CMH Pub 91-16_Advice and Support- The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965.pdf

               

PAGE 262.

On 22 June, the 1st and 3d Airborne Battalions were on a search-and-destroy 

operation in support of the 7th Division near Bang Lang, Dinh Tuong Province, 

72 kilometers southwest of Saigon when they ran into the 261st and 514th PLAF 

Battalions. Enemy fire downed four U.S. Army helicopters, including one carrying the 

commander of U.S. Army Support Command, General Joseph Stilwell. The general and 

all the aviators emerged unscathed. Meanwhile, helicopter gunships lent their support 

to the fight, at one point accidently inflicting nine casualties on the South Vietnamese. 

The combat below was intense, with the paratroopers charging the enemy multiple 

times. Hostile fire killed or wounded all nine platoon leaders in the 1st Battalion, but 

the unit never wavered. The enemy retreated at the end of the day. The paratroopers 

lost twenty-nine killed and eighty-nine wounded. Known enemy losses amounted to 

fifty-eight killed, twenty-six fighters captured, and twenty weapons. One adviser called 

the battle a “little classic of a military operation.” The Army awarded a Bronze Star and 

two Silver Stars to three advisers who fought in the action. One of the men who earned 

the Silver Star was Capt. James J. Lindsay, a future general.43

 On 18 July, nearly one hundred U.S. helicopters ferried troops to Cao Lanh, Kien 

Phong Province, 80 kilometers south of Saigon. The massive operation did not achieve 

much, but the enemy shot down a helicopter that was evacuating wounded soldiers. 

The crew of the downed aircraft fought the enemy for about ten minutes before 

Headquarters of the advisory detachment to the 7th Infantry Division, My Tho,  

Dinh Tuong Province

 U.S. Army

 43. Memo, Abn Bde Advisory Det for Former Members, Abn Bde Advisory Det, 10 Apr 1965, 

sub: Airborne Brigade Newsletter, 3, Historians Files, CMH; Quote from UPI, “Two Elite Red Outfits 

Routed,” The Daily Banner, 23 Jun 1964, 3.

 327

Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965

=====

 more helicopters arrived to rescue them. Troops also deployed to guard the downed 

helicopter and a team of U.S. technicians. The craft flew out on its own power the 

following day.44

 At 0100 on 20 July, the revolutionaries launched a major attack of their own. 

T

 hey massed three battalions—the 261st, 263d, and 514th—and one company each of 

recoilless rifles, machine guns, mortars, and sappers to attack Cai Be district town in 

western Dinh Tuong. About 300 soldiers, drawn from a regimental headquarters and 

local territorials, defended Cai Be. The insurgents penetrated the town and inflicted 

much damage, particularly on the housing of Regional Forces families. They killed 

twelve defenders and forty dependents. Another forty defenders and forty civilians 

suffered injuries. The insurgents withdrew at 0500.45

 The government responded with five battalions backed by armor to pin the enemy 

against the Mekong River, 5 kilometers west of Cai Be. Two battalions saw the most 

action. The 8th Airborne Battalion occupied Cai Be and then continued through sugar 

cane and rice paddies until 1545 when enemy fire hit two of its companies. The lead 

company advanced an additional 90 meters when heavy automatic weapons fire finally 

stopped it. The second company faltered after enemy fire killed its commander and 

radio operator. U.S. Army gunships fired 130 rockets as close as 45 meters in front of 

friendly troops to keep the enemy at bay. The battalion eventually withdrew at 1900. 

Meanwhile, at 1600, insurgent soldiers entrenched along a tree line pinned 

down a company from the 6th Airborne Battalion. After some delay, the 

battalion commander accepted his adviser’s recommendation to attempt a double 

envelopment, but the move was too shallow, and the pincers hit the enemy’s front 

rather than its flanks. At 1830, the battalion launched a frontal assault, assisted 

by two armed U.S. Army Mohawk aircraft and several gunships. Unfortunately, 

the gunships mistakenly hit the 6th Airborne, unnerving the unit, which then 

recoiled into a perimeter for the night. After Vietnamese helicopters refused to 

evacuate the casualties, a U.S. Army medevac helicopter arrived to remove twelve 

wounded soldiers. The senior adviser to the Airborne Brigade, Col. John G. 

Hayes, expressed disappointment at the lack of aggressiveness exhibited by the 

airborne battalions that day. Thirteen Vietnamese paratroopers died and fifty-two 

were wounded, as was one American. The enemy lost forty-six dead and a dozen 

f

 ighters taken prisoner. An adviser speculated that the allies had probably caused 

another hundred casualties. Military Region 2 contended that by attacking Cai 

Be it had made the South Vietnamese fearful of attacks on other district capitals. 

