Humor in a Near Death Experience | |
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One form of entertainment that I have always enjoyed is the old, silent, black and white comedies such as Keaton and Chaplin. The top of the list falls to the Keystone Cops. It seems that in every episode, at least once, there's someone who falls or is knocked into a mud hole. What tickles my funny bone is the manner in which they end up in the hole. But funnier yet is that stupid expression on the individuals face as he is spitting mud out. Unbeknownst to me at the end of February 1968, I would find myself in a similar situation, but the hole I ended up in did not have mud in it. At the end of December, 1967, the artillery unit that I was stationed with was moved to a Fire Support Base fourteen (14) kilometers west-southwest of Dak To, Vietnam. This base was called LZ Dogbone. When viewed from the air you could see how it got its name. Two bald, dirt knolls with a saddle in between situated on a valley plateau between two mountain ranges, due east and west. Three kilometers west of the base, the plateau plunged into a deep valley that butted up to the west range of mountains. The infantry perimeter around the bse was shaped just like the dog biscuit you see advertised on TV or on the grocers shelves, hence the name. At last, about 1 pm a chopper came in to pick up the last howitzer. I and my radio operator (I think it was Grasso from Seattle) were standing on the north east portion of the west knoll as the chopper lifted up this howitzer and left, again mortar rounds. I told the operator to get his stuff and get over to the other knowll so we could get on another chopper to get out of there. As he headed down the saddle I took off my gas mask and put it in its case. I started to turn to go pick up my stuff and it felt like someone with a big foot kicked me from the rear. The next thing I remember is that I'm spread eagle face down in a hole, spitting grit and dirt out of my mouth. My left arm is munb and as I looked at my elbow, its scraped up, so I figured I'd hit my "crazy bone" when I hit the ground. I looked back over my shoulder and about fifteen feet behind me is a hole (mortar round) still smoking. About then, Armstrong a kid in the ammo section jumped in the hole with me. His eyes were big as saucers, and fear was written all over his face. He asked me if I was hit, I told him that I didn't think so, the shock hadn't worn off yet. I'll never forget what Armstrong then said, "Sir, lets get the blank of this place". I told him to get over to the other knoll. I got up and walked over to get my equipment. Suddenly I realized that I couldn't pick anything up with my left arm. When I finally got back to Dak To, I was as green as the jungle fatigues I had on. Luckily the mortar fragment had gone clean through the meaty portion of the inside of my arm pit. Luckier still, by being uphill from where the round hit, I probably would have ended up paralyzed or worse, in a body bag. |  |
Tôi suýt là dân Nhật nếu di tản trong tháng 4/75!
- Nước mất thì nhà tan.
- Mình tính ko bằng Trời tính.
BÀI 1.
Trong đầu thập niên 1970, ba tôi làm đại lý tại VN cho hãng "K" Line, một trong hảng tàu biển hàng đầu của Nhật (K hình như là chữ tắt của Kawasaki). Công ty của ba tôi chuyên về stevedoring (thụ thác hàng hải, bốc xếp, v.v...). Công ty dùng trọn vẹn tầng trệt của tòa nhà 3 tầng của gđ tôi và trang bị những thiết bị điện tử tân tiến của Nhật như intercom để liên lạc giữa các phòng trong tòa nhà, teletype (viễn ấn tự, hoạt động 24/24 và 7 ngày 1 tuần) đễ nhận tin từ Nhật báo trước có tàu sắp cặp bến Sài gòn . . . với các cô thư ký xinh như mộng và cũng rất giỏi tiếng Anh . . . và vài người biết tiếng Nhật. (Trước 75, hàng Nhật tràn ngập tại SG, một phần do lính Mỹ dùng, một phần được CP nhập cảng. Phải nói Nhật phát triển hay làm giàu nhờ chiến tranh VN vì quân đội Mỹ xài toàn đồ Nhật từ máy ảnh, TV, radio cassette . . . đến xe GMC và xe bus quân đội hiệu Isuzu đều sản xuất tại Nhật . . .các chiến cụ hư hỏng được chở sang Nhật để tái chế dùng cho công nghiệp . . . Nhật là hậu cần (kho chứa bom đạn, quân trang quân dụng) của QĐ Mỹ cũng như nơi giải trí R & R của lính Mỹ.
Trong những ngày cuối tháng 4/75, trước sự sụp đổ liên tục của các tỉnh thành của miền Nam VN, người Nhật đã khẩn khoảng yêu cầu gia đình tôi, di tản đi ra khỏi nước bằng tàu lớn của họ. Ba tôi vì: chưa có kinh nghiệm với CS, tài sản quá nhiều, và đặc biệt, không nghĩ rằng miền Nam sụp đổ nhanh chóng và dễ dàng như vậy. Trong những ngày cuối cùng, trong khi nhiều ng rút tiền mua vàng thì ba tôi lại gửi tiền vào ngân hàng vì nghĩ rằng NH là nơi gửi an toàn nhứt trong thời loạn ly vì không sợ bị cướp. Và đúng như vậy, hệ thống NH của chế độ cũ chỉ "trút hơi thở cuối cùng" khi có lịnh đầu hàng của ông Dương văn Minh.
Cũng do gđ làm ăn với ng Nhật và thỉnh thoảng họ lên tầng hai thăm gđ tôi nên tôi có học vài câu chào hỏi của Nhật như: cám ơn (Arigato gozaimasu), xin mời (dozo), . . . và nhiều từ khác và đã gần như quên hết sau các năm tù.
