Thursday, July 17, 2025

 




The Vietnam War
by LTC JD Lock

As the Cold War lengthened in the late 1950s, NATO nations felt there was a need for small units to conduct passive, deep penetration intelligence gathering missions at corps levels and higher. From this need was born the Long Range Patrol (LRP) or Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) unit...both LRP and LRRP designations were used similarly and considered interchangeable, trained and equipped to infiltrate enemy lines by ground, air, or water. From well-concealed observation posts or as a function of point, area, or route reconnaissance, they were intended to report enemy movements. Stealth and reconnaissance were the mission of the LRRP, not direct combat. Ultimately, these LRRPs would lead directly to the Ranger companies of Vietnam.

In support of U.S. military operations in Vietnam, units designated as Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) were officially sanctioned and authorized. Field forces and division-sized elements activated an Infantry Company (LRP). Each company had a total of 118 soldiers assigned with a headquarters section and two reconnaissance platoons with eight six-man patrols. Two of the companies, Company E of the 20th Infantry Regiment) and Company F of the 51st Infantry Regiment, were each nearly twice the authorized strength at 230 soldiers and four reconnaissance platoons.

Separate brigades activated infantry detachments (LRP). These detachments had a total of sixty-one soldiers assigned with a large headquarters section and a single reconnaissance platoon. Eventually, eleven companies...this number does not include Company E, 30th Infantry Regiment, that was used as a training resource in Support of the Aviation Center and School...and four detachments...this number does not include the 70th Infantry Detachment that was deactivated in Hawaii prior to the 11th Infantry Brigade's deployment to Vietnam with the 23rd Americal Division...were activated and deployed with combat units.

Unfortunately for the LRP units, even though they would eventually become the founding units of the Rangers, there initially was no heritage or lineage to bind the separate companies and detachments. In that the Special Forces, having been without a lineage since its formation in 1952, had been granted the lineage and honors of the 1st through 6th Ranger Infantry Battalions, 1st Special Service Force, of the Second World War on 15 April 1960, the 75th Infantry Regiment with the lineage and honors of Merrill's Marauders and the 475th Infantry Regiment was selected as the lineage for the new LRRP organization.

This is the standard load for an M79 gunner in Papa Company, 75th Inf. (Ranger) in 1970 for a 4-5 day mission. more

On 1 February 1969, most of the active army LRRP companies and detachments were deactivated as LRRP units and reactivated as companies of the 75th Infantry Regiment. With the redesignation of the LRPs to 75th Infantry Regiment companies in 1969, additional Army Reserve National Guard (ARNG) Ranger-style companies were organized.

The Ranger companies in Vietnam were deactivated during the period 1969 to 1972 as the units they were attached to were deactivated or returned to the United States as part of Vietnamization, though Company O (Arctic Ranger), 75th Infantry Regiment would be reactivated in 1970 for duty at Fort Richardson, Alaska, for a short period of time.

In 1960, counter-guerrilla forces of South Vietnamese Army light infantry Ranger companies were created. Referred to as Biêt-Dông-Quân or BDQ, a significant number of Ranger-qualified officers and NCOs served as advisors to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger units throughout the duration of the war...nearly in 2,000 total.

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Though they were suppose to operate only in an advisory capacity, there were those situations that thrust some Ranger advisors to the forefront. On 4 April 1970, Sergeant First Class Gary L. Littrell found himself the only unwounded American Ranger advisor left after a surprise mortar barrage by the 28th North Vietnamese Regiment struck the 23rd ARVN Ranger Battalion in their defensive positions on top of Hill 763 in Kontum Province. An attempted helicopter extraction of the wounded Americans by Littrell failed as the helicopters could not penetrate the small arms fire to land near the Ranger NCO, who was standing in the open, exposed, holding a strobe light. Securing the wounded, Littrell proceeded to direct close air support throughout the night and into the next morning.

