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Saturday, June 28, 2025

 “There was only one MIKE Force battalion activated as it was, by COMUS MACV [Commander U.S. MACV] letter order,” said retired Brigadier General Stringham. “The order was sent from 5th Group that directed C-3 to form one reaction force battalion.19 Time was critical. A-302 was given less than two weeks to train the new unit. Filling the ranks with new recruits, issuing equipment, and training had to be accomplished by 22 June 1965. After that date, the battalion was to be on call to respond to emergencies in the hotly disputed III CTZ

LTC Miguel “Mike” de la Peña
LTC Miguel “Mike” de la Peña

“The unit was named the MIKE Force. This came from LTC Miguel ‘Mike’ de la Peña. ‘Mike’ was his code name,” said Stringham.20 The MIKE Force was composed of three 150-man companies. With 348 Company as the nucleus, A-302 recruited Nungs to fill the ranks of the other companies. Nungs were also hired to form the reconnaissance platoon.21 There were no Vietnamese CIDG or Special Forces in the first MIKE Force. The strong family ties among the Nungs made the recruitment easy and virtually eliminated the security problems.

“Nepotism was the name of the game,” said Stringham. “Most of the older Nungs were ex-French Foreign Legion [French Colonial Army] guys and they would vouch for the younger ones. It was kind of a ‘self-vetting process,’ but we didn’t have a lot of time.22 New recruits were given a cursory physical by the A-302 team medics to check for diseases and fitness. The troops were issued one set of tiger-stripe fatigues and M-2 carbines. Each company weapons platoon had three M-1919A1 .30 caliber machine guns and three 60 mm mortars.23 For communications, they were issued PRC-25 radios. The equipment for the MIKE Force came from the 5th SFG logistics base at Nha Trang. Being on the MIKE Force was economically advantageous for the troops. MIKE Force Nungs were paid considerably more than their CIDG counterparts. Each man received 6600 piastres ($55.00) per month as opposed to the 1500 p ($12.00) that was the CIDG monthly wage.24

A U.S. Air Force B-52D Stratofortress dropping 500 pound bombs over Vietnam. The first MIKE Force mission was to conduct a bomb damage assessment following a B-52 strike.
A U.S. Air Force B-52D Stratofortress dropping 500 pound bombs over Vietnam. The first MIKE Force mission was to conduct a bomb damage assessment following a B-52 strike.

“I was the battalion commander,” said Stringham. “Two NCOs [non-commissioned officers] worked with each company. The guys lived with their companies.25 A-302 focused on marksmanship and infantry small-unit tactics to get the MIKE Force operational. That test came on 22 June 1965.

“The first mission was to take three 6-man teams by helicopter into an area between Highway 13 and the Michelin Rubber Plantation to do a [bomb damage] assessment after a B-52 strike,” recalls Stringham. “The B-52s came out of Guam, but due to a mid-air collision during refueling, they missed the target. All they did was knock down enough stuff to make it hard to move through. We got inserted, ran around a while and got picked up. Not a great beginning for the MIKE Force.26 The real combat evaluation came a month later.

On 19 July 1965, orders came from the C detachment to prepare a MIKE Force company to aid the SF team at the CIDG camp at Bu Ghia Map under attack by two VC battalions. The Mike Force mission was to evacuate the SF team and their CIDG strikers. 348 Company, the new 4th Nung company and the recon platoon were trucked to Tan Son Nhut Airbase to load two C-123 aircraft for the flight that night to Bu Ghia Map near the Cambodian border.27

The bunker on the northwest corner of the camp at Bu Dop prior to the battle. Strong defensive bunkers were located on all four corners of the camp perimeter. The VC destroyed this bunker with recoilless rifle fire.
The bunker on the northwest corner of the camp at Bu Dop prior to the battle. Strong defensive bunkers were located on all four corners of the camp perimeter. The VC destroyed this bunker with recoilless rifle fire.
The ruins of the Special Forces team billets at Bu Dop after the battle. Little was left of the camp after the heavy Viet Cong assault.
The ruins of the Special Forces team billets at Bu Dop after the battle. Little was left of the camp after the heavy Viet Cong assault.
Aerial view of the CIDG camp at Bu Dop. The Viet Cong attacked the north and west sides of the camp. The SF billets were in the center of the camp.
Aerial view of the CIDG camp at Bu Dop. The Viet Cong attacked the north and west sides of the camp. The SF billets were in the center of the camp.

“We went in very light, no rucksacks or food. We landed and it was very dark,” said Stringham. “ I ran off the plane and straight into a ditch. When we got into the camp, I put my people on the perimeter, and got theirs [the camp occupants] off the wall, since they were likely compromised. There was half an A detachment and a handful of strikers there.28 There was little contact the rest of the night. The arrival of the MIKE Force had prompted the VC to switch their main attack to the nearby Bu Dop camp. In the early morning the C Team ordered Bu Ghia Map abandoned and the MIKE Force to move to reinforce Bu Dop.