Tôi nhớ, trong những ngày đầu tháng 5/1975, một đại đội quân CSBV đóng ở tầng ba của nhà tôi: khi họ vào VP của ba tôi, đặt tại một góc của tầng này thì thấy lá cờ VNCH trên bàn làm việc, họ bảo tôi vứt ngay lá cờ đó. Họ nói với tôi, đơn vị của họ đã gặp tổn thất khi đụng với sư đoàn 7 ngụy vì "chúng chuyên đánh đêm". Họ không ngờ đang nói chuyện với một quân nhân của SĐ này . . .
Khoảng hơn 1 tháng sau, tôi đi "học tập 10 ngày" theo thông báo của UB quân quản Sài gòn và chỉ trở về nhà vào một đêm tối sau gần SÁU NĂM. Đây là một ngôi nhà, số 122 đường Yersin quận 1, nhỏ hơn ngôi nhà cũ vì ba tôi phải bán để trả nợ cho tiền vay từ chế độ CŨ--trong khi tiền gửi trong NH của chế độ cũ thì mất trắng.
Chủ cũ của căn 122 Yersin là người Hoa, đã vượt biên. Lầu 2 của nhà này trải thảm--mà trước đó tôi chưa bao giờ thấy dù ba tôi làm thầu khoán xây biết bao nhà cửa!
...
Vì trước đó ba tôi đã hiến nhiều nhà như hai biệt thự ở làng ĐH Thủ Đức, Đà Lạt, Nha Trang, v.v... nên CP đã cho ba tôi chọn một căn để ở, trong đó có một căn ở đường Nguyễn Huệ quận 1--ba tôi ko chọn căn này vì nghĩ rằng nhà nước đâu còn cho dân buôn bán thì lấy nhà ở đường Nguyễn Huệ làm gì, ông đã chọn căn ở đường Yersin vì có bạn cũ ở cách đó vài căn. Ông này từng là trưởng ty cảnh sát công lộ ở SG.
Thôi đành tự nhủ : NƯỚC MẤT THÌ NHÀ TAN!
Thời đó chưa có phone tay: số phone 94.825 cũng dùng cho nhà tôi.
BÀI 2. ĐÁ NÁT VÀNG PHAI.
- Mất nước là mất tất cả.
- Mình tính ko bằng Trời tính.
Sau 75, nhiều gđ ở miền Nam ngậm đắng nuốt cay vì mất của mà ko dám khiếu nại, trong đó có gđ tôi.
- Sau ngày 30.4.75, GIÀU CÓ LÀ TỘI LỖI đến độ cho nhà/xe không ai dám lấy. Chỉ sau đó một thời gian mới có vụ mua bán nhà bằng giấy tay với giá vài chỉ vàng cho những người làm trong chính quyền tại địa phương*.
1/ Số là ba tôi có một biệt thự 2 tầng, rất đẹp ở số, hình như là số 6, đường Thi Sách Đà Lạt, màu vàng sậm, xem bản đồ 1. Trên lầu và từng trệt đều có lò sưởi, phòng ngủ, phòng tắm, sàn gỗ (moquette), v.v... theo kiểu Pháp. Các ông lớn của ngân hàng VN Thương Tín lên Đà Lạt đều ngụ ở nhà ba tôi (vì người quản gia ở nhà kế bên).
Sau 30.4.75, ba tôi định lên xem nhà nhưng ông quản gia nói, 'ông mà lên đây nhận nhà thì CS sẽ còng đầu ông vì tội tư sản mại bản, địa chủ, v.v...' (Ổng nói đúng vì thời đó GIÀU CÓ LÀ TỘI LỖI nên có cho cũng ko ai dám nhận). Sau đó 1 thời gian, một tên VC giờ-thứ-25 * nhưng gốc Nhân Dân Tự Vệ chế độ cũ có nhà gần đó, về SG gặp ba tôi và đề nghị 'bác lên đây nhận nhà thì ko được rồi, nay bác làm giấy tay bán cho cháu lấy vài CHỈ VÀNG'. Ba tôi nghe lời y và làm giấy tay, sau đó nghe nói y bán biệt thự này cho người khác và vượt biên sang Canada.
Tới khoảng năm 1988-89, ba tôi nhờ cô Vân lên ĐL gặp chủ nhà thì họ nói 'đã mua nhà này cả trăm CÂY VÀNG'. Thế là cô này buồn bả về báo cho ba tôi.
2/ Ba tôi cũng có một biệt thự cũ kiểu Pháp có đất chung quanh ở số 12 Quang Trung Nha Trang, màu vàng sậm, xem bản đồ 2, từ đó ra đường Độc Lập rất gần. Ba tôi cho ng láng giềng thuê sân trước để mở quán nhậu Lai Rai. Sau ngày 30.4.75, ba tôi cũng bán rẻ như trên, lấy vài chỉ vàng.
3/ Ba tôi có hai biệt thự ở Làng ĐH Thủ Đức, có vườn, hòn non bộ và HỒ BƠI; trước 75 cho Mỹ mướn, sau 75, ba tôi HIẾN cho địa phương VÌ SỢ. (Lô đất này là của KTS Ngô Viết Thụ, vì có công chỉnh trang đô thị thời ông Diệm nên ông Diệm cho 2 lô đất ở làng này, ông Thụ nhường lại cho ba tôi. Sĩ, em tôi, thường chở đám em vợ lên bơi lội ở hồ bơi này).