The light of dawn was met with another heavy mortar barrage against the besieged RVN battalion. Littrell moved about the perimeter administering first aid, directing fires, and moving casualties. A resupply helicopter was able to make it into the LZ around 1000. Littrell loaded the three wounded American Ranger advisors on board along with some ARVN Rangers as another American Ranger, Specialist 5 Raymond Dieterle, disembarked from the helicopter with ammunition.

For the remainder of the day, the two Ranger advisors moved about the perimeter, calling in air strikes, adjusting artillery strikes, and encouraging their South Vietnamese Ranger compatriots. The pressure against the perimeter grew along with the night. Sapper probes were driven back by indirect, aerial, and small arms fire.

The morning of 6 April opened with a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) attack that was repelled. Throughout that day, the NVA continued to rain heavy weapons and mortar fire down on the beleaguered force while the two American Rangers continued to make their rounds of the perimeter, shoring up the Vietnamese's spirits. At 0630 the following morning, another firestorm of explosive volleys swept the hilltop. A massed assault staging in the woods was met by helicopter strikes directed by Littrell at the point of attack. Despite the air strikes, the human-wave attack a half hour later nearly breached the perimeter. Only a stoic defense by the fatigued defenders and the advisors' bravery repelled the charge.

The Rangers were able to hold against a series of attacks that night. Finally, at 1030 on 8 April, the depleted and exhausted battalion was ordered to withdraw down the hill, through the jungle, across the Dak Poko River, to reach the 22nd ARVN Ranger Battalion. The two Ranger advisors set about organizing the movement, redistributing ammunition, and seeing that the dead and wounded were brought along.

The battalion moved out at 1100, under the command of the dazed ARVN battalion executive officer who proceeded to move down the wrong spur of the hill...despite the warning of the two American Rangers...and closer to the enemy position. At the bottom of the hill, the executive officer incredulously halted his formation for a five-minute tea break.

Immediately, the battalion was inundated with mortar fire. Littrell was able to establish radio contact with the 22nd ARVN Ranger Battalion and direct counter-fires against the enemy mortars. Requests for gunship support brought the word that none was immediately available, which prompted the battalion executive officer to panic and run. Seeing their commander flee, the remainder of the South Vietnamese Rangers began to scatter, leaving their dead and wounded behind.

With a "Come on, partner, let's hat up," Littrell grabbed Dieterle and slowly gathered up the dispersed Rangers. With the remnants of the battalion regrouped, the two Rangers proceeded to lead the formation through the jungle for several hours toward the proper objective. As the North Vietnamese pursued, the Rangers directed mortar fires "danger close" to keep the enemy at bay. During the repulse of one assault, Littrell and his partner were knocked to the ground by the force of 500-pound bombs the senior Ranger had called in nearby.

Directing the fight through two ambushes, the Americans continued to lead, cajole, and drag the ARVN soldiers along. At the last ambush site, Littrell stopped to assist three wounded Vietnamese Rangers. Carrying the most seriously wounded one on his back, Littrell ended up dragging the other two behind him and across the Dak Poko River as they held on to his web gear and were led to safety by Littrell with the remainder of the battalion.

Total losses for the ARVN Ranger Battalion were 218 casualties and nineteen MIA. For conduct above and beyond the call of duty, Sergeant First Class Gary L. Littrell was awarded the Medal of Honor.


By the end of United States involvement in Vietnam in 1973, Companies A and B of the 75th Infantry Regiment were the only two active duty Ranger/LRRP companies still in existence.


Ranger history © JD Lock. Used with permission.

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26 Sep 2004

Rosendo was a career soldier from Big Spring, Texas. He was married to Marie Montana and had been in the Army since 1964. He had completed a previous tour in Vietnam in 66-67.

