed in action and 4 wounded. Three weeks later a captured Viet Cong soldier from the 2nd Battalion, 271st Regiment, revealed that his unit lost 59 soldiers killed and 56 wounded, in battle with Cavazos' battalion. On October 8, Hay pulled Stauffer's 1st Battalion back to Phuoc Vinh to act as the division's reaction force. Lieutenant Colonel Terry D. Allen—commander of the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment—was then ordered to depart from Lai Khê with three of his rifle companies (Alpha, Bravo and Delta) and air-lifted into a site about 21 kilometers (13 mi) northwest of Chon Thanh village, and 3 kilometers (1.9 mi) north-west of Cavazos' 1st Battalion. Charlie Company was detached from Allen's 2nd Battalion to protect the supporting 15th Field Artillery Regiment.
Two days later, Stauffer's battalion was deployed into new blocking positions, as Viet Cong units were believed to be moving toward the Michelin Rubber Plantation. On October 11, Cavazos led two of his companies out on a northward probe, and they were immediately attacked by the Viet Cong. While under heavy fire, Cavazos ordered the lead company to pull back behind a perimeter formed by the second company. As the lead company fell back, artillery and air support were called in to pummel the Viet Cong's attacking formation. When the battle was over, 21 Viet Cong soldiers were found dead, whereas U.S. casualties for the day were 1 killed and 4 wounded. Shortly afterwards, Cavazos' battalion pulled back to Phuoc Vinh for rest and refitting. By mid-October, Hay believed the Viet Cong's 271st Regiment had suffered a major defeat and was ready to withdraw from the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, so he was ready to terminate Shenandoah II. However, increased Viet Cong activity near the Ong Thanh Stream, where the 1st Brigade made most of its contacts, had indicated otherwise.
On the morning of October 16, Allen led two rifle companies (Bravo and Delta) of the 2nd Battalion out from their temporary night defensive position along the Ong Thanh Stream to patrol an area to the southeast, which was covered by thick jungle canopy. After marching for about 2 kilometers (1.2 mi), the battalion found a fortified Viet Cong bunker, so Allen ordered his men to pull back and directed airstrikes against Viet Cong positions. When the bombing runs were over, Allen’s men entered the camp and a firefight broke out with Viet Cong snipers firing down from trees in the surrounding areas. Again, Allen ordered his men to pull back and form a perimeter to protect their wounded soldiers, as artillery strikes were called in against Viet Cong bunker positions. The 2nd Battalion re-entered the camp, and they discovered the bodies of 17 dead Viet Cong soldiers. Allen's men then moved through the western end of the camp, and another fire-fight broke out with an estimated 60 Viet Cong soldiers.
Later that afternoon Allen decided to break contact and return to base, to avoid fighting a battle that could last until the evening. In the meantime, however, he called in air-strikes to inflict further damage on the base camp of his primary target, the 271st Regiment. That evening Brigadier General William Coleman and other senior officers of the 1st Infantry Division visited the 2nd Battalion's camp, where they praised Allen's men for their efforts, and presented First Lieutenant Clark Welch—commander of Delta Company—with a Silver Star for his actions earlier in the day. Allen then decided to launch a full-frontal attack against the 271st Regiment's base camp, to determine if the enemy unit was still there. However, due to the lack of sufficient manpower, Welch suggested that Allen should either call off the assault or get more soldiers on the ground for the operation. Allen dismissed Welch's suggestions, and responded by giving Captain James George—commander of Alpha Company—the responsibility of leading the attack instead of Welch.
Meanwhile, Triet's 1,200-strong regiment was joined by 200 soldiers from the C1 Company of Rear Service Group 83—under the command of Captain Nguyen Van Lam—and they set up a three-sided ambush and waited for the arrival of a reported U.S. battalion. At around 8:00 am on the morning of October 17, the 2nd Battalion departed from their night defensive position with Alpha Company in the lead followed by the Battalion Command Group, and the tail of the formation was covered by Delta Company. Bravo Company stayed behind to protect the battalion's base, along with the mortar sections of Alpha and Delta Companies. In accordance with the 1st Brigade's policy, Allen personally led his unit out as part of the Battalion Command Group, although he preferred to supervise actions from a helicopter. For artillery support, Alpha Company was authorized to call upon the 105mm and 155mm howitzers located at Fire Support Bases Caisson V, Caisson III-S and Lorraine III.