4/ Căn nhà 6-8 Đỗ thành Nhơn Q.4, bề ngang bằng ba căn phố, bề sâu dài hơn bề ngang. Gia đình ba tôi chỉ ở tầng 2 (có phòng khách rất lớn, bar rượu, các hội đoàn hay mượn để tiếp tân hay nhảy đầm) và tầng ba. Liên lạc từ phòng ngủ của ba tôi với VP ở lầu 3 và nhà bếp ở lầu 2 bằng intercom. Tầng ba cũng đặt VP của hảng thầu của ba tôi. Tầng trệt cho một cty thụ thác hàng hải và bốc xếp thuê - ba tôi có phần hùn trong cty này, hình như là Vimitraco. Cty cũng là đại diện duy nhứt của hảng tàu biển Nhật K-Lines. Các cô thư ký đẹp đẻ, nói và đánh máy văn bản bằng tiếng Anh để giao dịch với Nhật. Có máy viễn ấn tự (teletype) chạy ngày đêm để thông báo tàu sắp đến để chuẩn bị thợ thuyền bốc xếp.
Sau 75, CS tiếp thu các ngân hàng, thấy ba tôi "có vay tiền của NH chế độ cũ" nên bắt phải trả. Thế là ba tôi bán nhà cho một cty quốc doanh để trả nợ của chế độ cũ.
...
Nhờ "hiến" 2 biệt thự ở Làng ĐH nên nhà nước cho ba tôi được quyền chọn bất cứ nhà vắng chủ, theo danh sách của họ. Ba tôi nói, lúc đó có nhà mặt tiền đường Nguyễn Huệ nhưng ba tôi ko lấy vì nghĩ có buôn bán gì đâu mà lấy nhà ở đường NH, ông chọn 1 căn mặt tiền ở đường Yersin, quận 1 vì có bạn cũ ở cách đó mấy căn (ông này là trưởng ty CS công lộ VNCH). Khi tôi ra tù năm 1981, tôi về ở nhà này .
Tới cuối TN 1980, vì kẹt tiền, ba tôi lại bán nhà Yersin và mua 1 căn trong hẻm đường NT Minh Khai (tên cũ Hồng Thập Tự). Nhà ngang 4 mét nhưng sâu chỉ 12 m, ba từng. Tôi ở nhà này từ khi ra tù 1981 tới khi đi Mỹ năm 1994.
Sau khi ba tôi chết, má tôi và em gái mua 1 căn phố trệt ở chúng cư Nguyễn thiện Thuật . . .
Ngoài những nhà trên, toàn bộ kho xưởng, máy móc thi công (construction equipment) như cần câu, xe ủi đất, máy trộn hồ, v.v... đều giao cho nhà nước. Trước 75, ba tôi cho thuê những máy móc này khi không dùng tới, bên Mỹ cũng có dịch vụ cho thuê máy móc thi công (equipment rentals) như vậy.
* Nghĩa là ng gia nhập chính quyền CS sau ngày 30.4.75.
BÀI 3. Phong thủy giỏi cho lắm cũng thua mệnh Trời .
- Mình tính ko bằng trời tính.
Dù được thày bói giỏi Trần Hữu Ích, rất nổi tiếng ở Sài Gòn trước 75, coi phong thủy trước khi gđ tôi dọn vào ngôi nhà ba tầng, bề ngang bằng ba căn phố, ở số 6-8 Đỗ thành Nhân quận 4 Sài Gòn; nhưng cuối cùng, căn nhà này và nhiều nhà khác của ba tôi đã lọt vào tay VC sau ngày 30.4.75.
Thày phong thủy phán rằng :
1/ Mẹ tôi và các em tôi về nhà mới trước: chọn ngày thứ tư 4 tháng 10 1961 giờ tý, từ 0g15 tới 2 g sáng. (25 tháng 8 âm lịch).
2/ Bố tôi về nhà mới : thứ ba 10 tháng 10 1960 giờ tý, từ 0g15 tới 2 g sáng (ngày mồng 1/9 âm lịch).
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SJ May 12 2025.
Tài Trần
Ops while with 6RAR [Nov 24 1969 until ANZAC Day 25 Apr 1970] - Major Torrance
Maj EJ Torrance RNZIR 1970 [Gundersen]Operations ROSS and MARSDEN
By November 24th we had completed nine days of pre operational training and were ready to join the other companies of 6 Royal Australian Regiment (RAR)/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion that had been in theatre for just over six months. At that time they were deployed on Operation Ross in an Area of Operation (AO) known as Linton. On the 24th we air assaulted by Iroquois helicopters into An Thuan Bien with the task of re-searching the area of the padi fields south of Xuyen Moc. Everyone was very keen but at the same time cautious. We didn’t have to wait long before the first report of a contact was signalled to company headquarters. On our second day out Lt Bill Blair’s 1 Platoon was setting up an ambush when a lone Viet Cong (VC) surprised the sentry and was able to make his escape minus his pack. We don’t know who got the biggest fright but it quickly reinforced the need for constant alertness and the doubling of sentries to give soldiers the reassurance that they sometimes need to open fire. During the next five days all platoons found signs of the enemy in the shape of abandoned camps, caches and tracks. It was a good settling down operation and we were confident that we would give a good account of ourselves in the days ahead. The company was moved into Fire Support Base (FSPB) Discovery to prepare for the next operation.