Consequently, observed the command, “They are forced to split up to reinforce the 

posts, and the morale of their troops is more apathetic than before.”46

 T

 he politico-military struggle continued in August. Pacification advanced 

modestly. The number of constructed hamlets rose to 155, MEDCAP teams treated 

20,000 sick civilians, and the division completed 18 civic action projects. Against 

this backdrop, the killing continued. On the tenth, Col. Huynh Van Ton reacted 

to information that a PLAF company was located 15 kilometers west of My Tho by 

44. AP, “Viet Reds Wound 7 Advisers,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 21 Jul 1964, 1–2.

 45. AP, “40 Viet Civilians Slain,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 22 Jul 1964, 1; Cao Minh et al., Quan Khu 8: 

Ba Muoi Nam Khang Chien (1945–1975) [Military Region 8: Thirty Years of Resistance War (1945–1975)] 

(Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1998), 500.

 46. David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 

1930–1975, vol. 1 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 640–43 (quote on 642); Reuters, “Reds Kill 30 

Children,” New York Times, 21 Jul 1964; AAR, 7th Div Reaction to VC Attack on Cai Be, Abn Bde 

Advisory Det, 3 Sep 1964, item 9, roll 36, MACV Microfilm, Library and Archives, CMH.

 328

Jogging Along

 sending out four battalions (one airborne, one infantry, and two ranger) and an M113 

troop supported by a platoon of 105-mm. howitzers. The armored carriers and the 

airborne and infantry battalions advanced south from Highway 4 while the rangers 

attacked from east to west from a position 5 kilometers to their south. All units made 

contact, and an airstrike helped to kill forty-two enemy combatants. The insurgents 

evacuated an estimated seventy more casualties. The South Vietnamese lost sixteen 

dead and forty-one wounded.47

 Ten days later, revolutionaries sprang a trap of their own. On 20 August, they 

overran Phu Tuc post in Kien Hoa Province, 10 kilometers northwest of Ben Tre, killing 

seven, wounding fifteen, and capturing the rest of the post’s thirty-six-man garrison. 

T

 he insurgents then burned the post and assaulted a nearby hamlet. These attacks were 

primarily a pretext for goading the South Vietnamese into sending a relief force. The 

government took the bait, sending elements of several battalions, which the insurgents 

declined to engage. Instead, they waited until government troops were departing Phu 

Tuc along a forest road, hitting the column when its guard was down. Caught in the 

ambush were 360 soldiers from the 41st Ranger Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 12th 

Infantry. The fighting lasted for more than an hour, with the 514th PLAF Battalion 

launching repeated bayonet charges heralded by bugles.

 Four Americans participated in the combat. 1st Lt. James M. Coyle was severely 

wounded but nevertheless kept fighting. Capt. Bryan C. Stone found himself firing 

a Browning automatic rifle in four directions as the enemy closed in around him. 

1st Lt. William D. H. Ragin grabbed a machine gun from a dead soldier and fired 

it point-blank at sixty advancing enemy soldiers. Moments before, he had thought 

they were friendly because they were clothed in government uniforms. Assisted by 

Sfc. Tom Ward, Stone, Coyle, and Ragin covered the retreat of the surviving South 

Vietnamese. By the time the battle was over, the insurgents had killed 85 South 

Vietnamese soldiers, wounded 60, and captured 122 weapons, with another 91 

government soldiers missing. All four Americans died in the engagement. General 

Westmoreland attended their memorial service, and the Army posthumously 

awarded them Distinguished Service Crosses.48

 Stung by the calamity, U.S. helicopter gunships attacked insurgents exiting the area 

by boat that night as more troops rushed to the scene. Allied forces failed to contact the 

enemy on the twenty-first, and on the night of 21–22 August, gunships again took to the 

night sky looking for sampans. On the morning of the twenty-second, seven battalions, 

two armored cavalry troops, and naval forces tried to encircle the enemy in Kien Hoa’s 

Ham Long District. The first attempt failed, but Ton quickly redeployed his men by 

boats and U.S. helicopters to catch the elusive foe. In the ensuing battle, 7th Division 

artillery fired 3,222 rounds, and the Vietnamese Air Force flew 10 fighter-bomber 

sorties. When the smoke cleared, the allies had killed ninety-eight PLAF soldiers 

and captured forty-three prisoners and thirty-seven weapons. Agents reported that 

the enemy buried another 200 dead and evacuated 300 wounded. Government losses 

amounted to seventeen killed and forty-five wounded. Nevertheless, IV Corps adviser 

Col. Sammie Homan thought that commanders were becoming cautious because of 

47. MACV, Monthly Evaluation, Aug 1964, A–5, A–9, A–10, Historians Files, CMH; History, 2d Air 

Div, Jul–Dec 1964, vol. 2, 67–68; Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 22 Aug 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, 

Intel Collection files, MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP.