Allen's men marched southward from the base, with the intention of entering the enemy base camp from a slightly different direction to the west. Preceded by marching artillery fire, the 2nd Battalion stopped periodically to conduct cloverleaf patrols to their front, rear and both flanks. At 9:56 am the lead element of Alpha Company stumbled upon a northeast-southwest trail, which appeared to have been used within the last hour. The 1st Platoon Leader then requested and received permission to make cloverleaf patrols to the east and west of the trail. Almost immediately, the 1st Platoon sighted a Viet Cong soldier while scouting west of the trail and another group of Viet Cong soldiers soon appeared. George then ordered the 1st Platoon to set up a hasty ambush across the trail, but by the time they were in position the Viet Cong soldiers had disappeared and everything was quiet. About 10–15 minutes later, the 1st Platoon Leader reported that trees were moving, in addition to the sound of weapons clicking and the rattle of ammunition.
In response, George ordered the 1st Platoon to reinforce their ambush position. While that was happening Alpha Company's right flank, which was covered by the 2nd Platoon, began to receive sporadic enemy fire. The rest of the 1st Platoon was then pinned down when the Viet Cong, from within concealed bunker positions, fired on them using captured M60 machine-guns. The Viet Cong steadily increased their fire which came in the form of various small arms, .50 caliber and 12.7mm machine guns. Unable to communicate with the 1st and 2nd Platoons, George moved forward with the 3rd Platoon only to find his lead platoons held in their positions by enemy fire. A M18 Claymore mine then exploded in front of Alpha Company's command element, killing the radio operator and severely wounding both George and his Forward Artillery Observer. At around 10:40 am gunfire had died down, but Alpha Company was virtually destroyed during 30 minutes of fighting, with the company commander wounded and the leaders of 1st and 2nd Platoons both killed.
To break contact with the Viet Cong units which fired on Alpha Company from the western flank, First Sergeant Jose Valdez quickly organized an assembly area on the eastern side to round up the survivors. Shortly after the assembly area was established George, who was severely wounded from the Claymore explosion, turned his company over to Valdez. Allen then ordered Valdez to lead the survivors of Alpha Company northward to join the rest of the battalion. The survivors, mostly from the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of Alpha Company, were then ordered to withdraw through a perimeter formed by Delta Company. As the surviving elements of Alpha Company pulled back, Delta Company began to receive sporadic fire from their southern flank, so Allen ordered his command group to remain in place near a prominent anthill with the 1st and 2nd Platoons of Delta Company. The 3rd Platoon, on the other hand, was instructed to move forward to assist the wounded men from Alpha Company.
As Viet Cong fire increased in intensity, the soldiers of Delta Company picked up the distinctive sound of a U.S.-made M-60 machine-gun firing from the southern flank. Allen assumed that Alpha Company was approaching his perimeter, so he ordered them to cease-fire because he feared his rifle companies were firing on each other. However, the order was also passed down along the formation of Delta Company, which enabled the Viet Cong soldiers of the 271st Regiment to gain fire superiority. At around 11:35 am, Triet unleashed his 2nd Battalion which was placed in reserve during the battle, and they attacked Welch's Delta Company from three different directions. During that time Allen tried to request artillery support, but that had become impossible due to the close proximity between U.S. and Viet Cong soldiers. In a scene that had characterized the destruction of Alpha Company earlier, both Allen and Welch were wounded in battle as Viet Cong snipers fired down from the trees. Nonetheless, just before 12:00 pm, Allen instructed Delta Company to begin a northward march toward the battalion's base, and Bravo Company to move forward to cover the withdrawal.
