Plei Me Under Siege As a first step in his highl ands campaign, General Man targeted the Special Forces camp at Plei Me, some forty-five kilometers southwest of Pleiku City, certain that his enemies would fi ght to protect a fa cility criti cal to the defense of the province capital. Using two North Vietnamese regiments, Man devised a three-part plan. In the first phase the 33d Regi ment would surround and assault the camp, applying enough pressure to compel the South Vietnamese to send reinforcements. In the second phase the 32d Regimel1t, positioning itself on the only road a relief col unm could take, Route 6C, would ambush and destroy that force. In the third phase the 32d would join the 33d in a final overwhelming push against the camp. Man's troops began preparations for the operation in mid-September. One month later, at sunset on 19 October, the time set for the Plei Me a ttack, they were read y.'O The Plei Me garrison was a varied group, consisting of twelve Ameri can advisers, fourteen South Vietnamese Special Forces troops, and a ClOG unit of over four hundred Montagnard tribesmen. Of these, eighty-fi ve Montagnards and two Americans were on a mission fifteen kilometers northwest of the camp. Another forty Montagnards were con ducting security ambush patrols in its immediate vicinity, and forty more were mmming two listening posts located about two kilometers to the north and southwest of the facility. The remaining members of the garrison were inside the campll The 33d Regiment began its attack at approximately 1900, when some of its troops opened fire on a Montagnard patrol. At 2200 a company of the 33d's 1st Bnttnlion overran the outpost southwest of the ca mp. At the same time, the camp itself came under mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Shortly after midnight the North Vietnamese attacked from the north and northwest. Around 0100 they began a second push from the south and east, penetrating the camp's wire barriers before being turned back. These initial assaults set the pattern for the next several days. Keeping 9 In tervs, Holmes with Larsen, 26 Oct 76, sec. 5, p. 6 (quotation), Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI, and SandstrLlITI vvith Larsen, 11 Mar 70, p. 11, Historians fil es, CMH. ]0 Wesfem Highlnllds, pp. 23-24; Boyle and SamabriCl, "Lure and An1bush," p. 4; Vinh Loc, Wily Pie; Me? (Pleiku, 1966), p. 59. " Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct-31 Dec 65, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, incl. 1, p. [I], Historians files, CMH . 99 Stel1lming the Tide Plei Me Special Forces calllP IInder attack one battalion in reserve, the 33d Regiment poured small-arms, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire into the camp while carrying out intermittent probes and larger attacks to maintain the pressure. In response, the ad visers called in fighter-bombers, and the South Vietnamese commander, as Man had expected, requested reinforcements." The first air strikes arrived around 0400 on 20 October, fo llowed by more than a hundred others over the next twenty-six hours, along with airdrops of food and ammunition. During the late evening hours of the twentieth Vinh Loc authorized the creation of a relief force, consisting of elements from an armored cavalry squadron, a ranger battalion, and a few other units. The contingent was to take Highway 14 south to Route 6C and then to turn southwest toward Plei Me. Since the assembly of the task force might take several days, the dispatch of interim reinforce ments seemed imperative. The commander of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Col. William A. McKean, who was responsible for organizing the relief effort, proposed a parachute drop into the camp, but Vinh Loc's American adviser, Col. Theodore D. Mataxis, rejected the idea. After some discussion, all concerned agreed tha t it would be 12 Ibid., pp. [1- 2]; AA R, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cay Div (A mbl), 4 Mar 66, p. 18, box 10, 67A/5216, RG 319, NARA; Weste,." Higillnllds, p. 32; Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations (CHECO) Rpt, Pacific Air Porces (PACAF), 24 Peb 66, sub: The Siege at Plei Me, pp. 2-3, copy in Historia ns files, CMH. 100 Illto the Highlnnds safer and quicker to land a force by helicopter near the camp and send it overland to Plei Me. One hundred and seventy-five men, the majority South Vietnamese rangers, received the assignment. Colonel McKean selected Maj. Charles A. Beckwith, an expert in long-range reconnais sance, to lead them.13 Beckwith's men landed about five kilometers northeast of Plei Me on the morning of 21 October. They had worked their way to a point near the camp by nightfall, but Major Beckwith decided to delay the final leg of the journey until the fo llowing morning because of the like lihood that the facility's defenders might mistake his men for the enemy in the darkness and open fire. Shortly after sunrise on the twenty second Beckwith instructed his men to "run like hell ... to the gates."I' Surprising the enemy, the move succeeded. Once inside the camp, Beckwith became the senior officer present and took command. Meanwhile, dispatch of the main relief force had been delayed by a disagreement between Vinh Loc and Colonel Mataxis. Mataxis wanted a larger relief force to counter the ambush everyone expected. Vinh Loc, however, considered the attack at Plei Me a possible ruse to lure South Vietnamese forces away from Pleiku, thus leaving the city unprotected. He wanted to do nothing until the situation at Plei Me became clear. On 22 October General Larsen broke the stalemate by promising Vinh Loc that American troops would ensure the safety of Pleiku if he would com mit his reserves to Plei Me's defense. A short while later the South Viet namese general increased the size of the relief force by two battalions. Larsen reciprocated by ordering General Kinnard to dispatch a battal ion task force, including an artillery battery, to Pleiku. Kinnard sent his division's 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, under the command of Lt. Col. Earl Ingram (see Mnp 7).15 Then, seeing an opportunity for combat, Kinnard obtained permis sion on 23 October to transfer his entire 1st Brigade to Pleiku. Under acting commander Lt. Col. Harlow G. Clark, elements of the brigade began the move that day by Caribou transport. By evening Colonel Clark's headquarters, the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and two artillery batteries had joined Colonel Ingram's force at the province capital. Clark's unit had two missions: to provide artillery support for the relief column and to prepare a reaction force for commitment to the camp. In the meantime, Vinh Loc added one of his two reserve battalions to the relief force, increasing its size to some fourteen hundred men. Follow ing the column's departure for Plei Me, he moved his other reserve bat 13 Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 62- 72. See also Quarterl y Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct-31 Dec 65, 5th SF Gp, 1st SF, inc!. 1, p. [2]. 14 Beckwith and Knox, Delfa Force, p. 67. 15 Coleman, Pleikll, p. 76; AAR, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cav Div, p. 18; Interv, SandstruITI with Larsen, 11 Mar 70, p. 13; Vinh Loc, Wily Pie; Me? I p. 61; Kinnard, "Victory in the la Drang," p. 73. 101 Stemmillg tlte Tide PLEI ME AND THE PURSUIT 19 October-6 November 1965 ~ Ground Movement +-_ _ Air Assault Enemy Retreat Engagement ELEVATION IN METERS ! o ! ,.. 500 800 and Above 10 Miles ~~~~J-"r-----' 10 Kilometers • MAP 7 talion, a ranger unit, by helicopter several kilometers west of what he suspected would be the ambush site. It had orders to sweep toward the highway on command.'· On the twenty-third the relief column made its way cautiously, ap proaching the edge of the suspected ambush zone around 1700. Armored personnel carriers and M41 tanks headed up the column, with infantry on the flanks and with supply trucks and a small infantry force trailing about two kilometers behind. Around 1800 small-arms, recoilless rifle, and mortar fire tore into the leading elements of the task force. The tanks and armored personnel carriers wheeled to the right and left of the road,