Three days later, the allies struck back in Binh Duong. Intelligence indicated that the enemy had positioned a PLAF battalion and an arms depot about 10 kilometers northwest of Thu Dau Mot. Because the information was already several days old, allied planners made the depot the target and not the battalion. The operation began on the morning of 8 May as aircraft hit three landing zones in preparation for the arrival of thirty-two Huey transports and twenty-five helicopter gunships provided by the U.S. Army’s 145th Aviation Battalion, as well as ten Vietnamese CH–34s. A .50-caliber machine gun shot down a CH–34 carrying intelligence personnel and two defectors who were to lead the soldiers to the target. The rest of the helicopters

discharged two battalions of the 9th Infantry on schedule. U.S. helicopters were to disembark a third battalion, this time from the 7th Infantry, into a blocking position, but this force diverted to secure the crash site instead. It found no survivors from the crash. Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry advanced in two columns from south to north. T he search failed to find the weapons depot, but the infantry killed 2 rebels, captured 75,000 piastres, and destroyed up to 30 tons of rice before linking up with a fourth battalion that had advanced by land. The three battalions set up a perimeter for the night near the Saigon River. T he next morning, 9 May, the three battalions set out in nine company columns, each spaced 50 meters apart in dense jungle. As they advanced, the troops received an increasing amount of fire. At noon, they found an abandoned horseshoe-shaped defensive position 750 meters in diameter. They occupied the position, with one battalion each facing north, east, and south. Automatic weapons overlooked a field to the west, the only open terrain in what otherwise was a flat expanse of jungle. Enemy f ire, including mortars, continued to grow as the day wore on. The commander of 

the 9th Infantry asked for reinforcements, but the 5th Division’s commander, Brig. Gen. Tran Thanh Phong, refused, judging the situation too dangerous. Thirteen allied Skyraiders and four U.S. B–57 aircraft responded with bombs, rockets, and shells. South Vietnamese artillery—ten 105-mm. and two 155-mm. howitzers—joined in, ultimately firing 1,700 rounds. The artillery was not effective, because commanders refused to drop rounds close to the perimeter. They perhaps were correct in their judgement, for at 1800, several rounds accidentally landed inside the perimeter. In two recent operations, friendly aircraft had bombed the 9th Infantry, and with B–57s flying overhead, the soldiers mistakenly assumed that allied aircraft once again had bombed them. Fifteen minutes later, bugles and whistles heralded a Communist assault. Shaken by the friendly fire incident and facing a determined attack, the soldiers “wilted, fleeing in disorder.” Regimental adviser Maj. Thomas W. Brogan and his subordinates used every means at their disposal, including force, to stop the rout, but to no avail. A few Vietnamese officers tried to rally the troops too, but most, including the regimental commander, whom the government had decorated thirteen times for bravery, joined the stampede. The soldiers fled west into the field, with U.S. Army gunships doing their best to protect them. The rout left just 200 Vietnamese, many of whom were wounded, and 16 U.S. advisers to face the enemy. T he remaining soldiers established a perimeter about a kilometer west of the original position. A helicopter braved enemy fire to pick up three wounded advisers. Bowing to U.S. pressure, Phong agreed to a rare nighttime airmobile assault, with U.S. helicopters delivering a fresh battalion at 2000. Fortunately, the defenders faced nothing more than harassing fire through the night. At 0700 on the tenth, helicopters delivered an airborne battalion to reinforce the survivors and to facilitate their extraction later that day. For the second time in just a few weeks, three government battalions had fled the f ield in a single incident. All totaled, the fiasco cost the South Vietnamese 32 dead, 122 wounded, 36 missing, a helicopter, plus nearly 100 weapons. The U.S. Army suffered two dead and three wounded. One of the wounded Americans was one of six soldiers the 173d Airborne Brigade had sent on the operation as observers. Known enemy losses from the three-day operation totaled four killed with three soldiers and four weapons captured. MACV sent teams to help rebuild the fighting spirit of the three broken battalions.54 T he large-scale routs that had occurred on 19 April in II Corps and 9 May in III Corps raised serious questions. South Vietnamese soldiers had performed well on many a battlefield throughout April and May. Were the two stampedes therefore an aberration, or were they harbingers of greater disintegration in the future? MACV was unsure, but it certainly appreciated the common soldier’s plight. Confused by the country’s unsettled political situation, lacking a firm commitment to a cause, and sometimes saddled with mediocre leaders, South Vietnam’s soldiers nevertheless had endured many dangers and hardships over the years. Would they continue to do so, or would the enemy’s growing numbers and new armament be the final straw? To what extent could U.S. combat power, in the sky and perhaps on the ground, persuade the South Vietnamese soldiers to stay in the fight?