 48. GO 8, HQDA, 9 Mar 1965, Library and Archives, CMH; History, 2d Air Div, Jul–Dec 1964, vol. 

2, 3, 72–74; AP, “Reds Rip Viet Force, 4 Americans Among 120 Dead,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 23 Aug 

1964, 1; AP, “4 Advisers Went Down Fighting,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 24 Aug 1964, 1.

 329

Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965

 the action on the twentieth and other recent ambuscades. To restore their confidence, 

he pledged to use U.S. Army helicopters to escort all future troop movements.49

 An example of the promised support occurred on 5 September, when five UH–1B 

gunships from the 120th Aviation Company supported a 7th Division operation in 

Dinh Tuong. The entrenched insurgents hit three of the gunships, compelling one 

to return to base. The gunships in turn killed sixty revolutionaries and wounded an 

estimated forty more. Thirty-four enemy soldiers surrendered after the onslaught.50

 September brought new men to the top echelons of the 7th Division. Brig Gen. 

Nguyen Bao Tri became division commander, and MACV appointed Col. Robert A. 

Guenthner to advise him. Guenthner had received the Silver Star and Bronze Star 

medals for bravery at Salerno and Anzio, Italy, during World War II. Before coming 

to Vietnam, he had served as an adviser to the Nationalist Chinese army. Guenthner 

continued Markey’s strong support for civic action, psychological warfare, and the 

Chieu Hoi program. He had great respect for the U.S. Operations Mission personnel 

working in the field. He also emphasized intelligence, most of which came from the 

agent networks run by district, province, and division entities. The chief problem 

with the networks was that information traveled slowly, as the agents, fearful that the 

insurgents would detect them if they used radios, preferred to send reports by courier. 

Information provided by civilians was also useful but tended to be exaggerated in 

Guenthner’s opinion.51

 As had previous commanders and advisers, Tri and Guenthner exploited the in

depth knowledge of Major Binh, who had accumulated extensive files over his seven 

years of service in the division’s G–2 section. This data sometimes allowed Binh to 

predict where the enemy might move next, and Guenthner established a joint planning 

committee to target specific enemy units based on the data.52

 Even if pattern analysis helped find enemy units, the division had little luck 

penetrating the National Liberation Front’s political apparatus. The Front employed 

strict security measures, and because torture and death awaited anyone it discovered to 

be a government agent, few were willing to attempt to penetrate enemy organizations. 

As Americans had found elsewhere, Guenthner discovered that even after the 

government had identified a clandestine Front cadre, “there is not an aggressive 

program designed to eliminate these persons.” When a suspect did fall in to the 

military’s hands, the colonel considered South Vietnamese interrogation procedures 

to be poor and accompanied by  “unnecessary shouting, shoving, hitting, and kicking 

of the captive.”53

 49. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 30 Aug 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, Intel Collection files, 

MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP; MACV, Monthly Evaluation, Aug 1964, 3, 5, 6, A–7, A–8, A–9; Memo, 

Brig. Gen. William E. DePuy, MACV J–3 for MACV Ch of Staff, 30 Aug 1964, sub: Summary of 

Accomplishments, 24–30 Aug 1964; both in Historians Files, CMH.

 50. History of the 120th Avn Co (Air Mobile Light), 1 Apr 1964–31 Dec 1964, 14, Historians Files, 

CMH.

 51. Memo, Col. Robert A. Guenthner, Senior Adviser, 7th Inf Div for DCSOPS (Dep Ch Staff for 

Ops), 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers Returning from Field Assignments, encl. 3, 11, Historians 

Files, CMH.

 52. Memo, Guenthner for DCSOPS, 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers, encl. 3, 8–9; Memo, Maj. 

R. L. Sears, G3 Adviser, 7th Inf Div, for members of G3 Advisory Section, 13 May 1965, sub: Organization 

and Functions, G3 Advisory Section, table C1, 4; Memo, Maj. Edwin J. Dorand, G2 Adviser, 7th Inf Div 

Advisory Det for Senior Adviser, 7th Inf Div, 8 Jul 1965, sub: Summary of 7th Division Intelligence 

Activities, 8; both in Historians Files, CMH.