Rosendo was a Pathfinder and was apart of the security detachment for the 17th Aviation Group. On April 15, 1970, Rosendo was shot to death when he was a part of a planned insertion of ARVN troops into LZ Orange to counter buildup of NVA troops around a Special Forces camp at Dak Seang, about 20 miles north of Dak To. He was the radio operator and was with another American soldier and a handful of ARVN troops who were the first group to be inserted and as such were setting up security for the insertion of additional ARVN troops when suddenly the second helicopter coming in for insertion was hit from all sides with ground fire. The helicopter was shot down. Specialist Montana was wounded in the concentration of ground fire and he continued to try to get out radio transmissions dispite his wounds. He was then killed as the second barrage was concentrated on his position.

Specialist Montana was buried with full military honors in Big Spring, Texas, and is remembered on the Permian Basin Vietnam Veterans' Memorial.

Notes from The Virtual Wall

The situation at Dak Seang was a little more complicated than described above. The Special Forces camp at Dak Seang was under attack and a decision was taken to insert the 3rd Bn, 42nd ARVN Regiment, onto a bit of high ground about a mile distant from the camp in order to relieve pressure on the SF camp. As noted, the 170th AHC was tasked with the insertion. Although NVA forces essentially surrounded the proposed landing zone they were invisible within camoflaged bunkers - and when they allowed the first Huey to land unopposed it appeared the insertion was into a "cold" LZ.

The first Huey landed two US pathfinders (SP5 Rosendo Montana and Cpl Herndon A. Bivens) and six ARVN troops. The second Huey, UH-1H tail number 68-16203, was shot down, landing in the middle of the LZ. Although two ARVN soldiers died in the crash, four US aircrewmen and four ARVN soldiers suffered only minor injuries and were able to exit the wrecked aircraft. The pilot, WO Albert L. Barthelme, was severely wounded as he exited but was carried to a nearby bomb crater. Copilot WO Roger A. Miller, crewmen SP4 Vincent S. Davis and SP5 Donald C. Summers, and four ARVNs were with Barthelme; the surviving soldiers from the first Huey were a short distance away. All were taking heavy fire from the NVA defenders. Immediate efforts at extraction were hampered by three factors:

  • Except for the Huey which landed Montana and Bivens, all the helicopters in the area were gunships or laden with ARVN troops;
  • The hilltop LZ was partially blocked by the wreckage of 68-16203; and
  • The entire LZ area was now under fire from dug-in NVA troops with weapons up to and including quad .51 caliber machineguns and 23mm light anti-aircraft guns.
A SAR force consisting of A-1 Skyraiders and two Air Force HH-3s was called up from Danang and arrived on scene without delay. While the Skyraiders attempted to suppress the NVA gunners, the lead HH-3E (JOLLY GREEN 27, tail number 66-13280) made two unsuccessful approaches to the LZ. On the third approach a previously silent quad .51 opened fire and brought the HH-3 down. The pilot, Capt Travis H. Scott, was killed in the crash. Copilot Major Travis Wofford, relatively uninjured, dragged the two badly burned crewmen from the wreckage. The HH-3 crash site was some distance from the other two US/ARVN positions, which turned out to be a mixed blessing - somewhat less NVA fire, but no possibility of mutually supporting defense. Fortunately the second HH-3E (JOLLY GREEN 29, HH-53C tail number 68-10360) was able to land next to the wreckage and recover Wofford and the two injured crewmen from 66-13280 before being heavily hit by 23mm fire and forced to withdraw from the area.

Two unladen 170th AHC Hueys then arrived on scene. One of them, piloted by a WO Bill McDonald, landed under heavy fire and was able to take crewmen SP4 Davis and SP5 Summers from UH-1H 68-16203 aboard before being forced from the LZ. Although McDonald's aircraft was badly shot up, he was able to nurse it to just within the Special Forces camp perimeter. The second UH-1 landed next to McDonald, made an under-fire transfer of the men from McDonald's aircraft, and lifted off with a load of wounded men. At this point Davis and Summers advised that one of the US pathfinders was dead and WO Barthelme severely wounded.

