In the II Corps area General Collins was also dubious of South Vietnamese capabilities. The dissolution of the 24th Special Tactical Zone headquarters along the Laotian border and the transfer of its responsibilities to the South Vietnamese 22d Division had not brought any noticeable improvement to the Highlands.33 Local American and South Vietnamese cross-border incursions there had amounted to only minor raids. The South Vietnamese 42d Infantry Regiment had continued its decline begun during the Ben Het battles of 1969, and neither the 42d nor the 22d's 47th Regiment had done well during the struggle for the 

border outpost of Oak Seang in April 1970." Collins regarded the other five South Vietnamese regiments in the zone as acceptable, but saw their "lack of aggressiveness" as a "persistent" and "fatal weakness."" "We need more fighters and fewer shadow boxers," Collins opined, reckoning that "we have perhaps overadvised them to the point where some of the lack of initiative . . . might be traced to overactive advisors."36 In his opinion, South Vietnamese units were "no match" for their North Vietnamese opponents, and South Vietnamese com manders relied too heavily on American air and artillery support now that it was available in quantity. In combat, they were simply unwilling to close with enemy forces. "The failure is one of leadership . .. and one of will." But, Collins had to conclude, "the one thing that can be said is that ARVN soldiers are doing the fighting and taking the casualties. "J> Some of Collins' subordinate advisers emerging from the Oak Seang cam paign seconded his views, and contrasted American air superiority with North Vietnamese "bunker superiority." One, an eight-month veteran adviser, con cluded that the primary Vietnamese problem was still poor leadership: "The only time they fight is when they are cornered and have to fight." He predicted that "in the end, when the American forces do pullout, the NVA will move back in" and that, judging by the punishment the enemy had already taken from American firepower and survived, "the South Vietnamese will not be able to stop them. 1138 Even in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones, American enthusiasm for the Cambodian experience and its beneficial influence of the South Vietnamese had begun to wane by the end of 1970. Although advisers continued to admire the uncharacteristic dynamism exhibited by Generals Tri and Thanh, the two corps commanders, they also began to focus their attention on perennial South Viet namese shortCOmings. Near Saigon, advisers described Chinh's replacement, General Phan Dinh Thu (alias Lam Son), as a "drunkard" and a "playboy," and certainly a poor second for the aggressive Tri." In the Delta General Cushman pointed out continued grave deficiencies in leadership, training, maintenance, and personnel management, and was especially critical of local South Vietnam ese artillery units. Admitting that the war in the Delta was a Vietnamese affai

"not having had much in the way of u.s. combat forces to start with, there had not been a reliance by ARVN on the U. S. to do most of the fighting" - he was concerned over the lack of improvement in leadership and the lack of motivation in individual soldiers. The net result was a "greater reliance on air and artillery support and a greater reluctance to close with the enemy by fire and manuever." Too much of the Vietnamization program, he felt, was devoted to sophisticated equipment, and it was "increasingly evident" that this emphasis tended to "in hibit the [South] Vietnamese from responding with the more primitive means available to them to cope with infiltration and the problem of locating the enemy (such means as night ambushes and patrols)."" Cushman's comments once again revealed the continuing confusion in roles and missions and American strategy. Were the South Vietnamese regulars to continue their territorial security orientation (pacification), or were they to en gage the larger enemy forces in mobile offensive operations (attrition)? Were the Vietnamese to follow American prescriptions against crossing into Cambodia and Laos? Or should they pull their own artillery out of static security missions to support such endeavors? Why did aggressive commanders like Tri and Thanh make Abrams nervous? American military leaders may have been confused by the entire matter of Vietnamization, which was a method of pulling American troops out of the war but not a strategy for fighting it. If the South Vietnamese simply could not fight well enough, then these questions were academic. But American leaders in Saigon and Washington chose to ignore such troubling matters. Most were more intent on showing how the Cambodian incursion had weakened the enemy and thus justified further troop withdrawals, paying more attention to what the American public thought of the episode than to what the operation showed about South Vietnamese military strengths and weaknesses. What now passed for American strategy in Vietnam was dependent on a variety of factors that appeared to have little relationship to what was occurring in Southeast Asia. Hereafter, MACV was to label almost every South Vietnamese combat action, in fact almost every activity, as another "test" of Vietnamization. However, few American generals had favorable predictions to make regarding Saigon's ability to stand alone. At this stage senior American advisers may have become too pessimistic in their evaluations, reacting perhaps to the many overly optimistic reports of progress in the past. Almost all of them continued to complain about poor South Vietnamese leadership; but, like the weather, no one did anything about it. General Westmoreland himself, visiting Vietnam in July 1970 as the Army chief of staff, saw "a need to clean house in the senior ranks of the Vietnamese Army"; pointed out to Thieu and Vien that there were "many young colonels capable of assuming general officer responsibilities and eager to do sd'; and recommended "forced retirements" for those who had proved wanting." Yet, American leaders still hesitated to push the Vietnamese generals on such matters. Saigon's stubborn resistance to even the most well-meaning foreign interference in its affairs had become gospel among American officials: If the ietnamese leaders demanded complete authority in this area, then let them have it. Washington may have also felt that such personnel changes were not that critical, and that if the Vietnamese generals could keep enemy forces bottled up in their cross-border sanctuaries, then the war was close to being won. But little more than a dozen South Vietnamese battalions had been involved in Cambodia at anyone time, and the enemy response had been negligible. The real testing was still to come. 

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31 Prior to the Oak Seang battle, the 47th Regiment replaced the U.S. 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, at Pleiku and the South Vietnamese 22d Division assumed responsibility for the northern Highlands with both the 42d and 47th Regiments (later reinforced by the 45th Regiment, 23d Divi M sian, Qut of Ban Me Thuot). In the ensuing struggle the South Vietnamese suffered 1,625 casualties )6 (216 killed, 1,281 wounded, US missing) and claimed 1,697 enemy dead. :J5 Quoted words from Ltr, Collins to Dzu, 6 Dec 70. See also MFR, Collins, 28 Dec 70, sub: Talks With Colonel Ba (Phu Yen Province Chief) and Captain Caligori (Australian Army), RF/PF Training Adviser. Both in Collins Papers, MHl. Quoted words from Msg, Collins to Rosson, 9 Aug 70. See also lnterv, Col Chandler Robbins III with Collins, 1981, pp. 360-62, Senior Officers Oral History Program. Both in Collins Papers, MHI. J:1 Quoted words from Msg, Collins to Abrams, 23 Apr 70. See also Msg, Collins to Duquemin, 19 Apr 70. Both in Collins Papers, MHI. 1I Interv, Barnard with Sfc David Butler, Senior Adviser, 2d Bn, 42d Regt, n.d., 2d sess., p. 319, VNIT 677, HRB, CMH. For similar comments from other advisers associated with the Oak Seang battle, see ibid., pp. 298-99,305-06,345-347, 388-89. For more optimistic views, see ibid., 1st sess., pp. 14, 32-33, 47-50. " MFR, Vann, 21 May 70, sub: Conversation With General Pham Van Dong, Minister of Veterans Affairs, on Thanh's Replacement in the IV crz, Vann Papers, MHI.