Our next operation was code named Marsden and planned for the AO designated as Gulliver. The AO lay astride the main VC approach and resupply routes into the Phuoc Tuy Province from the North. Of particular interest to our Australian CO, Lt Col David Butler, was the Nui May Tao hills to the east of the allocated AO. For some years these hills had served as a logistic and supply area for the VC. The intelligence indicated that we might be onto something big in this area and all the W3 disembarking at FSPB Picton [Young]company commanders were keen to have a piece of the action. I remember being very disappointed when the company tasks were allotted. We were being sent off in the opposite direction to everyone else. Obviously, as far as the CO was concerned, this was a job for the old hands and the new boys would have to wait their turn. The operation began December 1st with our company being airlifted from FSPB Discovery to the newly established FSPB Picton in AO Gulliver.
W3 disembarking at FSPB Picton [Young]
When we landed FSPB Picton was still in the throes of being developed. Everywhere you looked there was a hive of activity. With so much air activity the area was a constant dust cloud. We all looked up in amazement through the haze when the first Sky Crane helicopter appeared carrying a bulldozer suspended on steel wire ropes. It looked like a giant praying mantis carrying some prey that it had plucked off the ground. Such was the down draft and dust that we decided to move our perimeter defence further away from the developing base.
Our initial direction of movement was to the southwest towards the Song Rai and Suoi Loc streambeds. The terrain was fairly flat but difficult to move through. The area had been defoliated some time earlier, probably with Agent Orange, and the secondary growth was thick and matted. It was very hot and shade was limited. The sooner we got into the shade afforded by the natural trees the better it would be for everyone. We didn’t have long to wait before the first incident reports started to roll in. Lt John Fisher’s 3 Platoon was first off the cab rank with reports of recent enemy presence and the finding of caches of grenades, mines, and Bangalore torpedoes (explosives in a long pipe and used to blow a path through wire fences and minefields). Once we reached the Song Rai we changed direction and followed the line of the stream to the north. It was on the Song Rai that we made our first major contact with the VC. 1 Platoon drew first blood and when the firefight was over three VC had been eliminated. Hardly a day went by without some form of incident. Our first medical evacuation by air in an Iroquois air ambulance codenamed “Dustoff” was for a soldier with a poisoned foot. Then there were the discovery of bunkers, camping equipment, ammunition, more mines, food and documents. There was never a dull day. On December 11th a reconnaissance patrol from 2 Platoon, led by Sgt Dave Heywood, came across an enemy camp late in the afternoon. They reported fires, the smell of cooking, and the sound of female voices and estimated there could be 30-40 occupying the site. We decided to attack at first light from one direction and use the artillery and helicopter gun ships to cover possible escape routes. The assault resulted in one VC killed and the capture of numerous weapons. The enemy had a well-concealed escape route along the dry riverbed and was probably making their escape by the time that we launched the attack. When it was all over the gun ships hovered over our position for some time and appeared reluctant to leave. Our company radio operator, Cpl Peter Glendinning, called me over to the radio and informed me that the pilots wanted to know whether they could get their hands on some of the AK47 rifles that we had captured. I promised them that I would look into it when we returned to base. I didn’t have the heart to tell the American pilots that trading captured weapons was a big no-no in the Task Force. We later found out that the group in the camp came from the Ba Long Rear Services and the Ba Long Province Procurement Section.
After the assault we continued to patrol and search the general area of the camp without finding anything of significance. As a result weentrance to VC cache [Philips] were redeployed by helicopter to an area east of the Nui May Tao hills to follow the movements of B Company. At the same time 1 Platoon was given a separate task of moving to FSPB Picton to assist with its security. We were tasked to check again and see if we could locate a reported prisoner of war camp and munitions factory. Intelligence information had suggested that some USAF aviators could have been held captive in the area. Documents that we found indicated that there could have been installations of these types in the area, but nothing of real importance was discovered. We stayed in this area conducting patrols and ambushing until December 27th when we were extracted by helicopter to Nui Dat. The extraction brought Operation Marsden to a close.
entrance to VC cache [Philip]
During Operation Marsden I recorded these general observations that at the time were interesting: There was no water available from local sources. As a result all water had to be airlifted in four-gallon plastic jerry cans. The days were very hot but the temperature plummeted at night. I had to use a blanket in the early hours of the morning! Days went by with much the same routine and as a result we had difficulty remembering whether it was Wednesday or Sunday. Our signallers always knew so they ran the company headquarters guessing competition as to which day of the week it was. Our field rations were excellent. On resupply day we would get a hot meal from our own cookhouse and a mixture of American and Australian dry rations to see us through to the next resupply. I was amused that even cigars were available for those who wanted them! On Xmas day we were in the field. War like activities were reduced to a minimum to take advantage of parcels provided by the good folk of Raglan in the Waikato.
