The Battle of Minh Thanh Road While units from the 1st Division continued to hunt the Viet Cong, General DePuy gave Colonel Berry a special assignment: trick the en emy into ambushing an American convoy that seemed to be vulnerable and, when he took the bait, destroy him. Berry decided that the best place to spring the surprise was along the Minh Thanh Road, or Route 245, a provincial artery that branched off from Highway 13 below An Loc and meandered to the southwest. Signal intelligence seemed to sup port his decision, placing a regimental-size command post just north of the road and seven kilometers west of the highway, with, presumably, a lo t of troops nearby. "We had a fix" on the command post, DePuy recalled. The Viet Cong "were right there. They were obviously in an ambush position, either in it or moving into it."33 Berry decided to offer such a tempting target that an ambush would be inevitable. The deception plan would show that the 1st Division was sending a convoy of bulldozers and supply trucks, protected by a small armored cavalry contingent, from An Loc to Minh Thanh to repair the airfield there. In reality, the convoy-two cavalry troops, augmented by infantry-was formidable, as was the nearby reaction force-four infan try battalions ready to block or attack. The Americans would also set up two firebases within range, and the Air Force would have fighter-bomb ers poised to go on short notice. If the Viet Cong took the bait, they would bear the brunt of a lethal array.'" The plan unfolded beginning on 7 July. A three-battery mix of 105 mm., 155-mm., and 8-inc!1 howitzers moved to Artillery Base I just west of Highway 13 and about six kilometers southwest of An Loc, while a battery of lOSs formed Artillery Base II about eight kilometers south of " Rpt, USARV, 5 Feb 70, sub: History of the 273 VC Regiment, July 1964- December 1969, p. 11; ORLL, 1 May-31 Jul 66, 1st Inf Div, p. 10 and inc!. 17, p. 3; CHECO Rpt, PACAF, 30 Nov 66, sub: Operation EL PASO, pp. 15-19; AAR, Opn EL PASO II, 1st Bde, 1st In f Di v, 20 Aug 66, p. 7, Historians fi les, CM H; AAR, Opn EL 1','50 II / III, 1st Inf Di v, p. 23; Annual Hist Sum, ·1966, 2d 8n, 18th Inf, 28 Mar 67, p. 4, box 5, 81/ 469, RG 338, NARA. 3J AAR, Opn EL I'ASO II / III, 1st Inf Di v, an. C, p. 1; Interv, Albright with DePuy, 3 Apr 71, p. 47 (quoted words). " AAR, Opn EL PASO II/ III, 1st Inf Div, an. C, p. 1. 319 Stelllming the Tide An Loc and just east of the highway. In the meantime, Lt. Col. Jack L. Conn's 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, infiltrated in small groups to Minh Thanh, where it joined Maj. John C. Bard's 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, and an artillery battery. On 8 July elements of Lt. Col. Robert Haldane's 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, positioned themselves about twenty-five hundred meters east of Artillery Base 1. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Rufus G. Lazzell, stood ready at Quan Loi east of An Loc. To lure the enemy to the convoy, General DePuy used a suspected enemy contact. Certain that a Viet Cong spy or sympathizer on the prov ince chief's staff in Binh Long was leaking information on U.s. troop movements, DePuy made sure that the province chief and his entire staff heard the news that he planned to move construction equipment on 9 July to MinI) Thanh airfield.35 With the stage set, it was time for the bait. Task Force DRAGOON, con sisting of Capt. Nils P. Johannesen's Company B, 1st of the 2d Infantry, and Troops Band C, 1st of the 4th Cavalry, left An Loc airfield at 0700, 9 July. Captain Slattery's Troop C took the lead, while Capt. David S. Kelly's Troop B followed. Elements of Company B were interspersed throughout the columl1. Colonel Lewane, the task force commander, flew above the convoy in his helicopter. As the convoy took the turn toward Minh Thanh, artillery pounded areas along the road where the Viet Cong might be lurking, jets streaked overhead dropping napalm, and gunships prowled both sides of the road. Troop C's tanks fired at right angles to the column's progress. This was a powerful war machine, not a weak convoy. But Viet Cong units were not known for their tactical flexibility. If they were preparing for an attack, it was unlikely that they would change their plans (Mnp 25) 3. Around 1100 Captain Slattery's Troop C bumped into the base of an L-shaped ambush about four kilometers from the edge of the Minh Thanh Rubber Plantation. With Captain Kelly's Troop B close behind, Slattery moved up the L's stem, which lay to the north of the road. Most of the 272d