MỌI NGƯỜI ĐỀU BÌNH ĐẲNG TRƯỚC PHÁP LUẬT

The Tien Giang Tactical Area

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Markey repeated MACV’s criticism of the government’s shoddy treatment of the Self Defense Corps. He likewise advocated a robust information campaign, first to motivate soldiers to fight for their country, and second, to get them to treat their countrymen with respect, for their “conduct with the civilian population, especially during the conduct of operations, leaves much to be desired.”28 Adding to the usual challenges in correcting these entrenched deficiencies was the fact that between November 1963 and March 1964, the 7th Division had gone through five different commanders. The revolving door had to stop and Markey wished that MACV had the power to prevent the Vietnamese from removing officers, particularly when the primary reason for the change was political.

During the first half of 1964, the autonomous Tien Giang Tactical Area south of Saigon

had been one of the most contentious places in South Vietnam. The summer mon

soons brought no relief, as the number of enemy incidents in the third quarter of 1964

increased by 52 percent over the previous quarter. As was the case with other divi

sions, the 7th Division, which controlled the area, tried to achieve a balance between

pacification and offensive operations, but the need to react to enemy initiatives often

disrupted this effort.40

Using the Cushman concept as a model (see Chapter 6), by July, the division had its

own pacification cadre trained by division and province personnel. One American and

six Vietnamese MEDCAP teams actively treated the rural sick. Division senior adviser

Col. Edward Markey credited the division’s educational efforts in getting tactical units

to be more sympathetic to the population. By July, the division had completed 106 of

the 405 New Life hamlets planned for 1964.

he division relied heavily on artillery to perform its mission. Howitzers covered

85 percent of the Tien Giang area and helped repulse 218 of 243 attacks in July. During

that same month, government pieces expended more than 6,000 rounds in harassment

and interdiction fire that produced 200 known casualties. In one incident, 105-mm.

howitzers fired fifty rounds based on information provided by a civilian, killing

twenty-four insurgents. The enemy evacuated about seventy additional casualties

before troops arrived.41

U.S. Army Aviation also played a key role. The division typically ran three to

four “Eagle flights” per week, in which U.S. helicopters ferried Vietnamese soldiers

of platoon or company strength over the countryside in search of insurgents. The

modus operandi was for Colonel Markey and the division G–3 to take to the air in a

command-and-control helicopter. If they saw something suspicious, they would send

in a helicopter bearing a squad from the division’s reconnaissance company. During a

typical flight, they would drop five to ten squads to search multiple locations. If contact

occurred, they could call in the rest of the company, or even the divisional reserve—

two airborne battalions assigned to Tien Giang because of the area’s heavy fighting.

he technique was successful, but during one landing, Markey triggered a booby trap

that injured his leg. He returned to the United States for treatment.42

On 22 June, the 1st and 3d Airborne Battalions were on a search-and-destroy

operation in support of the 7th Division near Bang Lang, Dinh Tuong Province,

72 kilometers southwest of Saigon when they ran into the 261st and 514th PLAF

Battalions. Enemy fire downed four U.S. Army helicopters, including one carrying the

commander of U.S. Army Support Command, General Joseph Stilwell. The general and

all the aviators emerged unscathed. Meanwhile, helicopter gunships lent their support

to the fight, at one point accidently inflicting nine casualties on the South Vietnamese.

he combat below was intense, with the paratroopers charging the enemy multiple

times. Hostile fire killed or wounded all nine platoon leaders in the 1st Battalion, but

the unit never wavered. The enemy retreated at the end of the day. The paratroopers

lost twenty-nine killed and eighty-nine wounded. Known enemy losses amounted to

ifty-eight killed, twenty-six fighters captured, and twenty weapons. One adviser called

the battle a “little classic of a military operation.” The Army awarded a Bronze Star and

two Silver Stars to three advisers who fought in the action. One of the men who earned

the Silver Star was Capt. James J. Lindsay, a future general.43

On 18 July, nearly one hundred U.S. helicopters ferried troops to Cao Lanh, Kien

Phong Province, 80 kilometers south of Saigon. The massive operation did not achieve

much, but the enemy shot down a helicopter that was evacuating wounded soldiers.

he crew of the downed aircraft fought the enemy for about ten minutes before

Headquarters of the advisory detachment to the 7th Infantry Division, My Tho,

Dinh Tuong Province

U.S. Army

43. Memo, Abn Bde Advisory Det for Former Members, Abn Bde Advisory Det, 10 Apr 1965,

sub: Airborne Brigade Newsletter, 3, Historians Files, CMH; Quote from UPI, “Two Elite Red Outfits

Routed,” The Daily Banner, 23 Jun 1964, 3.