On December 27th I spoke to the whole company soon after arriving back in Nui Dat. This is what I said taken word for word from my Field Message and Notebook (Aust Military Forces (AMF) AAB 64. “Congratulations on the way you have worked during the past 34 days of our first operation – and I include our cooks, Q staff and the base element. Perhaps not as successful as we would have liked, however judged on the standards set by our predecessors it is well up there. During this period of backslapping I wish to issue a note of warning. Far too many of you still look upon the operations as an exercise – you must be constantly aware of the VC threat. Talking, coughing, banging mess tins and unnecessary loud chopping and digging noises all too frequent. Make a point of cutting down the noise level. General security – bunching, sentries not alert and “coffee housing” – we need to improve. Handling of firearms and explosives – no unauthorised discharges so keep it up – look at the placement of grenades on your webbing. Speed of movement – a command problem to control but endeavour to cut down the speed of movement. Behaviour in base. War is a man’s game – it is a unique experience for us all – we are ambassadors for our country – therefore as we are a small group our behaviour both good and bad is noticed – be on your best behaviour in this base – obey the rules – take it easy – act like grown men and enjoy yourself without going overboard – don’t touch arms or ammo, pyrotechnics etc as they could lead to death – don’t steal vehicles. Only by being well behaved will we win the respect and admiration of the other companies and the Australians. Rumours – don’t spread them. Identity discs to be worn at all times”.
A Late Christmas2Pl waiting at Eagle Farm LZ control facility for the arrival of helicopters [Philip]
We didn’t have to wait long before being deployed again – all of two days! The operation was called Bluewater and the AO called Drury. The idea was for the battalion to keep a company in the area between December 30th and January 7th 1970. On the 30th we were airlifted into a landing zone (LZ) on the Suoi Lo O Lon from whence we began to search to the northeast. We had been led to believe that up to 100 VC had been sighted in the area. Well, after three days of continuous movement and no sign of recent VC occupation we were extracted to Nui Dat.
2Pl waiting at Eagle Farm LZ control facility for the arrival of helicopters [Philip]
We all felt that we had been on a three-day route march and were looking forward to the belated celebration of Christmas and New Year on 1 January 1970.
Our base element looked after us very well. There was plenty to drink and a great range of excellent food. Sgt Ted Gorman had mentioned to me that he had a couple of turkeys in the oven for our festive season lunch. Two turkeys for 120 hungry soldiers didn’t sound right so I asked him why so few turkeys? He invited me to the kitchen to have a look at the American birds in the oven. There before me were the biggest turkeys I have laid eyes on – there was only room for one per oven. And yes, there was plenty of turkey meat and other goodies to go around. We all had a very relaxing time and Paul Edmonds the NZ Ambassador in Saigon joined us for lunch. Even had some Deep Cove beer that wasn’t too bad!
Operation Napier
Our next deployment commenced January 10th and was named Operation Napier. On that day we air assaulted into a LZ in preparation for a battalion cordon and search of Ap Ngai Giao village on Route 2. By last light on January 11th the cordon had been closed and a detailed search of the village had been started. We were part of the outer perimeter and never got the opportunity to see the village or any of its inhabitants. My lasting memory of this part of the operation was slipping over crossing a stream and receiving a good soaking, including my spare clothes. As a result I spent an uncomfortable night in the cordon where we were not able to cook and carry out our normal night time routine. We heard later that the search of the village didn’t turn up anything of major significance. If anything it probably alienated the inhabitants and made them less likely to support us in the future. On the 13th we moved out of the cordon area by APC to an area to the west of FSPB Peggy.
Operation Napier continued without a break to February 12th. Little did we know at the outset that this deployment would be the most action packed of our tour. Hardly a day went by without an incident involving the VC. It was also the first time that we were to suffer severe casualties to our own personnel. The first major contact was made by 3 Platoon when they captured a platoon commander of a finance platoon and killed a VC. The next day the CO 1RNZIR in Singapore, Rob Williams, made an overnight visit to our company headquarters and his training warrant officer, who accompanied him, stayed on for an extra couple of days. This was by way of a reminder that routine visits went ahead in the field despite the fact that there were a number of VC about. A few days later a Chiu Hoi (former VC soldier who had agreed to work for the Vietnamese Government) joined us. They were particularly useful in giving us guidance about VC operational techniques and interpreting the significance of installations and equipment that we discovered. But of course we couldn’t always rely on the information that they gave. It was a matter of making our own judgment as to the veracity of their advice. This Chiu Hoi was sent off to join 3 Platoon.
At this time the platoons were operating independently some two to three thousand metres from the Coy HQ base which was static. The reason for Coy HQ to remain in one place was twofold. Firstly, the area that we have been allocated is not large. Secondly, a fair proportion of the area is rubber estate, some of which is still being tapped. Strangely enough we had difficulty communicating with each other in rubber with the signals reluctant to “bounce” off the rubber trees. By staying put we are able to deploy larger aerials above the rubber tree canopy. We had sufficient personnel at Coy HQ to mount a fighting patrol most days and there was never any shortage of volunteers. It was a good way of keeping everyone sharp and alert and there was always the chance of making a contact with the VC! Back in Nui Dat there was little for the Assault Pioneers to do so they were assigned to our company for tasking. Purely by chance I put them in an area that would prove to be very active and, as a result, was chided by my platoon commanders for having allotted them such a productive zone. They were allocated call sign 62 and made 13 eliminations while under our command. Our Coy HQ base location covered a natural clearing that we used as a LZ [landing zone]. A machine gun post was permanently manned and its arc of fire covered the LZ. Shortly after an Iroquois had left from the LZ two VC were seen to approach the LZ making directly for the company base. They were engaged and killed. One of them was carrying a US Army issue hand torch in near brand new condition. One of the torch filters had been hand carved in the shape of a star and his name was on a piece of paper wedged into the base. I still have that US Army/VC torch.
