135. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, September 20, 1961, 7 p.m.
385. Task Force VN. Separate unclassified telegram2 gives text GVN communiqué re Sept 17/18 VC attack Phuoc Thanh. Aside from supplement information reported through MAAG channels, Thuan told me Sept 19 estimated three battalions had participated in attack. He said initial estimates of GVN casualties were about 20, but subsequent information indicates they considerably higher than this.
Contrary to impression given in official communiqué, VC succeeded in capturing Phuoc Thanh and holding it several hours, during which they reportedly staged “people’s trial” and executed [Page 306]province chief and chief assistant in market place.3 While ARVN forces are pursuing contact with VC broken off.
Phuoc Thanh is first provincial capital temporarily captured by VC. Earlier attempt take over capital of Kien Hoa in April was frustrated by local authorities. However, province chief, said by Diem to be one of best, is second killed past 18 months, other being in Vinh Long last year.
Phuoc Thanh, which I recently visited with President, is new province. Provincial capital is small town on edge thickly forested Zone D (which has long been VC base). It was garrisoned primarily by CG with some ARVN support. Attack followed pattern recent incident North Kontum, and thick jungle around Phuoc Thanh provided VC with excellent cover for assault, although two Ranger companies in area at time.
This most recent incident, a considerable VC success, is most regrettable, but should be balanced against recent ARVN victories. It demonstrates that tide has not yet turned. Additional VC attacks in strength, perhaps even closer to Saigon, to be expected as infiltration through Laos continues and local recruitment maintained at high level. Civil Guard will probably remain preferred target until its capabilities improve.
Nolting
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K 00/9-2061. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, London, and Paris. The Department was asked to pass a copy to ACSI.↩
Telegram 384 from Saigon, September 20. (Ibid.)↩
Nolting recalled that he visited the province chief and his family the week before and was impressed by him as a vigorous and well-motivated official. Nolting had often wondered whether there was any connection between his visit and the Viet Cong overrunning of that village. (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Viet-Nam Interviews, Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., May 25, 1984)↩
Contents
Preface
List of Sources
List of Abbreviations
List of Persons
Vietnam
I. Visit of General Edward G. Lansdale to Vietnam January 2-14, 1961 (Documents 1–8)
II. United States Efforts To Obtain South Vietnamese Acceptance of the Basic Counterinsurgency Plan February-April 1961 (Documents 9–30)
III. Creation of the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam and the Drafting of a Program of Action on Vietnam April-May 1961 (Documents 31–52)
IV. Vice President Johnson’s Trip to Asia, May 9-24, 1961, and the Visit of Vietnamese Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan to Washington, June 12-17, 1961 (Documents 53–71)
V. Special Financial Group Mission to Viet-Nam June 17-July 15, 1961 (Documents 72–95)
VI. Consideration Within the United States Government of the Special Financial Group Recommendations July-August 1961 (Documents 96–126)
VII. United States and Vietnamese Government Response to Increased Viet Cong Activity September-October 1961 (Documents 127–168)
VIII. The Taylor Mission to Southeast Asia October 15-November 3, 1961 (Documents 169–209)
IX. United States Government Consideration of the Taylor Mission Report November 3-15, 1961 (Documents 210–256)
X. Implementation of the Taylor Mission Report November 15-December 15, 1961 (Documents 257–323)
XI. The Secretary of Defense’s First Conference on Vietnam, Held at Honolulu, December 16, 1961, and Its Aftermath (Documents 324–343)
===
The Communists Renew the Offensive
While the South Vietnamese Army and its US advisors believed that they had made
significant progress during the summer of 1961 in the counterinsurgency war,
the Communists soon put an end to this momentary optimism. In September in Hanoi,
the Politburo and the Central Military Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party
approved a People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) General Staff recommendation to expand
the war in South Vietnam. According to the PAVN official history, the General Staff
proposal called for not only increased local recruitment and attacks by the Viet Cong in
the south but also the eventual deployment of some 30,000 to 40,000 North Vietnamese
troops to South Vietnam, including native southerners who went north in 1954.1
Coincidentally, or as a result of the planning effort in North Vietnam, the Viet Cong
mounted a major offensive in South Vietnam in September, more than tripling the
number of attacks of previous months. The most dramatic incident occurred on 17–18
September when an undetermined number of Viet Cong units overran the provincial
capital Phouc Thanh, approximately fifty-five miles north of Saigon bordering War Zone
D, a long-time Communist stronghold. In contrast to their usual hit and run tactics, the
Communist troops occupied the town for several hours. Showing their disdain for the
South Vietnamese government and lack of fear of reprisal, they held a “people’s trial” of
the province chief and his assistant in the town’s market square and then beheaded both
men. Ambassador Nolting reported that President Diem considered the dead chief to
have been one of his best. By the end of the month, US intelligence estimated VC military
strength at 17,000, an increase of 2,000 in a month. In an analysis of the growing boldness
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JCS and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968
and strength of the Viet Cong, an internal State Department study observed that during
September the Communists had “mounted three attacks with over 1,000 men in each.”
It concluded that “the Viet Cong strategy may be directed at ‘liberating’ an area in which
a ‘government’ could be installed.”2
The enemy forces in Laos also continued to worry American intelligence analysts.
While North Vietnamese troops in northern Laos appeared to be withdrawing, there was
at the same time “Viet Minh movement into Southern Laos bordering on South Vietnam.”
According to the State Department analysts, “it appears [the] enemy may be accepting
stalemate for time being within Laos and giving priority to stepping up offensive action
against South Vietnam.”3 This conclusion was supported by the findings of Brigadier
General William A. Craig, who visited Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam on behalf of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the feasibility of SEATO contingency plans.4 Upon
his return on 15 September, he forwarded a sixteen-page report to General Lemnitzer,
the Chairman, and personally briefed General Maxwell Taylor and presidential advisor
Walt Rostow. According to Mr. Rostow, General Craig emphasized “a build-up of Pathet
Lao-Viet-minh forces in Southern Laos and the beginnings of additional pressure on
Central Vietnam from that area.”5 General Taylor wrote that General Craig perceived
this guerrilla buildup in the Laotian panhandle as a possible harbinger “of an over-the
border offensive against South Vietnam.