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more helicopters arrived to rescue them. Troops also deployed to guard the downed

helicopter and a team of U.S. technicians. The craft flew out on its own power the

following day.44

At 0100 on 20 July, the revolutionaries launched a major attack of their own.

hey massed three battalions—the 261st, 263d, and 514th—and one company each of

recoilless rifles, machine guns, mortars, and sappers to attack Cai Be district town in

western Dinh Tuong. About 300 soldiers, drawn from a regimental headquarters and

local territorials, defended Cai Be. The insurgents penetrated the town and inflicted

much damage, particularly on the housing of Regional Forces families. They killed

twelve defenders and forty dependents. Another forty defenders and forty civilians

suffered injuries. The insurgents withdrew at 0500.45

he government responded with five battalions backed by armor to pin the enemy

against the Mekong River, 5 kilometers west of Cai Be. Two battalions saw the most

action. The 8th Airborne Battalion occupied Cai Be and then continued through sugar

cane and rice paddies until 1545 when enemy fire hit two of its companies. The lead

company advanced an additional 90 meters when heavy automatic weapons fire finally

stopped it. The second company faltered after enemy fire killed its commander and

radio operator. U.S. Army gunships fired 130 rockets as close as 45 meters in front of

friendly troops to keep the enemy at bay. The battalion eventually withdrew at 1900.

Meanwhile, at 1600, insurgent soldiers entrenched along a tree line pinned

down a company from the 6th Airborne Battalion. After some delay, the

battalion commander accepted his adviser’s recommendation to attempt a double

envelopment, but the move was too shallow, and the pincers hit the enemy’s front

rather than its flanks. At 1830, the battalion launched a frontal assault, assisted

by two armed U.S. Army Mohawk aircraft and several gunships. Unfortunately,

the gunships mistakenly hit the 6th Airborne, unnerving the unit, which then

recoiled into a perimeter for the night. After Vietnamese helicopters refused to

evacuate the casualties, a U.S. Army medevac helicopter arrived to remove twelve

wounded soldiers. The senior adviser to the Airborne Brigade, Col. John G.

Hayes, expressed disappointment at the lack of aggressiveness exhibited by the

airborne battalions that day. Thirteen Vietnamese paratroopers died and fifty-two

were wounded, as was one American. The enemy lost forty-six dead and a dozen

ighters taken prisoner. An adviser speculated that the allies had probably caused

another hundred casualties. Military Region 2 contended that by attacking Cai

Be it had made the South Vietnamese fearful of attacks on other district capitals.

Consequently, observed the command, “They are forced to split up to reinforce the

posts, and the morale of their troops is more apathetic than before.”46

he politico-military struggle continued in August. Pacification advanced

modestly. The number of constructed hamlets rose to 155, MEDCAP teams treated

20,000 sick civilians, and the division completed 18 civic action projects. Against

this backdrop, the killing continued. On the tenth, Col. Huynh Van Ton reacted

to information that a PLAF company was located 15 kilometers west of My Tho by

44. AP, “Viet Reds Wound 7 Advisers,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 21 Jul 1964, 1–2.

45. AP, “40 Viet Civilians Slain,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 22 Jul 1964, 1; Cao Minh et al., Quan Khu 8:

Ba Muoi Nam Khang Chien (1945–1975) [Military Region 8: Thirty Years of Resistance War (1945–1975)]

(Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1998), 500.

46. David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta,

1930–1975, vol. 1 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 640–43 (quote on 642); Reuters, “Reds Kill 30

Children,” New York Times, 21 Jul 1964; AAR, 7th Div Reaction to VC Attack on Cai Be, Abn Bde

Advisory Det, 3 Sep 1964, item 9, roll 36, MACV Microfilm, Library and Archives, CMH.