 53. Memo, Guenthner for DCSOPS, 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers, encl. 3, 8–9, 10 (quotes).

 330

Jogging Along

 September brought one other development in addition to the change in command. 

On 5 September, the Joint General Staff abolished the Tien Giang Tactical Area. It 

transferred the 7th Division and four of the five provinces it supervised to IV Corps 

and assigned Long An Province to III Corps. Over the summer months, the division 

and its provinces had managed to bring about 50,000 more people into the most secure 

category of government control, but the allies conceded that the majority of the area’s 

residents, nearly one million people, remained under the domination of the National 

Liberation Front. 

Battles in III Corp

====

The Tien Giang Tactical Area During the first half of 1964, the autonomous Tien Giang Tactical Area south of Saigon had been one of the most contentious places in South Vietnam. The summer mon soons brought no relief, as the number of enemy incidents in the third quarter of 1964 increased by 52 percent over the previous quarter. As was the case with other divi sions, the 7th Division, which controlled the area, tried to achieve a balance between pacification and offensive operations, but the need to react to enemy initiatives often disrupted this effort.40 Using the Cushman concept as a model (see Chapter 6), by July, the division had its own pacification cadre trained by division and province personnel. One American and six Vietnamese MEDCAP teams actively treated the rural sick. Division senior adviser Col. Edward Markey credited the division’s educational efforts in getting tactical units to be more sympathetic to the population. By July, the division had completed 106 of the 405 New Life hamlets planned for 1964. T he division relied heavily on artillery to perform its mission. Howitzers covered 85 percent of the Tien Giang area and helped repulse 218 of 243 attacks in July. During that same month, government pieces expended more than 6,000 rounds in harassment and interdiction fire that produced 200 known casualties. In one incident, 105-mm. howitzers fired fifty rounds based on information provided by a civilian, killing twenty-four insurgents. The enemy evacuated about seventy additional casualties before troops arrived.41 U.S. Army Aviation also played a key role. The division typically ran three to four “Eagle flights” per week, in which U.S. helicopters ferried Vietnamese soldiers of platoon or company strength over the countryside in search of insurgents. The modus operandi was for Colonel Markey and the division G–3 to take to the air in a command-and-control helicopter. If they saw something suspicious, they would send in a helicopter bearing a squad from the division’s reconnaissance company. During a typical flight, they would drop five to ten squads to search multiple locations. If contact occurred, they could call in the rest of the company, or even the divisional reserve— two airborne battalions assigned to Tien Giang because of the area’s heavy fighting. T he technique was successful, but during one landing, Markey triggered a booby trap that injured his leg. He returned to the United States for treatment.42 39. II Corps Trends, 20 Oct 1964, 1–2. 40. Rpt, MACV, Quarterly Review and Evaluation, Third Quarter, CY (Calendar Year) 1964, 5, Historians Files, CMH. 41. MACV, Monthly Evaluation, Jul 1964, A–11, A–12. 42. Lam Quang Thi, The Twenty-Five Year Century, A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2001), 122. 326 Jogging Along On 22 June, the 1st and 3d Airborne Battalions were on a search-and-destroy operation in support of the 7th Division near Bang Lang, Dinh Tuong Province, 72 kilometers southwest of Saigon when they ran into the 261st and 514th PLAF Battalions. Enemy fire downed four U.S. Army helicopters, including one carrying the commander of U.S. Army Support Command, General Joseph Stilwell. The general and all the aviators emerged unscathed. Meanwhile, helicopter gunships lent their support to the fight, at one point accidently inflicting nine casualties on the South Vietnamese. T he combat below was intense, with the paratroopers charging the enemy multiple times. Hostile fire killed or wounded all nine platoon leaders in the 1st Battalion, but the unit never wavered. The enemy retreated at the end of the day. The paratroopers lost twenty-nine killed and eighty-nine wounded. Known enemy losses amounted to f ifty-eight killed, twenty-six fighters captured, and twenty weapons. One adviser called the battle a “little classic of a military operation.” The Army awarded a Bronze Star and two Silver Stars to three advisers who fought in the action. One of the men who earned the Silver Star was Capt. James J. Lindsay, a future general.43 On 18 July, nearly one hundred U.S. helicopters ferried troops to Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Province, 80 kilometers south of Saigon. The massive operation did not achieve much, but the enemy shot down a helicopter that was evacuating wounded soldiers. T he crew of the downed aircraft fought the enemy for about ten minutes before Headquarters of the advisory detachment to the 7th Infantry Division, My Tho, Dinh Tuong Province U.S. Army 43. Memo, Abn Bde Advisory Det for Former Members, Abn Bde Advisory Det, 10 Apr 1965, sub: Airborne Brigade Newsletter, 3, Historians Files, CMH; Quote from UPI, “Two Elite Red Outfits Routed,” The Daily Banner, 23 Jun 1964, 3. 