Regiment had deployed there, but a few Viet Cong were waiting to the south of the American advance, possibly to obscure the direction of the main attack. They had maintained remarkable discipline through out the air and artillery attacks, waiting patiently until their targets were well within the killing zone. At 1110 the Viet Cong made their move. Troop C's 1st Platoon, led by 2d Lt. John K. Lyons, spotted two small groups of insurgents sprint ing across the road and fired on them. Enemy soldiers hidden along the road returned fire. In the minutes that followed, Lieutenant Lyons' men found themselves under crushing assault from automatic weapons, re 35 Ibid.; Interv, LtCoi Romje L. Brownlee and Lt Col William J. Mullen III with General William E. DePuy, 26 Mar 79, sec. 5, p. 31, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI. ,. AAR, Opn EI. PASO II /III, 1st In f Di v, an. C, p. 3; 911, Divisioll, p. 73. 320 .' , i'--' ARTILLIlRY BASE II BATILE OF MINHTHANH ROAD 9 July 1966 +-- Air Assault +---- Task Force Route - Enemy Attack EnemyW,thdrswsl 4 Mil81 I---.--'-,_-r'---,-_~----" o MAr 25 4 KiIOmfllers Stelllllling tile Tide coilless rifles, and mortars. The enemy had taken the bait. Word went to Colonel Lewane: This was i t.J7 When the attack began, Slattery's and Kelly's tanks and armored personnel carriers immediately angled to alternate sides of the road in a herringbone formation. Directly behind Lyon's 1st Platoon, which had taken the brunt of the fire, and Slattery's command group, Troop C's 2d Platoon deployed its vehicles along each side of the road, forming a stable center for the column. With weapons aimed to the north and south, the platoon opened fire. Within minutes of the attack, American artil lery and air strikes rained down north and south of the road. Huey gun ships added their firepower, scouring the brush nearby and cutting off possible escape routes.38 The armor elements still did not know the exact direction of the enemy's attack. Slattery ini tially reported that most of the fire was com ing from south of the road. After some moments, however, everyone realized that the threat lay to the north, so they concentrated their fire there. Meanwhile, Colonel Lewane ordered two platoons of Troop B for ward to join Troop C, strengthening Slattery. By 1230 the Viet Cong real ized that a successfu l assault would be impossible, and an hour later they were withdrawing." The battle was not yet over, however. Colonel Berry's infantry bat talions were reinforcing the American column and moving to block the enemy's departure. Within the first few minutes of firing Berry had or dered Major Bard's 1st of the 18th Infantry to push north of the road, the likely avenue of escape. He also directed Colonel Conn's 2d of the 2d Infantry, operating near Minh Thanh, to shift south of the artery as a reserve. Dense jungle reduced progress to a crawl. Aware of the slow pace, and soon realizing that the Viet Cong would not withdraw south ward, Berry had Conn's unit air-assault to the north. As the firing tapered off, 1st Division fo rces tried to draw the enemy into another fight. Between 1210 and 1230 Colonel Haldane's 1st of the 28th helicoptered to a landing zone north of the action and then headed southwest. Viet Cong sniped at the Americans, but did not try to stop their progress. Around 1330 air observers spotted large groups of insurgents mov ing northwest from the battlefield. Not all were fleeing, however, be cause a half hour later Haldane's men met a force of unknown size near the original ambush site. A two-hour firefight followed; then the enemy broke away. Haldane's men continued their sweep, moving to the out side edge of their fire support. Finding no Viet Cong, they turned back to hunt along the south side of the Minh Thanh Road. Again, they found nothing, so they settled into an overnight position just north of the road. 37 Annual Hist Sum, 1966, 1st Sqdn, 4th eav, p. 12. " Ibid., pp. 13- 14. " AAR, Opn EL ),,\50 II / III, 1st Inf Di v, pp. 3- 6. 