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sending out four battalions (one airborne, one infantry, and two ranger) and an M113

troop supported by a platoon of 105-mm. howitzers. The armored carriers and the

airborne and infantry battalions advanced south from Highway 4 while the rangers

attacked from east to west from a position 5 kilometers to their south. All units made

contact, and an airstrike helped to kill forty-two enemy combatants. The insurgents

evacuated an estimated seventy more casualties. The South Vietnamese lost sixteen

dead and forty-one wounded.47

Ten days later, revolutionaries sprang a trap of their own. On 20 August, they

overran Phu Tuc post in Kien Hoa Province, 10 kilometers northwest of Ben Tre, killing

seven, wounding fifteen, and capturing the rest of the post’s thirty-six-man garrison.

he insurgents then burned the post and assaulted a nearby hamlet. These attacks were

primarily a pretext for goading the South Vietnamese into sending a relief force. The

government took the bait, sending elements of several battalions, which the insurgents

declined to engage. Instead, they waited until government troops were departing Phu

Tuc along a forest road, hitting the column when its guard was down. Caught in the

ambush were 360 soldiers from the 41st Ranger Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 12th

Infantry. The fighting lasted for more than an hour, with the 514th PLAF Battalion

launching repeated bayonet charges heralded by bugles.

Four Americans participated in the combat. 1st Lt. James M. Coyle was severely

wounded but nevertheless kept fighting. Capt. Bryan C. Stone found himself firing

a Browning automatic rifle in four directions as the enemy closed in around him.

1st Lt. William D. H. Ragin grabbed a machine gun from a dead soldier and fired

it point-blank at sixty advancing enemy soldiers. Moments before, he had thought

they were friendly because they were clothed in government uniforms. Assisted by

Sfc. Tom Ward, Stone, Coyle, and Ragin covered the retreat of the surviving South

Vietnamese. By the time the battle was over, the insurgents had killed 85 South

Vietnamese soldiers, wounded 60, and captured 122 weapons, with another 91

government soldiers missing. All four Americans died in the engagement. General

Westmoreland attended their memorial service, and the Army posthumously

awarded them Distinguished Service Crosses.48

Stung by the calamity, U.S. helicopter gunships attacked insurgents exiting the area

by boat that night as more troops rushed to the scene. Allied forces failed to contact the

enemy on the twenty-first, and on the night of 21–22 August, gunships again took to the

night sky looking for sampans. On the morning of the twenty-second, seven battalions,

two armored cavalry troops, and naval forces tried to encircle the enemy in Kien Hoa’s

Ham Long District. The first attempt failed, but Ton quickly redeployed his men by

boats and U.S. helicopters to catch the elusive foe. In the ensuing battle, 7th Division

artillery fired 3,222 rounds, and the Vietnamese Air Force flew 10 fighter-bomber

sorties. When the smoke cleared, the allies had killed ninety-eight PLAF soldiers

and captured forty-three prisoners and thirty-seven weapons. Agents reported that

the enemy buried another 200 dead and evacuated 300 wounded. Government losses

amounted to seventeen killed and forty-five wounded. Nevertheless, IV Corps adviser

Col. Sammie Homan thought that commanders were becoming cautious because of

47. MACV, Monthly Evaluation, Aug 1964, A–5, A–9, A–10, Historians Files, CMH; History, 2d Air

Div, Jul–Dec 1964, vol. 2, 67–68; Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 22 Aug 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing,

Intel Collection files, MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP.

48. GO 8, HQDA, 9 Mar 1965, Library and Archives, CMH; History, 2d Air Div, Jul–Dec 1964, vol.

2, 3, 72–74; AP, “Reds Rip Viet Force, 4 Americans Among 120 Dead,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 23 Aug

1964, 1; AP, “4 Advisers Went Down Fighting,” Pacific Stars & Stripes, 24 Aug 1964, 1.