327 Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965 more helicopters arrived to rescue them. Troops also deployed to guard the downed helicopter and a team of U.S. technicians. The craft flew out on its own power the following day.44 At 0100 on 20 July, the revolutionaries launched a major attack of their own. T hey massed three battalions—the 261st, 263d, and 514th—and one company each of recoilless rifles, machine guns, mortars, and sappers to attack Cai Be district town in western Dinh Tuong. About 300 soldiers, drawn from a regimental headquarters and local territorials, defended Cai Be. The insurgents penetrated the town and inflicted much damage, particularly on the housing of Regional Forces families. They killed twelve defenders and forty dependents. Another forty defenders and forty civilians suffered injuries. The insurgents withdrew at 0500.45 T he government responded with five battalions backed by armor to pin the enemy against the Mekong River, 5 kilometers west of Cai Be. Two battalions saw the most action. The 8th Airborne Battalion occupied Cai Be and then continued through sugar cane and rice paddies until 1545 when enemy fire hit two of its companies. The lead company advanced an additional 90 meters when heavy automatic weapons fire finally stopped it. The second company faltered after enemy fire killed its commander and radio operator. U.S. Army gunships fired 130 rockets as close as 45 meters in front of friendly troops to keep the enemy at bay. The battalion eventually withdrew at 1900. Meanwhile, at 1600, insurgent soldiers entrenched along a tree line pinned down a company from the 6th Airborne Battalion. After some delay, the battalion commander accepted his adviser’s recommendation to attempt a double envelopment, but the move was too shallow, and the pincers hit the enemy’s front rather than its flanks. At 1830, the battalion launched a frontal assault, assisted by two armed U.S. Army Mohawk aircraft and several gunships. Unfortunately, the gunships mistakenly hit the 6th Airborne, unnerving the unit, which then recoiled into a perimeter for the night. After Vietnamese helicopters refused to evacuate the casualties, a U.S. Army medevac helicopter arrived to remove twelve wounded soldiers. The senior adviser to the Airborne Brigade, Col. John G. Hayes, expressed disappointment at the lack of aggressiveness exhibited by the airborne battalions that day. Thirteen Vietnamese paratroopers died and fifty-two were wounded, as was one American. The enemy lost forty-six dead and a dozen f ighters taken prisoner. An adviser speculated that the allies had probably caused another hundred casualties. Military Region 2 contended that by attacking Cai Be it had made the South Vietnamese fearful of attacks on other district capitals. Consequently, observed the command, “They are forced to split up to reinforce the posts, and the morale of their troops is more apathetic than before.”46 T he politico-military struggle continued in August. Pacification advanced modestly. The number of constructed hamlets rose to 155, MEDCAP teams treated 20,000 sick civilians, and the division completed 18 civic action projects. Against this backdrop, the killing continued. On the tenth, Col. Huynh Van Ton reacted to information that a PLAF company was located 15 kilometers west of My Tho by 44. AP, “Viet Reds Wound 7 Advisers,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 21 Jul 1964, 1–2. 45. AP, “40 Viet Civilians Slain,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 22 Jul 1964, 1; Cao Minh et al., Quan Khu 8: Ba Muoi Nam Khang Chien (1945–1975) [Military Region 8: Thirty Years of Resistance War (1945–1975)] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1998), 500. 46. David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975, vol. 1 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 640–43 (quote on 642); Reuters, “Reds Kill 30 Children,” New York Times, 21 Jul 1964; AAR, 7th Div Reaction to VC Attack on Cai Be, Abn Bde Advisory Det, 3 Sep 1964, item 9, roll 36, MACV Microfilm, Library and Archives, CMH. 328 Jogging Along sending out four battalions (one airborne, one infantry, and two ranger) and an M113 troop supported by a platoon of 105-mm. howitzers. The armored carriers and the airborne and infantry battalions advanced south from Highway 4 while the rangers attacked from east to west from a position 5 kilometers to their south. All units made contact, and an airstrike helped to kill forty-two enemy combatants. The insurgents evacuated an estimated seventy more casualties. The South Vietnamese lost sixteen dead and forty-one wounded.47 Ten days later, revolutionaries sprang a trap of their own. On 20 August, they overran Phu Tuc post in Kien Hoa Province, 10 kilometers northwest of Ben Tre, killing seven, wounding fifteen, and capturing the rest of the post’s thirty-six-man garrison. T he insurgents then burned the post and assaulted a nearby hamlet. These attacks were primarily a pretext for goading the South Vietnamese into sending a relief force. The government took the bait, sending elements of several battalions, which the insurgents declined to engage. Instead, they waited until government troops were departing Phu Tuc along a forest road, hitting the column when its guard was down. Caught in the ambush were 360 soldiers from the 41st Ranger Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry. The fighting lasted for more than an hour, with the 514th PLAF Battalion launching repeated bayonet charges heralded by bugles. Four Americans participated in the combat. 1st Lt. James M. Coyle was severely wounded but nevertheless kept fighting. Capt. Bryan C. Stone found himself firing a Browning automatic rifle in four directions as the enemy closed in around him. 1st Lt. William D. H. Ragin grabbed a machine gun from a dead soldier and fired it point-blank at sixty advancing enemy soldiers. Moments before, he had thought they were friendly because they were clothed in government uniforms. Assisted by Sfc. Tom Ward, Stone, Coyle, and Ragin covered the retreat of the surviving South Vietnamese. By the time the battle was over, the insurgents had killed 85 South Vietnamese soldiers, wounded 60, and captured 122 weapons, with another 91 government soldiers missing. All four Americans died in the engagement. General Westmoreland attended their memorial service, and the Army posthumously awarded them Distinguished Service Crosses.48 Stung by the calamity, U.S. helicopter gunships attacked insurgents exiting the area by boat that night as more troops rushed to the scene. Allied forces failed to contact the enemy on the twenty-first, and on the night of 21–22 August, gunships again took to the night sky looking for sampans. On the morning of the twenty-second, seven