By this time night was falling, the Special Forces camp was under active attack, and there was no realistic hope for further efforts to extract the US and ARVN troops on the hilltop. During the night, some of the ARVNs decided to try to get to the SF camp; two made it. Miller and Bivens elected to stay close to the Huey wreckage with WO Barthelme, who could not be moved, and await the morning's events. Renewed airborne SAR efforts were begun at first light, but to no avail - none of the missing US or ARVN troops could be located.

Friendly ground forces could not reach the LZ until 29 April 1970, when they found and recovered the bodies of WO Barthelme and SP5 Montana. There was no trace of WO Miller or CPL Bivens.

In time some of the questions were resolved. WO Miller had been captured, survived captivity, and was released by the NVA on 05 March 1973. On his return he advised that after Barthelme died during the night, he and Bivens decided to try for friendly lines but were ambushed while enroute. Bivens was hit in the chest by a half-dozen rounds, and Miller was told that Bivens died about two hours after they were captured.

All told, two US infantrymen, eight US aircrewmen, and twelve ARVN infantrymen had been on the ground. Only six survived the experience:

  • UH-1H 68-16203, 170th AHC:
    • CWO Albert L. Barthelme, Towson, MD, KIA
    • WO Roger A. Miller, POW, released 03/05/73
    • SP5 Donald C. Summers, WIA, recovered
    • SP4 Vincent S. Davis, WIA, recovered

  • HHC, 52nd Avn Bn
    • SP5 Rosendo Montana, Big Spring, TX, KIA
    • Cpl Herndon A. Bivens, Jamaica, NY, WIA, died after capture; body not recovered

  • HH-3E tail number 66-13280, 37th ARRS, 7TH AF
    • CPT Travis H. Scott, Montgomery, AL, pilot, KIA (Air Force Cross)
    • MAJ Travis Wofford, copilot, WIA (Air Force Cross)
    • SSGT Luther E. Davis, Oak Ridge, TN, DoW 05/25/1970
    • TSGT Gerald L. Hartzel, Graters Ford, PA, DoW 04/20/1970

  • 3rd Bn, 42nd ARVN Rgt
    • Ten KIA, names unknown
    • Two survivors, names unknown


 Though they were suppose to operate only in an advisory capacity, there were those situations that thrust some Ranger advisors to the forefront. On 4 April 1970, Sergeant First Class Gary L. Littrell found himself the only unwounded American Ranger advisor left after a surprise mortar barrage by the 28th North Vietnamese Regiment struck the 23rd ARVN Ranger Battalion in their defensive positions on top of Hill 763 in Kontum Province. An attempted helicopter extraction of the wounded Americans by Littrell failed as the helicopters could not penetrate the small arms fire to land near the Ranger NCO, who was standing in the open, exposed, holding a strobe light. Securing the wounded, Littrell proceeded to direct close air support throughout the night and into the next morning.

The light of dawn was met with another heavy mortar barrage against the besieged RVN battalion. Littrell moved about the perimeter administering first aid, directing fires, and moving casualties. A resupply helicopter was able to make it into the LZ around 1000. Littrell loaded the three wounded American Ranger advisors on board along with some ARVN Rangers as another American Ranger, Specialist 5 Raymond Dieterle, disembarked from the helicopter with ammunition.

For the remainder of the day, the two Ranger advisors moved about the perimeter, calling in air strikes, adjusting artillery strikes, and encouraging their South Vietnamese Ranger compatriots. The pressure against the perimeter grew along with the night. Sapper probes were driven back by indirect, aerial, and small arms fire.

The morning of 6 April opened with a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) attack that was repelled. Throughout that day, the NVA continued to rain heavy weapons and mortar fire down on the beleaguered force while the two American Rangers continued to make their rounds of the perimeter, shoring up the Vietnamese’s spirits. At 0630 the following morning, another firestorm of explosive volleys swept the hilltop. A massed assault staging in the woods was met by helicopter strikes directed by Littrell at the point of attack. Despite the air strikes, the human-wave attack a half hour later nearly breached the perimeter. Only a stoic defense by the fatigued defenders and the advisors’ bravery repelled the charge.