A 24-hour truce was put in place in Vietnam to coincide with Chinese New Year or Tet as it is called. During that period there was no gunfire, no aircraft movement and no patrolling. We were pretty sure that the VC would have used the truce to move about unhindered – that is, if they knew a truce was in force! On January 28th 1 Platoon had a contact which resulted in our first casualties. During the contact a soldier threw a grenade which rebounded off a tree and resulted in four men being hit by fragments. They were evacuated to the Australian 1 Field Hospital at Vung Tau. Fortunately none of them were seriously hurt and all returned to their platoon some time later. This embarrassing accidental wounding of our own soldiers was partly offset by the fact that we captured a VC in the same action.Pte David Wright RNZIR - DOW 19 March 1970
Our good fortune wasn’t to last much longer. January 30th was a sad day for us all. At 1120 hours Bob Upton’s 2 Platoon made contact with armed VC and wounded one. They followed up the blood trail and were ambushed by a group of about six. This resulted in two of the platoon being seriously wounded. David Wright died March 19th in Australia from the wounds that he had received January 30th and Dave McLeod was evacuated to NZ with gunshot wounds to his thigh and arm. Two VC were killed in this action. The serious wounding of two of our soldiers made us all take a reality check. I reemphasized to the platoon commanders the need for constant vigilance and careful appreciation of the situation before committing soldiers to the pursuit of VC.
Pte David Wright RNZIR - DOW 19 March 1970
The next major incident involved 3 Platoon on February 8th. A VC group made contact with the last man in the platoon patrol formation. The VC had obviously mistaken our soldier for one of theirs and tried to start up a conversation in Vietnamese. Our “tail end Charlie” quickly summed up the situation and replied with rifle fire. When the firefight was over three VC lay dead. A check of the equipment and rations that they were carrying revealed Australian issue mosquito nets and ration packs. It would be fascinating to do an audit to determine how they came to have these Australian sourced items. On February 12th we were back in Nui Dat preparing for our move to the Horseshoe.
I took the opportunity as soon as we had returned to Nui Dat to speak to the entire company. The notes that I wrote before the talk are as follows: “Speak for 10 minutes then invite questions. I want to talk about the two wars – a. VC b. Liquor and the consequence of over indulgence. first the VC. Congratulations everyone on the way you have worked on the past operation. Over 20 eliminations to the company – 30 if the Assault Pioneers total added. Own Casualties – Two. Pray that Dave McLeod and David Wright will make rapid recovery to full fitness in short time. Not a time to sit back and gloat. Overconfidence only leads to fall in standards and security. 2nd Liquor. 90% of non-operational problems stem from over indulgence in alcohol. It should be your aim, for it is mine, to ensure that as few members as possible get themselves into trouble. Blind eye turned over Xmas/New Year. As we are in an operational zone certain rules must be obeyed – drink only in the canteens provided – drinking in lines strictly forbidden”.
About this time I wrote an assessment of the situation in Vietnam and this is what I penned. “We are reasonably optimistic about the outcome of the war. There are not all that many VC about now and those that are around have very low morale and exist by stealing food from the villages as a lot of them are close to starvation level. Around us at the moment are about 10-12 battalions made up of Aust, ARVN and US forces. Apparently the US and ARVN forces have next to no VC in their areas so they have come here to try and catch what few we have. The VC are expected to mount a Tet offensive any day but it is difficult to see how he can possibly succeed. We have a number of ex VC working for us as scouts. They are really amazed and naturally delighted to find out that the US and Allied Forces aren’t as sadistic as they had been led to believe”.
Horseshoe Deployment.extinct volcano with collapsed wall at south end gave the feature the 'horseshoe' name. Dark plantation top left is Nui Dat [Young]
As planned we deployed to the Horseshoe Hill on February 15th. This heavily defended hill feature some 15 kilometres SE from Nui Dat was to become our home for the next six weeks at least.
extinct volcano with collapsed wall at south end gave the feature the 'horseshoe' name. Dark plantation top left is Nui Dat [Young]
Besides being responsible for its defence we were to undertake the training of ARVN soldiers – something very different from the routine patrolling and ambushing that we had been doing. We had quite a challenge in store. The Horseshoe was a dormant volcano “horseshoe” in shape and only 80 metres high. However, as the surrounding country is as flat as the proverbial billiard table the view was unsurpassed and of course the hill dominated the surrounding countryside. On arrival we took under our wing the following personnel and equipment: A Squadron 1 Armoured Regiment (Australian) x 15 [people] with three Centurion tanks, Administration Company drivers x 2, 1 Aust Training Team Vietnam (1ATTV) x 1, 104 Signals Squadron x 3, 110 Signals Squadron x 2, 131 Divisional Locating Troop with locating radars x 13, US Searchlight team x 5, 17 Construction Squadron x 1, 1 Field Squadron x 44, Support Company Mortars x 10, Interpreters x 6, Assault Pioneers x 5 and US Army 105mm tracked howitzer battery x 95.
On February 18th we were forewarned to stay under cover while a spray aircraft flew overhead and dosed the area with a DDT mixture to combat the mosquitoes that were spreading malaria. I recall telling everyone on the Horseshoe about the spraying operation and it was accepted at the time as a routine anti malarial spraying mission. Some years later I was surprised to read that some of the soldiers had claimed that the spray was the defoliant Agent Orange that is linked to some serious health problems that ex Vietnam soldiers suffer. The next day Major John McGuire (V5 Company) arrived to have a look around during the course of his pre deployment reconnaissance.