322 The 1st Division's War A Vllmed-ollf Alllericall arlllored persollllel carrier, hif by recoilless riJle fire all fhe Millh Thallh Road, alld a dead Viet COlIg soldier Major Bard's 1st of the 18th had better luck. Moving slowly through the choking undergrowth toward the battle area, the battalion ran into a small group of Viet Cong shortly before 1600. Bard called for artillery and then charged the hunkering insurgents, killing 12. But the fighting slowed the unit's movement into a blocking position, so Colonel Berry assigned another ba tta lion to the task'O The job went to Colonel Lazzell's 1st of the 16th, which ai r-assaulted north of the action and immediately maneuvered south. Dense jungle and occasional sniping by small groups of Viet Cong slowed Lazzell's progress, and it took him longer than expected to reach his destination. When an enemy bullet wounded him during the move, he was replaced by Lt. Col. George M. Wallace. Colonel COIU1'S 2d of the 2d also had orders to help seal off the battle field. His men, the last of whom did not arrive until 1755, fo rmed a defense line near their landing zone. At the same time, Troops Band C joined a South Vietnamese armored personnel carrier troop and straddled the road where the original fighting had broken out. Despite the effort, the Ameri cans were unable to prevent the Viet Cong from slipping through the net." " Ibid., p. 6. " Ibid., p. 5. 323 S!elllIl1ing ti,e Tide The battle of Minh Thanh Road was over. General DePuy believed that he had inflicted another defeat on the 9th Divisioll and frustrated the monsoon offensive in northern III Corps. He also made much of the fa ct that, for once, the deceiver was deceived, stating: "I guess we took a lot of pleasure out of the fa ct that this was one of the few times that they did what we wanted them to do rather than us doing what they wanted us to do."" Colonel Berry agreed, noting that his troops had "accomplished exactly what was intended." They had lured the enemy into ambushing a hard-fighting target and had inflicted heavy damage with supporting fires and reaction forces'3 The 1st Division had killed 238 Viet Cong by body count and esti mated that another 300 might have died and been carried away. In ad dition, it had captured or destroyed a substantial number of weapons and supplies. The enemy, in turn, had killed 25 Americans and wOlmded 113 and destroyed four armored personnel carriers, two helicopters, and a tank" In particular, Berry's four batteries of artillery plus air support had turned in a remarkable performance, in part because of the now typical 1st Division planning for their use that had gone into the preparations for the battle. By prior agreement, the Minh Thanh Road had been the fire support coordination line. During the fighting's first phases U.S. forces stayed mostly on the road, providing a clear line for the artillery and allowing the guns to bring their full power to bear. In addition, Air Force F-5 Freedom Fighters had flown over one hundred sorties, rein forced by carrier-based fighter-bombers. Tactical air support was con tinuing to prove essential to the survival of U.S. ground forces." Over the next few days the 1st Division continued its hunt for the 272d and its sister regiments without success. All Viet Cong units in volved in the fighting over the past four weeks were gone, recovering in nearby base areas. On 13 July General DePuy terminated EL PASO II, leaving a single brigade in the area to prevent the enemy from return ing. Dubbed EL PASO III, the operation lasted until 3 September, w ith no significant results. In statistical terms, EL PASO II produced a body count comparable to the 1st Cavalry Division's Pleiku and first Binh Dinh campaigns. In com bination with a few other Army units and air power, DePuy's troops re ported 825 enemy killed and estimated another 1,249 killed, mostly from the 9tll Division. In retul'l1, the d ivision had lost 125 killed and 424 wounded. H In tent, Brownlee and Mullen with DePuy, 26 Mar 79, sec. 5, p. 31. "AAR, Opn EL PASO rI, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, p. 16. "AARs, Opn EL PASO rI / III, 1st Inf Div, p. 48, and EL PASO II, 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, inel. 5, p. 2. The enemy admitted losing 128 ki lled and 167 wounded. See 9th DivisioJl, p.180. 45 AAR, Opn EL PASO II/ III, 1st Inf Div, an. C, pp. 6-8; Annual Hist Sum, 1966, 1st Sqdn, 4th Cay, p. ]3; CHECO Rpt, PACAF, 30 Nov 66, sub: Operation EL PASO, pp. 21 23. 324 The 1st Division's Wnr Interrogations of captured soldiers indicated that during the operation the 9th Division had sustained a 50-percent loss in combat effectiveness4 • North Vietnamese and Viet Cong commanders had a different view. A North Vietnamese analysis acknowledged that the 272d Regiment had "suffered heavy losses" during the encounter, but blamed them mostly on the unit's "unsatisfactory organization of its withdrawal from the battlefield" rather than on American tactics and firepower.47 Whatever the reason, the enemy had been dealt a severe blow, and it would take some time to regroup. But the fi ght was far from over. DePuy had won partly because the Viet Cong had chose