The Rangers were able to hold against a series of attacks that night. Finally, at 1030 on 8 April, the depleted and exhausted battalion was ordered to withdraw down the hill, through the jungle, across the Dak Poko River, to reach the 22nd ARVN Ranger Battalion. The two Ranger advisors set about organizing the movement, redistributing ammunition, and seeing that the dead and wounded were brought along.

The battalion moved out at 1100, under the command of the dazed ARVN battalion executive officer who proceeded to move down the wrong spur of the hill…despite the warning of the two American Rangers…and closer to the enemy position. At the bottom of the hill, the executive officer incredulously halted his formation for a five-minute tea break.

Immediately, the battalion was inundated with mortar fire. Littrell was able to establish radio contact with the 22nd ARVN Ranger Battalion and direct counter-fires against the enemy mortars. Requests for gunship support brought the word that none was immediately available, which prompted the battalion executive officer to panic and run. Seeing their commander flee, the remainder of the South Vietnamese Rangers began to scatter, leaving their dead and wounded behind.

With a “Come on, partner, let’s hat up,” Littrell grabbed Dieterle and slowly gathered up the dispersed Rangers. With the remnants of the battalion regrouped, the two Rangers proceeded to lead the formation through the jungle for several hours toward the proper objective. As the North Vietnamese pursued, the Rangers directed mortar fires “danger close” to keep the enemy at bay. During the repulse of one assault, Littrell and his partner were knocked to the ground by the force of 500-pound bombs the senior Ranger had called in nearby.

Directing the fight through two ambushes, the Americans continued to lead, cajole, and drag the ARVN soldiers along. At the last ambush site, Littrell stopped to assist three wounded Vietnamese Rangers. Carrying the most seriously wounded one on his back, Littrell ended up dragging the other two behind him and across the Dak Poko River as they held on to his web gear and were led to safety by Littrell with the remainder of the battalion.

Total losses for the ARVN Ranger Battalion were 218 casualties and nineteen MIA. For conduct above and beyond the call of duty, Sergeant First Class Gary L. Littrell was awarded the Medal of Honor.


By the end of United States involvement in Vietnam in 1973, Companies A and B of the 75th Infantry Regiment were the only two active duty Ranger/LRRP companies still in existence.


 “There was only one MIKE Force battalion activated as it was, by COMUS MACV [Commander U.S. MACV] letter order,” said retired Brigadier General Stringham. “The order was sent from 5th Group that directed C-3 to form one reaction force battalion.19 Time was critical. A-302 was given less than two weeks to train the new unit. Filling the ranks with new recruits, issuing equipment, and training had to be accomplished by 22 June 1965. After that date, the battalion was to be on call to respond to emergencies in the hotly disputed III CTZ

LTC Miguel “Mike” de la Peña
LTC Miguel “Mike” de la Peña

“The unit was named the MIKE Force. This came from LTC Miguel ‘Mike’ de la Peña. ‘Mike’ was his code name,” said Stringham.20 The MIKE Force was composed of three 150-man companies. With 348 Company as the nucleus, A-302 recruited Nungs to fill the ranks of the other companies. Nungs were also hired to form the reconnaissance platoon.21 There were no Vietnamese CIDG or Special Forces in the first MIKE Force. The strong family ties among the Nungs made the recruitment easy and virtually eliminated the security problems.