battalions, two armored cavalry troops, and naval forces tried to encircle the enemy in Kien Hoa’s Ham Long District. The first attempt failed, but Ton quickly redeployed his men by boats and U.S. helicopters to catch the elusive foe. In the ensuing battle, 7th Division artillery fired 3,222 rounds, and the Vietnamese Air Force flew 10 fighter-bomber sorties. When the smoke cleared, the allies had killed ninety-eight PLAF soldiers and captured forty-three prisoners and thirty-seven weapons. Agents reported that the enemy buried another 200 dead and evacuated 300 wounded. Government losses amounted to seventeen killed and forty-five wounded. Nevertheless, IV Corps adviser Col. Sammie Homan thought that commanders were becoming cautious because of 47. MACV, Monthly Evaluation, Aug 1964, A–5, A–9, A–10, Historians Files, CMH; History, 2d Air Div, Jul–Dec 1964, vol. 2, 67–68; Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 22 Aug 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, Intel Collection files, MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP. 48. GO 8, HQDA, 9 Mar 1965, Library and Archives, CMH; History, 2d Air Div, Jul–Dec 1964, vol. 2, 3, 72–74; AP, “Reds Rip Viet Force, 4 Americans Among 120 Dead,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 23 Aug 1964, 1; AP, “4 Advisers Went Down Fighting,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 24 Aug 1964, 1. 329 Advice and Support: The Middle Years, January 1964-June 1965 the action on the twentieth and other recent ambuscades. To restore their confidence, he pledged to use U.S. Army helicopters to escort all future troop movements.49 An example of the promised support occurred on 5 September, when five UH–1B gunships from the 120th Aviation Company supported a 7th Division operation in Dinh Tuong. The entrenched insurgents hit three of the gunships, compelling one to return to base. The gunships in turn killed sixty revolutionaries and wounded an estimated forty more. Thirty-four enemy soldiers surrendered after the onslaught.50 September brought new men to the top echelons of the 7th Division. Brig Gen. Nguyen Bao Tri became division commander, and MACV appointed Col. Robert A. Guenthner to advise him. Guenthner had received the Silver Star and Bronze Star medals for bravery at Salerno and Anzio, Italy, during World War II. Before coming to Vietnam, he had served as an adviser to the Nationalist Chinese army. Guenthner continued Markey’s strong support for civic action, psychological warfare, and the Chieu Hoi program. He had great respect for the U.S. Operations Mission personnel working in the field. He also emphasized intelligence, most of which came from the agent networks run by district, province, and division entities. The chief problem with the networks was that information traveled slowly, as the agents, fearful that the insurgents would detect them if they used radios, preferred to send reports by courier. Information provided by civilians was also useful but tended to be exaggerated in Guenthner’s opinion.51 As had previous commanders and advisers, Tri and Guenthner exploited the in depth knowledge of Major Binh, who had accumulated extensive files over his seven years of service in the division’s G–2 section. This data sometimes allowed Binh to predict where the enemy might move next, and Guenthner established a joint planning committee to target specific enemy units based on the data.52 Even if pattern analysis helped find enemy units, the division had little luck penetrating the National Liberation Front’s political apparatus. The Front employed strict security measures, and because torture and death awaited anyone it discovered to be a government agent, few were willing to attempt to penetrate enemy organizations. As Americans had found elsewhere, Guenthner discovered that even after the government had identified a clandestine Front cadre, “there is not an aggressive program designed to eliminate these persons.” When a suspect did fall in to the military’s hands, the colonel considered South Vietnamese interrogation procedures to be poor and accompanied by “unnecessary shouting, shoving, hitting, and kicking of the captive.”53 49. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 30 Aug 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, Intel Collection files, MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP; MACV, Monthly Evaluation, Aug 1964, 3, 5, 6, A–7, A–8, A–9; Memo, Brig. Gen. William E. DePuy, MACV J–3 for MACV Ch of Staff, 30 Aug 1964, sub: Summary of Accomplishments, 24–30 Aug 1964; both in Historians Files, CMH. 50. History of the 120th Avn Co (Air Mobile Light), 1 Apr 1964–31 Dec 1964, 14, Historians Files, CMH. 51. Memo, Col. Robert A. Guenthner, Senior Adviser, 7th Inf Div for DCSOPS (Dep Ch Staff for Ops), 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers Returning from Field Assignments, encl. 3, 11, Historians Files, CMH. 52. Memo, Guenthner for DCSOPS, 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers, encl. 3, 8–9; Memo, Maj. R. L. Sears, G3 Adviser, 7th Inf Div, for members of G3 Advisory Section, 13 May 1965, sub: Organization and Functions, G3 Advisory Section, table C1, 4; Memo, Maj. Edwin J. Dorand, G2 Adviser, 7th Inf Div Advisory Det for Senior Adviser, 7th Inf Div, 8 Jul 1965, sub: Summary of 7th Division Intelligence Activities, 8; both in Historians Files, CMH. 53. Memo, Guenthner for DCSOPS, 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers, encl. 3, 8–9, 10 (quotes). 330 Jogging Along September brought one other development in addition to the change in command. On 5 September, the Joint General Staff abolished the Tien Giang Tactical Area. It transferred the 7th Division and four of the five provinces it supervised to IV Corps and assigned Long An Province to III Corps. Over the summer months, the division and its provinces had managed to bring about 50,000 more people into the most secure category of government control, but the allies conceded that the majority of the area’s residents, nearly one million people, remained under the domination of the National Liberation Front. Battles in III Corp