We were not expecting the ARVN soldiers until February 28th so we decided to undertake some refresher training on a roster basis with, at any given time, one platoon away patrolling. The refresher training consisted of range practices and zeroing of personal weapons and the M79 grenade launcher, dry training and shooting of the M60 machine gun, handling of flares and tripAPC adapted to roll over & detonate anti-personnel mines [King] flares, firing the Claymore mines, movement and formations in open country, badges of rank of US, ARVN and Police Forces, checking of civilian identity cards and work papers and medical first aid. The live firing was conducted on a small firing range just outside the perimeter on the north side. It was very basic and had been used by a number of companies before us.
APC adapted to roll over and detonate anti-personnel mines [King]
The weather continued to be very hot and dry. The engineers were operating a quarry on the Hill and the dust from that operation was tremendous. We couldn’t get away from the dust and it was everywhere. A brick red film covered everything. We kept the dust moving by wiping the tables and desks constantly, shaking and brushing ones clothes and giving the bed a few whacks before retiring. mineclearing on the Horseshoe perimeter [Young]
mine clearing on the Horseshoe perimeter [Young]
Some years earlier a minefield had been laid from the Horseshoe to the coast a distance of about 9000 metres. All military manuals state that a minefield can only be effective if it is covered by sight and by gun fire. This minefield was out of sight most of the time and as a result the VC started to lift the mines and use them against us. The decision was then taken to remove the minefield. Lifting the mines by hand was out of the question so it was decided to have the Engineers use their plant and ingenuity to clear the minefield. They modified an APC to assist with the clearing. Extra plates were welded to the sides and underneath and a boom attached on which they threaded large used tyres. The APC moved backwards and forwards through the minefield with the mines being detonated by the tyres. From the Horseshoe we could see and hear this clearing being carried out and it continued throughout our stay there.
Training Vietnamese
B Company 5 Cavalry Regiment 18 ARVN Division soldiers arrived at the Horseshoe as planned and we set about to train them for operations against the VC. They were all very “green” and apart from their very young commander who had been trained at the Dalat Military Academy in Vietnam their military knowledge was minimal. We decided that the best way to teach the ARVN was to integrate our soldiers into their organisation and to show them by example. This method of instruction soon paid off. The ARVN platoons had two very successful contacts when ambushes set up on nearby tracks were initiated. Their morale took a leap with these successful operations and they were keen to prove that they had the making of a competent unit. The Task Force Commander was keen to prove that that it was feasible to move a force north of the Nui Dat base in APC’s avoiding the main rARVN troopers on the range outside the Horseshoe [King]oad known as Route 2. He saw the requirement to return the ARVN Company to their base at Xuyen Loc as an ideal opportunity to test whether an alternative route was possible. I was given the task and set about to plan our move that we estimated would take five days. During our overnight stops aggressive patrolling and ambushing would be routine. My lasting memory of the trip was seeing soldiers being knocked off the backs of APC’s by overhanging branches, being for ever tossed about, the constant replacement of thrown tracks and the remarkable outcome being that no one was killed or seriously injured. We got to our destination having had some successful overnight contacts on the way. The ARVN Company was on a high and most grateful for the training that they had received. We heard later that they had had a very successful first operation in which they eliminated 64 VC without any own casualties. Fortunately, we were allowed to return to the Horseshoe via Long Binh where we made an overnight stopover. The American base had a perimeter of about 80 kilometers and included three airfields. We had never been in such a vast establishment and we were all eyes and ears. The Americans were very generous and plied us with clothing and equipment that we had only dreamed about. They explained that once military items leave the continental US they are “written off” so they could afford to be generous and there were no soldiers more deserving than their Kiwi and Aussie mates!
ARVN troopers on the range outside the Horseshoe [King]
Our month of training and operations with the ARVN had gone off well but it wasn’t without incident. On March 11th an unexploded M79 grenade on the makeshift firing range was trodden on by one of the ARVN soldiers. Two ARVN soldiers and one of our own received minor shrapnel wounds and were medevac'd to Vung Tau to 1 Aust Field Hospital. They all returned to duty within a few days. In another incident an ARVN soldier lost part of a finger as he sat eating his meal in the ARVN mess tent. How he came to lose part of his finger was a complete mystery. His company commander, through the interpreter, told me not to worry as the soldier had probably cut off the finger so that he could be repatriated home. The soldier was in good spirits and he didn’t want to make too much of the incident. A short time later word came through that one of the soldiers manning the machine gun overlooking the entrance to the Horseshoe had had an accidental discharge during routine maintenance of his personal weapon. The CSM Doug Mackintosh and I did an investigation of the unauthorised discharge and came to the conclusion that the bullet had been responsible for the loss of the finger. We located the small hole in the side of the tent where the bullet had entered and from the line of trajectory assumed that the bullet had ended up embedded in the ground. I charged the soldier responsible and to this day we are thankful that no one was killed.