“Nepotism was the name of the game,” said Stringham. “Most of the older Nungs were ex-French Foreign Legion [French Colonial Army] guys and they would vouch for the younger ones. It was kind of a ‘self-vetting process,’ but we didn’t have a lot of time.22 New recruits were given a cursory physical by the A-302 team medics to check for diseases and fitness. The troops were issued one set of tiger-stripe fatigues and M-2 carbines. Each company weapons platoon had three M-1919A1 .30 caliber machine guns and three 60 mm mortars.23 For communications, they were issued PRC-25 radios. The equipment for the MIKE Force came from the 5th SFG logistics base at Nha Trang. Being on the MIKE Force was economically advantageous for the troops. MIKE Force Nungs were paid considerably more than their CIDG counterparts. Each man received 6600 piastres ($55.00) per month as opposed to the 1500 p ($12.00) that was the CIDG monthly wage.24

A U.S. Air Force B-52D Stratofortress dropping 500 pound bombs over Vietnam. The first MIKE Force mission was to conduct a bomb damage assessment following a B-52 strike.
A U.S. Air Force B-52D Stratofortress dropping 500 pound bombs over Vietnam. The first MIKE Force mission was to conduct a bomb damage assessment following a B-52 strike.

“I was the battalion commander,” said Stringham. “Two NCOs [non-commissioned officers] worked with each company. The guys lived with their companies.25 A-302 focused on marksmanship and infantry small-unit tactics to get the MIKE Force operational. That test came on 22 June 1965.

“The first mission was to take three 6-man teams by helicopter into an area between Highway 13 and the Michelin Rubber Plantation to do a [bomb damage] assessment after a B-52 strike,” recalls Stringham. “The B-52s came out of Guam, but due to a mid-air collision during refueling, they missed the target. All they did was knock down enough stuff to make it hard to move through. We got inserted, ran around a while and got picked up. Not a great beginning for the MIKE Force.26 The real combat evaluation came a month later.

On 19 July 1965, orders came from the C detachment to prepare a MIKE Force company to aid the SF team at the CIDG camp at Bu Ghia Map under attack by two VC battalions. The Mike Force mission was to evacuate the SF team and their CIDG strikers. 348 Company, the new 4th Nung company and the recon platoon were trucked to Tan Son Nhut Airbase to load two C-123 aircraft for the flight that night to Bu Ghia Map near the Cambodian border.27

The bunker on the northwest corner of the camp at Bu Dop prior to the battle. Strong defensive bunkers were located on all four corners of the camp perimeter. The VC destroyed this bunker with recoilless rifle fire.
The bunker on the northwest corner of the camp at Bu Dop prior to the battle. Strong defensive bunkers were located on all four corners of the camp perimeter. The VC destroyed this bunker with recoilless rifle fire.
The ruins of the Special Forces team billets at Bu Dop after the battle. Little was left of the camp after the heavy Viet Cong assault.
The ruins of the Special Forces team billets at Bu Dop after the battle. Little was left of the camp after the heavy Viet Cong assault.
Aerial view of the CIDG camp at Bu Dop. The Viet Cong attacked the north and west sides of the camp. The SF billets were in the center of the camp.
Aerial view of the CIDG camp at Bu Dop. The Viet Cong attacked the north and west sides of the camp. The SF billets were in the center of the camp.

“We went in very light, no rucksacks or food. We landed and it was very dark,” said Stringham. “ I ran off the plane and straight into a ditch. When we got into the camp, I put my people on the perimeter, and got theirs [the camp occupants] off the wall, since they were likely compromised. There was half an A detachment and a handful of strikers there.28 There was little contact the rest of the night. The arrival of the MIKE Force had prompted the VC to switch their main attack to the nearby Bu Dop camp. In the early morning the C Team ordered Bu Ghia Map abandoned and the MIKE Force to move to reinforce Bu Dop.

At daylight on 20 July, the C-123s began to arrive to evacuate the CIDG, the MIKE Force and their SF advisors. Stringham’s team placed explosive charges throughout the camp, on a five-minute delay. After the MIKE Force was flown out to Song Be, CPT Stringham and two NCOs, SSG William Parnell and SSG Elliot Wilson, were to detonate the charges.29 A helicopter picked up the three Americans, just before the explosives went off. Bu Dop had been hit hard the previous night. Two SF advisors and twenty CIDG strikers had been killed.30


USASF Organization

USASF Organization