At daylight on 20 July, the C-123s began to arrive to evacuate the CIDG, the MIKE Force and their SF advisors. Stringham’s team placed explosive charges throughout the camp, on a five-minute delay. After the MIKE Force was flown out to Song Be, CPT Stringham and two NCOs, SSG William Parnell and SSG Elliot Wilson, were to detonate the charges.29 A helicopter picked up the three Americans, just before the explosives went off. Bu Dop had been hit hard the previous night. Two SF advisors and twenty CIDG strikers had been killed.30


USASF Organization

USASF Organization

Arriving at Bu Dop in the afternoon of 20 July, Stringham positioned his MIKE Force personnel on the south side of the camp perimeter and relocated the CIDG defenders onto the north side. The assumption of the A-302 members was that a good percentage of the CIDG strikers were turncoats and would give the VC access to the camp. The enemy did attack the camp again that night, but could not penetrate the defenses. In the morning, CPT Stringham, now in command at Bu Dop, sent a reconnaissance platoon under SSGs Parnell and Collins out to find the enemy. Since Bu Dop was very close to the Cambodian border, locating the enemy escape route to safety across the border was not difficult. But there were still problems inside the camp.

The team discovered that the claymore mines emplaced on the perimeter defenses had been reversed during the night aiming them into the camp. Based on this, the SF soldiers began to thoroughly interrogate the civilians and CIDG personnel in the camp. Not surprisingly, there was a mass exodus from Bu Dop. With the MIKE Force to strengthen the defenses and the Communist sympathizers driven off, the threat of further attack was minimal.31 This established the pattern for the employing the MIKE Force that was used at Dong Xoai.32

The Nungs, whose loyalty to the Americans was unquestioned, became a major force multiplier. By November 1965, CPT Stringham and most of the members of A-302 involved in the formation of the original MIKE Force had completed their tours and rotated back to the United States. Their legacy, the III CTZ MIKE Force composed of Nungs, was the genesis of one of the most successful Special Forces initiatives in the Vietnam War.

Drawing on the combat experience and loyalty of the Nungs, the original MIKE Force was a reliable, well-trained hard-hitting combat unit that could be rapidly moved to reinforce or relieve CIDG camps when they were attacked by overwhelming enemy forces. The Special Forces C Teams in the other Corps Tactical Zones were soon directed by 5th SFG Headquarters to establish MIKE Force battalions.33 These MIKE Force elements caused a major shift in CIDG operations from defense to offense against the VC and NVA. Mobile Strike Groups and other variations of the original MIKE Force model quickly proliferated enabling Special Forces and their CIDG strikers to aggressively seek out and destroy the enemy.

The purpose of this article was to show how several successful VC attacks against the III CTZ CIDG camps prompted the organization of the first MIKE Force. The loyal, high-quality Nungs of the 348th Company became the nucleus of the MIKE Force. LTC Miguel “Mike” de la Peña, whose nickname became associated with the original MIKE Force battalion, saw his moniker attached to reaction forces countrywide. As the Vietnam War evolved, the term “MIKE Force” came to be applied to a variety of units at different times and places. Future articles will examine the varied and complex history of these units that were labeled MIKE Forces.

The author would like to thank BG (ret) Joseph Stringham, LTC (ret) Miguel de la Peña, the other former MIKE Force members who reviewed the article, and especially Roy Jacobson for their invaluable assistance.

 Under the new structure, the MAAG assigned between fifty 

and seventy advisers to each Vietnamese corps: ten advisers at the 

corps’ headquarters, twenty at the corps’ regimental training area, 

ten to twenty with the corps’ logistic command, and nine advisers 

with each of the corps’ infantry divisions. The typical division 

advisory detachment consisted of a senior adviser (colonel or 

lieutenant colonel) and five majors or captains acting as advisers 

in the areas of artillery, signals, ordnance, engineering, and staff. 

Rounding out the division advisory team were three regimental 

advisers (lieutenant colonels or majors), each of whom advised 

one of the division’s three infantry regiments.

 By the fall of 1961, despite the reorganization of the MAAG 

and the increase in American advisory support, the situation in 

39

Vietnam continued to deteriorate. Communist attacks were up 

and government casualties, despite some isolated tactical victo

ries, were on the rise, with 477 dead in September and 539 killed 

in October. The provincial capital of Kontum Province had been 

overrun the night of 1–2 September by one thousand Communist 

f

 ighters—two battalions of khaki-clad, well-armed soldiers that 

just a few days before had infiltrated into the South from Laos. 

Viet Cong agents in the garrison opened the gates and the enemy 

easily penetrated the security positions without firing a shot. They 

mauled a Civil Guard relief force and ambushed the 1st Battalion, 

40th Infantry, quick reaction force as it tried to reach Kontum the 

following day. It was not until late on 4 September that two battal

ions arrived from the general reserve in Saigon, over two hundred 

miles away. Only then was the government able to retake the city. 

By that time the Communists had disappeared, only to strike more 

outposts in Darlac, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Phuoc Vinh, and 

along the Laotian border. 

A rattled Diem, aware now of the extent of the danger, asked 

for a bilateral defense treaty with the United States and requested 

combat troops to assist him, a position he had refused to take for 

many years. However, Washington was not ready to take these steps. 

Instead, the MAAG recommended that the United States provide 

additional radios to facilitate coordination between Vietnamese 

units, a critical capability for units in far-flung counterinsurgency 

operations or those conducting rapid reaction operations. In 

addition, the United States sent a special U.S. Air Force unit, the 

4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (nicknamed Jungle Jim), 

under the code name Farm Gate. Although the squadron’s initial 

mission was to train the South Vietnamese Air Force, American 

pilots quickly began flying combat missions, always being careful 

to take along a South Vietnamese passenger to maintain the 

f

 iction that the planes were merely on training missions. Finally, 

President Kennedy sent an interagency team led by his personal 

military adviser, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to take a fresh look at 

the situation in Vietnam.

 General Taylor, accompanied by Walt Rostow of the National

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https://web.archive.org/web/20130120010553/http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/076/76-1/CMH_Pub_76-1.pdf