With the ARVN gone we got back to the routine that we had prior to their arrival. One platoon would be out on patrol/ambushing, one platoon securing the feature and one platoon on other tasks like providing protection for the engineers doing the minefield clearing. We were getting tired of the Horseshoe with its dust and the boredom of manning sentry posts. We were approaching the two-month mark, which was a longer period than any other Company had had on the feature. Nevertheless, we kept up the intensity with our operations and were rewarded with some successful contacts. In one very successful ambush 1 Platoon eliminated 5 VC who were part of a resupply party making their way towards Dat Do. We were very pleased to see the advance party of C Company 7RAR who had been assigned to take over from us. We were looking forward to rejoining 6RAR for the last part of their final operation in Vietnam.
After the Horseshoe
We left the Horseshoe on April 15th and the next day we were aboard APC’s heading 75 kilometres to the southeast to join 6RAR. It was very hot and dusty so we were pleased that we didn’t have to walk! It was forecast that it would stay very hot (5-10 deg C above normal) until the start of the rainy season next month. The operation was called Townsville in AO Auckland and yet again we thought that we were being sent on a wild goose chase well away from where other elements of the battalion were operating. As it transpired we had a very active few days. Some weeks earlier I had been shown an overlay of the province with all the contacts/incidents marked on it. It was interesting to note that a lot of the contacts had been taking place in the same areas and therefore those locations might be worth looking at again. When we had taken the ARVN Company back to Xuyen Loc we had spent a couple of days in the Courtenay Rubber patrolling and ambushing spots where there had been earlier contacts. This technique had proved very successful. Therefore, I decided to give it another try on this operation. When we reached our operational area I directedThe AC-47D was equipped with three 7.62mm SUU-11A Gatling Miniguns mounted in the fifth and sixth windows on the port side of the fuselage and in the aft passenger/cargo door area. Approximately 16,500 rounds of ammunition was carried on a typical mission. For night missions, the aircraft carried approximately 48 MK-24 Mod 3 flares. Each flare could last up to three minutes and produce a light magnitude of two million candlepower. The delivery system was extremely simple, the loadmaster armed and dropped each flare out the cargo door when the pilot signaled by flashing a cargo compartment light. [internet] the platoons to areas of earlier activity. In no time at all we were onto a good thing and all the platoon commanders were delighted with my crystal ball gazing! We even had an incident where enemy escaping from a platoon contact were engaged by elements of another platoon. The troop of APC's stayed with us in the Coy HQ static ambush location while the platoons patrolled on foot. One moonlit evening an USAF “spooky” aircraft was overhead. These aircraft were assigned to roam the skies looking for enemy targets to engage with their Gatling type guns. They could rain down a wall of bullets that would be disastrous to anyone without overhead protection. We couldn’t believe our ears and eyes as a hail of lead rushed towards us and pinged Airspeed during attack maneuvers was normally 120 knots indicated air speed (KIAS). With the Miniguns firing at a rate of 6,000 rounds per minute, aerial coverage was provided over an elliptical area approximately 52 yards in diameter, placing a projectile within every 2.4 yards during a three-second burst. [internet]off the armoured plating of the APC's. It took some time to get a message to the pilot that he was engaging friendly forces. When he realised his mistake he was mortified. He had become disoriented and thought that he was firing into an area some ten thousand metres away! Luckily we were all able to take cover in the APC's so no one was hurt. We heard later that the pilot was court-martialled and sent back to the USA in disgrace.
The AC-47D was equipped with three 7.62mm SUU-11A Gatling miniguns mounted in the fifth and sixth windows on the port side of the fuselage and in the aft passenger/cargo door area. 16,500 rounds of ammunition was carried on a typical mission. For night missions, the aircraft carried 48 MK-24 Mod 3 flares, each flare could last up to three minutes and produce a light magnitude of two million candlepower. The delivery system was extremely simple, the loadmaster armed and dropped each flare out the cargo door when the pilot signalled by flashing a cargo compartment light. Airspeed during attack manoeuvres was normally 120 knots. With the Miniguns firing at a rate of 6,000 rounds per minute, aerial coverage was provided over an elliptical area approximately 52 yards in diameter, placing a projectile within every 2.4 yards during a three-second burst. [internet]
During this last week of 6RAR operations two incidents resulted in the death of two officers. Lt Stan Kidd, a platoon commander with V4 Company was killed on April 17th and a few days later Lt Tony Garland, an Aust Artillery Officer who had worked with us for our first two months was killed in a mine incident. We were all very sad about these deaths but as I wrote at the time our concern for the living keeps us from getting too preoccupied with the more unsavoury aspects of war. see further comment here
On the night of our return to Nui Dat we had the V4 Company officers and senior NCO over to our lines for a drink. We took the opportunity to farewell them and catch up with the advance party of the new V5 Company. The next day we paraded with 6RAR and heard the CO, Lt Col David Butler, make his farewell speech. There were over 1000 men on parade so it made for quite an awesome sight. We had an early start on ANZAC Day for the dawn service which was followed later by a parade for the Task Force Commander to officially farewell 6RAR from Nui Dat – quite a lot of parades in a short space of time. Then the next day something very different - we were Reaction Company. This meant that we had to be ready to go at 15 minutes notice to anywhere in the province. Fortunately we weren’t called out so we were able to stand down for a couple of days before taking off to the Badcoe Club in Vung Tau.
At the end of our first six months in Vietnam we had spent 10 weeks on operations, 9 weeks on the Horseshoe, 2 weeks on operational preparation, 1 week as the Ready Reaction Force and 3 weeks on stand down/ Vung Tau/ Nui Dat. What was in store for us during the next six months?
more: "Ops while with 2RAR [May until Nov 1970]"
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