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the action on the twentieth and other recent ambuscades. To restore their confidence,

he pledged to use U.S. Army helicopters to escort all future troop movements.49

An example of the promised support occurred on 5 September, when five UH–1B

gunships from the 120th Aviation Company supported a 7th Division operation in

Dinh Tuong. The entrenched insurgents hit three of the gunships, compelling one

to return to base. The gunships in turn killed sixty revolutionaries and wounded an

estimated forty more. Thirty-four enemy soldiers surrendered after the onslaught.50

September brought new men to the top echelons of the 7th Division. Brig Gen.

Nguyen Bao Tri became division commander, and MACV appointed Col. Robert A.

Guenthner to advise him. Guenthner had received the Silver Star and Bronze Star

medals for bravery at Salerno and Anzio, Italy, during World War II. Before coming

to Vietnam, he had served as an adviser to the Nationalist Chinese army. Guenthner

continued Markey’s strong support for civic action, psychological warfare, and the

Chieu Hoi program. He had great respect for the U.S. Operations Mission personnel

working in the field. He also emphasized intelligence, most of which came from the

agent networks run by district, province, and division entities. The chief problem

with the networks was that information traveled slowly, as the agents, fearful that the

insurgents would detect them if they used radios, preferred to send reports by courier.

Information provided by civilians was also useful but tended to be exaggerated in

Guenthner’s opinion.51

As had previous commanders and advisers, Tri and Guenthner exploited the in

depth knowledge of Major Binh, who had accumulated extensive files over his seven

years of service in the division’s G–2 section. This data sometimes allowed Binh to

predict where the enemy might move next, and Guenthner established a joint planning

committee to target specific enemy units based on the data.52

Even if pattern analysis helped find enemy units, the division had little luck

penetrating the National Liberation Front’s political apparatus. The Front employed

strict security measures, and because torture and death awaited anyone it discovered to

be a government agent, few were willing to attempt to penetrate enemy organizations.

As Americans had found elsewhere, Guenthner discovered that even after the

government had identified a clandestine Front cadre, “there is not an aggressive

program designed to eliminate these persons.” When a suspect did fall in to the

military’s hands, the colonel considered South Vietnamese interrogation procedures

to be poor and accompanied by “unnecessary shouting, shoving, hitting, and kicking

of the captive.”53

49. Talking Paper, ODCSOPS, 30 Aug 1964, sub: Southeast Asia Briefing, Intel Collection files,

MHB, MACJ03, RG 472, NACP; MACV, Monthly Evaluation, Aug 1964, 3, 5, 6, A–7, A–8, A–9; Memo,

Brig. Gen. William E. DePuy, MACV J–3 for MACV Ch of Staff, 30 Aug 1964, sub: Summary of

Accomplishments, 24–30 Aug 1964; both in Historians Files, CMH.

50. History of the 120th Avn Co (Air Mobile Light), 1 Apr 1964–31 Dec 1964, 14, Historians Files,

CMH.

51. Memo, Col. Robert A. Guenthner, Senior Adviser, 7th Inf Div for DCSOPS (Dep Ch Staff for

Ops), 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers Returning from Field Assignments, encl. 3, 11, Historians

Files, CMH.

52. Memo, Guenthner for DCSOPS, 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers, encl. 3, 8–9; Memo, Maj.

R. L. Sears, G3 Adviser, 7th Inf Div, for members of G3 Advisory Section, 13 May 1965, sub: Organization

and Functions, G3 Advisory Section, table C1, 4; Memo, Maj. Edwin J. Dorand, G2 Adviser, 7th Inf Div

Advisory Det for Senior Adviser, 7th Inf Div, 8 Jul 1965, sub: Summary of 7th Division Intelligence

Activities, 8; both in Historians Files, CMH.

53. Memo, Guenthner for DCSOPS, 22 Jul 1965, sub: Debriefing of Officers, encl. 3, 8–9, 10 (quotes).

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September brought one other development in addition to the change in command.

On 5 September, the Joint General Staff abolished the Tien Giang Tactical Area. It

transferred the 7th Division and four of the five provinces it supervised to IV Corps

and assigned Long An Province to III Corps. Over the summer months, the division

and its provinces had managed to bring about 50,000 more people into the most secure

category of government control, but the allies conceded that the majority of the area’s

residents, nearly one million people, remained under the domination of the National

Liberation Front.

Battles in III Corp