The withdrawal quickly descended into a scene of chaos, as U.S. soldiers scrambled to avoid heavy enemy fire. During the last moments of the battle, Allen was struck in the head by machine-gun fire which grazed his helmet, and was finally killed when another burst of machine-gun fire hit him. At around 12:20 pm Newman flew into Ong Thanh to assume command of the 2nd Battalion, while Coleman took control of the 1st Brigade. Meanwhile, Alpha Company had linked up with Bravo Company, which had taken up positions about 450 meters (1,480 ft) to the south of the battalion's night defensive position with the task of assisting the wounded. At around 2:00 pm that afternoon, the 2nd Battalion's Charlie Company was airlifted into Ong Thanh from FSB Caisson V, as Bravo Company moved into the battle area to help evacuate the wounded. Coleman, who was coordinating the evacuation of U.S. casualties from a helicopter, decided to assemble the bodies of the dead in an area and protect it with artillery fire. By that stage, however, Triet's 271st Regiment had withdrawn from the battlefield, and medivac flights were only challenged by sporadic sniper fire.
At around 12:00 pm Triet had already ordered his troops to disengage from the battle without annihilating the remaining Americans caught in his ambush. His men were tired and hungry and he was behind schedule in his movement toward his next assignment. Moreover, he feared that American air power and artillery would begin to inflict heavy casualties on his unit.
The battle at Ong Thanh was a costly affair for the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment. During two hours of fighting the 2nd Battalion lost 64 men killed in action, including Lieutenant Colonel Terry Allen and every member of the Battalion Command Group, as well as 75 wounded and 2 missing. For their efforts in the battle, 13 American soldiers were awarded the Silver Star, while Allen and Welch received the Distinguished Service Cross. Forward Observer Second Lieutenant Harold B. Durham, who was attached to the 2nd Battalion on the day from the 15th Field Artillery Regiment, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions. Despite the losses that had been inflicted on the 2nd Battalion by the Viet Cong, the U.S. military told the media that the fight at Ong Thanh had resulted in a major American victory.
General Hay initially portrayed Ong Thanh as an American victory and cited 101 enemy dead in the battle. However, American veterans who survived the ordeals of the battle were adamant they were ambushed and defeated by the Viet Cong's 271st Regiment. The estimate of 101 enemy dead officially provided by the U.S. military was likely much inflated to emphasize the scale of the 'American victory'. For retired U.S. Army Brigadier General James E. Shelton, who was then a major and served as an Operations Officer with the 2nd Battalion, the lack of reliable intelligence and overconfidence on the part of Allen as the battalion commander, were some of the factors that led to the disastrous outcome in the Ong Thanh battle. Furthermore, the American soldiers under Allen's command lacked fighting experience, whereas the Viet Cong soldiers of the 9th Division were tough and experienced light infantry. The Viet Cong 271st Regiment, after their victory at Ong Thanh, withdrew back towards their base area near the Cambodian border.
Meanwhile, the rest of the Viet Cong 9th Division was planning for a major attack on Loc Ninh, with the objective of capturing the district town and the Special Forces Camp. To accomplish their goals the Viet Cong deployed the 272nd and 273rd Regiments, reinforced with two battalions from the 165th Regiment and the Vietnam People's Army 84th Artillery Regiment. During the days before the battle, U.S. military intelligence had noticed the build-up of Viet Cong units around Loc Ninh. Hay, in response, planned to insert four battalions of the 1st Infantry Division and position them around Loc Ninh, thereby trapping the Viet Cong inside the town. On the evening of October 28, the 272nd Regiment marched into position from the northeast, and the 273rd Regiment from west. At 1:15 am on October 29, the 273rd Regiment began assaulting the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp, but they were quickly repelled by U.S.-led Special Forces. At around 6:30 am the remaining elements of Bravo and Charlie Companies 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, were airlifted onto the Loc Ninh airfield, to set up a firebase at the field's south-western end. The soldiers of Alpha and Delta Companies were sent back to their Base Camp at Lai Khe to adjust to the losses they had suffered, and to be kept away from enemy activity.
Battle of Ong Thanh - Alchetron, The Free Social Encyclopedia