====

Many communities expressed apathy during Vietnam’s fratricidal conflict, but 

some adhered vigorously to one side or the other. One such community was the 

Catholic hamlet of Long Phu, located 8 kilometers from Ben Tre in Kien Hoa Province. 

Over the past year, the National Liberation Front had hit this hamlet over forty times, 

and each time the inhabitants had repulsed the insurgents. The government had urged 

the population to relocate to a safer locale and most had done so, but a hard core 

refused to leave.

 On 23 September, the Front tried to overrun Long Phu once again. At 0235, mortar 

f

 ire covered sappers as they sprinted forward to place demolition charges along the 

barbed-wire perimeter. After the charges blew gaps through the barrier, insurgent 

soldiers charged through, but the hamlet’s fifty defenders repulsed them once more. 

By the time reinforcements arrived, they found the enemy in retreat, leaving behind 

twenty-two bodies and twenty-six weapons. The South Vietnamese estimated the 

enemy had carried off another seventy-two casualties. The defenders lost five dead and 

four wounded, but the government had had enough. The next day it compelled the last 

few residents and their Popular Forces defenders to relocate.74

 73. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 26 Sep 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, Intel Collection files, 

MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP.

 74. “Viet Cong Steps Up Attacks,” New York Times, 24 Sep 196; Horst Faas, “Heroic Long Phu 

Soldiers Repulse Viet Cong,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 25 Sep 1964, 6; AP, “Heroic Viet Unit Evacuates 

Post After Victory,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 26 Sep 1964, 7; Msg, Saigon A-299 to State, 16 Oct 1964, sub: 

Mission Province Report: Kien Hoa, 4, Historians Files, CMH.

 338

Jogging Along

 T

 hree days after the enemy assaulted Long Phu, the 43d Ranger Battalion chased 

an enemy force into a fortified pagoda 5 kilometers southeast of Cau Ke, Vinh Binh 

Province. The commander split his force, sending two companies across flooded paddies 

to attack from the east as the rest of the battalion circled around to approach from the 

west. By 1130, enemy fire had pinned down the eastern wing. Disregarding American 

advice to bring the rest of the battalion back to support the eastern attack, the other 

two companies continued to advance around to the west until enemy fire pinned them 

down as well. At 1330, the insurgents killed an adviser while he was directing fire on 

an enemy machine gun. A request for artillery support went unmet, and the 4.2-inch 

mortar platoon accompanying the battalion fired only four rounds as it had brought 

little ammunition. Finally, the battalion commander asked for air support. The U.S. 

Air Force made ten sorties, losing one aircraft. Ten U.S. Army helicopter gunships also 

lent assistance. Late in the afternoon, the 9th Division ordered an M113 troop to help, 

but a recoilless rifle halted the unit in its tracks, damaging two carriers, 6 kilometers 

from the pagoda. The rangers’ ordeal ended about midnight when the enemy left the 

area. The South Vietnamese lost nine dead and twenty-seven wounded. The United 

States lost one dead soldier and an A–1E Skyraider. Enemy losses numbered twenty 

dead and seven captured weapons, with the insurgents reportedly carrying off forty 

more casualties.75 

T

 he enemy’s summe

 ===

Many communities expressed apathy during Vietnam’s fratricidal conflict, but some adhered vigorously to one side or the other. One such community was the Catholic hamlet of Long Phu, located 8 kilometers from Ben Tre in Kien Hoa Province. Over the past year, the National Liberation Front had hit this hamlet over forty times, and each time the inhabitants had repulsed the insurgents. The government had urged the population to relocate to a safer locale and most had done so, but a hard core refused to leave. On 23 September, the Front tried to overrun Long Phu once again. At 0235, mortar f ire covered sappers as they sprinted forward to place demolition charges along the barbed-wire perimeter. After the charges blew gaps through the barrier, insurgent soldiers charged through, but the hamlet’s fifty defenders repulsed them once more. By the time reinforcements arrived, they found the enemy in retreat, leaving behind twenty-two bodies and twenty-six weapons. The South Vietnamese estimated the enemy had carried off another seventy-two casualties. The defenders lost five dead and four wounded, but the government had had enough. The next day it compelled the last few residents and their Popular Forces defenders to relocate.74 73. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 26 Sep 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, Intel Collection files, MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP. 74. “Viet Cong Steps Up Attacks,” New York Times, 24 Sep 196; Horst Faas, “Heroic Long Phu Soldiers Repulse Viet Cong,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 25 Sep 1964, 6; AP, “Heroic Viet Unit Evacuates Post After Victory,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 26 Sep 1964, 7; Msg, Saigon A-299 to State, 16 Oct 1964, sub: Mission Province Report: Kien Hoa, 4, Historians Files, CMH. 338 Jogging Along T hree days after the enemy assaulted Long Phu, the 43d Ranger Battalion chased an enemy force into a fortified pagoda 5 kilometers southeast of Cau Ke, Vinh Binh Province. The commander split his force, sending two companies across flooded paddies to attack from the east as the rest of the battalion circled around to approach from the west. By 1130, enemy fire had pinned down the eastern wing. Disregarding American advice to bring the rest of the battalion back to support the eastern attack, the other two companies continued to advance around to the west until enemy fire pinned them down as well. At 1330, the insurgents killed an adviser while he was directing fire on an enemy machine gun. A request for artillery support went unmet, and the 4.2-inch mortar platoon accompanying the battalion fired only four rounds as it had brought little ammunition. Finally, the battalion commander asked for air support. The U.S. Air Force made ten sorties, losing one aircraft. Ten U.S. Army helicopter gunships also lent assistance. Late in the afternoon, the 9th Division ordered an M113 troop to help, but a recoilless rifle halted the unit in its tracks, damaging two carriers, 6 kilometers from the pagoda. The rangers’ ordeal ended about midnight when the enemy left the area. The South Vietnamese lost nine dead and twenty-seven wounded. The United States lost one dead soldier and an A–1E Skyraider. Enemy losses numbered twenty dead and seven captured weapons, with the insurgents reportedly carrying off forty more casualties.75 T he enemy’s summer offensive in IV Corps generate